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1. The context: The European patent system has been affected by substantial changes over 
the past three decades, which have raised vigorous debates at different levels. The main 
objective of the present dissertation is to contribute to these debates through an exploratory 
analysis of different changes in patenting practices – in particular the way applications are 
drafted and filed to patent offices –, their drivers, association with the value of patents, and 
potential impact on the patent system. The coming essays are therefore empirical in their 
essence, but are inspired by economic motivations and concerns. Their originality is threefold: 
it resides in the novelty of the main questions discussed, the comprehensive database 
specifically built to address them, and the range of statistical methods used for this purpose. 
The main argument throughout these pages is that patenting practices have significantly 
evolved in the past decades and that these developments have affected the patent system and 
could compromise its ability to fulfil its economic purpose. The economic objective of patents 
is to encourage innovation and its diffusion through the public disclosure of the inventions 
made. But their exploitation in the knowledge economy has assumed so many different forms 
that inventors have supposedly developed new patenting and filing strategies to deal with 
these market conditions or reap the maximum benefits from their patents. The present thesis 
aims at better understanding the dimensions, determinants, and some potential consequences 
of these developing practices. 
 
2. The evolution: Chapter 2 presents a detailed descriptive analysis of the evolution in the 
size of patent applications filed to the European Patent Office (EPO). In this chapter, we 
propose two measures of patent voluminosity and identify the main patterns in their evolution. 
Based on a dataset with about 2 million documents filed at the EPO, the results show that the 
average voluminosity of patent applications – measured in terms of the number of pages and 
claims contained in each document – has doubled over the past 25 years. Nevertheless, this 
evolution varies widely across countries, technologies and filing procedures chosen by the 
applicant. This increasing voluminosity of filings has a strong impact on the workload of the 
EPO, which justifies the need for regulatory and policy actions. 
 
3. The drivers: The evolution in patent voluminosity observed in chapter 2 calls for a 
multivariate analysis of its determinants. Chapter 3 therefore proposes and tests 4 different 
hypotheses that may contribute to explaining the observed inflation in size: the influence of 
national laws and practices and their diffusion to other countries with the progressive 
globalization of patenting procedures, the complexification of research activities and 
inventions, the emergence of new sectors with less established norms and vocabularies, and 
the construction of patent portfolios. The econometric results first reveal that the four 
hypotheses are significantly associated with longer documents and are therefore empirically 
supported. It appears however that the first hypothesis – the diffusion of national drafting 
practices through international patenting procedures – is the strongest contributor of all, 
resulting in a progressive harmonization of drafting styles toward American standards, which 
are longer by nature. The portfolio construction hypothesis seems a less important driver but 
nevertheless highlights substantial changes in patenting practices. These results raise two 
questions: Do these evolving patenting practices indicate more valuable patents? Do they 




4. Measuring patent value: If the former of these two questions is to be addressed, measures 
are needed to identify higher value patents. Chapter 4 therefore proposes a review of the state 
of the art on patent value indicators and analyses several issues in their measurement and 
interpretation. Five classes of indicators proposed in the literature may be obtained directly 
from patent databases: the number of countries in which each patent is enforced, the number 
of years during which each patent has been renewed, the grant decision taken, the number of 
citations received from subsequent patents, and whether it has been opposed by a third party 
before the EPO. Because the former two measures are closely connected (the geographical 
scope of protection and length of maintenance can hardly be observed independently), they 
have been subjected to closer scrutiny in the first section of chapter 4, which shows that these 
two dimensions have experienced opposite evolutions. A composite measure – the Scope-
Year Index – reveals that the overall trend is oriented downwards, which may suggest a 
substantial decline in the average value of patents. The second section of chapter 4 returns to 
the five initial classes of measures and underlines their main patterns. It appears that most of 
them witness the well-known properties of patent value: a severe skewness and large country 
and technology variations. A closer look at their relationships, however, reveals a high degree 
of orthogonality between them and opposite trends in their evolution, suggesting that they 
actually capture different dimensions of a patent’s value and therefore do not always pinpoint 
the same patents as being the most valuable. This result strongly discourages the reliance on 
one of the available indicators only and opens some avenue for the creation of one potential 
composite index of value based upon the five indicators to maximize the chances of capturing 
all potentially valuable patents in a large database. The proposed index reflects the intensity 
of the signal provided by all 5 constituting indicators on the potential value of each patent. Its 
declining trend reflects a rarefaction of this signal on average, leading to different plausible 
interpretations. 
 
5. The links with patent value: Based upon the six indicators of value proposed in chapter 4 
(the five classical ones plus the composite), the question of the association between filing 
strategies and the value of patents may be analysed. This question is empirically addressed in 
chapter 5, which focuses on all EPO patents filed between 1990 and 1995. The first section 
presents a comprehensive review of the existing evidence on the determinants of patent value. 
The numerous contributions in the field differ widely along three dimensions (the indicator of 
value chosen as dependent variable, the sampling methodology, and the set of variables tested 
as determinants), which have translated into many ambiguities across the literature. Section 2 
proposes measures to identify different dimensions of filing strategies, which are essentially 
twofold: they relate to the routes followed by patent filings toward the EPO (PCT, accelerated 
processing), and to their form (excess claims, share of claims lost in examination), and 
construction (by assembly or disassembly, divisional). These measures are then included into 
an econometric model based upon the framework provided by the literature. The proposed 
model, which integrates the set of filing strategy variables along with some of the classical 
determinants, is regressed on the six available indicators separately over the full sample. In 
addition, the sensitivity of the available results to the indicator and the sampling methodology 
is assessed through 18 geographic and 14 industrial clustered regressions and about 30 
regressions over random samples for each indicator. The estimates are then compared across 
countries, industries and indicators. These results first reveal that filing strategies are 
indicative of more valuable patents and provide the most stable determinants of all. And 
second, they confirm some classical determinants in their positive association with patent 
value, but highlight a high degree of sensitivity of most of them to the indicator or the sample 
chosen for the analysis, requiring much care in generalizing such empirical results. 
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6. The links with patent length: Chapter 6 focuses on one particular dimension of patent 
value: the length of patents. To do so, the censored nature of the dependent variable (the time 
elapsed between the filing of a patent application and its ultimate fall into the public domain) 
dictates the recourse to a survival time model as proposed by Cox (1972). The analysis is 
original in three main respects. First of all, despite the fact that renewal data have been 
exploited for about two decades to obtain estimates of patent value (Pakes and Schankerman, 
1984), this chapter provides – to the best of our knowledge – the first comprehensive analysis 
of the determinants of patent length. Second, whereas most of the empirical literature in the 
field focuses on granted patents and investigates their maintenance, the analysis reported here 
includes all patent applications. This comprehensive approach is dictated by the provisional 
rights provided by pending applications to their holders and by the legal uncertainty these 
represent for competitors. And third, the model integrates a wide set of explanatory variables, 
starting with the filing strategy variables proposed in chapter 5. The main results are 
threefold: first, they clearly show that patent rights have significantly increased in length over 
the past decades despite a small apparent decline in the average grant rate, but largely due to 
the expansion of the examination process. Second, they indicate that most filing strategies 
induce considerable delays in the examination process, possibly to the benefit of the patentee, 
but most certainly to the expense of legal uncertainty on the markets. And third, they confirm 
that more valuable patents (more cited or covering a larger geographical scope) take more 
time to process, and live longer, whereas more complex applications are associated with 
longer decision lags, but also with lower grant and renewal rates. 
 
7. Conclusions: The potential economic consequences and some policy implications of the 
findings from the dissertation are discussed in chapter 7. The evolution of patenting practices 
analysed in these works has some direct consequences for the stakeholders of the patent 
system. For the EPO, they generate a considerable increase in workload, resulting in growing 
backlogs and processing lags. For innovative firms, this phenomenon translates into an 
undesired increase in legal uncertainty, for it complicates the assessment of the limits to each 
party’s rights and hence of the freedom to operate on a market, which is precisely what the so-
called ‘patent trolls’ and ‘submariners’ may be looking for. Although empirical evidence is 
lacking, some fear that this may result in underinvestment in research, development or 
commercialization activities (e.g. Hall and Harhoff, 2004). In addition, legal uncertainty is 
synonymous with an increased risk of litigation, which may hamper the development of 
SMEs and reduce the level of entrepreneurship. Finally, for society, we are left with a 
contrasted picture, which is hard to interpret. The European patent system wishes to maintain 
high quality standards to reduce business uncertainty around granted patents, but it is 
overloaded with the volume of applications filed, resulting in growing backlogs which 
translate into legal uncertainty surrounding pending applications. The filing strategies that 
contribute to this situation might reflect a legitimate need for more time and flexibility in 
filing more valuable patents, but they could also easily turn into real abuses of the system, 
allowing some patentees to obtain and artificially maintain provisional rights conferred by 
pending applications on inventions that might not meet the patentability requirements. 
Distinguishing between these two cases goes beyond the scope of the present dissertation, but 
should they be found abusive, they should be fought for they consume resources and generate 
uncertainty. And if legitimate, then they should be understood and the system adapted 
accordingly (e.g. by adjusting fees to discourage some strategies, raising the inventive step, 
fine-tuning the statutory term in certain technologies, providing more legal tools for patent 
examiners to reject unpatentable applications, etc.) so as to better serve the need of inventors 
for legal protection in a more efficient way, and to adapt the patent system to the challenges it 
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“Patents should draw a line between the things which are 
worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive 
patent, and those which are not. Patents are, after all, 
government-enforced monopolies and so there should be 




1.1 Purpose of the thesis 
The patent system is at the crossroads. Patents have become the focal point of an increasing 
number of litigation cases with major economic consequences,2 record patent license or cross-
license deals are regularly announced, and patents frequently make the headlines in the 
newspapers. This booming interest for patents has also translated into an unprecedented 
growth in the number of applications filed to patent offices throughout the world (a 150% 
increase at the European Patent Office (EPO)3 between 1995 and 2005). 
 
At the same time, the patent system is intensively debated and questioned around the world on 
several grounds. Criticism includes the fact that the system seems unable to master the flood 
of applications, resulting in increasing delays in the granting process and higher legal 
uncertainty on the markets; that it may hamper substantial academic research efforts because 
of an anti-commons effect (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998); that it is unaffordable for SMEs and 
independent inventors; that the risks and costs associated with legal disputes may hinder the 
level of entrepreneurship activity; that some new technologies (software, genetic inventions, 
living varieties, etc.) should be kept outside the scope of patentable subject matter; that 
patents of dubious validity are regularly issued; and that patents are increasingly exploited for 
strategic purposes in a way that may be detrimental to competition and innovation. 
 
The main objective of the present dissertation is to contribute to this debate with a series of 
essays presenting an empirical analysis of different aspects of the European patent system and 
the way it has evolved since the early eighties. More specifically, this dissertation will focus 
on the way inventors patent at the EPO provided they have chosen to do so.4 It will 
investigate several developments in patenting practices and their relation with the value of 
patents. 
 
                                                 
1 Jefferson, T. (1813), Letter to Isaac McPherson. See Mossoff (2007) for a provocative discussion around this 
well-known statement. 
2 See e.g. RiM vs. NTP, largely discussed in Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007). 
3 Established by the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (EPC) signed in Munich 1973, the EPO is the 
outcome of the European countries’ collective political determination to establish a uniform patent system in 
Europe. The EPO was set up by the contracting states to the EPC with the aim of strengthening co-operation 
between the countries of Europe in the protection of inventions. This was achieved by adopting the EPC, which 
makes it possible to obtain such protection in several or all of the contracting states by a single patent grant 
procedure, and establishes standard rules governing the treatment of patents granted by this procedure. By filing 
a single application in one of the three official languages (English, French and German) it is possible to obtain 
patent protection in some or all of the EPC contracting states. The resulting patent is, however, not a single 
patent but rather a bundle of national patents. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007) provide an in-depth 
description of the European patent system. 
4 Therefore, we will not discuss why firms innovate or why they patent (or not). 
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The main argument throughout this dissertation is that patenting practices – in particular the 
way applications are drafted and filed to the EPO – have substantially evolved in the past 
decades and that these developments have affected the patent system and may compromise its 
ability to fulfil its economic purpose. 
 
The originality of this dissertation is threefold. Its first contribution resides in the three 
questions that will be addressed empirically: What are the drivers behind the developments of 
new filing strategies? Are these strategies associated with more valuable patents? What is 
their impact on granting procedures? The second originality of this dissertation comes from 
the data and methods that will be used to investigate these questions. To address them, a 
comprehensive database has been built covering all applications filed to the EPO over a 25-
year period (between 1980 and 2004), which represents about 2 million observations. This 
dataset will be analysed using a wide range of multivariate econometric methods, including 
probit models, count models, and survival time analysis. 
 
In this sense, this thesis is essentially exploratory. It is empirical in its essence, but is inspired 
by economic motivations and concerns. These motivations come from the major changes that 
have been observed in patent systems over the past two or three decades. The next section 
will therefore briefly summarize the foundations, structure, and evolution of the European 
patent system, in order to sketch the context of this dissertation. 
 
1.2 The context 
1.2.1 The economic justification of patents 
Patents are at the very heart of innovation policies and it would be difficult to analyse patents 
or patenting practices without first recalling the economic objectives of these legal 
instruments. It is in the interest of society that inventions be made, for they contribute to 
consumer and social welfare by providing new or higher quality products, or by enabling 
cheaper production processes, and that the inventions made are diffused to further contribute 
to the advancement of science and techniques, generating spillovers. 
 
Knowledge – presumably the most valuable resource in today’s economy – has two main 
characteristics: it is non-excludable (an author cannot prevent his readers from sharing his text 
with others or from using the information it contains) and non-rival (the use of a knowledge 
asset by someone does not prevent another person from using it, in other words it cannot be 
consumed) (Romer, 1990a; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007). A good is excludable if someone 
with a property right can prevent others from taking advantage of it. For a rival good, 
possession ensures excludability, but for non-rival goods such as knowledge, it is much more 
difficult to enforce property rights (Romer, 1990b).5 
 
                                                 
5 Note that Greenhalgh and Longland (2005) show that knowledge is actually characterised by a rapid 
depletability due to subsequent or substitute innovations and that excludability – even with patents – is difficult 
to obtain and enforce. 
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These two characteristics make it very unattractive to produce knowledge, or in the particular 
context of this work, to innovate. On the one hand, a low level of appropriation of inventions 
(or excludability) might lead to a disincentive effect. If people know that their inventions will 
be exploited by a third party who has not invested any money into the research that has led to 
those inventions and therefore does not have to recoup any investment, they will be reluctant 
to incur the costs of performing the necessary research activities (Arrow, 1962; Spence, 
1984). The result could be that many inventions will never be made or commercialized. On 
the other hand, low levels of excludability lead to higher spillovers between firms (Veugelers 
and Cassiman, 1999), i.e. to a better diffusion. 
 
The challenge for society therefore consists of making knowledge excludable (in order to 
allow inventors to recoup their investments and profit from their own innovations), while 
keeping it non-rival (to allow the diffusion of knowledge and allow research efforts to be 
pursued on the invention) (Romer, 1990b). Patents can solve these two issues in a sequential 
way: they grant inventors a temporary right to exclude others from exploiting their inventions 
– leading to a deadweight loss for society – in exchange for the public disclosure of their 
product or process (patents are published no later than 18 months after their filing). This way, 
patents balance the interest of inventors and consumers sequentially, a welfare loss during a 
limited period of time (due to the monopolistic power of the inventor) in exchange for the 
disclosure and diffusion of the invention to the long-term benefit of society.6 Patents therefore 
act as an incentive mechanism both to invent and to diffuse inventions.7 
 
However, European patents8 actually offer two distinct benefits to their holders: they grant 
them a right to exclude others from the market, but also offer them the guarantee that their 
invention will never be patented by anyone else. Indeed, as soon as a patent application has 
been published – no matter whether it has been examined or granted or not –, it becomes an 
integral part of the state of the art that the world will never get rid of. The former effect – the 
exclusive rights – is presumably acquired if and only if a patent has been granted and 
validated in some countries and is only enforceable in these countries. Nonetheless, the 
European Patent Convention (EPC) provides that a patent application under review at the 
EPO entitles its applicant similar rights as those provided by a valid patent grant, which are 
enforceable in all countries designated by the applicant.9 Therefore, a pending application 
readily entitles its holder with some provisional exclusive rights (though probably more 
difficult to enforce as the claimed scope of protection has not yet been validated by the 
office), and the mere filing of a patent application at the EPO produces major legal effects. 
 
                                                 
6 Nordhaus (1969) has formally analysed this trade-off between encouraging innovation to benefit society and 
suffering the consequences of a temporary monopoly (see also Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007). 
7 See Scherer (2001), Dixon and Greenhalgh (2002) and Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007) for more detailed 
discussions on the economic justification of patents. However, the efficiency of patent systems in encouraging 
innovation and its diffusion has been discussed by different scholars but goes beyond the scope of the present 
dissertation (see e.g. Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000; Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Licht and Zolz, 1998). 
8 In the remainder of the dissertation, we will refer to patents granted by the EPO as “European patents”. 
9 Article 67, EPC. 
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1.2.2 Institutional framework: the European patent system 
In order to obtain these benefits from patent protection in Europe, an inventor must draft and 
file an application either to the national patent office of all European States where he would 
like his invention to be protected, or to the EPO, which offers a centralised granting procedure 
for inventors seeking patent protection in different European countries.10 Once an inventor 
gets a patent grant from the EPO, he still has to translate and validate it in all European 
countries where he would like his patent to be enforced.11 Failure to provide the required 
translation and validation fees in due time in a given country renders the patent unenforceable 
there. Due to the costs induced by these multiple translations and validation fees, many 
patents accepted for grant by the EPO are in fact never validated at all (about 5% of all 
patents granted), and most of them are validated only in some of the countries originally 
designated. 
 
When a patent has been validated in different countries, the result for the holder is not a single 
European patent per se, but rather a bundle of national patents, which need to be maintained 
every year (for up to twenty years) in each country against payment of renewal fees, and 
which will need to be enforced separately in each country. Should a patent holder be willing 
to sue a third party who is allegedly infringing his rights, he would have to file an action 
before all jurisdictions where the patent has been validated and where the infringement has 
been suspected. This would of course induce considerable expenses. 
 
However, in order to be accepted for grant, a patent application at the EPO must fulfil the 
patentability requirements provided by the EPC. These legal provisions actually define the 
metes and bounds of the patentable territory that may be appropriated (by drawing the line 
between the inventions that may be granted a patent and those that are not), and determine the 
amount of technological territory that may be protected by a single document as well as the 
maximum duration for patent rights. These design parameters of the patent system must be 
fine-tuned in order for the system to adequately fulfil its economic objectives In this respect, 
there are four main dimensions that need to be adjusted by law and procedural practice: the 
patentable subject matter, the inventive step, the technological breadth and the length.12 
 
The optimal setting of these four dimensions has been widely discussed in the literature from 
a theoretical point of view. Major contributions in this respect are found in Boldrin and 
Levine (2002), Cornelli and Schankerman (1999), Gallini (1992), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), 
Greene and Scotchmer (1995), Kamien and Tauman (1986), Klemperer (1990), Kremer 
(1998), Merges and Nelson (1990), O’Donoghue et al. (1998), Scotchmer (1999), Scotchmer 
and Green (1990), and Teece (1986, 2006). The common denominator of this literature was a 
dissection of all dimensions of the patent system and a discussion on the potential effects that 
a change in one design parameter could have on R&D, innovation, competition or growth. 
                                                 
10 See section A1.1 in the appendix for a more detailed overview of the European patent system. 
11 Note that the recently adopted London Protocol will soon reduce the obligations in terms of translations. 
12 See section A1.2 in the appendix as well as Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007), Chapter 5, for discussions 
on these dimensions. 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
N. VAN ZEEBROECK - ESSAYS ON THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PATENT SYSTEMS 7 
This allowed these authors to provide some guidance on the optimal level of each dimension 
for the patent system to achieve its mission. 
 
However, for a given configuration of the system, its effects may be affected by the use that is 
made of patents in practice, and past decades have only brought major developments in their 
exploitation on the markets. 
 
1.2.3 Patenting in the knowledge economy13 
In today’s economy, knowledge has become one of the most precious assets and its legal 
appropriation is therefore the subject of intense rivalry. As the main instrument to legally 
appropriate industrial knowledge (copyrights protect artistic creations, designs and models 
cover industrial forms, and trademark law protects brands and the identity of their owners), 
patents have become increasingly critical in many industries (see e.g. Hall and Ziedonis, 
2001). 
 
As a result, patents seem to be at the centre of a new kind of gold rush: public and private 
institutions are struggling to get hold of the largest possible share of the knowledge cake 
before anyone else does. Patents provide innovative firms or ventures with the opportunity to 
gain an advantage over their competitors, but there are various ways in which this market 
advantage can be used, beyond directly extracting a rent from customers: to restrain the power 
of suppliers by owning key technology elements in another part of the value or technological 
chain, to “freeze” a technology by preventing its exploitation, to guarantee the holder’s 
freedom to invent by securing in advance the possibility to exploit an invention in the future, 
to build negotiating power for the acquisition of complementary inventions or for easier 
access to the market, to set up “picket fences” around a competitor’s patent and force him to 
concede a cross license, to avoid being invented or patented around, to secure freedom to 
operate and avoid potential litigation, to prevent others from acquiring IP rights by filing 
defensive applications that they drop into the public domain once published, to “create a 
smoke screen” by filing applications on technologies that will not be exploited by the 
company, but may disturb or deceive competitors, to improve the company’s image, to serve 
as a collateral for loans or as proof of credibility for potential investors, or to generate direct 
financial revenues through licensing, resale, or securitization. 
 
All these tactics, often dictated by strategic reactions to the behaviour of competitors, induce 
more patent applications. The influence of market forces is well illustrated by the 
semiconductor industry where the enormous financial consequences of the potential 
injunction of a pending patent litigation to shut down a manufacturing plant – even for a very 
short period of time – urge industry players to file patents, which are necessary as a dissuasive 
bargaining instrument. Similarly, patents are sometimes necessary as an exchange currency to 
access a specific third-party technology, which can only be traded against other IP rights. 
                                                 
13 This section draws from Guellec, D., B. van Pottelsberghe and N. van Zeebroeck (2007), Patent as a market 
instrument, in Guellec D. and B. van Pottelsberghe, The Economics of the European Patent System, Oxford 
University Press, 2007, pp. 85-113. See also Greenhalgh and Rogers (2007). 
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From a firm’s perspective that is facing a promising patent obtained by one of its competitors, 
there are not so many ways of avoiding the loss of competitive advantage and market shares. 
The first possibility would naturally be to get the patent revoked through legal procedures 
such as opposition or litigation. Should such initiatives fail or appear too hazardous and 
costly, the only other options are to buy or license in the new patented technology or to invent 
or patent around the patent.14 The “invent around” strategy (Glazier, 2000), consists of 
developing a product or process that does not infringe on the competitor’s patent, but still 
allows the firm to enter the same market. The resulting invention is then often patented as 
such. The “patent around” strategy – also referred to as “picket-fence” strategy – consists of 
filing patents covering any potential improvement to the original invention in such a way that 
the original patent becomes impossible to exploit as such, thereby forcing its holder to 
negotiate a cross-license. 
 
The fear of inventing or patenting around strategies pushes innovative firms to apply for 
patents with the broadest scope possible, i.e. to make them difficult to invent and patent 
around. This implies drafting patents so as to block as many alternative inventions as possible, 
to invent around one’s own patent and to file the resulting inventions, or to build a preventive 
picket fence around one’s patent before anyone else does so. Otherwise, the initial patent 
holder could eventually be forced to invent around invented-around patents in return. 
Together, these behaviours induce a snowball effect where competitors keep on patenting for 
minor inventive steps, either around each other’s patents, or around their own patents. 
 
Such practices may sometimes result in undesirable situations in which an entire field of 
technology may be covered by such a dense web of overlapping rights that it becomes almost 
impossible for any newcomer to enter the field. Such webs of patents, referred to as “patent 
thickets” by Shapiro (2001), may be controlled by one or more actors and may result from a 
deliberate strategy or from competition among incumbents willing to maximize their 
respective rights. The main issue with thickets is that they make it very difficult to determine 
the exact scope of protection to which each patent holder is really entitled, so that each party’s 
freedom to operate in the field becomes very difficult to ensure. Therefore, thickets act as 
very strong barriers to entry and could strongly affect competition or innovation on the 
market. 
 
These developments in patenting strategies show that the motivations for filing patents have 
become very diverse in nature, causing firms to make their protection as robust and complete 
as possible, and resulting into more and more patent applications being filed all over the 
world (see Kortum and Lerner, 1999), and generating new patenting practices. These practices 
– including, for instance, filing several applications to cover a single invention or forcing the 
patent system to produce some expected benefits – may compromise the patent system and its 
economic objectives. 
 
                                                 
14 Arguably, the default – but risky – alternative would be to simply ignore the patent and hope the infringement 
will not be detected. 
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Patents, however, have not only gained a huge popularity on the markets. There is one 
additional area in which they have become extremely popular: the economic literature. Patents 
provide an unhoped-for source of information for the stream of economic research that is 
directly heir to the very long history of the economics of innovation and that focuses at the 
macro or micro level on the performance and impact of R&D on economic or social welfare. 
Since patent data are publicly available, centralised and formalised, they provide easy counts 
of one of the end products of R&D activities. 
 
It soon appeared, however, that the distribution of patent value is highly skewed (see e.g. 
Scherer (1965), Griliches (1990), Schankerman (1998) and Scherer and Harhoff (2000)) so 
that simple patent counts would provide very poor measures of R&D outputs. Therefore, 
many scholars have scrutinised patent databases in a desperate quest for that small piece of 
information that would enable them to distinguish between what is really valuable and what is 
not in helping them gaining advanced knowledge of the future or potential value of patents. 
Once they have identified a candidate, they implement the most appropriate statistical method 
to determine whether the piece of information is indeed significantly correlated with the 
presumed value of the patents. If so, it should be easy to produce value weighted counts of 
patents based upon the identified piece of information. 
 
Reliable counts of patents – once available – can then be used to support different types of 
economic analyses (see Griliches (1990) for a survey of the various uses of patents as 
economic indicators): to assess the performance and impact of R&D activities across 
countries,15 regions,16 sectors17 or firms,18 to quantify the internationalization of research,19 to 
investigate knowledge spillovers at different levels – usually based on patent citations (see 
Cincera and van Pottelsberghe (2001) for a review of this strand of the literature),20 to 
evaluate the technological proximity21 or specialization22 of firms or countries, to analyse 
patenting behaviours,23 or to monitor the patent system. 
 
The present set of essays fits into this latter stream of research: it will make use of patent data 






                                                 
15 See e.g. Greenhalgh et al., 1996; 2001. 
16 See e.g. Capron and Cincera, 1999; Debackere et al., 1999; Cincera and Veugelers, 2000. 
17 See e.g. Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2006b. 
18 See e.g. Cincera, 1997; Peeters and van Pottelsberghe, 2006a. 
19 See e.g. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2001; Cincera et al., 2004. 
20 E.g. Jaffe, 1986; Jaffe et al., 1993; Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe, 1998; Frost, 1998; Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2002a,b. 
21 See e.g. Capron and Cincera, 1998; Cincera, 2005. 
22 See e.g. van Zeebroeck et al., 2006b. 
23 See e.g. Cincera, 2003; Peeters and van Pottelsberghe, 2006b; Blind et al., 2007; Harhoff et al., 2007a. 
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1.3 Research objectives, methodology and structure 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to the intense debate on the European 
patent system by shedding some empirical light on several developments it has experienced 
over the past two or three decades, their drivers, and some of their potential economic 
aftermath. We will first investigate how patent applications have evolved since the inception 
of the EPO and analyse the drivers of these developments. This exercise will show that the 
size of patent applications has dramatically increased, thereby revealing major changes in 
patenting practices – that is the way applicants draft their patent filings and manage the 
granting process – largely due to the globalization of patenting procedures. 
 
Our objective will then be to address two main questions derived from these developments in 
the practice of patenting: Do they indicate more valuable patents? What is their impact on the 
granting process? The answers to these questions will then allow some of the potential 
economic consequences and policy implications of these developments to be highlighted. Our 
main argument is therefore that patenting practices have changed and that these developments 
have strongly impacted the patent system, thereby raising the need for further economic 
research and policy actions. 
 
To achieve these objectives, this dissertation is based on a set of empirical studies. Since the 
main argument refers to the strategies adopted by patentees in drafting and filing each patent 
to the EPO, our unit of observation in the following pages will be each EPO patent filing. 
This research therefore involved building a dataset with detailed information on every 
application filed to the EPO and analysing the relationships between these characteristics 
using descriptive statistics as well as econometric modelling. Such analyses are quite popular 
in a whole stream of literature on the economics of patent systems since they may contribute 
to a better understanding of how those systems are used and why. 
 
The empirical analyses presented in the following pages are based on a dataset specifically 
built for this dissertation. It is made of different building blocks that have been merged 
together and are presented in Figure 1.1. Two different institutions provided the necessary 
data: the OECD (triadic patent families and citations) and the EPO (procedural data, renewals 
and lapses, communications, and the PATSTAT (EPO, 2006) database). Some of these 
databases are publicly available (OECD Triadic Patent Families, OECD Citations Dataset, 
PATSTAT), the others were kindly provided by the EPO. 
 
These different sources provided four main categories of data that were needed in the 
following essays. First, many procedural data on all published patent applications at the EPO 
formed the basis of the dataset: priority, application and publication numbers (used to link 
these data with all other datasets), priority, filing and decision dates, information on the 
decisions affecting each patent, details on the applicants and inventors, and additional 
bibliographic data (PCT information, number of claims and pages, requests of different kinds, 
etc.) All these data were obtained from ad-hoc extractions of EPO databases. 
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The second group of data pertained to the validation, renewal and lapse of all patents granted 
by the EPO. These were provided in the form of two separate datasets kindly provided by the 
Office, which were merged to form a single dataset with all relevant data on granted patents. 
 
The third group of required data was aimed at providing information relating each application 
with the worldwide patent system: priority numbers, technological classifications, and 
citations (patent and non patent). These data were extracted from two public databases: the 
PATSTAT database (EPO, 2006) and the OECD patent citations dataset (OECD, 2006). 
 
Figure 1.1 – Structure of the data sources used in the dissertation 
 
 
* = Publicly available datasets 
 
The last source of data compiled within the main dataset contained the set of all triadic patent 
families (i.e. simultaneously applied for to the EPO, the Japan Patent Office and the US 
Patent Office), as published by the OECD. This allowed the identification of all EPO patent 
applications that belong to a triadic patent family. 
 
All the variables used in the coming chapters have been constructed from this dataset. Their 
construction or exact origin will nevertheless be exposed when they are first introduced in 
their respective chapters. 
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As depicted in Figure 1.2, the dissertation is organised into two main parts. Part I is focused 
on the drivers behind the evolution in patenting practices and therefore analyses the form (or 
size) of patent applications filed to the EPO. It is composed of two chapters. Chapter 2 
proposes two different metrics and shows the evolution in the size of patent applications filed 
to the EPO and the main patterns in this trend. The drivers are empirically investigated in 
chapter 3, showing that the increasing size of applications mainly results from changes in the 
practice of patent drafting and the internationalization of patenting routes. It also suggests that 
the size of applications is sometimes instrumentalised by the applicants in an attempt to 
deceive patent examiners or competitors. This observation raises two questions: Are these 
developing practices associated with more important or valuable patents? And what is their 
impact on granting procedures and hence on the patent system? 
 





These questions are discussed in Part II, which is divided into three chapters. Chapter 4 
addresses some issues in assessing the value of patents and analyses different indicators 
proposed in the abundant literature in the field. It concludes with the risk of basing an analysis 
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on one of these indicators only, and with the definition of a composite patent value index that 
encapsulates and complements the information provided by the 5 underlying indicators. 
 
The second chapter in Part II (chapter 5) then presents an empirical investigation of the 
association between patenting practices and patent value. It therefore starts by proposing 
different measures to identify the strategies developed by the applicants in drafting and 
managing their patent filings, based upon the findings made in chapter 3. Thanks to 
competing regressions on six different value indicators and clustered regressions by country 
and by industry, the empirical model shows that most filing strategies are consistently and 
positively associated with patent value. 
 
Chapter 6 then focuses on one particular dimension of patent value, namely the length of 
patents, which may be broken down into the duration of the reviewing procedure and the 
duration of the maintenance of granted patents. This empirical exercise shows that filing 
strategies do induce longer patent rights in time, but that it is mainly due to substantial delays 
in the granting process. This supports the idea expressed by different scholars in the US 
(Quillen and Webster, 2001; Lemley and Moore, 2004; Jensen et al., 2007) that such 
strategies are sometimes used by patentees to slow down the process and force the system to 
provide them with a protection for their invention no matter whether it properly fits with 
patent law or not. 
 
Chapter 7 therefore concludes the dissertation by discussing some potential economic impacts 
of these practices on the patent system and its stakeholders, proposing some avenues for 

























Part I: Patenting practices and their drivers 
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2.1 Research objectives 
In this first part of the thesis, we aim at addressing the following opening question: what are 
the drivers of the recent developments in patent systems? 
 
Research scholars have reported and analysed the boom in patent filings observed all over the 
world and exceeding the growth in R&D expenses (e.g. Kortum and Lerner (1999) for the 
US). In this part, we will look at EPO patent filings themselves and their form in order to 
investigate what they can reveal about what is going on and what the drivers are. Some 
anecdotal evidence suggests that in addition to the surge in the number of patent applications 
filed around the world, the size of patent documents has dramatically increased over the past 
decades, putting patent systems under pressure.25 Patent offices worldwide are struggling to 
master their growing workload, and average decision lags are reportedly still growing. 
 
The main objective of this chapter is therefore to propose two different measures to quantify 
the volume of patent applications and to analyse their evolution, allowing the identification of 
some broad patterns in the observed trend and of some potential impacts that will need a 
closer investigation in the following chapters. 
2.2 The inflation in patent volume 
The past twenty years have witnessed a dramatic increase in both the number of inventions for 
which protection has been sought from patent offices around the world and in the average size 
of patent applications. This joint evolution of the number and size of patent applications raises 
serious concerns about the ability of the patent system to master the workload that it imposes 
on patent offices, in particular with respect to the efficiency and timeliness of search and 
examination procedures. 
 
Although the phenomenon has become particularly pronounced in the last decade, the issue of 
patent complexity and voluminosity is far from being of recent concern.26 For instance, in 
1933 the US Patent and Trademark Office Society was seeking advice on recommendations to 
eliminate the multiplicity of claims and on a fee schedule dependent on the number of claims 
(Smith, 2003).  Three decades later in 1965, the problem of complexity was reported to have 
had such a major influence on the delay in processing patent applications that it was proposed 
again. This was in addition to hiring more examiners and introducing mechanised searching 
and procedural modifications to increase filing and renewal fees (Duncan, 1965). 
                                                 
24 As cited by Monod, J. (1970), Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris, Seuil. 
25 In December 2000, in an article titled “Patently Ridiculous”, New Scientist evoked a drastic increase in the 
length of patent applications over the world. The author attributed this surge mainly to a stampede to file patents 
on biotech inventions and he accused it of bringing the patent system to its knees (Fox B. and A. Coghlan, 
“Patently Ridiculous” in New Scientist, December 2000). 
26 From the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, voluminosity is “the quality or state of being voluminous”. 
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In recent years, the growth in patent voluminosity became so extreme that the term “mega-
applications” was coined, often in relation to applications filed together with biological 
sequence listings. In one such case, the EPO received an application (EP20000301439) with 
283 priorities, 80,259 sequences and an estimated 50,000 pages. Including all priority patents, 
the case totalled around 600,000 pages. In the US, the application US20050182468 was 
originally filed with 13,305 claims, for which a small-entity fee of 1,249,075 US$ was 
initially requested by the USPTO. According to Dudas (2005), 7% of applications now filed 
with the USPTO represent about 25% of the patent claims that are examined. 
 
Several recent reports prepared by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2003), the U.S. 
National Academy of Public Administration (USPTO, 2005), the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (Mittal and Koontz, 2005), the Patent System Subcommittee of Japan, 
the Intellectual Property Policy Committee and the Industrial Structure Council (Patent 
System Subcommittee, 2002) have highlighted this voluminosity issue. In addition, further 
studies on the US patent system and the voluminosity of its applications include Lemley 
(2000), Allison and Lemley (2001) and Moore (2005).  
 
At the EPO, the incoming workload has been publicly discussed as one of the factors 
influencing its current efforts in mastering the workload27 and is now an element of the 
ongoing strategy debate on the future of the patent system in Europe.28 
  
The objective of this chapter is to highlight different issues raised by the voluminosity of 
patent applications at the EPO: how can it be measured? Are there any patterns in the 
potential factors underlying its surge? Is there any potential social cost induced by this 
evolution? In addition to this objective, the originality of this analysis relies on a database that 
has been built specifically to measure and address these phenomena in the context of the EPO. 
It is created from a large number of variables providing information on more than two million 
documents filed to the EPO between the creation of the Office in 1978 and the end of 2004. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: the first section discusses the measurement issues and 
scrutinizes candidates for voluminosity indicators, the second section investigates potential 
explanatory factors, and the third section elaborates on the social cost of patent voluminosity. 
 
The main results are that the voluminosity of patent applications at the EPO can be measured 
with the number of claims and pages of applications, that these indicators have doubled over 
the past 20 years, and that this phenomenon is mainly associated with applications that have 
been filed via the PCT route, with a US priority filing, in the biotech sector, or with a large 
number of inventors. Moreover, this evolution has a tangible impact on the Office’s workload. 
All these findings will provide a useful basis for further analytical work in the next chapters. 
                                                 
27 European Patent Office, Proceedings of Session 2: A Closer Look at the Nature of the Incoming Workload, 
Mastering the Workload, A European Patent Office Customer Workshop, Munich, Germany, 2003 and European 
Patent Office Conference on Quality in the Patent System, The Hague, November 2005. 
28 The Increased Voluminosity of Patent Applications Received by the EPO and its Impact on the European 
Patent System. http://ac.european-patent-office.org/strategy_debate/documentation/pdf/ec05073.pdf 
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2.2.1 Measurement issues 
Volume as an overall concept can have different facets and be measured in different units 
especially when it is applied to documents such as patent applications. Table 2.1 summarizes 
the main potential measures with their advantages and disadvantages. The most intuitive 
measure of the voluminosity of a document is probably its number of pages. It has the great 
advantage of quantifying the amount of workload and processing cost incurred by the granting 
authority to examine the application. It may also inform on the extent of the disclosure 
provided by the applicant on the invention. 
 
Table 2.1 – Potential voluminosity indicators 
  Proxy for Advantages Drawbacks 




Legal core of patent 
Format and language 
neutral 
Relationship with scope/breadth 
difficult to interpret. Ideally, should 
distinguish between independent and 
dependent claims 
     





representation of the 
examiner's workload 
Format and language sensitive 
 Description Pages Disclosure 
Technical core of 
patent 
Format and language sensitive 




Format and type of illustration 
sensitive 
     




 Format and language sensitive 
     
Claim pages per claim 
Complexity, 
Relative size of 
claims 
 
Very loose measure due to 
approximate page counts. Format and 
language sensitive 
 
As patent publications are drawn up according to a standardised structure, the total number of 
pages can further be divided into the number of pages of each of the different parts it is made 
of, hence providing a more precise indication: the bibliographic section provides information 
on the patent such as its serial number, the date of filing, the date of publication, the 
designation of any claimed priority applications, data on the inventors and applicants, etc. It is 
followed by a description of the invention and then by the claims section. The claims specify 
in detail the “components”, or building blocks of the patented invention, and consequently 
their number may be indicative of the “scope” or “breadth” of the invention (Hall et al., 
2001). The description and claims may be complemented by various illustrations e.g. 
drawings, figures, sequences, flow diagrams grouped together in the “drawing” section.  
 
Taking into consideration the number of pages in each successive section of a patent 
document may present several advantages. When looking at the size of incoming applications 
this allows for the possibility of disregarding from the overall voluminosity the pages of the 
bibliographic and search sections, which are actually added or modified by the office after the 
search process. What is more, it provides a finer measure, which would enable to identify 
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whether large applications are actually due to longer descriptions, longer claims, or just 
numerous illustrations. 
 
Since all EPO patent documents are available in an electronic format the size of the digital 
publication, expressed in kilobytes, makes yet another potential measure of the size of a 
document. As it appears in Table 2.2, one may obviously expect such a measure to be 
strongly correlated with the number of pages the document is made of. 
 
Table 2.2 – Correlations between voluminosity indicators 
  Claims Pages Desc. Pg. Claims Pg. Draw. Pg. Doc. Size 
Claims at Filing 1.00      
Pages at Filing 0.37 1.00     
Description Pages at Filing 0.30 0.89 1.00    
Drawing Pages at Filing 0.18 0.64 0.25 1.00   
Size of document filed (KB) 0.35 0.92 0.83 0.59 1.00  
Claim pages per claim at Filing -0.06 0.17 0.14 0.01 0.12 1.00 
       
All coefficients are significant at a 5% probability threshold
Sample: All applications (Euro-Direct and Regional PCT) filed to the EPO between 1978 and 2004 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
Since pages and kilobytes depend on both the substance and the form of a document, one 
should look at potential content-based measures. The core section of a patent is made of the 
claims, which define the legal scope of the invention for which protection is being sought. 
Therefore, the number of claims in itself may provide a much more neutral measure of patents 
voluminosity. Much has been written on the meaning and interpretation of the number of 
claims (Tong and Frame, 1994; Lanjouw and Shankerman, 1999; and Scotchmer, 2004), but 
there is still no clear-cut interpretation of the relationship between the number of claims and 
the scope or breadth of protection. 
 
The number of pages can also be compared to the number of claims to produce claim-
weighted counts of pages. In this respect, the number of claim pages per claim represents the 
average amount of page size consumed by each claim in a document. The slightly negative 
coefficient between this amount and the raw number of claims observed in Table 2.2 suggests 
that the more claims there are in a document, the shortest they tend to be. Since dependent 
claims can by nature be expected to be shortest than independent claims (as they refer to 
independent claims, usually by adding one particular precision to it), this negative correlation 
may be an indication that large sets of claims tend to contain a larger proportion of dependent 
claims than smaller sets. This would be largely consistent with the patent law, as an 
application to the EPO is required by law no to exceed four independent claims (one 
independent claim of each allowed type: product, process, apparatus or use). Therefore, any 
extra claim in excess of four should – by legal assumption – be a dependent claim. 
 
Another format-independent measure could be made of the number of words in a publication, 
or in each of its sections. Similarly, the number of illustrations in the drawing section might 
CHAPTER 2 - ON THE EVOLUTION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS AT THE EPO 
N. VAN ZEEBROECK - ESSAYS ON THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PATENT SYSTEMS 20 
be more revealing than the number of pages of this section. Such measures could indeed 
provide a relatively unbiased indication of the richness of the content of a document, but 
drawings may be very diverse in complexity and nature and words are obviously language-
dependent. Besides, none of these indicators are available as such for all patent filings at EPO. 
 
There is probably no such thing as one single helpful definition of a patent document's 
voluminosity. It depends on what one is willing to analyse. While the number of claims can 
give an idea about the scope or breadth of a patent, the number of words or pages may rather 
reveal the level of the disclosure or the level of complexity of an invention for which 
protection is being sought or on the workload that the processing of an application may 
impose on the examiner. As expected, these different measures are quite well correlated as 
illustrated in Table 2.2, especially between page-related counts but also between page and 
claim counts. 
 
There are, however, some limits to the unbiasedness of every potential indicator described 
here above. Measures consisting of or based upon the number of pages are inherently 
dependent on the format (paper format, margins, line and paragraph spacing, font size, 
hyphenation etc.) as well as on the language of the document. As long as the format of patent 
applications is left to the choice of the applicant or his representative, one may expect to have 
a very wide variety of formats, making such measures highly unpredictable. 
 
At the EPO, one may distinguish between original facsimile formats and official EPO-
formatted documents. Indeed, since the very beginning of its activities, the European Patent 
Office has always published granted patents in a specific, very compact format referred to as 
“type-set format”, with standardised fonts and uniform page layouts.29 Hence, the number of 
pages in published granted patents, always expressed in terms of the homogenously 
reformatted document, can be expected to be quite uniform.  
 
One major drawback of this format for granted patents publications only, is however that the 
claims as required by the European Patent Convention (EPC) are always provided into the 
three official EPO languages - English, French, German. Therefore, the number of pages of 
the claims section is always about three times larger than it should really be. Contrary to 
grants, incoming applications published generally 18 months after the priority date, have only 
been harmonised from the mid-eighties and for non-PCT applications exclusively. Therefore, 
one may look either at the number of pages in the original, highly heterogeneous, facsimile 
documents or at the number of pages in EPO-reformatted publications. The former are highly 
volatile and poorly comparable to each other while the latter are hard to interpret for filings 
preceding the progressive implementation of this standard format and are not available for 
PCT applications. 
 
As far as the detailed numbers of pages making up the different sections are concerned, the 
available data provides less straightforward indications. As it contains the numbers 
                                                 
29 This format appears to cut the number of text pages from facsimile documents by 50% on average. 
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corresponding to the starting page of each section the difficulty lays in the continuity of the 
documents (each section starting on the same page where the previous one ends) and in the 
optional nature and order of some sections.30 Indeed, generally speaking the only mandatory 
sections in any patent publication are the bibliographic data, the description, and the claims.31 
The search report, preceding or following the application itself, and the drawing sections are 
not always present and some amendments may sometimes be inserted anywhere within the 
application. Determining the exact number of pages of each section is indeed not a 
straightforward or clear-cut exercise. An example is provided in Table A2.1 in the appendix. 
It shows that the length of each section may vary widely from one technological area or 
country of residence of applicants to the other. It also shows that the description section totals 
the largest share of the documents’ size. 
 
In addition to these layout and formatting issues, measures made of a number of pages as well 
as of a number of words are highly dependent on the language used in the application. It is 
well known for instance that for the same document translated into different languages there 
are more words in Latin than in Germanic languages but that words are longer in the latter.32 
One should therefore consider this potential language bias when relying on the number of 
pages or words in a document. Nevertheless, for institutional reasons, applications must be 
filed at the EPO in any of the three official languages (English, French, German), which is the 
case for about 90% of EPO applications and hence confines this issue to a certain extent. 
 
The number of claims is in fact no perfect indicator either. There are independent and 
dependent claims33 and there are different types of independent claims (product, process, 
apparatus or use). A more accurate measure of the number of claims should hence provide 
separate counts of the number of dependent claims and the number of independent claims of 
each type, although this information is unfortunately not available. Moreover, patent drafting 
styles may be strongly influenced by national or regional systems, cultures and modes. The 
practice of using dependent claims as fallback positions, i.e. a set of different versions of a 
same claim or of overlapping claims to serve in different contexts and maximize chances for 
the main claim to stand before an examiner or court, is not evenly spread around the world 
                                                 
30 The burden to the computation of sectional pages is due to the starting of each section as a continuation of the 
previous one, hence on the same page where the previous section ended. As an example, if the specification 
starts on page 2 and the claims start on page 5 and end on page 7, should page number 5 be computed as part of 
the claims or of the specification section? As a matter of fact, the specification may end and the claims may start 
anywhere on page 5. Hence the best option is to make the assumption that the place on a page where one section 
ends and the next one starts is a random process and that it should be even all over the page. Therefore, it should 
be safe to cut page 5 into two parts and grant half a page to both sections, thus resulting in 3.5 pages for the 
description and 2.5 pages for the claims. 
31 The claims define the scope of protection of a granted patent, and thus are subject of a detailed scrutiny in the 
process of substantive examination. Therefore, they are mandatory in each stage of the patenting process. 
However, in certain jurisdictions, such as in the US and UK, it is allowed to file a patent application with no 
claims at all; claims would then be introduced during the examination phase. Such notice is known as a 
continuous application (see Quillen et al., 2002). 
32 For instance, the text of the 2002 edition of the EPC, comprises 73,629 words (427,113 characters) in German, 
84,583 words (396,710 characters) in English and 86,353 words (413,769 characters) in French. 
33 Independent claims stand on their own, whereas dependent claims depend on a single claim or on several 
claims and generally express particular embodiments (Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claim_(patent)). 
CHAPTER 2 - ON THE EVOLUTION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS AT THE EPO 
N. VAN ZEEBROECK - ESSAYS ON THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PATENT SYSTEMS 22 
and the level of details in the specification may depend on the inventor’s expectation about 
the potential behaviour of a court in case of litigation, not to mention important country to 
country differences in patent drafting practices. 
 
Even before investigating all these potential drawbacks with voluminosity measures a choice 
has to be made in terms of the document type one is looking at: applications are more 
appropriate to the investigation of workload issues and grants should be preferred when 
looking at patent quality or legal validity. Once this choice has been made, one may also have 
to deal with the existence of several publications for one single application or grant. This may 
be due to various factors occurring during the granting process e.g. an amendment filed after 
the initial publication of an application may provoke a new document to be published, 
oppositions and appeals after grant may also require a new version of the patent to be issued. 
 
Comparing voluminosity measures between the application of a file and its grant may 
obviously reveal very interesting information on the effect of the granting process. But such a 
comparison is probably not straightforward. Firstly, formatting and layout considerations may 
hamper the comparability of the number of pages, except for non-PCT applications filed after 
the implementation of EPO’s harmonised format to direct incoming applications. Second, the 
amount of text in the claims section is approximately multiplied by three in grant publications 
since the claims must be provided in the three official languages. Finally, even when it turns 
to the number of claims, any variation in this number between application and grant could 
give rise to different interpretations. Some claims may have been removed but also merged 
with others, resulting either in a reduction or enlargement of the patent scope. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Average number of claims and pages in incoming applications at EPO (1980-2004) 
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In what follows, the focus will be on the two main voluminosity indicators detailed in Table 
2.1, i.e. the number of pages and the number of claims. Our dataset covers applications filed 
at the EPO from 1 January 1978 through 31 December 2004, representing 2,069,698 
documents.34 This dataset is made of variables computed from different EPO databases 
(including EPO, 2006). It contains the number of claims in the original application and in the 
resulting granted patent if issued (only for post-1990 filings) and the number of pages, 
description, claims and drawing pages in type-set when available or facsimile format, in both 
the published application and granted patent. Table A2.2 in the appendix further provides 
some basic statistics on the main dataset variables. The evolution of these indicators, 
illustrated in Figure 2.1, is to be balanced with the fast-increasing number of applications 
received by the EPO as depicted in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2 – Status of applications at the EPO by year of filing as on January 2006 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
Figure 2.1 shows a drastic increase in all voluminosity indicators during the eighties and the 
nineties. Both distributions present some outliers in recent years with up to nearly ten 
thousand pages and a thousand claims. Further to this phenomenon, WIPO has even received 
in 2004 a series of PCT applications with US priority in the biomedical field with up to nearly 
20,000 claims for the largest of these filings, as illustrated in Table A2.3 in the appendix.35 
                                                 
34 Following Hall et al. (2001) for quantitative analyses, and Dernis et al. (2001) for statistical purposes, the 
actual timing of patented inventions is closer to the application dates than to the (subsequent) grant dates, and 
since the interest is on the volume of incoming applications, the data always refers to cohorts of applications in 
terms of their filing date at the EPO. 
35 These applications have later entered the Regional phase at the EPO where the number of claims per 
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Figure 2.1 exhibits a drop in the average number of pages of granted patents since 1996, 
which suggests at first sight that patents granted more recently tend to be smaller. This could 
be the result of smaller applications getting granted faster than larger ones. It may also be a 
consequence of page counts at grant necessarily referring to harmonised type-set format 
publications whereas page counts at filing are provided in facsimile format for PCT 
applications. Section 3 will investigate some patterns and potential drivers in this evolution. 
 
Figure 2.2 shows a striking decline in the rate of grant according to the year of filing. This is 
naturally due to the inherent delays in the granting process, so that the more recent the 
application, the less likely it is to be yet granted, withdrawn or refused. Section 4 will 
investigate the potential impact of the voluminosity on the delays in the granting process. 
 
2.2.2 Explanatory factors 
In this section, we identify some potential factors behind the surge in voluminosity of 
applications. These factors include claim-based fees, filing routes, geographical origins and 
technological specificities. 
 
Figure 2.3 – Number of claims in EPO applications 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
2.2.2.1 Fees 
Figure 2.3, showing the frequency distribution of the number of claims at filing, displays an 
absolute mode at 10 claims and a local one at 20 claims. This bi-modal distribution is 
probably explained by the fee policies governing EPO and USPTO applications respectively, 
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of additional claim-based fees.36 This reveals that there may be an impact of administrative 
fees on patent drafting, hence the potential existence of a price elasticity of the number of 
claims. As an illustration, 43% of the applications in the dataset have been filed with 10 
claims or less and 78% with 20 claims or less. The frequency distribution of the number of 
pages at filing is shown in Figure 2.4. It clearly shows the importance of the tail of the 
distribution towards large applications, but contrary to the claims, no price elasticity is 
revealed as such.37 
 
Figure 2.4 – Number of pages in EPO applications 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
Both figures further depict a strong shift of the distribution to the right over the past twenty 
years confirming the broad increase in voluminosity illustrated in Figure 2.1. They also 
highlight the increasing skewness of both distributions as emphasised by the very long 
distribution tails, especially with the number of pages where about 12% of filings account for 
over 50 pages in recent years against only 5% in 1989-1993. 
 
2.2.2.2 Filing routes 
A patent application can follow different routes before it gets filed at the EPO. It may be filed 
directly at the EPO as a priority or after a national priority application had been filed in one 
specific country and possibly transferred to WIPO under the PCT option. This leaves three 
                                                 
36 At the EPO, the claim-based fees for the eleventh and each subsequent claim in a patent application is 45 EUR 
(as of April 2006), from 40 EUR before (between March 1999 and April 2006). In the US, for the twenty-first 
and each subsequent claim there is a fee of 50 USD (effective December 8, 2004). See also van Pottelsberghe 
and François (2006) for an analysis of the cost factor in patent systems. 
37 At the EPO there is a surcharge for excess pages (calculated on the facsimile version) at the time of 
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possible routes: a national priority filing subsequently transferred to the EPO, a first filing at 
the EPO and an application with a national or regional priority transferred to the EPO through 
the PCT process. It is important to note the strong increase of PCT applications among EPO 
filings, from 15% in 1985 to 50% in 2000. 
 
The dependence of pages counts on filing routes (i.e. PCT versus Euro-Direct applications) 
due to the formatting issues evoked above has already been underlined. Nevertheless, granted 
patents – although sharing a common standardised format no matter the filing route – are on 
average larger for PCT (15.7 pages on average with a median of 12 pages) than non-PCT 
(13.4 pages on average with a median of 10 pages) applications. Further to this effect on 
pages, the average number of claims in incoming applications as well as granted patents is 
higher for PCT than non-PCT filings, as shown in Figure 2.5. This suggests that the PCT 
route is correlated with the increasing voluminosity of applications at the EPO. Nevertheless, 
non-regional Euro-PCT filings i.e. PCT filings designating but not yet transferred to the EPO, 
have also on average more claims (24.31 claims on average in 2004 with a median of 18 
claims) than regional Euro-PCT applications (21.15 claims on average in 2004 with a median 
of 17 claims). This is probably partly because it is only once they are transferred that EPO 
fees for excess claims have to be paid and that a translated version of the application has to be 
provided. It is hence likely that many PCT applications either never get transferred to the EPO 
in practice or are somewhat adapted – and supposedly reduced – prior to being effectively 
transferred. 
 
Figure 2.5 – Number of claims in PCT and Euro-Direct applications (2000-2004) 
 



































Number of claims in application filed
Euro-Direct
PCT
CHAPTER 2 - ON THE EVOLUTION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS AT THE EPO 
N. VAN ZEEBROECK - ESSAYS ON THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PATENT SYSTEMS 27 
The observations made from the preceding figure (Figure 2.5) are further confirmed by two 
tests of equality of the means reported in Tables A2.6 and A2.7 in the appendix. These tests 
confirm at the 99% probability level that PCT filings are larger on average than Euro-Direct 
applications.  
 
More than 95% of EPO applications were actually filed after an initial national priority had 
been applied for.38 In some cases, the national priority which is claimed for an EPO filing is 
not unique. Sometimes because the priority application had already been transferred to other 
national or regional offices, sometimes because the application filed at the EPO is in fact a 
combination of several national priorities merged together. The average number of priorities 
per application has very slightly increased over the past 20 years and is just above 1. As 
shown by Dernis et al. (2001) applications filed by Japanese firms tend to be composed of 
several Japanese priority filings merged together to form a single US or European application. 
 
Figure 2.6 – Claims and pages by number of priorities in EPO applications (1989-2000) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
Figure 2.6 further depicts an apparent linear relationship between the number of priorities 
associated with an application and the number of claims and pages the application contains, 
suggesting that the number of claims and pages are driven by the number of priorities. A large 
number of priorities may either indicate a large number of countries in which an application 
was filed prior to reaching the EPO, or a particular construction of an EPO application that is 
made up of several distinct filings originating from one or more countries, which have been 
merged together. The latter interpretation (typical of filings originating from Japan because of 
                                                 
38 According to the Paris Convention, for a valid priority claim, subsequent applications must be filed within 12 
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the Japanese patent law traditionally limiting filings to strictly one independent claim each) 
suggests that this particular type of construction leads to larger filings than applications made 
of only one priority and supposedly transferred to the EPO as such. 
 
2.2.2.3 Geographical origin 
The country of residence of the applicants (“assignees” in the American terminology) and the 
country of priority of their application may influence the drafting style hence the size of 
patent filings. In fact, for 99% of EPO applications, the country of priority corresponds to the 
country of at least one of the applicants, in 85% of the cases it is even the country of the first 
applicant listed, which confirms that applicants usually file their first priority in their home 
country. Table A2.5 in the appendix provides some empirical evidence on the large 
fluctuations across countries in terms of average size and number of filings and their growth. 
 
Similarly, the language of filing is strongly related to the country of the applicant. For more 
than 90% of all EPO applications, the language of filing corresponds to one of the three 
official EPO languages – French 7%, German 20%, English 63%. Opportunistically, 
applicants tend to file their EPO applications primarily in their home language, provided that 
it is one of the three EPO languages. As illustrated in Table 2.3, approximately 95% of 
applications by companies with Germany or Austria as country of residence are filed in 
German, approximately 99% of applications originating from Anglo-Saxon countries as well 
as Israel or Republic of South Korea are filed in English whilst 88% of filings by French 
applicants are filed in French. In multilingual countries, such as Switzerland and Belgium, the 
picture is much more balanced (Belgium : English 63%, French 25%, Dutch 7%, German 5%; 
Switzerland : German 60%, English 28%, French 11%, Italian 1%). 
 
Countries having no EPO language tend to opt for English – Israel, Republic of South Korea, 
Finland and Denmark all file at over 95% in English – however there is also a strong reliance 
on the national language in some countries. Italian applicants file 60% in English and 40% in 
Italian, Dutch applicants 75% in English and 20% in Dutch, Swedish applicants 70% in 
English and 30% in Swedish, and Japanese applicants 70% in English and 30% in Japanese. 
 
This preference of English over national languages seems to be increasing over time, as also 
depicted in Table 2.3. One may indeed observe that from 1988-1989 to 2000-2001 many non-
native English speaking countries have largely increased the share of their EPO filings in 
English, such as Austria (2% to 8%), Belgium (45% to 72%), Switzerland (14% to 38%), 
Sweden (60% to 72%),  Germany (3% to 8%) and France (3% to 16%). The only notable 
exception in this respect was Japan which showed a decline, from 90% to 61% of EPO filings 
in English. This increasing success of English as language of filing is closely associated with 
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Table 2.3 – Languages of filing at EPO by country of applicant (%) 
  German English French Other  
Country Period EU-D PCT EU-D PCT EU-D PCT EU-D PCT Total 
Australia 1988-1989 0 0 19 81 0 0 0 0 100 
Australia 2000-2001 1 0 3 96 0 0 0 0 100 
Austria 1988-1989 76 22 2 0 0 0 0 0 100 
Austria 2000-2001 48 45 2 5 0 0 0 0 100 
Belgium 1988-1989 4 0 39 6 31 6 13 1 100 
Belgium 2000-2001 3 2 33 40 11 9 2 2 100 
Canada 1988-1989 1 0 90 7 2 0 0 0 100 
Canada 2000-2001 0 0 18 80 0 1 0 0 100 
Denmark 1988-1989 4 0 32 34 0 0 0 30 100 
Denmark 2000-2001 4 2 16 64 0 0 2 12 100 
Finland 1988-1989 1 0 45 31 0 0 0 24 100 
Finland 2000-2001 1 1 20 52 0 0 4 22 100 
France 1988-1989 1 0 2 0 87 10 0 0 100 
France 2000-2001 2 1 8 7 37 44 0 0 100 
Germany 1988-1989 85 12 2 1 0 0 0 0 100 
Germany 2000-2001 44 47 3 5 0 0 0 0 100 
Italy 1988-1989 2 0 47 7 1 0 42 0 100 
Italy 2000-2001 1 1 26 33 0 0 36 3 100 
Japan 1988-1989 0 0 89 0 0 0 0 10 100 
Japan 2000-2001 0 0 58 3 0 0 0 39 100 
Netherlands 1988-1989 5 0 68 5 1 0 20 1 100 
Netherlands 2000-2001 2 1 16 62 2 0 7 9 100 
Sweden 1988-1989 2 1 34 26 0 0 7 31 100 
Sweden 2000-2001 1 1 11 63 0 0 1 24 100 
Switzerland 1988-1989 64 9 13 2 9 2 1 0 100 
Switzerland 2000-2001 30 20 11 27 6 4 1 1 100 
United Kingdom 1988-1989 0 0 73 26 0 0 0 0 100 
United Kingdom 2000-2001 0 0 22 77 0 0 0 0 100 
United States 1988-1989 1 0 69 30 0 0 0 0 100 
United States 2000-2001 1 0 19 79 0 0 0 0 100 
EU-D = Euro-Direct applications (non-PCT EPO applications) - Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
Figure 2.7 displays the average number of claims and pages in applications filed in 1998 
according to their priority countries. Revealing a clear relation between the two indicators and 
large discrepancies among countries such as Germany and the United States, it suggests that 
the size of patent applications may be influenced by country-specific patent drafting styles. 
The case of Japan is worth noticing given that it appears slightly above the line of an abstract 
linear relationship between the number of pages and the number of claims, suggesting that 
Japanese applications have on average more pages, but not more claims, than filings issuing 
from continental European countries. 
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Figure 2.7 – Average size and number of EPO applications according to priority countries 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
The most striking result is the location of the average American application on the chart with, 
by far, the largest number of both claims and pages. This observation is further reinforced by 
the anecdotic evidenced produced in Table 2.4, which shows the share of the main priority 
countries among the 1,000 largest applications by claims and pages and among the last 
percentile of the claims and pages distributions. Occupying over 80% of these rankings in 
claims and 72 to 80% of these rankings in pages, against about 35% of all applications filed 
(i.e., US priorities are more than twice as present in the last percentile as in the overall 
distribution), there is little doubt that American priorities (and drafting styles) lead by far the 
voluminosity race. 
 
Table 2.5 provides a more nuanced view on the filing route effect evoked here above. It first 
confirms that the PCT route has a significant effect on non-American applications (with about 
3 additional claims than direct EPO applications on average). Second, the US effect appears 
slightly more significant, as witnessed by EP-Direct applications with a US priority having 5 
more claims than EP-Direct applications with non-US priorities (“ROW” - rest of the world). 
Third, the most striking result is observed with the joint impact of US priorities and of the 
PCT option. Filings with a US priority have on average 10 more claims when they were filed 
through the PCT than when they were filed directly to the EPO. What is more, it seems that 
the US syndrome is much more pronounced with PCT than non-PCT filings (the difference 
between US and non-US priority applications is of 12 claims for PCT-Direct applications and 
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(*) The size of the bubbles reflects the number of applications filed at EPO in 2002 with a priority from the corresponding country
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Table 2.4 – Share of priority countries in largest applications 
Priority Country 
% of Top 1000 
filings 
in # of claims 
% of Top 1000 
filings
in # of pages 
% of Top 1% 
filings
in # of claims 
% of Top 1% 
filings 
in # of pages 
% of filings in 
the period 
1978-2004 
Australia 1.0 0.8 1.4 1.2 1.1 
Canada 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 
Denmark 0.3 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.6 
EPO 0.2 0.5 0.6 1.4 2.3 
France 0.1 1.2 0.6 0.8 6.5 
Germany 0.6 1.2 1.8 3.2 18.2 
Israel 0.4 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.3 
Italy 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.1 2.6 
Japan 4.5 8.7 7.5 13.7 16.3 
Netherlands 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.2 
South Korea 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.3 1.2 
Spain 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 
Sweden 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 1.8 
Switzerland 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.5 
United Kingdom 1.3 3.4 3.1 4.2 6.6 
USA 81.9 80.5 80.4 72.4 34.8 
Other 8.6 1.6 1.2 0.5 4.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
This phenomenon almost surely finds its roots in the fundamental differences between civil 
and common law regimes, the latter leading (in many fields of activity) to much larger official 
documents than, for instance, in continental Europe. 
 
Table 2.5 – Number of claims and pages in PCT and non-PCT filings by country of priority 
 Priority country Claims Filings 
Euro-Direct ROW 13.53 30,085 
Euro-Direct US 18.72 8,485 
PCT ROW 16.28 54,588 
PCT US 28.86 45,402 
Overall  19.95 138,560 
Applications filed to the EPO in 2002 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
2.2.2.4 Technological specificities and complexity 
European patents are classified according to the International Patent Classification (IPC) 
published by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), a hierarchical 
classification with several levels of breakdown, primarily concerned with the technological 
characteristics of the invention.39 Patent applications, as they enter the granting process at the 
EPO, are assigned to specific IPC classes, of which the first is referred to as the “main” class 
of the application. Further classes may nevertheless be associated to the application later on. 
The number of IPC classes may be considered an indication of the complexity or architectural 
nature of an invention. Its average number (about 2 classes per application) has been fairly 
                                                 
39 See van Zeebroeck et al. (2006b) for an analysis of the impact of the choice of a classification on patent-based 
statistics. 
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stable over the past 20 years. But Figure 2.8 clearly shows that this number, as an indication 
of the complexity of an invention, influences the number of claims and especially the number 
of pages in patent applications, suggesting that more complex or architectural inventions 
require more claims and pages to be bounded and disclosed. 
 
Figure 2.8 – Claims and pages by number of 8 digits-IPC classes in EPO applications (1989-2000) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
Similarly, the number of inventors having contributed to the invention may also be seen as an 
indicator of the complexity of the new product or process, as increased intellect, skills and 
time have been necessary to its realization (see Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2000). This 
number has in fact increased by 25% over the past two decades from about two inventors on 
average in 1980 to over 2.5 in 2004. Figure 2.9 also reveals a clear linear relationship between 
the number of inventors and of claims or pages contained in the issuing application, 
suggesting larger teams of inventors and more complex inventions lead to larger filings. 
 
As EPO’s operational units in charge of the grant and opposition procedures, have been 
organised,  since 2004, into fourteen homogeneous technological areas of practice known as 
“Joint Clusters”, it is possible to allocate the applications to the corresponding area at EPO in 
charge of examining them. The correspondence between IPC classes and EPO Joint Clusters 
is established by a correspondence table provided in Table A2.4 in the appendix.40 
                                                 
40 Since applications may be associated to several IPC classes and since some IPC classes are split between 
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Figure 2.9 – Claims and pages by number of inventors in EPO applications (1989-2000) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
A breakdown of voluminosity indicators by technological field shows that all fields are not 
equally affecting the size of applications. Figure 2.10, presenting the average number of 
claims and pages by joint cluster for applications filed in 1998, shows that there are very large 
differences in patent sizes between sectors such as vehicles, electronics and biotechnology. 
 
Figure 2.10 – Average size of EPO applications according to different Joint Sectors 
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(*) The size of the bubbles reflects the number of applications filed at EPO in 2000 in the corresponding cluster
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In addition, the chart exhibits a nearly linear relation between the number of pages and the 
number of claims across technological sectors. Additional evidence on these technological 
discrepancies is provided in table A2.5 in the appendix. 
 
The various patterns emerging from the preceding bivariate analyses call for a closer 
investigation of the determinants of patent voluminosity in a multivariate setting. This 
exercise will be achieved using econometric modelling in the next chapter (Chapter 3),41 but 
before discussing the results of this quantitative analysis, let us briefly consider the potential 
cost (or side-effects) of the observed inflation in patent applications. 
 
2.2.3 The potential cost of patent voluminosity 
The observed evolution in the size of applications filed at the EPO may have important 
economic consequences, which will be empirically evaluated in chapter 6. At first sight, the 
most direct impacts should be expected on the granting process, hence on delays and 
backlogs, and eventually in terms of quality and legal certainty in the patent system (see 
Lemley, 2000). 
 
Figure 2.11 – Average time to grant decisions by size of initial application 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
The time to grant is a very critical issue, not only for many patentees, but also for the society 
at large. Many users of the patent system regularly complain about delays in getting their or 
                                                 
41 Note that multivariate descriptive analyses using tools such as correspondence analysis or ANOVA could shed 
additional light on these issues in the future, particularly to clarify the effect of technologies (in the form of Joint 
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others’ patents granted. Figure 2.2 illustrates the increasing backlog accumulated at the EPO 
and similarly at other patent offices around the world. The length of the granting process, 
defined in terms of the number of months between the application date at the EPO and the 
date of the grant or no-grant decision, has been increasing over time, from 36 months in the 
early eighties to about 57 months in recent years and will be analysed in chapter 6. 
 
In this respect, the question that can be raised is whether there is an influence of patent 
voluminosity on these delays? Do larger applications require more time for being granted? 
The statistical evidence depicted in Figure 2.11 suggests they do. A nearby linear relation can 
indeed be identified between the average time to grant and the number of claims and pages in 
the original application. It ranges from about 45 months for applications with a maximum of 5 
claims and pages to 65 months for applications with more than 60 claims or pages. These 
results somewhat validate and reinforce the results obtained by Lazaridis and van 
Pottelsberghe (2007). The authors find that on average two additional claims lead to an 
additional communication between the examiner and the applicant, and that one additional 
communication induces one year of delay in the application outcome. 
 
Figure 2.12 – Status of applications according to the number of claims in initial applications 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
These results suggest at first sight that the EPO processes smaller applications much faster 
than larger ones. This is in line with intuition and common sense but it also reinforces the idea 
that larger applications monopolise and consume more resources from patent offices for their 
processing and hence contribute to the increase in granting delays and backlogs. On top of 
this procedural cost, patent voluminosity also has an important financial cost for patent 
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Together with the cited prior art, both to the applicant and in the case of an application 
following the PCT route to the WIPO, as well as in terms of translation when they are finally 
become granted and validated as national patents. Since it has indeed been observed by van 
Pottelsberghe and François (2006) that translation costs represent an important part of the 
total cost of a European patent, it is to be expected that such costs will increase in absolute 
terms for longer texts to be translated. 
 
Linking the voluminosity of applications to grant decisions is yet another valuable exercise. 
Are larger applications more, or less, likely to be granted than smaller ones? Statistical 
evidences do not clearly put such relations in evidence. Nevertheless, Figures 2.12 and 2.13 
show a slight downward inclination in the share of filings that pass to grant as the numbers of 
claims, and less strikingly, pages increase which suggests that very large applications are 
slightly less likely to be granted. 
 
Figure 2.13 – Status of applications according to the number of pages in initial applications 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
Should they be granted or not, outrageously large applications may contribute to polluting 
their technological field by generating smoke screens and reducing the legal certainty of the 
patent system.  
 
The drafting style of a patent application, especially its claims, is very closely related to the 
intended use that the assignee will make of the patent grant. Factors such as the number of 
independent and dependent claims and the presence of fall-back positions in dependent 
claims, or in the description and drawings have a significant impact on the legal certainty 
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art, may influence anticipations of patent applications at a later stage and increase the 
complexity of the search phase. Furthermore, long and numerous claims supported by an 
overly extensive description often makes it difficult to exactly evaluate the patentability 
requirements and, if granted, the exact scope of protection. According to the Japanese Patent 
Office (2005), there are risks of technology leakage when applications are disclosed without 
being protected by patent rights, which imposes a careful management of all patent 
applications and in particular to avoid such thoughtless applications. 
 
In 1998, Dack and Cohen (2001) were asked to produce a report for the EPO on the growth 
observed at that time in so-called complex patent applications. In particular, to reference to 
the number of claims and various problems relating to the presentation of the subject matter 
within claims. The authors proposed a number of possible measures to be taken including a 
strict approach to the examination of clarity and conciseness, declarations of a partial search 
or a refusal to search, the introduction of a claims-based fee for applications filed under the 
PCT, a statutory limitation to the overall number of claims and the possibility to allow for 
amendments before search.  
 
Since then, one important step has been taken by the EPO. The introduction of Rule 29(2) of 
the EPC was implemented in amended form, effective January 2002, with the intention to 
induce applicants to file fewer independent claims within the same category. In addition, 
some fees related to the number of claims of a patent when filed and to the number of pages 
when granted. Whilst the amounts to be paid already have a discouraging intention towards 
submitting large documents they may not be sufficient, and at the time of going to press, the 
EPO has made it clear that it may need to review its fees policy to proactively react to the 
steady increase in size of patent documents (Pompidou, 2005). 
 
Similar actions have already successfully been taken by other patent offices around the world 
such as in the US in December 2004, where a new patent fee schedule was signed into law 
including significantly increased fees on claims, both independent and dependent, as well as 
on excessive number of pages of applications as filed.42 This new fee regime may very well 
encourage applicants filing patents to the USPTO to re-think their drafting style and possibly 
even have a knock-on effect on follow-on patent applications filed in other patent jurisdictions 
such as the EPO. 
 
Figure 2.14 provides an illustration of the trend prior to and what happened after December 
2004 with respect to the number of claims in applications filed at the USPTO. The analysis is 
                                                 
42 Furthermore, as applications containing a large number of claims are difficult to process and examine properly 
and require excessive patent examining resources, the USPTO is further proposing changes to its practice of 
examination of claims so that an initial examination would be performed solely on the representative claims i.e. 
all the independent claims and the dependent ones expressly designated by the applicant for initial examination. 
If the total number of representative claims is greater than ten, then the applicant will be required by the USPTO 
to share the burden of examining the application by submitting an examination support document covering all 
representative claims. It is worth noting that it is estimated that only 1.2% of all non-provisional applications 
filed at the USPTO in the first ten months of 2005 include more than ten independent claims. See National 
Archives and Records Administration (2006). 
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based on a set of published US patent applications having a filing date in the period from 
January 2004 to December 2005. The solid line in bold shows the evolution in the average 
number of claims for applications filed at the USPTO and originating from the US while the 
dotted line in bold indicates the evolution in the average number of claims for EP second 
filing applications filed with the European Patent Office and having a US priority. For both 
lines in bold, the X-axis indicates the corresponding US filing date in weeks before and after 
the introduction of the new fee schedule. Both lines are drawn on the basis of 4-week moving 
averages. The thin lines indicate weekly observations. 
 
Figure 2.14 – Number of claims in US applications of US origin and EP filings of US origin 
 
The two bold lines represent 4-weeks moving averages. 
Source: DELPHION (c) The Thomson Corporation 
 
Figure 2.14 reveals two main outcomes of the new fee schedule: one, that increased claims 
fees have a discouraging effect with respect to the average number of claims filed; and two, 
that important events in one patent office, and in this case a new fee schedule introduced by 
the USPTO, can have far-reaching secondary influences on other patent offices around the 
world. Indeed, firstly the figure clearly shows a significant decrease in the average number of 
claims observed for the published US applications with US priority – a drop from about 28 
claims to about 23 (17,9 % reduction). 
 
Incidentally, this also provides some insight into the claim-based fee elasticity. For example, 
the increase post-December 2004 in the fee for each additional dependent claim was from 18 
USD to 50 USD (normal entity), i.e. a 178% increase. Thus, one can calculate the average fee 
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ε ,    (2.1) 
 
where y1 is defined as the 12 months period preceding the new fee schedule application 
(12/08/2003 to 12/07/2004) and y2 represents the following 12 months period (starting 
December 8, 2004). In other words, a 10% increase in the claim-based fees induces a 1% 
reduction in the number of claims. 
 
Secondly, a further observation of the data presented in Figure 2.14 indicates that there has 
also been a drop in the average number of claims in EP second filings of US origin from 
about 21 claims to about 18 claims, which corresponds to a reduction of ca. 14.3%. 
 
Thus, a clear conclusion from the data presented in Figure 2.14 is that fees are a useful tool in 
influencing patent drafting behaviour, even when introduced by another patent authority. In 
this case there are two fee regimes being applied, one in the US patent system with a 
threshold at 20 claims and one in the EP system with a threshold at 10 claims. As confirmed 
by Figure A2.1 in the appendix, the recent implementation of new claim-based fees at the 
USPTO in early 2005 have already had a strong, and apparently persistent, effect on the 
average number of claims in USPTO filings.43 
 
However, there have also been several important effects of changes in US substantive patent 
law. One in particular is the Festo decision, which – to many observers – is a cause for 
tremendous increases in the number of claims due to the need to incorporate every possible 
angle in the patent application at the time of filing.44 According to Miller (2002) and Israelsen 
et al. (2002), this case may also have had an impact on the extent of disclosure, hence on the 




                                                 
43 The USPTO patent fee schedule effective December 8, 2004 charges 200 USD per independent claims in 
excess of three, 50 USD for dependent claims in excess of twenty and an additional 360 USD fee in case of 
multiple dependent claims, cf. http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2004dec08.htm. 
44 US Supreme Court’s ruling in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd on 28 May 2002. 
In this case, Festo sued Shoketsu for infringement on the grounds of the doctrine of equivalents (i.e. Shoketsu’s 
products were not allegedly infringing on the exact claims included in Festo’s patent, but were considered 
sufficiently equivalent to them by Festo), but the Courts of Appeal for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) decided that 
some amendments brought to her patent’s claims by Festo in the course of the examination proceedings were 
creating an absolute bar against the application of the doctrine of equivalents (a principle referred to as the 
“doctrine of prosecution history estoppel”). In May 2002, the Supreme Court reversed the CAFC’s ruling, 
holding that “such amendments do not create an absolute bar, but instead must be examined in light of the 
reason for the change”. “If the change was made to keep the patent from overlapping with another patent, then 
the patent applicant will be presumed to have given up the right to complain about anything broader than the 
patent claim itself” (Wikipedia). Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s ruling suggested that any foreseeable 
equivalent should be covered in the claims, forcing applicants from then on to include as many potential forms of 
their invention into their claims as possible. See Gallini (2002) for a summary of this case. The complete ruling 
can be found on http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=000&invol=00-1543. 
CHAPTER 2 - ON THE EVOLUTION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS AT THE EPO 
N. VAN ZEEBROECK - ESSAYS ON THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PATENT SYSTEMS 40 
2.3 Concluding remarks 
The objective of this chapter was to provide an overview of the evolution in patent filings at 
the EPO and to propose statistic indicators to quantify this phenomenon and identify its 
potential drivers and impacts, which will be analysed in a more integrated way in the 
following chapters. The most appropriate and affordable indicators of voluminosity consist of 
the number of claims and the number of pages in patent applications. 
 
A broad overview of all patent filings at the EPO has clearly revealed that these measures 
have considerably inflated over the past two or three decades. This evolution is important for 
two reasons: first because it may denote major changes in the practice of patent drafting and 
filing, and second, patent voluminosity has become a critical issue for patent offices around 
the world and for the EPO in particular. 
 
A descriptive analysis of these indicators reveals a wide range of potential drivers, from the 
fee structure to the complexity of inventions. Apparently driven by specific national systems – 
especially the American one –, technological specificities (e.g. biotech and computers) and a 
diffusing appreciation for the internationalization of patenting procedures and markets (e.g. 
the PCT route), this escalation may be a common result of the accelerating complexity of new 
technologies and of the harmonization of international patent laws. More generally, it appears 
that any voluminosity indicator is influenced by the geographical origin and the technological 
area of the patent. 
 
No matter its roots, the anecdotal evidence reported in this chapter suggests that the surge in 
the size of incoming applications rapidly increases the workload of patent offices, which if not 
mastered will inevitably lead to widened backlogs and delays in grant decisions, and raises 
serious quality issues. One may indeed question whether patent examiners, who are on 
average supposed to treat each application in the same amount of time, can reasonably 
provide the same quality in their examination on small, medium or excessively large 
applications. The importance of this question is reinforced by different papers, which reported 
that the validity of patents including a larger number of claims is more likely to be challenged 
in opposition (see e.g. Harhoff and Hall (2002), Graham et al. (2002), Cincera (2007), as well 
as chapter 5 below). 
 
Yet another open question is whether this escalation in voluminosity is more or less related 
with developing patenting practices, consisting for instance in constructing applications from 
different filings, dividing applications, creating uncertainty by polluting a technological field, 
or circumventing the disclosure requirement by hiding major inventions (see Stevnsborg and 
van Pottelsberghe, 2007). Alternatively, is the increase in the number of claims actually 
revealing a better and more systematic use of fallback positions in patent drafting and the 
number of pages a more thorough disclosure of inventions for which protection is being 
sought? These questions are calling for more formal statistical testing to identify the 
determinants of patent volume and their potential impact on the patent system, which will be 
addressed in the following chapters. 
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3.1 Research objectives 
The previous chapter has presented ample evidence of a surge in the size of patent 
applications filed to the EPO (which has doubled over the past two decades) and has 
suggested that this evolution may result in a dramatic surge in patent offices' workload all 
over the world and in serious concerns over patent quality standards. It also identified some 
broad patterns in the evolution of patent documents size, witnessing that it may be affected by 
geographical and technological peculiarities, in addition to some procedural features of the 
patent system (e.g. the PCT process). These preliminary results have opened the avenue for a 
multivariate analysis of the determinants of patent volume. 
 
The objective of the present chapter is to identify the drivers of these developments in 
drafting practices by investigating the determinants of the volume (in claims and pages) of 
EPO applications. Four hypotheses are quantitatively tested: the diffusion of national drafting 
practices, the complexification of inventions, the emergence of new sectors, and the 
construction of patent portfolios. 
3.2 The voluminosity of applications and its determinants 
Patents, given their role in the knowledge-based economy, have increasingly become an 
object of intense covetousness and disputes between industry players. At the very heart of this 
rivalry are the patented claims, which define the legal scope of the invention for which 
protection is being granted. Therefore, patent applicants45 tend to draft their patents with more 
claims to broaden the scope of the protection and to make them more resistant to invalidation 
challenges (Bessen 2006). This may – among other factors – have resulted into the observed 
inflation in patent applications sizes depicted in chapter 2. 
 
Claim counts have been extensively used in the economic literature as a measure of the ‘size’ 
of an invention (Tong and Frame 1994), which has proved to be related to the probability that 
a patent is litigated (Lanjouw and Schankerman 1997) and to other patent value indicators 
(Lanjouw et al. 1998; Lanjouw and Schankerman 1999). But, to the best of our knowledge, 
little attention has been paid so far to the evolution of those numbers and to the underlying 
changes that may have occurred in patent systems and technology markets around the world, 
driving patentees to adapt their drafting practices. 
 
Once something totally unconceivable, applications of over thousand pages are now 
frequently filed at the European Patent Office (EPO) and other patent offices around the 
world, and several applications even reached 100,000 pages or up to 20,000 claims in recent 
                                                 
45 In what follows, the term ‘applicant’ will be used to refer to the person, institution or firm having applied for 
the patent and who is, in the European patent system, the initial owner of the patent rights (the equivalent of the 
‘assignee’ in the U.S.). By virtue of this ‘first to file’ principle, the term ‘patentee’ may refer either to the 
applicant/assignee or to the actual inventor of the patent. 
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years.46 To a larger scale, the EPO has witnessed a radical surge in the size of patent 
applications over the past two decades no matter it is measured in terms of number of claims 
or pages in the filed documents. While the former indicator has almost doubled from 10 to 
about 18 claims per application between 1980 and 2002, the latter has witnessed a similar 
evolution in an even shorter period, from 14 pages in 1988 to 30 pages per application in 
2002. This effect, combined with the well known boom in the number of patent filings 
themselves, is in fact generating such a workload on patent offices that the EPO has to deal 
with a huge backlog of applications still to be searched for or examined.47  
 
The key question raised by this evolution of drafting practices in Europe is whether it results 
from an increasing greed of patentees in claiming for more protection, from structural and 
exogenous changes in patent systems, technologies and market conditions, or from other 
factors. This question precisely introduces the objective of this chapter: to provide a coherent 
analysis of the determinants of patent applications’ voluminosity and to identify some drivers 
of its surge, which requires exploring the very intimate anatomy of patent applications and 
systems. 
 
The approach relies on a quantitative model applied to a unique database with data on more 
than one and a half million EPO applications,48 filed between 1982 and 2004. In addition, this 
study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first one to empirically scrutinize the determinants 
of two essential dimensions of a patent’s drafting: its number of claims and of pages, which 
may represent respectively the ‘size’ and the amount of disclosure of the patent. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 reviews possible interpretations of the number 
of patent claims and pages and elaborates on the reasons why voluminosity matters in the 
patent system. Section 2 is devoted to the development of a set of four broad hypotheses 
associated with an application’s characteristics, which could contribute to determine its size 
and to explain the observed phenomena. The econometric model, its results and 
interpretations of the determinants of patent voluminosity follow in section 3. 
 
The results are threefold. First, they reveal fundamental differences in patent drafting styles 
between Civil and Common Law countries, with the latter system clearly leading to much 
larger patents on average. This result is consistent with a prolific literature observing similar 
differences between the U.S. and continental Europe in the size of commercial contracts.49 
Second, the internationalization of patenting procedures and the increasing success of the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)50 lead to the harmonization of drafting styles around the 
                                                 
46 Note that these latter extreme cases of jumbo filings actually concern PCT applications filed to the WIPO in 
2004 and later that were either never transferred to the EPO, or transferred in a considerably reduced form. See 
Table A2.3 in the appendix for a list of such filings. 
47 See chapter 5 of Jaffe and Lerner (2004) for an illustration of this issue at the USPTO. 
48 PCT filings that had not yet been transferred to the EPO at the time of the data extraction (January 2006) were 
excluded from the dataset presented in chapter 2 due to limited data availability.  
49 E.g. Van Hecke (1962), Langbein (1987), Lundmark (2001),Von Westphalen (2004), Hill and King (2004). 
50 The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), subscribed to by most of the members of the Paris Convention and 
supervised by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), offers inventors a major way of deferring 
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world in favour of the U.S. model. Following a kind of ‘draft once, file everywhere’ principle, 
patentees seem to opt for a U.S. drafting style as soon as they plan to file their application 
internationally. This diffusion of Common Law compliant drafting styles in Europe has a 
major aftermath on the European patent system. This also suggests that the observed inflation 
in patent drafting may to a large extent be due to changes in patent systems and technology 
markets and not only to a real increase in the average scope of protection claimed. Third, the 
fast emergence of new technologies (namely biotechnologies, telecommunications and 
computers) in the patent field, the increasing technological complexity of inventions and to a 
lower extent the applicant’s patent portfolio and its construction also appear as significant 
determinants of the voluminosity. 
 
3.2.1 Inflation in patent applications’ voluminosity 
A patent document is made of bibliographic data (providing information on the applicant, 
inventor, technological classes, references to the existing prior art, etc.), a specification or 
description of the invention, a set of claims (what the patentee is claiming exclusive rights on, 
aka the patent’s scope of protection), and finally – but optionally – some illustrations 
supporting the specification and claims in the form of drawings, listings, gene sequences, etc. 
As they constitute the legal core of a patent, the claims have been subject to numerous 
investigations in the economic literature.51 Their most appropriate interpretation is however 
still unclear.52 
 
The number of claims might reflect a broader scope of protection since more subject matter is 
included. This is the dominant interpretation in the literature (e.g. Tong and Frame 1994; 
Lanjouw and Shankerman 1999), and it is confirmed by practitioners in many cases. Not all. 
The breadth of a patent is often tied to the wording of the claims – e.g. replacing the word 
‘rodent’ by the word ‘mouse’ will drastically shrink the scope of a patent. Adding claims 
could even in certain cases signal a narrower filing – e.g. listing three types of rodents takes 
three claims, while just mentioning rodents takes one. However it is empirically sound to 
consider that the number of claims is overall positively correlated with the scope of 
protection.53 
                                                                                                                                                        
patenting expenses. Under this Treaty, one can file an ‘International Patent Application’, which doesn’t turn into 
some sort of international patent, but primarily acts as a vehicle to buy a period of time within which to proceed 
with national or regional (such as the EPO) patent applications. Instead of having only a twelve month time 
period within which an inventor must file foreign applications in order to claim priority, with the PCT, the 
inventor can gain an additional eighteen months before having to incur the relatively large expenses of 
completing the applications at each of the designated offices. Those additional months can be crucial to the 
exploitation of an invention. They may give the inventor additional time to raise the funds required to file patent 
applications in a large number of countries, or provide additional time within which to gauge the economic 
importance of the invention, or to find licensees or even partners for the project. 
51 Article 69 of the EPC, based on the Strasbourg Convention of 1963, clearly states that the claims aim at 
demarcating the scope of the monopoly granted by a patent (see Sherman, 1991). 
52 The distinction between independent and dependent claims might be somewhat helpful in this respect but such 
a distinction does unfortunately not exist in EPO data for there should normally be only one independent claim 
(possibly one per category of invention) in each application and for no fees are based on the distinction between 
dependent and independent claims. 
53 Note that the number and scope of claims are usually restricted during the examination, so that granted patents 
are narrower than applications (on average, granted patents have one to two claims less than when applied). 
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More claims may nevertheless also denote a more detailed definition of the protected area, 
adding precision: instead of giving a generic term which could be somewhat vague, the 
applicant will list extensively and individually all potential components of the subject matter. 
The purpose could be to secure the legal validity of the patent in case of licensing or in case 
of litigation. It could also be to construct ‘fall back positions’ in the course of the examination 
procedure or in view of the application of the doctrine of equivalents. By having a series of 
claims partly overlapping, partly fitted into each other, the applicant has the possibility of fine 
tuning the scope of protection before the examiner’s objections and to maximize her chances 
to be able to claim infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. This is of particular 
relevance in the U.S. where something is deemed equivalent only if the variation between the 
features of the infringing device or process and the patented claim are ‘insubstantial’.54 
 
Finally, the number of claims may be the result of some strategic choice, as clearly suggested 
by Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe (2007). More claims may indeed betray a willingness of 
the applicant to hide the true invention in the middle of many ‘non inventions’, using 
vagueness as a weapon. This could be either because the applicant wants to deceive 
competitors or patent examiners, or because she does not know herself at the time of filing 
what the real invention is. For instance the inventor of a chemical product, after experiments, 
would identify a family of compounds, some members of which would have a certain 
property, but she does not know which one of them has it. She will therefore list all the 
members in the application, in order not to miss the right one. In order to write such patent 
applications, it is possible to use some ad-hoc software (commercially available) that will 
combine various works or sequences of letters in as many ways as needed, so that one might 
draft automatically a patent application with thousands of claims coming from the same 
mould and covering a broad field, a tiny part of which only is of any relevance.55 
 
Such a strategy makes obviously sense in the case of inventions still in the early stage, not 
mature enough for being completely and precisely described. Hence one would expect the 
following strategy from the applicant: first, filing a broad application, with many claims most 
of which are irrelevant, then filing divisional applications, possibly over several generations 
(i.e. divisionals of divisionals) so as to restrict progressively the scope of protection while 
research is advancing and still benefiting from the earliest priority.56 Such behaviour may be 
suspected for instance in the case of a few gigantic patent applications filed in 2004 at the 
WIPO by Angiotech International AG, a Swiss biotech company, with a U.S. priority and 5-
digit numbers of claims, up to 19,368 (see chapter 2). 
 
Notably resulting from the number and length of the claims, the number of pages might be 
seen as the extent of the disclosure of the invention, without presuming of its quality. The 
more thorough the description and the more exhaustive the drawings, the more pages the 
                                                 
54 See Marr (2003), Meurer and Nard (2005), and Lichtman (2006) for extensive analyses of the U.S. doctrine of 
equivalents, and Chandler (2000) for a discussion on the different aspects of the prosecution history estoppel. 
55 Patent drafting software solutions include e.g. Kernel Creations’ Patent Pro, LexisNexis’ PatentOptimizer, 
InventNet’s PatentEase.and Versist Business Research’s Patent Caddie. 
56 Continuations in part and reissues are not allowed in the European Patent System. 
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application will contain and the more it may divulge on the invention. In parallel with the 
claims, the average number of pages in patent applications has witnessed a drastic surge over 
the past two decades with record applications of up to 140 000 pages filed at the WIPO in 
2000.57 Here again, more voluminous files might just be needed for more complex inventions, 
requiring more wording, details and possibly illustrations to be entirely disclosed. Or it might 
be the result of a deliberate willingness to hide the true invention in the middle of gigantic 
applications, creating a new variant of submarine patents.58 
 
An implicit and key question is whether such jumbo-applications do matter. Almost surely, 
they do. As does the overall increasing size of patents, for it has an impact on the patent 
system, the economy and the society at large, as it will be discuss in the coming chapters. To 
the economy, more claims often mean that broader protection is sought, inducing a higher 
cost to society, and possibly more uncertainty for competitors during the examination 
procedure and beyond. To patent offices, more claims or pages mean more work, hence more 
resources allocated to searching and examining the files, which induces an additional pressure 
on quality. What is more, this growing size of applications comes along with a very sharp 
increase in the number of patent filings themselves, which have been multiplied by 2 over the 
past 10 years. As a result, the total number of claims and pages to be examined by the EPO is 
now growing exponentially. 
 
Table 3.1 – Summary statistics of voluminosity indicators (endogenous variables) 59 
Variable Period Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mode Median 
Annual
Growth 
Euro-Direct and PCT Regional filings only 
# Claims at filing 1982-2004 1 551 459 14.60 12.08 1 651 10 11 2.5% 
# Claims at filing 1988-2002 1 147 567 14.74 12.11 1 592 10 11 3.2% 
# Pages at filing 1988-2003 1 136 677 21.45 35.95 1 9786 6 13 5.3% 
          
PCT international filings (not yet entered into regional phase) included 
# Claims at filing 1982-2004 1 933 373 16.00 15.11 1 999 10 12 3.3% 
# Claims at filing 1988-2002 1 393 794 15.80 14.19 1 999 10 12 3.7% 
# Pages at filing 1988-2003 1 382 365 23.14 37.12 1 9786 7 15 5.6% 
Source – own calculations based on EPO data 
 
                                                 
57 UNDP 2001:103. 
58 ‘Submarine patent’ usually referred to a patent published long after the original application was filed. Like a 
submarine, it stayed under water (unpublished) for long, then emerged (i.e. was granted and published), and 
surprised the whole market. Since applications are now published after 18 months in most countries, no matter 
they are already granted or not, submarine patents per se have disappeared, except for USPTO filings with no 
international extension, which are only published at grant. Jumbo applications make nowadays the new ‘de 
facto’ submarines patents. The hidden claims, regularly unknown by the applicant herself at the time of filing, 
can only be identified by text mining techniques. 
59 Note that for regional PCT filings (i.e. PCT filings that have entered the regional phase at EPO), the reported 
number of claims corresponds to the set of claims included in the application as transferred. This set is frequently 
smaller than the initial set of claims, as the claims originally found in a PCT filing frequently include region-
specific versions of similar claims. In addition, contrary to the WIPO, the EPO charges claim-based fees for 
claims in excess of 10, which apply to PCT applications once they enter the regional phase. This may encourage 
applicants to abandon some claims initially included in their PCT filings prior to transferring them to the EPO. 
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The increase in the average number of claims and pages in applications filed to the EPO is 
depicted in Figure 2.1 and summary statistics for these indicators are provided in Table 3.1 
(box plots of the two dependent variables are provided in Figures A3.2 and A3.3 in the 
appendix). It shows that these numbers have increased over the past two decades, and 
especially since the nineties with a 50% increase in the number of claims (21 claims per 
patent on average in 2004 against 14 in 1994) and pages (30 pages per patent in 2002 against 
20 in 1994). Other patent offices around the world have experienced a similar phenomenon. 
 
3.2.2 Hypotheses on the determinants of patent voluminosity 
In order to explain the increasing voluminosity of patent applications at the EPO, four broad 
candidate hypotheses have been identified. These hypotheses are to be tested with a dataset 
composed of all patent applications at the EPO filed between 1982 and 2004, which makes 
1 551 769 filings. 
 
H1: National practices and internationalization of patenting procedures 
The anecdotal evidence reported in chapter 2 has clearly highlighted important differences in 
the average size of patent applications originating from different countries. Despite the 
progressive harmonization of patent systems notably induced by the TRIPS, essential 
differences in national patent law subsist between countries, which may explain these 
discrepancies in voluminosity. 
 
As observed and scrutinised by an abundant literature, commercial contracts in the U.S. are 
usually much larger than their continental European counterparts.60 In explaining the observed 
differences in contract sizes, research scholars refer to different aspects of the U.S. legal 
system and culture at large as compared to continental ones as well as to specific aspects 
relating to contract law, which may lead to a higher verbosity in U.S. contract drafting. In 
particular, they point to the ‘perfectionism’ of U.S. lawyers and the relative uncertainty of the 
Common Law (Van Hecke 1962), the superiority of the civil procedure in Germany as 
compared to the U.S. (Langbein 1987), the obligation of good faith in continental contracting 
(Von Westphalen 2004), a general U.S. distrust of judges and a strong inclination for the 
freedom of contract (Lundmark 2001), a propensity to ‘stop sooner’ the arm’s race in 
customizing a contract, the reliance in continental Europe to standardised ‘good enough’ 
solutions, the applicability without any reference to standard provisions (mandatory or 
default), definitive interpretations and definitions of common terms established by the law, as 
well as a lower propensity to litigate on the Continent and the attitude of continental judges in 
interpreting contract terms (Hill and King 2004). 
 
                                                 
60 Van Hecke (1962) reported the case of a U.S. firm willing to contract with a Belgian counterpart. The former 
submitted to the latter two drafts of contract containing about 10,000 words together. The Belgian firm, shocked 
by the length of the document, refused to pursue the negotiation unless she was allowed to propose a new draft 
for the contract. The Belgian draft, with barely 1400 words, was finally agreed on and executed by both parties 
as the American firm acknowledged the document included all the substance that was really needed. 
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When turning to patent drafting, one may reasonably expect that those characteristics of the 
U.S. legal system and culture that induce longer commercial contracts should also induce 
longer patent drafts. In particular, the presumed ‘perfectionism’ of U.S. lawyers, the more 
intense recourse to customization and details in U.S. legal documents, the limited availability 
of general terms and definitions provided by the law, the higher propensity to litigate and the 
smaller foreseeability of judges’ decisions (notably due to the traditionally larger role of 
precedents in Common Law Courts’ decisions as compared to continental European Courts 
and to the Common Law tradition allowing its judges to establish broad principles of law in 
the absence of legislation) may all contribute to more detailed patent drafts. Lundmark (2001) 
also evokes an unresponsive dispute resolution practice in the U.S., by which Common Law 
judges are of no help in terms of interpretation when a need for clarity rises in litigation. In 
this legal tradition, the need for clarity and specificity mounts dramatically. The same author 
further points to the discovery mechanisms in Common Law countries, leaving a much 
weaker power to the judges, which also puts a higher premium on the clarity and details in 
legal documents. All these factors feed a huge fear of litigation in the U.S. (particularly in the 
absence of a ‘subsidizing losers’ rule and given the very high stakes reached in some cases), 
which forces legal patentees to add precision so as to reduce their exposure to the system. 
 
In addition to these general features of the U.S. legal environment, various national 
specificities of patent systems may also induce different patent drafting behaviours. In 
particular, the U.S. doctrine of equivalents and the file history estoppel are two major 
characteristics of the U.S. patent system, which have strongly influenced patentees’ 
behaviour.61 According to the latter principle, strongly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 
the Festo case (Festo Corp. v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002)), 
a party who makes a change to a patent application to accommodate the requirements of 
patent law cannot claim indirect infringement of an element that was narrowed by that 
change. However, this case was only a recent example in a long series of rulings which 
progressively reduced the practical applicability of the doctrine of equivalents.62 Hence to be 
able to use the doctrine of equivalents, applicants tend to embed in their draft very detailed 
fall-back positions that they can use in case of litigation for saving as much as possible of the 
protection afforded by their patent (see e.g. Wheeler 2003). 
 
                                                 
61 At the EPO, it is required that the ‘number of the claims shall be reasonable in consideration of the nature of 
the invention claimed.’ (Rule 29(5) EPC). Under Rule 29(2) EPC, there should be only one single independent 
claim in each ‘category’ (product, process, apparatus or use). More may be allowed ‘where it is not appropriate, 
having regard to the subject-matter of the application, to cover this subject-matter by a single claim.’ On the 
contrary, a U.S. application may have a multiplicity of independent claims. 
62 The doctrine of equivalents is a “legal rule [...] that allows a court to hold a party liable for patent 
infringement even though the infringing device or process does not fall within the literal scope of a patent claim, 
but nevertheless is equivalent to the claimed invention.” (Wikipedia) It is therefore aimed at ensuring patent 
owners a fair protection for their patents beyond the literal wording of their claims. Without an applicable 
doctrine of equivalents, the claims must be drafted in such a way as to cover in detail all potential variations of 
the invention. Marr (2003) reported e.g. Judge Rader’s decision in Johnson & Johnson, 285 F.3d at 1059, 
himself citing Federal Circuit cases dating as far back as 1984, that: “The patentee has an obligation to draft 
claims that capture all reasonably foreseeable ways to practice the invention. The doctrine of equivalents would 
not rescue a claim drafter who does not provide such notice. Foreseeability thus places a premium on notice 
while reserving a limited role for the protective function of the doctrine of equivalents.” 
CHAPTER 3 - THE DETERMINANTS OF PATENT VOLUME 
N. VAN ZEEBROECK - ESSAYS ON THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PATENT SYSTEMS 49 
Another specificity of U.S. patent law is that claims cannot be cross-referred as much as they 
are in Europe, forcing applicants to add claims instead of strengthening the overall structure 
of the application. In addition, the mandatory best mode to be detailed in USPTO applications 
but not in EPO or JPO ones might be yet another contributor to this effect. It is indeed 
frequent practice by American patentees to detail several utilization modes to hide the ‘best’ 
one, possibly leading to longer descriptions as well. One could finally argue that patents play 
a more crucial role in competitive processes in the U.S. than in other parts of the world, so 
that companies will invest more in patent drafting, prosecuting and enforcement.63 
 
Conversely, the Japanese system is known for the low number of claims composing each 
patent. Therefore, when the protection of a Japanese invention is extended abroad, several 
priority patents are often merged to form a single U.S. or EPO application.64 This practice 
might also result in EPO patent applications of different sizes than the average patent 
applications from other countries. 
 
In addition, different fee regimes in place in the various patent offices around the world may 
further influence the number of claims and pages. At the EPO, additional fees are incurred 
when the total number of claims exceeds 10, against 20 in the U.S. system. This difference 
may also influence patent drafting styles, as observed or suggested by Brooks and Ware 
(2005) and van Pottelsberghe and François (2006), as well as in chapter 2. On the contrary, no 
claim-based fees are applied to PCT filings until the end of the international phase. 
 
Chapter 2 also suggested a strong impact of international patenting procedures, and more 
specifically of the PCT on the voluminosity of EPO applications. By lengthening the 
international ‘waiting’ phase from one year to 30 months, the PCT option provides more time 
to the applicants to assess the economic value of their invention before taking the decision to 
file abroad or not, which induces significant expenses. If the patent is effectively filed abroad 
after 30 months, the total cost is slightly higher than the non PCT route towards the EPO 
patent (Dernis et al. 2001). But if the patent is dropped into the public domain, the total cost 
of the patenting process is lower than direct EPO applications. This may explain why the PCT 
option has met an increasing success over the past 20 years, from 15% of EPO applications in 
1985 to 50% in 2000, a figure which is currently stable. Furthermore, the PCT does not 
involve any additional fee for excess claims and allows (under PCT Rules 40 and 68) to 
separate groups of claims to be directed to separate inventions in the International Search and 
Preliminary Exam in case the unity of invention is lacking. Hence, it is all easy and costless 
for applicants to draft more claims than may be needed when their PCT application is filed to 
ultimately obtain protection in Europe. 
 
 
                                                 
63 See Hall et al. (2003) for an in-depth analysis of U.S. patent litigation processes. 
64 Although the cost of filing a patent application at the EPO will depend – among other factors – on the number 
of claims it contains, it is usually less costly to file a single application with several claims rather than a number 
of applications with fewer claims, notwithstanding the unity of the claimed protection. Van Pottelsberghe and 
François (2006) provide in-depth simulations of the price structure of patent filings. 
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Table 3.2 – Summary statistics of exogenous variables 
Variable Type Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max (1)
H1: National practices and internationalization of patenting procedures (Reference = France) 
PCT Filing DUM 1 551 769 0.380 0.49 0 1 9.85%
Non U.S. Applicant with U.S. priority DUM 1 551 769 0.035 0.18 0 1 6.72%
U.S. Applicant with non U.S. priority DUM 1 551 769 0.016 0.13 0 1 0.19%
AT Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.010 0.10 0 1 0.50%
AU Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.007 0.08 0 1 1.15%
BE Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.009 0.10 0 1 1.62%
CA Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.012 0.11 0 1 2.66%
CH Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.036 0.19 0 1 -1.60%
DE Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.199 0.40 0 1 -0.84%
DK Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.007 0.08 0 1 3.17%
ES Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.005 0.07 0 1 7.52%
FI Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.010 0.10 0 1 7.61%
FR Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.075 0.26 0 1 -1.76%
GB Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.052 0.22 0 1 -3.43%
IL Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.005 0.07 0 1 9.90%
IT Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.033 0.18 0 1 1.05%
JP Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.179 0.38 0 1 1.33%
KR Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.008 0.09 0 1 32.04%
NL Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.037 0.19 0 1 0.89%
SE Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.021 0.14 0 1 -0.13%
U.S. Applicant DUM 1 551 769 0.289 0.45 0 1 0.29%
Applicant from the ROW DUM 1 551 769 0.024 0.15 0 1 3.38%
Filing in a non-EPO (DE/EN/FR) language DUM 1 551 769 0.077 0.27 0 1 5.25%
H2: Technological complexity 
# Inventors DISC 1 551 769 2.407 1.77 0 53 1.36%
# IPC-7 DISC 1 534 018 1.921 1.33 1 49 0.40%
# Backward Patent Citations DISC 1 461 657 4.530 2.89 0 125 0.50%
# Non Patent Citations DISC 1 461 657 0.953 1.84 0 170 2.74%
H3 Emerging sectors 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry DUM 1 551 769 0.113 0.32 0 1 -1.73%
JC-02 - Organic Chemistry DUM 1 551 769 0.136 0.34 0 1 -0.69%
JC-03 - Polymers DUM 1 551 769 0.094 0.29 0 1 -1.43%
JC-04 - Biotechnology DUM 1 551 769 0.121 0.33 0 1 2.32%
JC-05 - Telecommunications DUM 1 551 769 0.052 0.22 0 1 7.18%
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media DUM 1 551 769 0.049 0.22 0 1 3.21%
JC-07 - Electronics DUM 1 551 769 0.074 0.26 0 1 -0.16%
JC-08 - Electricity & Elec. Machines DUM 1 551 769 0.108 0.31 0 1 -0.71%
JC-09 - Computers DUM 1 551 769 0.048 0.21 0 1 4.61%
JC-10 - Measuring Optics DUM 1 551 769 0.089 0.29 0 1 -0.32%
JC-11 - Handling & Processing DUM 1 551 769 0.125 0.33 0 1 -1.35%
JC-12 - Vehicles & Gen. Technology DUM 1 551 769 0.099 0.30 0 1 0.13%
JC-13 - Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics DUM 1 551 769 0.089 0.28 0 1 -0.84%
JC-14 - Human Necessities DUM 1 551 769 0.111 0.31 0 1 0.67%
H4: Portfolio construction 
# Priorities DISC 1 551 769 1.171 1.29 0 482 0.23%
Application has issued divisionals DUM 1 543 076 0.020 0.14 0 1 12.14%
Application is a divisional DUM 1 543 076 0.024 0.15 0 1 13.68%
# Cumulative Filings (5 years) DISC 1 551 743 420.664 1082.48 0 11 111 4.39%
Occasional (no filing in 4 prev. yrs) DUM 1 551 743 0.234 0.42 0 1 -1.57%
DUM = Dummy variable | DISC = Discrete variable - International PCT filings excluded 
(1) Average annual growth rates of the variable or the share of filings concerned in case of dummy variables
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Therefore, the first hypothesis (H1) is that national patent systems strongly influence the way 
patent applications are drafted, that the original application drafted for one particular country 
determines the form of the subsequent application filed internationally, and that the increasing 
success of the PCT option encourages this approach. As patents are indeed increasingly 
applied within a worldwide strategy, patentees presumably draft one single patent – often with 
a U.S. template – then apply it to other offices around the world through the PCT procedure.  
 
To capture these potential factors in the empirical model, a set of dummy variables has been 
computed, which are described in Table 3.2: PCT takes the value 1 if the application was filed 
under the PCT option and 0 in case of a Euro-Direct filing with or without an earlier national 
priority; USPR identifies those applications filed with a U.S. priority by a non-U.S. applicant, 
which is the case for a bit more than 3% of EPO applications, as shown in Table 3.2; USAP 
takes the value 1 for applications filed by a U.S. applicant with a non-U.S. priority, 
representing about 1.5% of applications. The two latter variables, USPR and USAP, will allow 
making a distinction between cultural effects (referring to the country of origin of the 
applicant) and institutional effects (pertaining to the local patent law in the country for which 
the application was supposedly initially intended, that is the country of priority). To complete 
the set of variables, 19 country dummies identify the country of residence of the applicants.65 
Table 3.2 shows that 29% of EPO applications originate from the USA, 20% from Germany 
and 18% from Japan. When the number of pages is the dependent variable, the language of 
the publication must be taken into account with the variable NO_EPL. This variable is equal 
to 1 when the number of pages refers to another language than the three official EPO 
languages (English, French or German).66 
 
H2: Technical complexity 
As technology becomes more complex, more words may be required to describe and claim it. 
Notably because a dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant may really see farther than a 
giant himself, architectural inventions tend to lead to increasingly complex inventions and 
technologies over time, produced by larger and larger teams of inventors with complementary 
skills and expertise. If this assumption had to be true and if more complex technologies do 
require longer descriptions, one may expect that the rise in technological complexity will 
drive the voluminosity of subsequent patent applications. 
 
                                                 
65 The 18 largest countries whose applicants have filed at least 10,000 EPO applications (about 0.5% of the total 
sample) over the entire period (1978-2004) were selected. The other countries were identified by the dummy 
variable ‘APP_ROW’. Note that given their very high correlation with countries of priority, using the latter ones 
produces very similar results. 
66 From chapter 2, the country of the applicant seems a fairly good proxy for the language of filing (patentees 
tending to file their EPO applications in either their home language or English if they have no EPO language). 
But under Article 14 of EPC, it is possible for applicants to file their patents in non-EPO languages provided 
they supply a valid translation within 3 months. In some countries (especially Japan), applicants often tend (for 
up to 30 or 35% of their applications) to file their applications in their home language instead, making the 
applicant country-language correspondence less predictable, hence the need to control for non-EPO languages in 
our model. 
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This hypothesis is measured with 4 discrete variables: INV, representing the number of 
inventors listed in the application; IPC8, the number of IPC (International Patent 
Classification) classes at 8 digits associated with the invention, which denotes the 
technological diversity embodied in the invention, i.e. an ‘architectural invention’ resulting 
from a process of combination of existing ideas and devices (see for instance Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe 2000; 2002);67 BPC, the number of citations made to previous patents, which 
indicates a larger use of prior ‘patented’ art; and NPC, the number of citations to the scientific 
literature made by the application, which identifies science-based inventions. Table 3.2 
indicates that the average EPO application has been produced by 2.4 inventors (with a 
maximum of 53), covers about two IPC8 classes (up to 49), and makes 4.5 citations to earlier 
patents (with a maximum of 125) and only about 1 reference to the scientific literature (up to 
170, however). 
 
H3: Emerging sectors 
Greenhalgh et al. (1996) have shown that the patent system is most significant in protecting 
sectors with mature technology, whereas in high technology sectors it is the bringing to 
market of an innovation which sustains trade performance in the short to medium run, and 
even this advantage is eroded in the long run. Consequently, patenting practices may also 
differ across technology field. 
 
In addition, the wording space required for the codification of an invention may vary 
substantially across technological areas. The vocabulary of more recent technologies may be 
less standardised than in more established fields, requiring more detailed descriptions. 
Emerging technical fields rely more on recent science than older fields, and are based on (yet) 
less well known natural phenomena, which require more explanation than artefacts based on 
mechanisms recognised and accepted for long. This is notably the case for biotechnology, 
based on molecular biology, and of software, based on maths, algorithm and operational 
research. Furthermore, markets where technology is the most important competitive 
argument, where there is more licensing and cross-licensing, may encourage industry players 
to establish their rights with higher precision. Therefore, the sectoral specificity of a patent 
application might very well affect its voluminosity, and the surge in patenting in new, 
science-based and extremely competitive technological areas might contribute to the increase 
in patent voluminosity at large. 
 
This hypothesis is tested through 14 dummies representing the joint clusters used at the EPO 
to dispatch the applications to the proper examination departments. These dummy variables 
were computed from the IPC4 classes associated with the applications, through a matching 
table in use at the EPO at the time of this study. These clusters (JC) – listed in Table 3.2 – 
represent broad technological areas, such as industrial chemistry (JC-01), telecommunications 
(JC-05) and human necessities (JC-14). Organic chemistry (JC-02), handling and processing 
(JC-11), and biotechnologies (JC-04) are the largest technological areas. Their shares in total 
                                                 
67 See van Zeebroeck et al. (2006b) for an analysis of the impact of the choice of a classification on patent 
statistics. 
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EPO applications are 13.6, 12.5 and 12.1% respectively, while the computers and audio, 
video and media joint clusters are the smallest ones, each accounting for about 5% of all EPO 
applications. 
 
H4: Portfolio construction 
As the IP strategy of companies in certain industries has moved from being static (leveraging 
exclusion rights) to more active (trading rights, using them for licenses or other strategic 
purposes, as evoked in chapter 1), their patent strategy has changed from a ‘single patent’ 
view to a ‘portfolio management’ view. It is well known that some large firms have a large 
propensity to patent their inventions. IBM for instance has used the fact it is the largest 
patentee in the USA as a marketing tool for several years and Microsoft has recruited an IP 
officer (from IBM) for developing its patenting strategy with a view to outperform IBM in 
this respect. In this context, what matters can then become the size and strength of the 
portfolio rather than the quality (scope, ability to stand in courts) of any single patent (see for 
instance Shapiro 2000; Hall and Ziedonis 2001; and Bessen 2003). 
 
The number of claims per patent could be the result, intended or not, of certain strategic 
choices of applicants, such as the ones detailed in section 1. One such strategy is the early 
patenting of yet unfocused inventions, which are narrowed down later in the process of 
examination. This could be identified through the use of divisionals: a divisional application 
is a sub-part of an initial application which does not satisfy the requirement of the EPC 
regarding the unity of the invention, but of which the applicant can secure the most important 
claims in a smaller application with a similar priority number and one or several further 
applications with the same priority date. One would expect that in the case of a divisionals 
strategy, the initial application, the ‘parent’, would be bigger than average.  
 
Another aspect may be the experience or lack of experience of the patentees with the patent 
system. Under-staffed, inexperienced or insufficiently trained patent departments or 
employees may result in longer patent drafts (sometimes with many unclear, often 
overlapping and redundant claims), as drafting concise patents can be a very difficult exercise. 
Poorly drafted applications may also be a by-product of a strategy putting quantity over 
quality as a priority and may in some seldom cases be the effect a deliberate strategy to 
pollute a technological field or create a smoke screen around it. 
 
Some aspects of patent portfolios and their construction are therefore captured, through a set 
of 5 variables: PRIO provides the number of priority patents claimed in the EPO application 
(about 1.2 on average); HASDIV identifies those applications that gave rise to subsequent 
divisional filings, which is the case of about 2% of the dataset; on the contrary, ISDIV isolates 
divisional filings themselves, representing about 2.4% of the filings. Finally, building on 
Kortum and Lerner (1999)’s approach, two variables are built up: SIZE gives the cumulative 
number of additional applications filed by the same applicant during the same year and the 
four consecutive previous years (420 filings on average) and OCCAS represents the 
inexperience of the applicant by marking those applications that are the only filing of their 
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applicants in the current and the four previous years (about 23% of the filings). These two 
latter variables were computed using the official applicant codes from the main EPO database, 
i.e. without any cleaning of applicants’ names.68 
 
H0: The time trend 
Next to all these potential factors, patents may become larger and larger simply as a 
consequence of global changes in economic environments, in market conditions, in courts 
behaviours and expectations, or in writing and documenting norms, to mention only a few. 
This overall trend, extraneous to the above hypotheses, might be related to a general 
propensity toward increasingly lengthy and detailed technical descriptions in every field of 
human activities over time. Figure 2.1 precisely illustrates a clear trend component in the 
increasing voluminosity (the drop of the number of pages in the mid eighties is an artefact due 
to changes in the patent format at EPO). Therefore, it is important to capture in a way this 
potential effect of time and potentially non-accounted for factors through the four main 
hypotheses. Table 3.2 further reflects the constant increase in the number of filings in recent 
years (the drop in 2004 is another artefact due here to the exclusion of the numerous 
international PCT filings not yet duly transferred to the EPO), as already observed by Kortum 
and Lerner (1999) in the United States.69 To capture this trend, the model includes a set of 23 
time dummies representing the year of filing at the EPO. 
 
3.2.3 Empirical results 
3.2.3.1 The model 
The following model is used in order to test the four broad hypotheses on the determinants of 
voluminosity: 
 
iijiji eTHfV += ),,(β ,        (3.1) 
 
where V denotes the voluminosity indicators (number of claims or number of pages) for each 
patent i (i=1, …, 1 551 769). The endogenous variables are described in Table 3.1. jβ  is the 
vector of parameters to be estimated. Hj are the vectors of explanatory variables, described in 
Table 3.2 and summarised in Table 3.3 corresponding to the four main hypotheses (j=1,…,4). 
T captures the trend factor (represented by time dummies) and e is the error term. Our dataset, 
created from different EPO databases,70 comprises all Euro-direct and Euro-transferred PCT 
                                                 
68 Following Trajtenberg (2004), this means that our data is subject to ‘type I errors’ only, i.e. missing names that 
should go together, which leads to a likely underestimation of the variable SIZE and overestimation of the 
variable OCCAS. In other words, some patentees may have been erroneously declared occasional and recurrent 
patentees probably have larger portfolios in reality than accounted in our data. 
69 Kortum and Lerner (1999) suggest that the increase in patenting in the U.S. has been driven by changes in the 
management of innovation of U.S. firms which brought a real burst of innovation and an increased propensity to 
patent. Peeters and van Pottelsberghe (2006a) provide evidence on the impact of these changes on the size of 
patent portfolios. These changes include an intensification of collaborative R&D, especially with universities; a 
focus on basic and applied research, an orientation towards product innovation, and the ability to reduce or 
overcome the traditional barriers to innovation. 
70 Including EPO (2006). 
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applications filed at the EPO between 1978 and 2004.71 The estimates are run over the periods 
1982-2004 for the number of claims and 1988-2002 for the number of pages (due to the 
formatting issues discussed here below and to the unavailability of page counts data for post 
2002 applications). 
 
Table 3.3 – List of exogenous variables72 
H1: national practices and internationalization of patenting procedures hypothesis: 
 PCT  a dummy equal to 1 for PCT applications and 0 otherwise
 USPR  a dummy equal to 1 for filings with a U.S. priority applied by a non-U.S. applicant 
 USAP a dummy equal to 1 for filings with a non-U.S. priority applied by a U.S. applicant 
 APP_XX 19 country dummies (18 major countries of applicants + Rest of the World) 
 NO_EPL 
a dummy equal to 1 for applications filed in another language than the three 
official EPO languages (DE, EN or FR) (mainly concerns a few Japanese  
applications filed in Japanese) 
   
H2: the technological complexity hypothesis 
 INV the number of inventors 
 IPC8 the number of 8-digit IPC classes listed
 BPC  the number of backward patent citations
 NPC  the number of non-patent backward citations
   
H3: the emerging sectors hypothesis: 14 dummies (1 for each EPO Joint Cluster)
   
H4: the patent portfolio construction hypothesis (5 variables)
 PRIO  the number of priority applications listed in the patent filing
 HASDIV a dummy equal to 1 if the application led to one or more divisionals and 0 otherwise 
 ISDIV a dummy equal to 1 for divisional applications and 0 otherwise
 SIZE  
the cumulative number of applications filed by the applicant in the same year and  
the 4 previous years on top of the current application 
 OCCAS  
a dummy equal to 1 if the applicant had no other filing in the current and 4 previous 
years 
   
H0: 23 time dummies (ranging from 1982 to 2004) to control for the effect of time 
 
Our empirical methodology consists first in running subsequent estimates of Equation 3.1 
with an OLS regression on the basic sample, with each independent variable and each 
individual hypothesis alone, and then with all the hypotheses simultaneously. The objective is 
to get first a broad idea of the explanatory power of each of the four hypotheses at large, then 
to estimate the simultaneous impact of the determinants included in each of the four 
hypotheses, and finally to calculate the contributions of the various factors at the aggregate 
level. To perform the two latter steps, the count nature (i.e. discreteness and non-
negativeness) and high skewness depicted by the distribution of the dependent variables (see 
Figure 3.1), dictate the recourse to a count model with a negative binomial specification (see 
                                                 
71 Note again that non-transferred PCT filings designating the EPO are not included in the main dataset. See 
Khan and Dernis (2005) for an interesting discussion on the impact of including or excluding international phase 
PCT applications on EPO statistics. 
72 Descriptive statistics of these variables are provided in Table 3.2 and box plots of the discrete variables among 
them are depicted in Figures A3.4 to A3.9 in the appendix. 
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Hausmann, Hall and Griliches (1984) and Cameron and Trivedi (1986)).73 Hence, we assume 
that the number of claims and pages is an exponential function of the variables listed above, 













exp,      (3.2) 
 
The error term e represents unobserved variables and measurement errors on the data and is 
assumed to be Gamma distributed with parameters 1/α where α is the overdispersion 
parameter. The dispersion for the i-th observation is a function of the expected mean of the 
counts for this observation, i.e. iαλ+1 . The model is estimated using maximum likelihood for 
the negative binomial distribution. The reported likelihood ratio test for overdispersion (α) 
rejects the null hypothesis of equidispersion, which reinforces the preference for the negative 
binomial regression model over the pure Poisson one. 
 
Figure 3.1 – Frequency distribution of claims and pages (1988-2002) 
 
Source – own calculations based on EPO data 
 
Figure 3.1 displays the frequency distribution of the endogenous variables (claims and pages). 
At first look, it reveals a high skewness of both distributions, with a very long upper tail, 
especially with page counts. Moreover, a strong institutional bias appears in the distribution 
of claim numbers in the form of an absolute mode of the distribution at 10 claims. This bias is 
due to EPO’s excess-claim fees, making an additional fee due as from the eleventh claim on, 
                                                 
73 The sample variance of the number of claims is about 146, and it is about 1292 for the number of pages, 
indicating substantial overdispersion in raw terms in both cases. We use here a NEGBIN II model in the sense of 





















Number of claims/pages in application filed
Claims
Pages
CHAPTER 3 - THE DETERMINANTS OF PATENT VOLUME 
N. VAN ZEEBROECK - ESSAYS ON THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PATENT SYSTEMS 57 
which suggests some kind of price elasticity of the number of claims to claim-based fees. An 
analogous though weaker effect can furthermore be observed at 20 claims, which corresponds 
to the equivalent USPTO limit. Since the objective of this exercise is more to understand why 
applicants file claims in excess of the institutional threshold, the model is run on a modified 
count of claims, shifted to the left according to Equation 3.3, with M equal to 10.74 
 
)0;max(' MVV ii −=          (3.3) 
 
The number of pages has been perturbed by some external factors, as discussed in chapter 2. 
The most critical issue comes from the fact that EPO-Direct and PCT applications have 
different formats. Since the mid-eighties, when direct applications have been filed at the EPO, 
the description and claims sections of the applied documents have indeed been computerised 
and reformatted by the Office into a standard highly compact template, also known as ‘type-
set’ format. This reformatting of direct EPO applications, with the same font and layout for all 
EPO applications, makes the number of pages of these documents highly comparable with 
each other. On the contrary, PCT applications have not been reformatted by the EPO and the 
number of pages in the database corresponds then to the original (and heterogeneous) 
facsimile documents, as it can be observed in Figure A3.1 in the appendix. Because of these 
formatting issues, the number of pages can hardly be analysed for pre-1988 applications and 
must be controlled for the filing route as of 1988. The PCT variable should therefore capture 
this structural effect and be granted higher an explanatory power on the number of pages than 
it really deserves. Here also, in order to focus on pages in excess of the distribution mode, the 
model in (3.2) is nevertheless estimated with a transformed number of pages, according to 
(3.3) with M equals to 6. 
 
3.2.3.2 The explanatory power of the four hypotheses 
The adjusted R-squared of the OLS estimations and the pseudo-R-squared of the Maximum 
Likelihood estimations are presented in Table 3.4 with the four broad hypotheses individually. 
It clearly shows that each hypothesis and the model at large are stronger at explaining the 
number of pages than the number of claims. 
 
At first sight it appears that the most relevant hypotheses are the ‘national practices and 
internationalization of patenting procedures’ and the ‘technological complexity’ hypotheses 
(H1 and H2, respectively) followed by the ‘emerging sectors’ and ‘portfolio construction’ 
hypotheses (H3 and H4, respectively). When explaining the number of claims, the first 
hypothesis has a very high explanatory power (with an adjusted R-squared of about 11%). 
The technological complexity hypothesis explains about 5% of the variance and the emerging 
sectors, portfolio construction and trend, about 3% each. For the number of pages, although 
the ranking is the same, hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 have more explanatory power than for the 
claims, with 11% for the former and 7% for the two latter. However, it is important to bear in 
mind that the ‘PCT’ variable within H1 captures the effect of the reformatting issue evoked 
                                                 
74 Note that this transformation further increases the overdispersion of the distribution, yet reinforcing the choice 
of a negative binomial specification over a pure Poisson one. 
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here above and hence is granted much stronger a power than it probably deserves. 
Nevertheless, even when separating PCT applications (in heterogeneous facsimile formats) 
from Euro-Direct applications (in type-set format) within clustered regressions or when 
looking at the evenly type-set formatted grant publications, the explanatory power of H1 on 
the number of pages remains very high (with an adjusted- R-squared of 0.09 in the latter 
regression, see ‘Robustness estimates’ below, section 3.2.3.9). 
 
Table 3.4 – Explanatory power of the 4 hypotheses (Adjusted R² of the OLS models) 
OLS (Adjusted-R²) Neg. Bin. (Pseudo-R²)
Hypothesis Claims Pages Claims Pages
H1: Internationalisation and US diffusion 0.108 0.125 0.010 0.049
H2: Technological complexity 0.054 0.114 0.007 0.020
H3: Emerging sectors 0.034 0.070 0.005 0.018
H4: Portfolio construction 0.029 0.069 0.005 0.017
H0: Trend 0.031 0.017 0.005 0.006
H1+H2 0.140 0.199 0.020 0.074
H1+H2+H3 0.151 0.218 0.022 0.081
H1+H2+H3+H4 0.165 0.254 0.025 0.087
H1+H2+H3+H4+H0 0.179 0.256 0.027 0.088
Estimates run on the same sample for claims and pages counts 
Period: 1988-2002 - 1,092,164 observations 
 
All this suggests the following preliminary observations: 
- The model looks better at explaining the number of pages than the number of claims. 
- The first hypothesis (H1) has the strongest explanatory power, suggesting at first sight 
that country-specific features (languages, patent cultures, drafting modes, parameters 
of the patent system) play the most important role on the size (claims and pages) of 
patent applications at EPO. 
- The technological complexity comes clearly second in both cases, followed by the 
emerging sectors and portfolio construction at equal distance. 
- Finally, the trend is weaker than the hypotheses, albeit slightly stronger with the 
number of claims than pages.  
 
When all the hypotheses are included in the model, the estimates explain about 18% of the 
variance in the number of claims and 26% of the variance in the number of pages. 
 
Maximum likelihood estimates for the negative binomial distribution are reported in Table 
3.5, which displays the estimated parameters for both claims and pages counts (z-statistics are 
based on heteroskedastic-robust standard errors).75 Table A3.3 in the appendix reports the 
results of an alternative specification where all variables are interacted with a time trend 
(ranging from 1 (=1978) to 23 (=2000)). This way, we may disentangle the coefficient 
associated with each factor into a fixed component (α) and a time-varying component (γ). 
 
                                                 
75 Despite the robustness estimates reported in section 3.2.3.9 below, the results are subject to the imperfection of 
the measures, particularly with the portfolio variables, the construction of which relies on uncleaned applicant 
names, and the number of pages, which is subject to the formatting issue discussed above. 
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Table 3.5 – Econometric estimates of Equation 3.1 (Negative Binomial Regressions) 
 Claims 1982-2004 Pages 1988-2002
 Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z
H1: National practices and internationalization of patenting procedures (Reference for countries = France)
PCT Filing 0.27 1.25 77.38 (**) 1.29 14.78 401.73 (**)
Non U.S. Applicant with U.S. priority 0.68 4.26 99.06 (**) 0.37 4.10 46.99 (**)
U.S. Applicant with non U.S. priority -0.57 -1.98 -52.78 (**) -0.35 -2.81 -35.62 (**)
AT Applicant -0.07 -0.31 -4.26 (**) -0.19 -1.59 -12.78 (**)
AU Applicant 0.58 3.53 42.82 (**) 0.38 4.34 27.18 (**)
BE Applicant 0.16 0.78 11.37 (**) 0.33 3.67 23.27 (**)
CA Applicant 0.38 2.09 29.24 (**) 0.38 4.36 30.88 (**)
CH Applicant 0.23 1.17 25.34 (**) 0.17 1.71 19.81 (**)
DE Applicant -0.04 -0.18 -6.32 (**) -0.09 -0.85 -16.32 (**)
DK Applicant 0.30 1.54 16.66 (**) 0.36 4.13 27.43 (**)
ES Applicant -0.68 -2.23 -21.71 (**) 0.02 0.23 0.89
FI Applicant 0.10 0.47 7.19 (**) 0.10 0.94 8.54 (**)
GB Applicant 0.30 1.55 40.60 (**) 0.16 1.60 23.74 (**)
IL Applicant 0.51 2.96 29.39 (**) 0.59 7.59 12.87 (**)
IT Applicant -0.03 -0.14 -3.13 (**) 0.10 1.03 10.78 (**)
JP Applicant 0.05 0.23 7.46 (**) 0.99 13.20 171.11 (**)
KR Applicant 0.19 0.92 10.85 (**) 0.50 6.00 35.28 (**)
NL Applicant -0.12 -0.50 -12.20 (**) -0.07 -0.62 -8.24 (**)
SE Applicant 0.04 0.18 3.41 (**) 0.18 1.86 21.06 (**)
U.S. Applicant 0.77 4.16 134.73 (**) 0.67 7.36 132.67 (**)
Applicant from the ROW 0.08 0.39 7.19 (**) 0.19 1.96 20.24 (**)
Filing in a non-EPO (DE/EN/FR) language -0.68 -4.92 -120.78 (**)
H2: Technological complexity   
# Inventors 0.06 0.26 67.11 (**) 0.10 0.98 121.18 (**)
# IPC-7 0.07 0.33 64.33 (**) 0.09 0.85 87.14 (**)
# Backward Patent Citations 0.05 0.22 94.52 (**) 0.01 0.14 33.64 (**)
# Non Patent Citations 0.04 0.17 46.60 (**) 0.04 0.36 37.34 (**)
H3 Emerging sectors (Reference = JC-02 - Organic Chemistry)
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 0.03 0.13 5.67 (**) -0.35 -2.86 -80.68 (**)
JC-03 - Polymers 0.07 0.34 13.68 (**) -0.01 -0.13 -2.90 (**)
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0.31 1.55 60.61 (**) 0.40 4.37 79.09 (**)
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0.29 1.46 41.38 (**) 0.07 0.66 11.51 (**)
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0.35 1.85 47.99 (**) 0.21 2.13 34.95 (**)
JC-07 - Electronics 0.04 0.19 6.73 (**) 0.02 0.16 3.17 (**)
JC-08 - Electricity & Elec. Machines 0.00 0.02 0.86 -0.22 -1.87 -48.90 (**)
JC-09 - Computers 0.33 1.72 47.67 (**) 0.39 4.42 48.55 (**)
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0.08 0.39 15.93 (**) -0.11 -1.01 -24.96 (**)
JC-11 - Handling & Processing -0.02 -0.09 -3.81 (**) -0.23 -1.96 -50.67 (**)
JC-12 - Vehicles & Gen. Technology -0.21 -0.87 -35.25 (**) -0.34 -2.77 -72.56 (**)
JC-13 - Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics -0.15 -0.65 -24.62 (**) -0.30 -2.49 -60.16 (**)
JC-14 - Human Necessities 0.08 0.39 16.82 (**) -0.17 -1.47 -39.16 (**)
H4: Portfolio construction   
# Priorities 0.25 1.14 92.23 (**) 0.21 1.94 67.45 (**)
Application has issued divisionals 0.62 3.78 72.14 (**) 0.38 4.35 49.98 (**)
Application is a divisional -0.22 -0.89 -17.88 (**) 0.59 7.43 63.34 (**)
Cumulative Filings (Coef. x10e3) -0.06 -0.26 -35.61 (**) -0.01 -0.05 -4.28 (**)
Occasional (no filing in 5 prev, yrs) 0.10 0.48 28.89 (**) 0.02 0.18 5.88 (**)
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 Claims 1982-2004 Pages 1988-2002
 Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z 
H0: Year of filing (Reference = 1988) 
1982 -0.23 -0.92 -13,29 (**)  
1983 -0.18 -0.73 -11,02 (**)  
1984 -0.14 -0.60 -9,38 (**)  
1985 -0.12 -0.50 -8,00 (**)  
1986 -0.10 -0.45 -7,41 (**)  
1987 -0.06 -0.25 -4,14 (**)  
1989 0.04 0.18 3,06 (**) 0,01 0,09 0,88
1990 0.06 0.27 4,74 (**) 0,04 0,38 3,82 (**)
1991 0.07 0.31 5,35 (**) 0,08 0,78 8,00 (**)
1992 0.05 0.22 4,01 (**) 0,10 1,01 10,25 (**)
1993 0.10 0.46 7,99 (**) 0,12 1,24 12,95 (**)
1994 0.15 0.70 12,14 (**) 0,14 1,37 14,02 (**)
1995 0.17 0.82 14,30 (**) 0,13 1,29 13,83 (**)
1996 0.23 1.16 19,96 (**) 0,16 1,59 16,72 (**)
1997 0.30 1.57 27,00 (**) 0,17 1,68 17,98 (**)
1998 0.36 1.92 32,91 (**) 0,17 1,76 19,08 (**)
1999 0.45 2.50 41,63 (**) 0,20 2,01 21,91 (**)
2000 0.52 2.95 48,60 (**) 0,23 2,42 26,02 (**)
2001 0.60 3.53 56,26 (**) 0,25 2,63 27,30 (**)
2002 0.66 4.00 61,97 (**) 0,32 3,42 34,99 (**)
2003 0.72 4.54 68,42 (**)  
2004 0.76 4.96 66,28 (**)  
Constant 0.03 0.13 5,67 (**) -0,35 -2,86 -80,68 (**)
Pseudo R² 0.03 0.09 
Wald chi²(65/58) 229,488 542,166 
Log likelihood -3,531,227 -3,622,027 
LN(alpha) [Std.Err.] 1.14 [0.002] -0.01 [0.002] 
LR Test of alpha=0 1.0E+07 (**) 1.1E+07 (**) 
# Observations 1,454,552 1,092,164 
 
Heteroskedastic-Robust S.E. – Significance level: (*) p < 5% - (**) p < 1%. 22 Time dummies included 
(1) Marginal elasticities (dy/dx) computed for a hypothetic patent characterised by all explanatory variables 
equal to their average value. Elasticity to dummy variable X is defined as dy when X changes from 0 to 1. 
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3.2.3.3 National practices and internationalization of patenting procedures 
The results provide strong support for the ‘national practices and internationalization of 
patenting procedures’ hypothesis. Indeed, with France as the reference, the U.S. applicant 
dummy is associated with a very large and significant parameter, one of the most significant 
parameters of the model, suggesting that a patent filed at the EPO by a U.S. applicant is 
composed of four additional claims and seven additional pages than the average patent 
application at the EPO. To a lesser extent, other Anglo-Saxon countries also outfit the 
voluminosity of patent applications at the EPO: patents filed by British, Australian and 
Canadian applicants include on average one to 3 additional claims and one and a half to 4 
additional pages. Some smaller countries such as Israel, Denmark, Korea and Switzerland 
exhibit similar properties. On the contrary, continental European countries such as Germany, 
Spain and the Netherlands tend to have less claims and pages. These cross-country differences 
are largely confirmed by the test for equality of the coefficients reported in Tables A3.8 and 
A3.9 in the appendix. Furthermore, an additional regression in which all exogenous variables 
were interacted with a time trend, allowing the observation of changing effects over time and 
reported in Table A3.3, shows that the value and significance of the country effects have 
strongly increased over the entire period of observation. 
 
These geographical patterns are illustrated in Figure 3.2, representing the average size of 
applications from different countries. From this figure, one can observe two main groups of 
countries clearly emerging: the first one in the upper right quadrant is mainly composed of 
Anglo-Saxon countries (the USA, UK, Canada and Australia, as well as two smaller highly 
specialised countries, Denmark and Israel) and characterised by applications with more claims 
and pages than the average. The second group, in the lower left quadrant, is made of most 
continental European countries. It is striking that these two groups of countries essentially 
differ in that they are mainly governed by Common and Civil Law respectively. This suggests 
that some of the features of the U.S. patent system reviewed in section 2 may be generalised 
to the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition at large.76 As hypothesised in section 2, this may be related 
to some general features of the Common Law, such as the ‘perfectionism’ of U.S. lawyers, 
the more intense recourse to customization and details in U.S. legal documents, the limited 
availability of general terms and definitions provided by the law, a higher propensity to 
litigate associated with a smaller foreseeability of judges’ decisions, the unresponsiveness of 
the dispute resolution practice in the U.S., and fundamental differences in discovery 
mechanisms. In addition, patent specific rules and practices in the U.S., such as the 
restrictions to the application of the doctrine of equivalents (especially by the file history 
estoppel), the mandatory best mode to be detailed in USPTO applications but not in EPO or 
JPO ones, and the differences in fee regimes between patent offices may also contribute to 
these differences.77 
                                                 
76 According to Lundmark (2001), although English contracts are usually shorter than their American cousins, 
they are still considerably longer on the whole than their continental counterparts. Therefore, the terms ‘English-
Speaking’ and ‘Anglo-American’ may be used broadly to refer to the practice in jurisdictions in the Common 
Law legal family as distinguished from the continental European family. 
77 While the USPTO applies extra fees for claims in excess of 20, the EPO penalizes claims in excess of 10, 
hence the fee in the country of priority (and supposedly for which it is initially drafted) may dictate the length of 
CHAPTER 3 - THE DETERMINANTS OF PATENT VOLUME 
N. VAN ZEEBROECK - ESSAYS ON THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PATENT SYSTEMS 62 
Even more support for this institutional hypothesis can be found in the estimated parameter of 
the USPR and USAP variables, indicating that non U.S. applicants draft longer patents when 
they target the U.S. market first and then forward their U.S. application to the EPO (with 4 
more claims and pages than the average) whereas U.S. applicants file smaller patents when 
they first file outside the U.S. This confirms that it is probably not the culture of American 
applicants, but rather the American patent system itself that induces a higher voluminosity, 
implying patentees applying to the U.S. to specify and formulate their claims with much more 
details than what the continental European system would require. 
 
Figure 3.2 – Average voluminosity of EPO applications according to priority country  
 
Source – own calculations based on EPO data (applications filed to the EPO in 2002) 
 
Of particular interest in this respect is the case of Japan, since Japanese patents are not 
particularly composed of more claims but significantly more pages. In other words, Japanese 
applicants seem to ask for fewer claims than many other countries’ applicants, but include 
longer descriptions, possibly disclosing more of their inventions. 
 
What is more, the NO_EPL variable, identifying documents in a non-EPO language (i.e. the 
number of pages refers to the original PCT publication in another language than English, 
French or German instead of the EPO one), is associated with one of the most significant but 
negative parameters of the model, inducing five pages less than the average. As this variable 
mainly captures Japanese PCT filings published in Japanese, this tends to suggest that the 
translation of Japanese patents into an official EPO language turns into much larger 
documents than their original counterparts. Beside the potential effect of language differences 
                                                                                                                                                        
the application when it is filed at the EPO, which is further supported by the frequency distribution of the 
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in characters and wording space, one possible interpretation could be that the assumed 
Japanese practice consisting of merging several national priorities into one single filing to the 
EPO does result in files with more pages but no more claims than the average filing. 
 
On top of these national specificities, the PCT dummy is associated in both models with one 
of the largest and most significant coefficients (by far the most significant in the pages count 
regression). A patent filed under the PCT option contains indeed a bit more than one claim 
and almost 15 more pages than the average EPO application. This is highly supportive of the 
assumption that dominant drafting styles diffuse internationally through the PCT process 
(although once again the PCT variable is also capturing the format differences evoked here 
above for the number of pages).78 This effect appears to be growing regarding the number of 
claims (i.e. its coefficient has increased over time) and constant for the number of pages. 
 
Indeed, since PCT applications generally designate the USPTO, they tend to be mainly 
drafted in a U.S.-compliant format, for the USA represent the largest market, their granting 
process is usually shorter, and it is usually easier to remove than to add subject matter, details, 
or fall-back positions in an application. Such a harmonization of drafting styles has been 
anticipated by Lundmark (2001) in the sphere of sales contracts due to the increasing diversity 
in European law, informality of legal transactions, difficulties in enforcement, and distrust of 
international arbitrators. Hill and King (2004) support a similar anticipation for business 
contracts in general with a kind of snow-ball effect in detailing the terms of contracts.79 
 
In other words, PCT filings seem to follow a ‘draft once, file everywhere’ principle, 
according to which patents are drafted with a U.S. template then applied to all other patent 
offices. Having expended considerable resources drafting a patent application for one large 
market, there is a tendency to crib from it when making applications elsewhere. This therefore 
suggests that the evolution in patent drafting practices may actually result from a progressive 
harmonization of drafting styles, in favour of American modes, through the 
internationalization of patenting procedures, namely the emergence of the PCT. 
 
Nonetheless, the fact that PCT filings tend to be so much larger in both dimensions might 
embed additional factors. As the main benefit of the PCT option is to delay the costs to be 
incurred in the procedure while the invention gets more mature and the market clearer, it 
seems reasonable to consider that many PCT applications may be drafted somewhat in a 
hurry, without a precise view yet on the critical element to claim protection for, especially 
given the absence of claim-based fees at WIPO. Hence, since it is more difficult to reduce 
than to enlarge the claimed content of an application once the procedure is started, applicants 
in such a situation would draft applications in a broader, fuzzier and possibly longer way (as 
confirmed by the effect of divisional examined here below). The common recourse to office-
specific versions of a single claim may also contribute to explain this observed phenomenon. 
                                                 
78 As a reference, this variable also adds slightly more than one page to granted publications the format of which 
is uniform no matter the filing route. 
79 ‘Once enough people who do not subscribe to the stopping sooner norm enter the community, the norm 
becomes quite hard to sustain’. Hill and King 2004:926. 
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3.2.3.4 Technological complexity 
The four variables composing the technological complexity hypothesis all appear highly 
significant and positive determinants of patent voluminosity. In particular, four additional 
inventors induce one additional claim and four additional pages, suggesting that inventions 
originating from larger teams are broader and require longer descriptions. This effect could 
also be embodied in the way patent drafts are fed with information from the research teams, 
possibly implying each inventor to bring some contribution to the document. Similarly, the 
number of 8-digit IPC classes characterises potential architectural or complex inventions, 
which translates into applications with a higher voluminosity. An application linked to 3 more 
IPC classes is composed of one more claim and 2.5 more pages. Nevertheless, the influence 
of the number of inventors on patent voluminosity has strongly increased over time whereas 
the effect of the number of IPC classes has remained constant, as reported in Table A3.3. 
Finally, the number of backward patent and non patent citations is also positive and 
significant in both models. Relying on more patented prior art induces slightly more claims (1 
claim for 5 additional citations) and pages (1 page for 10 citations) whereas relying on the 
scientific literature adds one claim every 6 citations and 1 page every 3 citations. All these 
results suggest that complex inventions require more claims and more pages to be patented. 
 
3.2.3.5 Emerging sectors 
The sectoral specificities of patent applications also have a strong impact on the voluminosity. 
With the organic chemistry cluster as the reference, the biotechnology area has the most 
significant and one of the largest positive effects on the number of claims and pages. On 
average, a patent application in the biotechnology cluster holds one and a half more claims 
and more than four additional pages. Of course, genetic sequences included in biotech filings 
almost surely play a role in this oversised number of pages, but biotech applications also 
present more textual pages.80 The audio, video and media cluster as well as the computers 
cluster (and to a lesser extent the telecommunications cluster) present similar effects on both 
the number of claims and pages. These sectoral effects exhibit in addition a strong trend 
component when they are interacted with a time trend, as reported in Table A3.3, suggesting 
that they have become stronger over time. For the remaining technological areas, some are 
associated with more claims but with less pages, such as industrial chemistry (with the 
strongest negative effect on pages), polymers, measuring optics and human necessities. Other 
sectors are associated with less claims and pages, namely vehicles and civil engineering. 
 
Such technological disparities – confirmed by a test for equality of the betas reported in Table 
A3.10 and A3.11 in the appendix – may take their origin in the relative complexity of the 
related science, techniques and inventions, or in industry-specific practices. As hypothesised 
earlier, this may also be related to the relative maturity or immaturity of the established 
vocabulary within the field, leading to more details and words being needed to fully cover the 
scope of a new invention. 
                                                 
80 As confirmed by additional non-reported regressions of the number of textual pages alone (i.e. illustrations 
excluded) as well as of the full number of pages with an additional control variable to account for the presence of 
drawings in the document. 
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Additional estimates of Equation 3.1 in which the complexity variables were interacted with 
all industry dummies are reported in Table A3.12 in the appendix. This specification of the 
model allows sector-specific patterns in the complexity of applications to be investigated. 
This brings some interesting nuances to the preceding results. The fixed components of all 
variables (complexity indicators and joint cluster dummies) keep their sign and significance, 
but the interaction terms have some unexpected effects. In particular, the number of inventors 
has a smaller effect on the number of claims in the biotech and chemical industry sectors, but 
a stronger effect in the multimedia, electricity, computers, optics and human necessities 
sectors. The number of backward patent citations exhibits similar patterns, and much less 
induces additional claims and pages in the biotech sector in particular, suggesting that the 
presence of many backward citations in biotech patents is less indicative of complexity than 
in other sectors. On the contrary, references to the non patent literature have a much stronger 
effect in the biotech, electricity and IT sectors than in any other, probably revealing different 
patterns in the reliance on basic research. These patterns probably also reflect significant 
differences in citation practices across industries. 
 
3.2.3.6 Portfolio construction 
In terms of portfolio construction, the one consisting of merging several priorities to file a 
single EP application leads to one of the strongest effects on both claims and pages. One 
additional priority leads indeed to one additional claim and almost two additional pages, 
probably witnessing that individual priorities may be copy-pasted into a new document. 
 
Of great interest are the two variables (HASDIV and ISDIV) relating to the filing of divisional 
applications. As logically expected, applications resulting into multiple divisional filings are 
much larger on average, with about 4 additional claims and pages. These applications – 
increasingly common at the EPO – almost surely reveal the more systematic early filing of 
unfocused inventions, leading to larger documents. But surprisingly enough, the divisional 
applications themselves have only one fewer claim for even more pages than the average, 
which suggests that applicants in such a case tend to drop claims but not the state of the art or 
the description of their invention from the initial filing. 
 
Finally the experience (or lack of experience) of the applicants also influences the drafting of 
applications, but more significantly in terms of claims than pages, suggesting that it is more in 
the way they claim protection for their inventions that small and large applicants differ. In 
particular, larger applicants tend to file patents with fewer claims whereas occasional ones 
include slightly more claims into their applications.81 This suggests that more experienced 
patentees have a capacity to draft their applications in a more focused way while accepting 
some rules of the disclosure game. On the contrary, applicants with less experience or with 
fast growing patent portfolios tend to claim for exclusivity rights in a less synthetic way.  
 
                                                 
81 Note however, that including also the square of the SIZE variable into the regression highlights the non-
linearity of the relationship since the square gets associated with a positive coefficient and the nominal variable a 
negative one. 
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3.2.3.7 Time trend 
The trend effect appears very clearly in both estimates, especially for the claims where the 
time dummies for the early eighties have a negative and significant impact (1988 being the 
reference year). This negative impact decreases over time and becomes positive in the mid-
nineties. A linear trend is highly visible, in terms of both the size of the parameters and their 
significance. This suggests that there remain some unaccounted for factors, extraneous to our 
hypotheses that influence the race toward larger and larger patents. 
 
3.2.3.8 Contributions to the 'workload' growth 
The regressions above have identified the determinants of the size of each individual 
application. It is tempting to use these results in order to understand the dynamics of the 
average size of applications over the period 1980 to 2000. The coefficients reported in Table 
3.5 give a measure of the importance of the related factors and of their contribution to the 
number of claims and pages. Nevertheless, a finer measure of these contributions to the 
growth in voluminosity may be computed at the aggregate level based on the average number 
of claims or pages in year t: 
 
ttjt ectjFV +++= εε ),(         (3.4) 
 
where εj are the average elasticities computed for the average filing, c is an intercept and F(j,t) 
is the average of variable j in year t over the entire population, for instance the share of PCT 
applications in the total (i.e. the share of applications for which the PCT dummy takes the 
value 1) or the average number of inventors per application. 
 
The growth of the number of claim or pages from year t1 to year t2 therefore writes as follows: 
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The contribution of each variable j is calculated as its elasticity εj multiplied by its average 
change between t1 and t2. The relative contribution of one factor, expressed in percentage, is 
its absolute contribution divided by the share of total change in the number of claims 
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Table 3.6 provides the contribution of each of the explanatory variables to the growth in the 
different voluminosity indicators according to Equation 3.6. It suggests that few variables, 
even though they appeared as highly significant determinants of the voluminosity of 
individual filings, look strong contributors to the actual increase in the voluminosity of EPO 
filings. In terms of our hypotheses, the major contributor remains the diffusion of national 
specificities through the PCT route, which altogether contribute to about 15% of the growth in 
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the number of claims and 60% in the number of pages. The PCT variable alone explains 10% 
of the claims’ growth and 58% of the pages’ growth (notably thanks to the formatting). But 
the U.S. applicant dummy contributes 1% of the growth in both indicators and the non-U.S. 
applicants with a U.S. priority explain about 3% of the increase in claims and 1% of the 
increase in pages. 
 
From the technological complexity hypothesis, contributing overall about 7% of the 
increasing voluminosity, the number of inventors remains clearly the most important factor, 
contributing to 3 to 4% of the increase in claims and pages. The other variables contribute 
between 1 and 2% each. 
 
The emerging sectors, namely biotechnologies, telecommunications, media and computers 
contribute together about 5% of the increase in claims and 3% of the increase in pages. The 
portfolio construction hypothesis contributes virtually not at all to the growth in voluminosity, 
except maybe for the number of priorities (PRIO) and the issuance of divisionals (HASDIV), 
which explain about 1% of the growth each. Although their coefficients have opposite signs, 
large and occasional patentees are in fact negative contributors to the increase in claims. 
 
However, another potential contribution of the different explanatory factors to the growth in 
size may come from an increasing effect of the factor over time. This possibility of a variable 
effect of each hypothesis over time is tested in the alternative specification with trend 
interactions reported in Table A3.3 in the appendix. The results show at first sight that the 
effect of the PCT option has even strongly increased over time, but not the effect of the 
complexity variables (except for the number of inventors). The effect of the number of 
priorities and of the parents of divisional applications has decreased over times, but divisional 
filings themselves and the cumulative size of the applicant’s patent portfolio are increasingly 
contributing to the size of patent documents. The increasing effects over time – if accounted 
for in the contributions reported in Table 3.6 – should probably increase the relative 
contribution of the different hypotheses included in the model and reduce the importance of 
the unaccounted for factors reflected as such in the trend component. 
 
Nonetheless, the importance of the trend component in the relative contributions suggests that 
our model misses some important factors behind the surge in voluminosity, which have not 
been accounted for. These factors may relate to the intensification of competition in many 
industries as well as to an increase in the attention paid to IP issues, which may induce an 
increasing rivalry around patent matters and an increasing level of details brought by 
applicants in drafting their patents. These factors could be investigated in the future by 
including industry-level data such as market concentration indexes, statistics on the frequency 
of patent litigation, etc. Unfortunately, such data would require the firms in the database to be 
matched with industries. The recent developments in matching European patent databases 
with firm-level data (e.g. Magerman, et al., 2006; Hall et al., 2007; Rogers, 2007; Thoma and 
Torrisi, 2007) open some promising avenues for such investigation in the future. 
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Table 3.6 – Contributions of endogenous variables to the growth in number of claims and pages 
 Claims 1982-2004 Pages 1988-2002 
Exogenous variables Growth ε (1) Contrib. R.C. Growth ε (1) Contrib. R.C.
H1: National practices and internationalization of patenting procedures (Reference for countries = France) 
PCT Filing 0.50 1.25 0.62 10% 0.44 14.78 6.44 58%
Non U.S. Applicant with U.S. priority 0.04 4.26 0.18 3% 0.04 4.10 0.15 1%
U.S. Applicant with non U.S. priority 0.00 -1.98 0.00 0% 0.00 -2.81 0.00 0%
AT Applicant 0.00 -0.31 0.00 0% 0.00 -1.59 0.00 0%
AU Applicant 0.00 3.53 0.00 0% 0.00 4.34 0.00 0%
BE Applicant 0.00 0.78 0.00 0% 0.00 3.67 0.00 0%
CA Applicant 0.00 2.09 0.01 0% 0.00 4.36 0.02 0%
CH Applicant -0.01 1.17 -0.02 0% 0.00 1.71 0.00 0%
DE Applicant -0.04 -0.18 0.01 0% -0.02 -0.85 0.02 0%
DK Applicant 0.00 1.54 0.01 0% 0.00 4.13 0.01 0%
ES Applicant 0.01 -2.23 -0.01 0% 0.00 0.23 0.00 0%
FI Applicant 0.01 0.47 0.01 0% 0.01 0.94 0.01 0%
GB Applicant -0.04 1.55 -0.07 -1% -0.02 1.60 -0.04 0%
IL Applicant 0.01 2.96 0.02 0% 0.00 7.59 0.03 0%
IT Applicant 0.01 -0.14 0.00 0% 0.00 1.03 0.00 0%
JP Applicant 0.04 0.23 0.01 0% -0.01 13.20 -0.11 -1%
KR Applicant 0.01 0.92 0.01 0% 0.01 6.00 0.09 1%
NL Applicant 0.00 -0.50 0.00 0% 0.00 -0.62 0.00 0%
SE Applicant 0.00 0.18 0.00 0% 0.00 1.86 0.01 0%
U.S. Applicant 0.01 4.16 0.04 1% 0.01 7.36 0.10 1%
Applicant from the ROW 0.02 0.39 0.01 0% 0.01 1.96 0.02 0%
Filing in a non-EPO (DE/EN/FR) language     0.05 -4.92 -0.27 -2%
H2: Technological complexity           
# Inventors 0.63 0.26 0.17 3% 0.40 0.98 0.39 4%
# IPC-7 0.17 0.33 0.06 1% 0.16 0.85 0.14 1%
# Backward Patent Citations 0.56 0.22 0.12 2% 0.77 0.14 0.10 1%
# Non Patent Citations 0.49 0.17 0.08 1% 0.20 0.36 0.07 1%
H3 Emerging sectors (Reference=JC-02 - Organic Chemistry)         
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry -0.04 0.13 -0.01 0% -0.03 -2.86 0.08 1%
JC-03 - Polymers -0.03 0.34 -0.01 0% -0.03 -0.13 0.00 0%
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0.05 1.55 0.08 1% 0.03 4.37 0.12 1%
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0.06 1.46 0.09 1% 0.06 0.66 0.04 0%
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0.03 1.85 0.05 1% 0.02 2.13 0.05 0%
JC-07 - Electronics 0.00 0.19 0.00 0% 0.00 0.16 0.00 0%
JC-08 - Electricity & Elec. Machines -0.01 0.02 0.00 0% -0.01 -1.87 0.02 0%
JC-09 - Computers 0.04 1.72 0.07 1% 0.04 4.42 0.17 2%
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0.00 0.39 0.00 0% -0.01 -1.01 0.01 0%
JC-11 - Handling & Processing -0.04 -0.09 0.00 0% -0.04 -1.96 0.07 1%
JC-12 - Vehicles & Gen. Technology 0.00 -0.87 0.00 0% 0.00 -2.77 0.00 0%
JC-13 - Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics -0.02 -0.65 0.01 0% 0.00 -2.49 0.01 0%
JC-14 - Human Necessities 0.01 0.39 0.00 0% 0.00 -1.47 0.00 0%
H4: Portfolio construction           
# Priorities 0.05 1.14 0.06 1% -0.02 1.94 -0.03 0%
Application has issued divisionals 0.01 3.78 0.03 1% 0.00 4.35 -0.01 0%
Application is a divisional 0.01 -0.89 -0.01 0% 0.00 7.43 -0.02 0%
# Cumulative Filings (5 years) (Coef. *1000) 329.09 -0.26 -0.09 -1% 227.71 -0.05 -0.01 0%
Occasional (no filing in 4 prev, yrs) -0.07 0.48 -0.04 -1% -0.04 0.18 -0.01 0%
Year of filing           
Trend 4.92 4.92 77%  3.33 3.33 30%
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3.2.3.9 Robustness estimates 
Various robustness tests have been performed, largely confirming the results presented below: 
estimating the same model with OLS regressions (reported in Table A3.5 in the appendix), 
estimating the model with one explanatory variable (along with the control variables) at a 
time, running the estimates (both negative binomial and OLS) on small random samples, and 
performing clustered regressions by country and by sector. All these robustness estimates 
largely confirm the results presented above.82 
 
These estimates, however do not account for the potential influence of outliers on both sides 
of the model equations (the box plots reported in Figures A3.4 to A3.9 in the appendix do 
reveal the presence of some major outliers in the dataset). The leverage of influential outliers 
that bias the prediction and distort the significance of parameter estimates may be at least 
attenuated by the logarithmic transformation of the discrete variables characterised by some 
outliers in the dataset (Yaffee, 2002). The model presented in Table 3.5 has therefore been 
estimated with log-transformed discrete variables. The results – reported in Table A3.6 in the 
appendix – largely confirm the preceding estimates (reported in Table 3.5, at least in terms of 
sign and significance of the estimated coefficients), suggesting that the main model was not 
severely affected by influential outliers. Nonetheless, alternative regression models are 
inherently more robust to the presence of outliers. One of them consists of the Iteratively 
Reweighted Least Squares, using robust corrections for influence of the outliers (Mächler and 
Chatterjee, 1995).83 This model has been applied to Equation 3.1, the results of which are 
reported in Table A3.7 in the appendix. Here again, the results globally confirm the 
significance and sign of the original estimates.84 
 
A particular issue however is the effect of the PCT option, due to the difference in formatting 
standards, and to the absence of claim-based fees at WIPO. To better assess the PCT-specific 
effects, the model has been clustered between PCT and Euro-Direct filings. The results are 
reported in Table A3.1 in the appendix and largely confirm the explanatory power of the 
different hypotheses despite a few discrepancies. In addition, the same model with a slightly 
reduced set of variables85 has been run on an extended dataset, including international PCT 
filings for which the EPO was designated as the International Search Agent (ISA) (1 931 631 
filings in total), in which the international or regional status of PCT applications was also 
controlled for. These estimates are presented in Table A3.4 in the appendix and here again 
exhibit no major variations from the main estimates. 
 
A second issue is associated with the format of patent applications at the EPO. These might be 
highly heterogeneous (as witnessed by the difference between PCT applications and direct 
                                                 
82 The results of all robustness estimates are available upon request. 
83 See also Yaffee (2002) for a brief discussion of this regression model. 
84 Yet an alternative approach could be provided by the Generalised Event Count Model proposed by King 
(1989) or semi-parametric methods. See Winkelmann and Zimmerman (1995) or Cincera (1997) for discussions 
on the different count models available. Similarly, quantile regressions (see Yaffee (2002) for a review of these 
models) could provide more outlier-robust results. 
85 I.e. without backward citations in the complexity hypothesis and without the ISDIV variable in the patenting 
strategies hypothesis for these variables were not available on international PCT applications. 
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EPO applications). In order to assess the impact of this issue, an additional robustness test has 
been performed, which relies on granted patents as a control dataset, for they are unaffected 
by formatting issues. Indeed, once granted, EPO patent documents have always been 
reformatted by the Office into the same type-set format, ever since 1978, and no matter their 
filing route. As they share the same fonts and layouts, granted publications are highly 
comparable with each other in terms of number of pages, even between PCT and non-PCT 
filings.86 Nevertheless, due to the lags in the granting decision process, the number of pages at 
grant (PAGES_AG) becomes skewed over time for applications filed as of the mid-nineties, 
which prevents us from modelling it for post-1995 applications (it takes more than five years 
on average to process a patent application, and it can last up to 10 years or more). 
 
The results can then be compared with the results obtained with the full sample at filing over 
the same period. Given the lags in the grant decision process, such a test cannot be performed 
on the entire period 1988-2000. Consequently, we may only estimate the coefficients for 
applications filed between 1988 and 1995. The results of these estimates can be found in 
Table A3.2 in the appendix. They confirm the main observations made from the original 
model: the relative explanatory power of the five broad hypotheses is not really affected, 
neither are the individual effects of the most significant determinants. 
3.3 Concluding remarks 
The size and length (or voluminosity) of patent applications at the EPO has drastically 
increased over the past 20 years, presumably revealing an increasing propensity of patentees 
to claim more exclusive rights on their inventions or to adapt their drafting styles to changing 
legal, technological and market conditions. This phenomenon raises serious questions on the 
ability of patent offices to master their workload while upholding high standards of quality. 
 
The objective of this chapter was to identify the drivers of this phenomenon through an in-
depth quantitative analysis of all EPO patent filings since 1982. The analysis investigated two 
dimensions of voluminosity: the number of claims and the number of pages in each filing. It 
consisted in testing four broad hypotheses to explain what factors have influenced these 
dimensions over the past two decades. 
 
The four hypotheses (the diffusion of national practices, the technological complexity, 
emerging sectors and portfolio construction) all play some role in explaining the voluminosity 
of patent applications, but to different extents, and a larger one for the number of pages than 
for the number of claims. A significant trend effect also appears next to the hypotheses, 
especially for the claims. 
 
The results have highlighted some interesting – although not so surprising – effects. First, 
emerging sectors (namely biotechs, computer science, and audio, video and media 
technologies) with less established vocabulary and practices lead to larger patent applications 
                                                 
86 As the number of pages of patents in their original format has also been maintained in the database, the dataset 
provides the number of pages in the patent both before and after the reformatting, for granted applications only. 
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than more traditional areas such as industrial chemistry, polymers, vehicles, or civil 
engineering. Such disparities may take their origin in the relative complexity of the related 
science, techniques and inventions, or in industry-specific practices leading for instance to the 
premature filing of unfocused inventions. Second, the complexity of an invention and of the 
research process leading to it induces larger documents as well. Architectural inventions, 
made by large teams of researchers, and heavily relying on the state of the art seem to require 
more description and claims to be disclosed and protected. And thirdly, strategies consisting 
of filing unfocused patents later split into several divisional filings is an increasingly common 
practice that also contributes to the growth in the size of applications filed at the EPO. This 
may also be one of the motivations driving the increasing success of the PCT. 
 
The results presented here have two important implications. First, they reveal fundamental 
differences in patent drafting styles between Civil and Common Law countries, with the latter 
system clearly leading to much larger patents on average. The difference in size between 
North American and continental European commercial contracts for instance – observed and 
investigated by several law scholars – further supports the idea that the Common Law system 
induces larger documents than the Civil Law one does. In addition, some specificities of the 
US patent system, namely restrictions to the application of the doctrine of equivalent (notably 
by the prosecution history estoppel), the mandatory best mode, and differences in fee regimes 
between the USPTO and the EPO, underline these institutional influences on drafting styles. 
 
Second, the internationalization of patenting procedures and the increasing success of the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty leads to the harmonization of drafting styles around the world in 
favour of the U.S. model. Following a kind of ‘draft once, file everywhere’ principle, 
patentees seem to opt for an American template as soon as they plan to file their application 
internationally. This diffusion of U.S. compliant drafting styles into Europe has a major 
aftermath on the European patent system. This also suggests that the observed inflation in 
patent drafting may to a large extent be due to changes in patent systems and technology 
markets and not only to a real increase in the average scope of protection claimed. 
 
However, there still remains a significant unexplained trend in the increase of the 
voluminosity of patent applications. This trend may ultimately witness an inexorable path 
towards more complexity, towards more complete, detailed, complex and hence voluminous 
literature in every field of activity, such as the user manuals of electronic devices, the 
documentation of mass-market consumer goods, official or technical reports, or even laws. 
Patents may be just another playground for this generalised verbosity, encouraged by the 
decreasing costs of drafting and disseminating written information. Or it may reflect 
additional strategic factors, related to the intensification of competition on markets (and in 
courts), which are not captured by the model presented here. Again, matching patent 
applicants with firm- or industry-level data should help clarify these issues in the future. 
 
Overall, these results raise an important issue: patenting practices are evolving, in terms of the 
route leading to a patent filing in one particular country or region and in terms of the way 
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patent applications are drafted. The latter practices include in particular the drafting of 
applications by construction (assembly, disassembly, divisional filings) and the potential 
deliberate inclusion of an excessive number of claims or pages to create uncertainty at the 
patent office and on the market, to deceive examiners or competitors. These developing 
practices bring two questions: do they indicate more valuable patents? Do they impact the 
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4.1 Research objectives 
The second part of this dissertation has as main objective to determine whether the filing 
strategies developed by the applicants are associated with the value of their patents. The main 
idea behind this question is whether the procedures offered by patent systems have any 
economic utility to innovative firms. 
 
Unfortunately, the monetary value of patents is very difficult to observe: it should consider 
the entire life of patents (hence it can take 20 years before it becomes available) and involves 
a certain degree of subjective appreciation. The prerequisite to the question raised in this part 
of the dissertation is therefore to identify some measures that can be used as proxies of patent 
value against which different potential factors could be tested. However, measuring patent 
value over a large dataset restricts the potential indicators to the information that is available 
within patent databases and prevents the recourse to any direct assessment or approximation 
of monetary or economic value. For this purpose, we will rely on the abundant literature on 
patent value (Pakes and Schankerman, 1984; Trajtenberg, 1990; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 
1997, 1999; Harhoff et al., 1999; Harhoff et al., 2003), which has proposed several potential 
indicators and has found them positively correlated with the value of patents. But since the 
analysis of these various measures as indicators of patent value requires firm-level data or 
direct assessment through surveys, the variables proposed in the literature have seldom been 
analysed over a large sample or compared with each other to assess their consistency. 
 
Therefore, the objective of the present chapter is to analyse the different measures of patent 
value proposed in the literature, and to investigate their consistency and evolution. This 
analysis is performed over a unique database containing detailed information on all patent 
applications filed to the EPO, including data that had never been available so far at such a 
large scale. 
 
The renewal of patents and their geographical scope for protection constitute two essential 
dimensions in a patent’s life, and constitute fairly direct indications of the private value of 
patents, since they induce a direct cost for patent holders who should only incur them if the 
expected benefits from a patent outweigh these costs (provided they behave rationally). But 
the intertwining of these dimensions (the geographical scope of protection may vary over 
time) makes their analysis complex, as any measure along one dimension requires an arbitrary 
choice on the second. The first section of the present chapter therefore focuses on these two 
dimensions and proposes a new indicator of patent value based upon them: the Scope-Year 
Index. This index is computed for patents filed at the EPO from 1980 to 1996 and validated. 
                                                 
87 Couquiaud, M. (1985), Trou noir, in Un plaisir d’étincelles, GRP. 
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In the second section, we propose a review of the main indicators found positively correlated 
with patent value in the literature (forward citations, grant, families, renewals and 
oppositions) and analyse their meaning, construction, evolution, and consistency with each 
other over a large sample (including all applications filed to the European Patent Office 
between 1980 and 2002). These indicators appear weakly correlated with each other and 
frequently attribute the highest value to different sets of patents, suggesting that they actually 
capture different dimensions of patent value and are hence complements rather than 
substitutes. The last section therefore proposes one approach to consolidate the information 
provided by each dimension into a new composite indicator of value. 
4.2 A two-dimensional approach: the Scope-Year Index 
Over the past two decades the major patent systems have experienced a common trend: a 
substantial increase, if not an explosion, in the number of patent filings. This boom, 
thoroughly investigated by Kortum and Lerner (1999) for the US and Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe (2007) for Europe, witnesses a more pronounced attention devoted to the 
protection of industrial inventions. This phenomenon comes from the emergence of new 
technologies (ICTs and biotechnologies), the arrival of new countries in the patent arena (e.g., 
China, South Korea, and Brazil), a higher propensity to patent inventions (notably by small 
firms and universities), and the development of more aggressive patenting strategies that 
consist for instance in filing several patents for a given invention. 
 
This growth in the number of patent filings is increasingly questioned on the ground that their 
average value might be decreasing, particularly given the fact that it comes along with a 
severe inflation in the size of applications filed to patent offices (see chapters 2 and 3). It is 
commonly agreed that only a few patents (3 to 5) out of one hundred are associated with some 
economic value. In this respect, how the value of patent filings has evolved over time is a 
question of utmost importance since patent applications with a low value constitute a cost for 
society (high examination costs, and high deadweight costs due to more potentially exclusive 
exploitation rights and to more uncertainty on the market, as will be discussed in chapter 7). 
In this respect one may wonder whether patent offices should be more selective in their 
granting procedure.88 
 
The answer is far from being straightforward, as patent value is rather difficult to grasp. Like 
any intangible asset it is highly volatile (especially in the frame of competing technologies) 
and subject to substantial information asymmetries (the buyer and the seller have different 
perceptions of both the technology and its potential market) (Guellec et al., 2007). The quest 
for ‘valuable’ patents has been the field of investigation of an emerging stream of economic 
research. This burgeoning literature has started in the mid eighties and intensified over the 
nineties.89 Out of the myriad of potential candidates for patent value indicators or 
                                                 
88 See Lemley (2001), van Pottelsberghe and François (2006) and Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007) for 
broad discussions on patent systems, their effectiveness and their cost to society. 
89 Dixon and Greenhalgh (2002), Reitzig (2004b) and Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe (2007) provide in-depth 
surveys of this literature, including discussions on the variables used to measure the value, and the potential 
value determinants. The most frequently used indicators of value are applicants' perception of patent value 
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determinants, renewal data and patent families are probably the most widely recognised and 
used.90 Indeed, they constitute two essential dimensions of a patent’s life, its age and 
geographical scope respectively, which together reflect the efforts and costs incurred by 
patent owners to acquire and uphold their rights. In the two cases indeed substantial funds are 
required to keep the patent alive: renewal fees for each year of protection; validation fees and 
translation costs for each country of protection. Despite their symbiotic nature, these 
indicators are frequently used in the literature, but never jointly or simultaneously. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the evolution of the average patent value measured 
with these two indicators of survival and geographical scope. The field of observation is 
composed of all patent applications at the European Patent Office (EPO) between 1980 and 
1996 that had been granted before January 2006. As the two indicators are naturally mutually 
dependent it is complex and sometimes restrictive to analyse one dimension without the other. 
We therefore put forward a new indicator, the Scope-Year Index, which aims at providing a 
synthetic value indicator combining the geographical scope for protection and the life span of 
a patent. 
 
The two indicators of life span for a given geographical scope and of geographical scope for a 
given life span suggest that the average value of the patents filed at the EPO has decreased 
since the mid eighties. The evolution of the Scope-Year Index corroborates, if not 
exacerbates, this view of a sharp apparent decline in European patents’ value from the mid-
eighties to the mid-nineties. 
 
4.2.1 Measurement issues 
It is important to understand the basic functioning of the European patent system before 
investigating the effective measurement of the value of European patents. This section is 
subdivided in three parts. The first one briefly explains the granting process at the EPO. The 
second one underlines the timeliness issue associated with value indicators. The third sub-
section presents the two indicators of geographical scope and renewal and the implicit 
complexity induced by their relationship. 
 
4.2.1.1 The filing process at the EPO 
The EPO is the granting authority of the European Patent Convention (EPC), which was 
composed of 11 Contracting States in 1980 and 31 in early 2007. Patents can follow various 
routes before being filed at the EPO (first filings are directly applied at the EPO, second 
filings follow a priority application in a national patent office, and PCT filings follow the so-
                                                                                                                                                        
through surveys (e.g., Harhoff et al., 2003; Gambardella et al., 2006), renewal data (e.g., Pakes and 
Schankerman, 1984), families (e.g., Harhoff et al., 1999), forward patent citations (e.g., Trajtenberg, 1990), and 
oppositions (e.g., Harhoff et al., 2003) or litigations (e.g., Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1997). 
90 Renewal data has been used by Pakes and Schankerman (1984), Pakes (1986), Schankerman and Pakes 
(1986), Pakes and Simpson (1989), Lanjouw (1993), Lanjouw et al. (1996), Cornelli and Schankerman (1999), 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999), and Bessen (2006). Data on patent families are very frequently used in 
different forms, such as the triadic patent data published by the OECD or patent families indicators used in a 
majority of papers on patent value. 
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called international route).91 Once filed at the EPO, an application enters first into the search 
process (aiming at identifying relevant prior art) followed by the examination process that 
eventually leads to the grant of the patent. At the time of the request for examination, the 
applicant must designate the Contracting States (at least one) in which protection for the 
invention is desired. This gives rise to designation fees to be paid per designated country. 
Until the end of the granting procedure, annual fees are due to the European Patent Office in 
order for the application to be maintained. 
 
Once the patent is granted the applicant is asked for a second time by the EPO to declare the 
designated states for protection (which can be the same number or less than the ones 
designated earlier). Then, the applicant must validate her patent in all desired national offices 
of the EPC where she aims at getting an effective enforcement of her rights, without any 
possibility to extend the scope at a later stage (once validated, the European patent scope can 
only shrink but not expand). As noticed by van Pottelsberghe and François (2006), the 
effective validation of a granted European patent may induce high administrative and 
translation costs.92 For each country, the payment of validation fees and a translation of the 
patent in one of the national languages are requested.93 Therefore, the more the countries 
targeted for protection the higher the cost. In addition, each subsequent year the applicant will 
have to pay renewal fees to maintain the patent into force in each of the desired states, hence 
the longer the protection, the higher the costs as well. After twenty years from their date of 
filing at the EPO, European patents normally fall into the public domain.94 
 
This ‘expense’ structure justifies the use of validation and renewals data to estimate the value 
of European patents (Pakes and Schankerman, 1984; Harhoff et al., 1999): On the one hand, 
the larger the geographical scope for protection is, the higher the perceived value of the patent 
will be, for the applicant has access to a larger ‘exclusive’ market, which is costly to acquire 
in terms of fees and translation costs. On the other hand, the longer the desired protection, the 
higher the cost to the applicant, as renewal fees are requested by national patent offices each 
year. Failure to provide a required translation or to pay the renewal fees in one country in one 
year makes the patent irreversibly lapse and fall into the public domain in this particular 
country. The renewal of a patent in a country therefore provides a clear message to the 
competitors, as it indicates that the patent owner is still willing to enforce her rights. It 
therefore sounds sensible to assume that patents validated in a large number of countries or 
                                                 
91 See Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe (2007) for an in-depth description of the European patent system and 
the various ways to file a patent at the EPO. 
92 Van Pottelsberghe and François (2006) report some estimates of these validation and translation costs in recent 
years, which have also been studied by Harhoff et al. (2007b). 
93 “The period for supplying the translation shall end three months after the date on which the mention of the 
grant of the European patent or of the maintenance of the European patent as amended is published in the 
European Patent Bulletin, unless the State concerned prescribes a longer period.” Article 65 EPC. 
94 Article 63 (1) EPC. This justifies the choice of the date of filing as the reference date in what follows, for 
patents which took more time to be granted could only reach a smaller age than quickly granted patents if one 
considered the granting date as a reference. Note however that similar results as those presented in the paper 
have been obtained using grant dates instead of filing dates. 
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renewed for a long period of time are of more value than others (Pakes, 1986; Schankerman 
and Pakes, 1986; Schankerman, 1998; Lanjouw, 1998). 
 
However, this clearly illustrates the intertwining of those two dimensions of European 
patents’ value, given that a patent can be maintained for a long period of time in some 
countries and lapse very quickly in other countries. This means that the size of the family of a 
European patent may decrease from one year to the next year and that the age reached by a 
European patent may be different from one country to the other. Therefore, speaking of the 
size of a European patent family always depends on the age at which the patent’s scope is 
measured and, conversely, the age reached by a patent inevitably depends on the geographical 
scope over which it is computed. Based on families and renewals, the value of patents may be 
measured at different points in space and time, possibly providing totally different pictures. 
 
Figure 4.1 – The institutional expansion of the EPO 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
4.2.1.2 Timeliness 
One of the major limitations to patent value indicators in general is their timeliness. If one 
assumes that a patent which has been maintained for 20 years is more valuable than a patent 
which has lapsed in all countries where it had been validated a few years after its grant, one 
needs to wait for twenty years from the date of filing at the EPO before being able to 
determine which patents were of any value and which ones were not, making such indicators 
of limited help to practitioners. However, at the end of each year in a patent’s life, the 
relevance of the two value dimensions increases. At the time of filing, one may already know 
that an application now exists (for which filing fees have been exposed) and how many 
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bound estimate of the patent’s EPC family ever. At the end of the granting procedure, one can 
know for how long the application has been maintained in the pipeline (i.e. how many times 
annual processing fees have been paid to the EPO), whether the patent has been granted or not 
(an indication of value in itself following Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002)), and in 
how many countries it has been validated (the most expensive action to take due to the 
translations).95 After the validation process, the age reached and family size can then be 
reassessed at the end of each year, refining the estimated value hence gaining in relevance. 
Therefore, the most accurate value indication becomes ultimately available twenty years after 
the filing of the application. 
 
Figure 4.2 – Frequency of validation and market size 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO and OECD Data 
 
Since the major costs have been incurred by the time the patent has been granted and 
validated in some Contracting States, the first reliable indications on granted patents’ value 
are provided by the age of the patent at the time of grant (since lengthy procedures are more 
costly) and by the size of the family formed by the countries where the patent was effectively 
validated. This information gets available after 6 or 7 years from the filing date on average, 
the average duration of the granting process at the EPO. The evolution of the initial family 
size of European granted patents (the effective geographical scope for protection targeted 
within the EPC) is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The average number of countries of validation per 
granted patent (by year of filing) is shown next to the total number of EPC Member States 
and the total number of patent filings. Despite the fact that the EPC has been increasingly 
                                                 
95 Note however that the information on validations requires one year from the grant date to become available, 
that is the time for national patent offices to observe whether translations and validation fees have been duly paid 
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successful (an increase from 11 EPC Member States in 1980 to 19 in 1998, associated with a 
quasi permanent increase in the number of patent filings), the average number of countries of 
validation has been strikingly stable, decreasing by about half a unit over twenty years (from 
about 5.5 in the early eighties to about 5 in the late nineties). In other words the effective 
geographical scope targeted by granted patents has been slightly decreasing over time, despite 
the arrival of 8 new EPC Member States over the period.96 This indicator is however ‘crude’ 
as it does not take into account the size of the targeted markets or the age reached. 
 
4.2.1.3 Geographical scope and renewals 
Geography, and more particularly the size of countries, plays an important role in the filing 
strategies adopted by applicants. Figure 4.2 shows that three largest European countries 
(Germany, France and the UK) are the most frequently targeted for protection, with 83 to 94 
percent of the granted patents filed in 1990 getting validated there. This share drops 
substantially for the Netherlands (41%), as well as Spain and Switzerland (36%) followed by 
the other member States. The figure also suggests that the market size (measured with the 
GDP) of the targeted countries plays an important role in the validation strategy of the 
applicants, as illustrated by a clear and nearly linear relationship.  
 
Figure 4.3 – Frequency of validation and average maintenance per Member State 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
                                                 
96 By comparison, note that the average number of designated states at grant (but not yet effectively validated) 
has very slightly but continuously increased over the same period, from about 6.2 in 1980 to about 8.5 in 1999, 
meaning that the number of designated states abandoned at grant (i.e. lapsed ab initio) on average has increased 
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A comparison of the share of granted patents validated in a country with the average age 
reached by those patents in the country is provided in Figure 4.3. It reveals that the countries 
that are the most frequently targeted are also experiencing the longest survivals, with the 
exception of the two smallest countries, Liechtenstein and Luxemburg, both above the 
abstract linear relationship, probably due to their attractiveness for the headquarters of 
(patent) holding companies. The patents that are validated in the largest countries are held for 
more than twelve years on average, against about 11 years in smaller countries. 
 
Another way of taking both dimensions into account at the same time is to measure the 
average scope of protection of each patent at a certain age. Figure 4.4 shows the evolution of 
the average geographical scope of protection per patent at four different points in their 
lifetime: just before grant (designated states), immediately after grant (validated states), 10 
years after filing, and 15 years after filing. The figure emphasises three interesting 
phenomena: first, as expected, the longer the life of patents, the smaller the scope of 
protection at the end of their life (patents renewed over a longer period were maintained in a 
smaller number of countries in the end, a one country span between the average scope of 
validation for all patents and the average maintenance scope after 15 years for those that 
survived this long); secondly, the average number of countries designated by the applicants at 
the time of grant has been slightly increasing over time (from about 6 to 7 countries), 
although much slower than the pace of expansion of the EPC; and thirdly, the effective 
geographical scope of protection has been slightly decreasing (by approximately half a unit) 
over time, no matter the age reached by patents. 
 
Figure 4.4 – Geographical scope at different points in a patent’s lifetime by year of filing 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
(1) All granted patents | (2) All granted patents validated 
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A closer look at the picture reveals that although the number of designated states at the time 
of grant has increased by about one unit between the early eighties and the late nineties, the 
average scope of validation (also depicted in Figure 4.1) has been relatively stable around 5.5 
countries until the mid eighties and has since then started falling down to less than 5 countries 
in 1998. Similarly, patents that have been renewed at least 10 years after filing have lost half a 
country in scope on average (from about 5 to 4.5), and those maintained at least 15 years have 
experienced a similar evolution (from 4.5 to about 4). In addition, the figure illustrates the 
growing gap between designated states and effective validations, suggesting that applicants 
are increasingly reluctant to incur the costs of expanding the scope of their patents to 
additional countries. 
 
Figure 4.5 – Geographical scope after 10 years of maintenance 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data 
 
Which countries are targeted is illustrated in Figure 4.5 for the patents that were granted and 
renewed at least 10 years after the filing date. An increasing share of these patents was 
validated in at least one of the three large countries (Germany, France and Great Britain), 
from 62 per cent in 1980 to 74 per cent in 1996. The share that was validated simultaneously 
in the three large countries is expectedly smaller but has increased over time, from 40 per cent 
in the early eighties to about 50 per cent in the mid-nineties, despite a noticeable downward 
inflection since 1992. According to this last indicator one might be tempted to conclude that 
the average value of patents has increased over time. However, the two lower curves reveal 
that the share of patents maintained 10 years in at least two countries in addition to the three 
large ones has decreased over time, from about 30 per cent in the early eighties to 20 per cent 
in the mid-nineties - i.e. about 65% of its original level. Looking at an even more ‘valuable’ 
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simultaneously, the relative share of patents appears obviously weaker (about 14 per cent in 
the mid-eighties) and has also decreased over time to fall in 1996 to two-third of its level in 
the early eighties. These results strongly suggest that applicants in the European Patent 
System increasingly target the three largest markets – validating and maintaining their patents 
there in priority – and less and less the smaller ones. 
 
An additional light on these issues is shed by Figure 4.6, which displays the family size of 
different cohorts of patents filed at the EPO between 1980 and 1985 at different points in their 
lifetime. At first sight, the figure reveals that the geographical scope of European patents 
decreases on average before and after the effective validation step. In addition to the 
designated countries which are given up by the applicant once validation costs need to be 
exposed, patents may lapse each year in certain countries in which they were validated until 
they entirely fall into the public domain. In view of the observations from Figure 4.5, it is 
likely that such lapses occur more frequently in smaller countries than Germany, France and 
the UK. A second learning from the figure is that – at any point in their lives – the patents 
with the longest longevity had on average a larger scope of protection than those that lived 
shorter. For instance, ten years after their filing date, the family of patents that reached 20 
years of maintenance was larger by one country than those that lapsed after 10 to 14 years. 
Nonetheless, older patents finished their lives on average with a smaller scope than younger 
ones, as they experienced the most severe post-validation reduction in the size of their family. 
On average, two countries were abandoned between the 15th and the 20th year.  
 
Figure 4.6 – Average scope of EPO patents at different points in time (1980-85 filings)  
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One of the major drawbacks in the preceding analysis is due to the interdependence of the two 
potential value indicators, the scope and age of patents, since the measurement of one 
dimension depends on the threshold chosen on the second dimension. For instance one may 
be tempted to conclude that the average value of patents has increased over time as those that 
survived at least ten years are more frequently maintained in the three large countries 
simultaneously nowadays than before. But looking at a larger potential scope of protection 
reveals that those patents who reached 10 years of validity or more are in fact less frequently 
maintained outside those 3 large countries, suggesting that patents increasingly focus on the 
three large countries instead of smaller ones. Looking at different time frames or different 
geographical areas may hence provide very different value indications. In a nutshell, it seems 
relatively easy to fine-tune the boundaries of an indicator so that it would level off or 
exacerbate an average value trend, or even reverse it. 
 
The complexity of performing a joint analysis of duration and scope is somewhat illustrated in 
Pakes (1986) and Deng (2007). The two authors perform patent value simulation exercises 
based on the renewals data in a given patent office (i.e., separately for Germany, France, and 
the UK), but not for patents simultaneously filed in the three offices. 
 
4.2.2 The Scope-Year Index 
The apparent subjectivity and real complexity associated with the appropriate settings of a 
value indicator aiming at simultaneously grasping the geographical scope and the term of 
survival call for a potentially unbiased, or less biased, indicator. A solution that we put 
forward in the present chapter, and which is relatively simple to compute and free of any 
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where SYCT,i stands for the Scope-Year Index of a given patent i over C countries and T years 
of maintenance, and Gi(c,t) is a variable that takes the value 1 if the granted patent i was 
active in country c in year t from its filing date, and 0 otherwise. The index is normalised to 
its maximum value representing T years of maintenance in C countries. The level of C and T 
should be decided in order to minimize the potential biases in the measure. For instance, if 
one is interested in measuring the Scope-Year Index of patents filed up to 1995, T should be 
set to 10 years maximum (since the latest data on renewals and lapses available at the time of 
the present study were observed for the year 2005). Similarly, one should exclude from the 
index countries which were not yet Contracting States to the EPC at the time the oldest 
patents were filed. As an example, when looking at patents filed as of 1980, one should only 
keep in the index the 11 countries which were already members of the EPC in 1980, so that 
all patents in the sample are treated equally. 
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Under this definition, the average SY Index across patents provides an indication of the 
average value of granted patents at the EPO taking into account the spatial and temporal 
dimensions of a patent’s life. This index could be further improved by weighting the countries 
according to the size of their market, for instance by giving a score of 2 to medium sised 
countries and a score of 3 to the largest countries in terms of GDP for instance.97 The 
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where Wc represents the weight associated with country c. 
 
The evolution of the SY Index, both unweighted and weighted, is presented in Figure 4.7 for 
all the patents granted by the EPO that were filed between 1980 and 1995. Consistently with 
the preceding examples, the index presented has been computed over 10 countries (all the 
Contracting States in 1980 except Italy due to data unavailability)98 and the first 10 years of 
renewal from the date of filing (logically inducing a 10-year delay in the index).  
 
Figure 4.7 – The Scope-Year Index 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data - Scope-Year Index in 10 countries over 10 years 
 
                                                 
97 Another option would be to use the GDP or population of each country as a weight. 
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Figure 4.7 shows that the SY Index has witnessed an increase in the average value of patents 
from the early to the mid-eighties. From 1985 onwards there has been a clear and constant 
decrease in the index, suggesting that the average number of country-years of protection has 
lost about 20% of its average value (from 48 to about 38 country-years). The evolution of the 
weighted Scope-Year Index is very similar to the one of the unweighted index and hence does 
not influence the conclusions, meaning that they may be used indifferently.99 
 
The SY Index can also be computed per technological field or according to the geographical 
origin of patents. This is illustrated in Figure 4.8 for some selected sectors (the results of the 
remaining sectors are presented in Table A4.1 in the appendix) according to the Joint Clusters 
classification in use at the EPO (see chapter 2). Two important observations may be drawn 
from this figure. First, there is a substantial heterogeneity in the SY Index across 
technologies. Biotechnologies and organic chemistry display relatively high SY Indexes, with 
values fluctuating between 50 and 65 over time, whereas Audio-video-media and civil 
engineering have a relatively low index. Second, there has been a visible drop in the index 
between 1985 and 1995, no matter the technological field. This drop has nevertheless been 
more pronounced in Telecommunications (-9.8), Handling and Processing (-9.4) and Organic 
Chemistry (-8.9). Such sectoral discrepancies may be explained by the time needed for 
inventions to mature in different fields (it is well known for instance that drugs take a very 
long time for their real market potential to be assessed). 
 
Figure 4.8 – The Scope-Year Index, by technological field 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data - Scope-Year Index in 10 countries over 10 years 
                                                 
99 Note that the weighted index could be even more sophisticated by weighting the years of maintenance as well 
(given for instance less weight to the first year since it is inevitable to any application filed and a much higher 
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This decline in the Scope-Year Index is also noticeable across applicant countries. However, 
there seems to be less heterogeneity across countries, as illustrated in Figure 4.9, with the 
noticeable exceptions of Denmark (which has the highest index, probably due to its strong 
specialization in biotech) and Japan (with the lowest index, probably resulting from a 
common strategy of Japanese firms to systematically focus on the three largest countries). 
 
One drawback of the proposed Scope-Year Index, however, is that it is measured for granted 
patents only. Hence, it may not be used to assess pending, refused or withdrawn applications. 
Of course, such applications almost surely have much less value than granted patents, but they 
are not necessarily of no value at all, especially during the examination process, which may 
last up to 10 years. Indeed, by virtue of Article 67 EPC, applications while pending may have 
the same effects as a granted patent.100 This is why some applicants deliberately try to slow 
down the examination process of their application to enjoy this provisional protection (using 
their pending patents as a threat or a bargaining instrument against competitors) at a much 
lower cost than a granted patent incurs (see Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe (2007) for a 
typology of filing strategies and chapter 6 for an empirical analysis of this issue). 
 
Figure 4.9 – The Scope-Year Index, by country of applicant 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO Data - Scope-Year Index in 10 countries over 10 years 
 
                                                 
100 “A European patent application shall, from the date of its publication under Article 93, provisionally confer 
upon the applicant such protection as is conferred [to granted patents] by Article 64, in the Contracting States 
designated in the application as published” (Article 67(1) EPC). In addition, “every State shall ensure at least 
that, from the date of publication of a European patent application, the applicant can claim compensation 
reasonable in the circumstances from any person who has used the invention in the said State in circumstances 
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Therefore, an alternative index might be helpful in assessing the potential value of such 
applications: the provisional Scope-Year Index. This index applies the same rationale to the 
applications under examination at the EPO as to granted patents, but must rely on an 
important hypothesis regarding the geographical scope for protection (since the patent is still 
pending, there is no information on the effective validation behaviour). One solution would be 
to use the information on the designated states chosen at the request for substantive 
examination. Unfortunately, this information is of a limited reliability because it has increased 
on average over the past decades whereas the number of countries of validation has decreased 
over the same period (see Figure 4.4).101 A more reliable option would be to rely on the 
average number of countries where the patents filed in the same year have been validated in 
each sector (in order to take into account the important sector to sector variations in validation 
patterns) as a proxy for the provisional scope of protection of pending applications. In order to 
cope with the systemic expansion of the time to grant, the actual examination duration should 
be weighted by the average duration for granted patents which were filed in the same sector 


















=        (4.3) 
 
where PSYCT,i stands for the provisional Scope-Year Index of a given application i over C 
countries and T years of processing, PTT,i is the number of years during which the application 
i was maintained in the examination process (with a maximum of T), JCitTS ,  is the average 
scope of validation (over T countries) of patents granted which were filed in the same year in 
the same sector (JCit) and JCitTPT ,  is the average examination duration of patents granted 
which were filed in the same year in the same sector. Dividing the observed pending time of 
the application by the average delay in the same sector and the same year of filing is also a 
way to weight the importance of non granted applications as compared with granted patents. 
 
Figure A4.1 in the appendix shows the evolution in the average provisional Scope-Year Index 
as computed according to Equation 3 for non granted patents, and the average value of all 
filings (using Equation 1 for granted patents and Equation 3 for non granted applications). 
The figure exhibits a continuous drop in the average value of non granted applications, by 1% 
a year on average from 1980 to 1995. This slight decrease in the provisional index only 
smoothens the observed evolution in the standard index computed over granted patents and 





                                                 
101 In addition, designation fees are much lower than validation and renewal fees and they have been limited to 7 
countries since July 1st, 1999. This means that as soon as an applicant pays for the designation of 7 countries, 
she gets all the others designated for free. 
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4.2.3 Preliminary conclusions 
There has been a boom in the number of patent filings over the past 20 years. This boom puts 
pressure on patent offices as witnessed by growing backlogs (see chapter 2). In addition, it 
generates criticisms on the patent system and its myriads of applications, generating 
complexity and legal uncertainty. Indeed, if the average value of patent filings is decreasing it 
is legitimate to wonder whether the system is viable in the long run (see Jaffe and Lerner 
(2004) and Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007)). The objective of this chapter was to 
provide some basic measures of the average value of patents based on renewals data (i.e., the 
time of survival) and the geographical scope for protection within the framework of the 
European Patent Convention. The empirical ground consisted in analysing the historical 
evolution of all patents granted by the EPO from 1980 to 1998 along two essential dimensions 
in a patent life: the size of its family and its age reached. 
 
Analysed separately, the two dimensions revealed some decreasing trends in the average 
value of granted patents. However, it turned out that playing with the definition or “metes and 
bounds” of the potential indicators (analysis of the geographical scope for a given duration, or 
analysis of the duration over a given geographical scope) could lead to sharper or leaner 
conclusions regarding the evolution of the average patent value. We therefore put forward a 
new indicator, the Scope-Year Index (SY), which explicitly combines the time and 
geographical dimensions. This index, consisting of quantifying the country-years covered by 
each patent with respect to a maximum potential reach, exhibits a constant decrease in 
average value between 1985 and 1995. The fall of about 20% in the SY Index must however 
be considered jointly with the increase of about 100% in the total number of applications over 
the same period. In other words the total number of country-years of maintenance has in fact 
increased over time in raw terms. 
 
Substantial variations in the SY Index appear across technologies, with biotechnologies and 
organic chemistry reaching the highest value, and audio-video-media the lowest. However, 
there remains a common tendency towards a marked decline in the average value indicator. 
Similar observations (though with less heterogeneity) can be made based on the geographical 
origin of patents. 
 
Two lessons may be drawn from this empirical exercise. First, the institutional expansion of 
the EPC over the eighties and the nineties have not resulted into an increase in the average 
geographical scope of protection of European patents, suggesting that applicants to the EPO 
increasingly focus on the three largest European markets (Germany, France and the UK). 
 
Secondly, the historical analysis reported in the present chapter provides clear evidence of a 
declining trend in the average country-years of protection in Europe, due to a decrease in the 
average geographical scope of validation stronger than the increase in average term of 
maintenance. This evolution suggests that patent holders increasingly assess that the extra 
value from protection in a larger set of countries may not be worth the extra (translation and 
maintenance) costs induced. The exact interpretation of this trend is, however, not clear cut. 
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One explanation might come from changes in technology markets and in the exploitation of 
innovation and IP assets. For instance, the effect of economies of scale in certain capital-
intensive sectors may make it sufficiently efficient to block competitors in a few key markets 
to keep them away from all other countries in practice.  
 
However, another possible interpretation is that the observed trend simply reflects a decline in 
the average value of patents between the mid-eighties and the mid-nineties. In view of the 
surge in patent filings, this evolution depicted by the Scope-Year Index is strongly suggestive 
of a higher propensity of inventors to file patents with a lower value. This concern – shared by 
Jaffe and Lerner (2004) and Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007), and frequently expressed 
by patent examiners at the EPO and in other patent offices – might be a by-product of the 
increasing importance of IP assets to firms (see Hall and Ziedonis (2001) for an illustration in 
the semiconductors industry), but its underlying drivers still need to be explored. 
4.3 A state of the art on value indicators 
Recent developments in the patent system have put a huge emphasis on the issue of patent 
quality. The boom in the number of patent applications (e.g. Kortum and Lerner, 1999), the 
inflation in patent application sizes (see chapter 2), and the rise of new patenting strategies 
(Jaffe and Lerner, 2004; Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2007) has raised considerable 
challenges for patent offices to face, in order to master their increasing workload while 
upholding high quality standards. What is more, at the end of the day, patent quality is not 
only an issue for patent examiners, it is absolutely critical for the predictability and legal 
certainty of the whole patent system (Hall and Harhoff, 2004). Sanyal and Jaffe (2004) for 
instance have shown that a decrease in the quality standards applied by patent examiners 
would induce a significant increase in the number of filings. Hence, patent quantity and 
quality are closely connected.  This section presents one approach to quantitatively assess the 
value of patents by accounting for their different dimensions as proxies for their quality or 
importance, and analyzing its evolution since the creation of the EPO in 1978. 
 
Assessing the importance of patents is also a way to separate the wheat from the chaff, an 
essential task given the increasing need for patent valuation, the boom in patent filings, and 
the well-known skewness of the patent value distribution (Griliches, 1990; Scherer and 
Harhoff, 2000; Silverberg and Verspagen, 2004). This statistic property of patent value has 
raised serious concerns on the usability of patent counts as a measure of innovation 
performances. To cope with this uneven distribution, scholars have focused on potential 
indicators of patent value, in an attempt to produce value-weighted counts of patents. Three 
main economic approaches to this problem have been developed: using market-related events 
or data (stock markets, spin-off creations, etc.), surveying the patent value estimated by 
inventors or patent owners, or identifying legal or technical characteristics of each patent that 
may be substantially correlated with its value. 
 
In this latter case, the purpose is less to assess the monetary value of one specific patent than 
to understand what characteristics of patents – mainly provided by bibliographic data – are 
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correlated with their value or importance so that they may be used to weight patent counts or 
get advanced notice on potential patent value. The difficulty consists of assessing the 
relevancy of such candidates as indicators of patent value and to confront them with other 
value indicators with proved reliability. Unfortunately, there is no fully trustable method for 
valuing patents and the data needed to construct patent-based measures of value are rarely 
available on a large scale, forcing scholars to analyse patent value over small and focused 
samples. Consequently, it is also hard to address the question of the evolution of the average 
value of patent applications filed around the world over the past decades. A question which is 
nonetheless of great importance given the explosion in patenting activity observed in most 
industrialised countries and the subsequent backlogs that arise in many offices. 
 
This chapter presents the first results from the construction of a unique database, made of all 
patent applications filed to the European Patent Office (EPO) between 1980 and 2002, 
including detailed information on their outcome, validation, renewal, opposition and citations. 
To the best of our knowledge, such data had never been available over such a large sample 
and allows us to compute the different patent value indicators proposed in the literature (Narin 
et al., 1987; Trajtenberg, 1990; Putnam, 1996; Scherer and Harhoff, 2000; Hall et al., 2001) 
and to analyse their specificities, evolution, and consistencies. The results of this analysis 
show that the various traditional indicators are weakly correlated with each other and 
frequently attribute the highest value to different sets of patents, suggesting that they actually 
capture different dimensions of patent value and are therefore complements rather than 
substitutes. These orthogonalities call for the construction of a composite indicator that would 
account for all those dimensions in an inclusive way. The proposed composite indicator 
suggests a declining trend in the average value of patent applications filed over the period 
1985-1995, providing some empirical support to the numerous concerns over the worldwide 
boom in patent filings. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: section 1 broadly reviews the literature 
on patent value indicators and presents descriptive statistics of the five most classical 
indicators: forward citation counts, grant outcomes, families, renewals, and opposition 
incidences. Section 2 investigates the relationships between these indicators, and section 3 
introduces and describes a composite indicator. 
 
4.3.1 Value indicators: what are they and what do they tell us? 
For lack of a recognised and established value indicator, numerous proxies are found in the 
literature.102 Value indicators can be obtained from outside the information available within 
the patent, such as the (surveyed) monetary value of each patent (Harhoff et al., 2002; Brusoni 
et al., 2006; Gambardella, 2006), the present value evaluated by experts on a value scale 
(Reitzig, 2003), whether a high-tech start-up has been created on the basis of the protected 
invention (Shane, 2001), or firm profits, Tobin-Qs and stock market quotations (Griliches, 
                                                 
102 See Dixon and Greenhalgh (2002), Reitzig (2004a,b), Meyer and Tang (2005), Greenhalgh and Rogers 
(2007), and Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe (2007) for recent literature surveys on patent value. 
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1981; Griliches et al., 1986; Narin et al., 1987; Trajtenberg, 1990; Lerner, 1994; Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004; Hall et al., 2005).103 
 
Such external indicators, convenient as they can be, should nevertheless be treated with care, 
especially when based upon surveys of applicants or inventors. One recent example, provided 
by Gambardella et al. (2006) is based on the ‘PATVAL’ survey of about 9000 patents granted 
by the European Patent Office (EPO) between 1993 and 1997, located in France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. The inventors of those patents were 
asked to provide an estimation of the value of each of their patents, in terms of the minimum 
price at which they would have been willing to sell it on the day of the grant. This induces of 
course a high degree of subjective appreciation by the inventors who may or may not be 
aware of the value of some of their patents, especially the non exploited and non licensed 
ones, but it is probably the only way to get a financial appraisal on patent value. 
Unfortunately, such approaches can hardly be performed at a very large scale since patent-
level data needs to be collected. 
 
Table 4.1 – Main indicators of patent value in the literature 
Indicator Rationale Main limitations 
Granted Limited legal protection if not granted Timeliness, large share (about 60%) 
Citations 
received 
Subsequent R&D Investments gave rise to further 
patents in same area + Technological importance 
Timeliness, interpretation 
Family size Cost / targeted market 
Scope considered, large share (60% EPO 
applications are triadic) 
Renewals Cost of maintaining a patent Timeliness, technology life cycles 
Opposition 
Market potential 
Cost and risks associated with legal disputes 
Timeliness, very small share (about 7%), 
inter-partes settlement? 
Litigation 
Timeliness, very small share, inter-partes 
settlement, data availability, market? 
Firm market 
value 
Patent value embedded as intangible asset 




Patent value is known by inventors or managers 
Subjectivity, selection issues, very limited 
samples 
 
Nevertheless, the approach consisting of testing the relationship between patent 
characteristics and some indicators of economic value has demonstrated that a number of 
them are significantly correlated with patent value. Namely, such indirect indicators include 
forward patent citations (Trajtenberg, 1990), the fact that the patent has been granted or not 
(Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2000), patent oppositions (Harhoff et al., 2002; Graham et 
al., 2002) or litigation (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1997), renewals (Pakes and Schankerman, 
1984), and family sizes (Grefermann et al., 1974; Schmoch et al., 1988; Putnam, 1996; 
                                                 
103 Additional examples are provided with Cockburn and Griliches, 1988; Shane and Klock, 1997; Hall, 1999; 
Bosworth et al., 2000; Bosworth and Rogers, 2001; Bloom and van Reenen, 2002; Czarnitzki et al., 2005; 
Griffiths et al., 2005; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2006a; Hall and MacGarvie, 2006. 
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Harhoff et al., 1999), which all denote the existence of a potential market for the invention. 
These numerous indicators may be organised into 5 categories, which are summarised in 
Table 4.1. 
 
4.3.1.1 The dataset 
A comprehensive dataset has specifically been constructed to compute these indicators. This 
dataset is made of different pieces of data gathered from PATSTAT (EPO, 2006), OECD 
(2006) and different EPO databases. It includes all patent applications filed or transferred to 
the European Patent Office between 1980 and 2002 (i.e. excluding PCT applications 
designating the EPO which had not entered the regional phase by the end of 2002). This 
represents about 1.4 million patent filings. The main variables in the dataset represent the 5 
main dimensions classically used as indicators or determinants of value in the literature: the 
outcome of the application,104 the size of the application family,105 the age reached by the 
application,106 the number of forward citations received from subsequent EPO applications, 
and the opposition track record of the file. The dataset is completed with country, sector and 
time dummies.107 Table 4.2 presents summary statistics for these indicators. 
 
Table 4.2 – Summary statistics of patent value indicators over the period 1980-2002 
Variable Period Scope T A Obs. M Mean S.D. Min Max AGR
Granted and validated 1980-2002 All 0/1 5 1411223 0 0.49 0.50 0 1 -0.8
Triadic 1980-2002 All 0/1 3 1411223 1 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.8
# Countries where patent filed worldwide 1980-2002 All DIS 3 1405656 4 4.98 3.68 1 50 -0.1
Initial EP Family Size (countries of validation) 1980-2002 Grants DIS 5 688796 4 5.27 3.32 1 18 -0.1
EP Family Size after 10 years (from filing) 1980-1995 Maint. 10yrs DIS 10 393339 4 4.64 3.06 1 16 -0.5
Patent survived 10 years in DE, FR and GB 1980-1995 Grants 0/1 10 497137 0 0.48 0.50 0 1 1.3
SY Index (SY) (10c./10y.) 1980-1995 Grants DIS 10 497137 37 43.26 23.82 0 100 -1.5
Extended SY Index (ESY) (10c./10y.) 1980-1995 All DIS 10 744454 28 31.68 25.56 0 100 -1.7
Patent has been opposed 1980-2002 Grants 0/1 6 765380 0 0.06 0.238 0 1 -3.2
Patent was opposed and survived opposition 1980-2002 Opposed 0/1 8 46116 0 0.21 0.41 0 1 -1.5
Patent was renewed beyond opposition 1980-2002 Opposed 0/1 9 46116 0 0.49 0.50 0 1 -0.5
5-year Forward Citations Received 1980-2002 All DIS 5 1409676 0 1.02 1.89 0 105 4.0
T: Type of variable | A: Average time to availability in years | M: Median 
AGR: Average annual growth rate (%) from 1980 to 1995 
 
4.3.1.2 Citations 
The search reports produced as part of the grant procedure have built over time a network of 
patent applications by referring each new application to the pieces of prior art it is actually 
making use of. Such pieces were usually in the form of previously published patent 
                                                 
104 Pending, granted and validated, withdrawn or refused. There is indeed a small proportion of patents granted 
by the EPO (about 1.5% of granted patents filed between 1980 and 1995) that have not been validated in any 
Member State. This may be because they were revoked in an opposition before getting validated (20% of them) 
or because the applicant gave them up to avoid the important costs of validating and translating her patent. 
105 Triadic or not, international family size, EPC family size at different points in time. 
106 It may vary in each country were the patent was validated (see above in section 4.2) but note however that 
data on renewals in Italy is not available. 
107 The counting method is based on countries of residence of the applicants for the geographic clusters and of 
year of filings at EPO. See Dernis et al. (2001) for a review of the different possibilities in this respect and their 
impact on patent statistics. 
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applications or grants but increasingly include the scientific literature as well. This way, 
published search reports provide for each patent application or grant the list of references it 
makes to the existing prior art and the list of posterior applications or grants making 
references to the patent being considered. The former references are called ‘backward 
citations’ (patent or non-patent), the latter are referred to as ‘forward citations’. Altogether, 
they allow for the construction of technological linkage indicators for individual patents, both 
upstream and downstream.108 The use of forward citations has since then proved to provide 
one of the most frequently used value indicators and has been found positively correlated with 
the economic value of patents or firms (Trajtenberg, 1990; Harhoff et al., 1999; Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001; Harhoff et al., 2002; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002).109 Two main 
arguments support the validity of forward citations as indicators of patent value: first, they 
indicate the existence of downstream research efforts, suggesting that money is being invested 
into the development of the technology at stake, which is a sign that there probably is a 
market for the patented innovation; and second, the fact that a given patent has been cited by 
subsequent patent applications suggests that it has been used by patent examiners to reduce 
the scope of protection claimed by a subsequent patentee to the benefits of the society. In this 
sense, forward citations indicate the social value of inventions.110 
 
One of the main difficulties with patent citations is that they can come at any point in time, 
long after the cited patent was filed, granted, or even reached full term. Therefore, the effect 
of time increases the probability for any patent to have been cited by subsequent patents. The 
classical remedy to this bias consists of counting citations received by patent applications 
within a given period of time (e.g. within the first 5 years of their publication). Table 4.2 
indicates that the average number of citations received by EPO filings from subsequent filings 
is 1. As depicted in Figure A4.2 in the appendix, some 50% of applications have never been 
cited in 5 years. The figure largely confirms the well-known skewness of citation counts. The 












,,          (4.4) 
 
In this equation, CITi,T is the number of forward citations received by patent application i 
published in year Pi within T years from its publication. Cj,i is a dummy variable which is 
equal to 1 if application j is citing application i, and 0 otherwise. J(t) is the set of all 
applications published in year t. 
 
                                                 
108 Some authors (e.g. Trajtenberg et al., 1997) even go further by looking at the technological areas in which the 
patented invention found its roots (i.e. the IPC classes which the cited patents belong to) or to which the patent 
further contributed (i.e. the IPC classes which further citing patents belong to), constructing indicators of 
‘originality’ and ‘generality’, which are further looked at by Hall et al. (2001). 
109 Additional examples are found in Campbell and Nieves, 1979; Carpenter et al., 1981; Carpenter and Narin, 
1983; Albert et al., 1991; Shane and Klock, 1997; Serrano (2005); Blind et al., 2007. 
110 Recall, however, that Chapter 3 suggested significant differences in citation practices across technological 
areas. 
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4.3.1.3 Grant rates 
The fact that an application has resulted into a granted patent or not makes yet another helpful 
insight onto the potential value of a patent, as pointed out by Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 
(2000, 2002).111  Indeed, non granted patents have by nature limited private value to their 
owner, suggesting that it should be a preliminary dimension to look at prior to any other 
proxy (many papers consider only granted patents). However, pending applications may have 
some value on the market as they signal potential rights that may be enforced retroactively 
once granted. The EPC prescribes indeed that a published European patent application 
provisionally confers upon the applicant the same rights in all designated States as if the 
patent was granted.112 Hence some patentees tend to use pending applications as a bargaining 
instrument on the market and sometimes even slow down the granting process to exploit the 
uncertainty surrounding their pending application while incurring very limited costs 
(Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe, 2007).113 Once an application gets withdrawn or refused, 
it entirely loses its private value, except for the freedom to operate it may confer (as the 
publication prevents further appropriation of the same invention by third parties).114 
 
The grant outcome index is summarised in Equation 4.5: 
 
iii VGGRANT .=          (4.5) 
 
where Gi is equal to 1 if the application i has been granted by the EPO and 0 otherwise, and Vi 
is equal to 1 if the granted application i has been validated by the applicant in at least one 
EPC Contracting State and 0 otherwise. 
 
4.3.1.4 Family sizes 
The size of patent families, represented by the number of countries in which protection is 
sought for the same invention as imagined by Grefermann et al. (1974) and revived by 
Putnam (1996), has been examined and found positively correlated with patent or firm value 
by many authors, in particular Schmoch et al. (1988), Lanjouw and Shankerman (2001), and 
                                                 
111 See also Palangkaraya et al. (2005), Jensen et al. (2005), Schneider (2006), and Webster et al. (2007) for 
additional studies on grant outcomes. 
112 “A European patent application shall, from the date of its publication under Article 93, provisionally confer 
upon the applicant such protection as is conferred [to granted patents] by Article 64, in the Contracting States 
designated in the application as published” (Article 67(1) EPC). In addition, “every State shall ensure at least 
that, from the date of publication of a European patent application, the applicant can claim compensation 
reasonable in the circumstances from any person who has used the invention in the said State in circumstances 
where that person would be liable under national law for infringement of a national patent” (Article 67(2) EPC). 
113 Indeed, the main costs incurred by patent applicants (at least in the European Patent System) are exposed 
once the application is granted and needs to be translated and validated in each designated Member State (see 
van Pottelsberghe and François, 2006 and section 4.2 here above). 
114 There are five possible outcomes to patent applications filed to the EPO: they may be pending, refused, 
withdrawn (Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe, 2006), or granted in which case they may have been validated in 
Member States or not. Overall, about 60% of all applications filed at the EPO between 1980 and 2002 with a 
known outcome are granted by the EPO and validated by their owner in at least one EPC Contracting State, 
about 3% have been refused, 31% were withdrawn and about 6% were granted but not yet validated. There are 
over 200,000 applications filed in 2002 or before which were still in the EPO backlog in early 2006. Note that 
the dataset comprises grant decisions taken up to January 2006 included. 
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Harhoff et al. (2002). Given the costs required to file and enforce patents in many countries, 
only those with sufficient expected value to their owners will be extended abroad, denoting an 
expected market for the patented technology and justifying the use of family sizes as an 
indicator of private patent value. This may induce a home advantage bias (nationals of a 
country own a larger share of the patents filed in their home country) or disadvantage bias 
(applications filed in a country may include many domestic patents of lower value that are not 
worth being extended abroad resulting in a lower average value of domestic patents).115 
 
The size of a patent family may be observed at different scales. One may for instance consider 
the number of jurisdictions around the world in which an application was filed no matter the 
outcome in each country. Table 4.2 reveals that the international family size of EPO patent 
applications ranges from 1 to 50 countries with a mean size of about 5 countries. Of course, 
not all jurisdictions should be regarded evenly as they may vary widely in the size of their 
market. Hence, one may rather look at triadic patents. Triadic Patent Families (TPF) are made 
of applications filed in the three largest patent offices in the world, namely the USPTO, the 
Japanese Patent Office, and the EPO.116 Table 4.2 shows that about 50% of EPO applications 
are triadic. This relatively high share may be partly explained by the international nature of 
the EPO. Even to European patentees (for which an EP patent may even be more expensive 
than a US patent in the long run), filing an application to the EPO is yet an international 
extension of their domestic filing. Once applicants are ready to expose the costs of a European 
extension, they are more likely to be ready to expose those of an international extension to the 
largest overseas markets. In this respect, EPO patents are less sensitive to the home advantage 
bias for they present an intrinsic international nature (van Zeebroeck et al., 2006b), and triadic 
families are made of high value patents (e.g. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2004 and 
Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe, 2007) and suffer even less from home advantage effects than 
USPTO or EPO patent data (Criscuolo, 2005). 
 
When focusing on Europe, the size of a European patent family strongly depends on the grant 
of the patent. As the EPO offers a centralised processing of European applications, patents 
could be extended (validated) in different European jurisdiction only if and once granted by 
the EPO (in up to 31 member states as of 2006).117 If an EP application is pending, refused or 
withdrawn, its family size is limited to one (EP first filings) or two (EP second filings) 
countries in Europe. Therefore, the family size of a European application may be considered 
as the number of EPC Member States in which a patent was effectively validated once 
granted.118 This number (denoted as VSCOPEi in what follows) represents the scope of 
                                                 
115 Note that in certain circumstances, getting a patent in one large country may be sufficient to effectively block 
competitors all over the world, for instance, if the technology is patented in the single country having the 
required production capabilities, or if access to a major market is blocked by a single patent, preventing 
competitors to ever reach the necessary volumes to achieve substantial economies of scale. 
116 Note however that because non-granted applications have only been published for a few years in the US, 
triadic patent families include by definition patents filed to the EPO and the JPO and granted by the USPTO. 
117 Recall that the number of Member States to the EPC has evolved from 10 in 1977 to 32 in 2007. 
118 To compute this number using EPO renewals databases, validation records with a lapse within the first year 
from the date of grant needs to be discarded as they denote lapses ‘ab initio’. Lapses ab initio concern countries 
which were designated by the applicant at the time of grant but in which the applicant did not pay the required 
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validation or initial European family size of patent i granted by the EPO. As reported in Table 
4.2, the average validation scope of granted patents covers about 5 countries.119 The 
distribution of the initial EPC family size is depicted in Figure A4.3 in the appendix where the 
absolute mode at three corresponds in most cases to the three largest countries (France, 
Germany and the UK) and also to the threshold from which the EPO option is said to become 
economically justified by comparison to individual national procedures. As an illustration, 
only 27% of granted patents filed in 1990 were not validated in France, Germany or the UK. 
 
The size of the EPC family can naturally reduce over time as patents are abandoned in 
different countries, hence the necessity to observe the geographical scope at different points in 









,,,          (4.6) 
 
In this equation, SCOPEi,t is patent i’s geographical scope, t years after its date of filing. C is 
the total number of EPC Contracting States considered and Ai,c,t is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if patent i was active in country c after t years from its date of filing and 0 otherwise. It may 
be observed in Table 4.2 shows that the family size after 10 years (i.e. with t=10) is 
significantly smaller than its initial size (about one country smaller on average). The 
distribution of EP family sizes after 10 years is depicted in Figure A4.4 in the appendix. 
 
However, such indicators based on numbers of countries of validation or maintenance present 
a major downside: given the institutional expansion of the EPC (from 10 countries in 1977 to 
32 in 2007), a comparison of average family sizes as such over time would be significantly 
biased (see section 4.2 above). 
 
4.3.1.5 Renewals 
Once granted, a patent’s track record can still provide valuable indicators. Indeed, as of its 
grant, a patent can only be maintained – at least in the European patent system – as long as 
renewal fees are duly paid by the patent holder for each jurisdiction where patent protection 
needs to be maintained. The costs these fees represent to a company may suggest that rational 
applicants would only incur them when justified by the perceived value of their patents. 
Hence, whether the renewal fees for a specific patent have been paid all along its life or 
whether a patent has lapsed before its maturity provides yet another indication of its private 
value that is empirically supported (Pakes and Schankerman, 1984; Pakes, 1986; 
                                                                                                                                                        
validation fees or failed to provide a valid translation. In such a case, there has in fact not been any validation of 
the patent, but EPO databases assume that granted patents are necessarily validated in all countries designated by 
the applicant, and record a lapse ab initio, should it appear that the validation has actually not been effective at 
the end of year 1 after grant. 
119 It has been showed that the costs of filing an application to the EPO instead of filing it to national offices 
separately are recovered when at least three countries are targeted (see e.g. van Pottelsberghe and François, 
2006). Section 4.2 above showed that 3 countries are targeted in priority (i.e. by about 70% of granted patents): 
France, Germany, and the UK.  
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Schankerman and Pakes, 1986; Pakes and Simpson, 1989; Lanjouw et al., 1998; 
Schankerman, 1998; O’Donoghue et al., 1998; Cornelli and Schankerman, 1999; Deng, 2005; 
Bessen, 2006).120 
 
In the European patent system in particular, renewal fees are imposed by most national offices 
on an annual basis and up to the twentieth year after which all patents fall into the public 
domain. Failure to pay the required fee on time in one country would provoke the patent to 
irremediably lapse in this country. As a matter of fact, very few patents reach their maximum 
age of twenty years (Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) observe that less than 50% of patents 
granted in Germany are maintained 10 years or more beyond their grant). 
 
This means, however, that a European patent may live longer in one country than in another 
and hence may have as many life durations as countries in which it has been validated. 
Consequently, it is impossible to measure the age reached by European patent rights without 
making any choice on the geographical scope on which one would like this age to be 
measured. In addition, the age reached is physically restricted for applications filed less than 
20 years ago. Given that the EPO has been active for less than 30 years now, there is very 
limited window of applications on which maintenance to full term could possibly be 
observed. To use such renewal information on reasonably recent applications, one therefore 
has to define a maximum threshold and distinguish between patents which survived this long 
and patents which did not. In this respect, we proposed in the previous section a 10-years term 
from the date of filing as a good balance between relevance and timeliness of the indicator. 
Given the latest data on renewals in our dataset is available for the year 2005 the indicator is 
only relevant for applications filed up to 1995. 
 
Here again, this may be observed at different geographical scales. The easiest approach would 
be to determine whether a patent has been maintained for 10 years from its date of filing in at 
least one Contracting State, as proposed in Equation 4.7, where AGEi,c is the age reached by 




ci AGEMAXAGE ==        (4.7) 
 
From our data, 70% of all patents granted by the EPO that were filed between 1980 and 1995 
have been renewed for 10 years or more in at least one EPC Contracting State. By comparison 
less than 40% of granted patents filed before 1991 survived 15 years or more. Another 
approach consists of looking at the period in which patents were maintained in an entire 
geographical area, that is in a given set of countries. This would correspond to the minimum 
age reached by a given patent over a given set of countries (A in Equation 4.8). 
 
)(min ,, ciAcAi AGEMINAGE ∈=        (4.8) 
                                                 
120 Note that in certain industries (e.g. pharmaceuticals), the cost of maintaining a patent being marginal as 
compared with the R&D efforts undertaken and the potential return, some firms choose to renew all their patents 
up to the statutory term, no matter the expected value or effective exploitation of the patented invention. 
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Looking for instance at the three largest and most frequently targeted countries in Europe 
(France, Germany and the UK), Table 4.2 shows that the share of EPO grants maintained 10 
years in these three countries simultaneously falls to about 50%. And if one considers patents 
that survived 10 years in the three big countries and two others, as few as 25% remain. 
 
The intertwining of the term of renewal and geographic dimensions (the geographical scope 
may vary over time as patents may lapse in some countries each year) motivated the creation 
of Scope-Year Index in Equation 4.1. Unfortunately, as such, the SY Index’s score for non-
granted applications is necessarily zero, since patents can be validated in EPC Members 
States only once granted by the EPO. Therefore, the provisional version of the index defined 
in 4.3 is to be used instead for non-granted filings. The extended index (ESY) is therefore 
computed by using Equation 4.1 for granted patents and Equation 4.3 for non-granted 
applications as detailed in Equation 4.9. 
 
  SYCT,i  if application i has been granted 
ESYCT,i =           (4.9) 
  PSYCT,i  otherwise 
 
Table 4.2 shows that the average value of the ESY Index over the period 1980-1995 is about 
28. The distribution of the ESY Index, reduced to a smaller scale (from 0 to 8) for the sake of 
readability, is provided in Figure A4.5 in the appendix. 
 
4.3.1.6 Legal disputes 
Finally, the incidence and outcome of legal disputes, should they take the form of opposition 
proceedings before patent offices allowing them (typically the European Patent Office) or the 
more exceptional occurrences of patent litigation (annulment or infringement actions), 
designate patents whose importance justified to them or the owner the cost and risks 
associated with the dispute, and clearly establishing the existence of a market for the patented 
invention. Hence, legal disputes have been used as value determinants or indicators and found 
positively correlated with patent or firm value by different authors (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 1997, 2001; Harhoff and Hall, 2002; Harhoff et al., 2002; Graham et al., 
2002).121 Though as oppositions are centrally processed, publicised in a centralised way and 
more frequent than litigation, they are more easily examined. 
 
For they betray the strategic interest of a third party in getting a patent amended or revoked, 
opposition cases provide a very interesting signal of a patent’s value on the market as 
perceived by a third party. One of the great advantages with oppositions is that they need to 
be filed within nine months from the publication of the mention of the grant of the European 
patent.122 Hence, nine months after the grant of a patent, it can be definitively known whether 
                                                 
121 Additional examples are found in Allison and Lemley, 1998; Allison et al., 2003; Hall et al., 2003; Harhoff 
and Reitzig, 2004; Jerak & Wagner, 2003; Cremers, 2004; Reitzig, 2004a; Wagner, 2004; Cincera and 
Prokopieva, 2005; Blind et al., 2007; Cincera, 2007. 
122 Within nine months from the publication of the mention of the grant of the European patent, any person may 
give notice to the European Patent Office of opposition to the European patent granted. Notice of opposition 
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it has been opposed or not. However, once an opposition has been filed, its final outcome 
requires two years on average to be decided (potential appeal proceedings included). 
Consequently, opposition-based indicators are available on average about 7 years after a 
patent has been filed. Table 4.2 indicates that only 6% of all granted European patents that 
were filed between 1980 and 2002 have been opposed. 
 
Whereas opposition cases per se clearly denote the existence of a market for the patent 
concerned (or at least its threatening power against third parties), the outcome of such actions 
may not only provide an indication of a patent’s strength but more importantly it may 
considerably modify its value. Following an opposition case, a patent can be maintained as 
such, amended or irremediably revoked in the entire EPC area. These three potential 
outcomes statistically occur with a similar frequency, though about 20% of opposition cases 
concerning patents filed up to 2002 were still pending at the time the data was extracted, that 
is in January 2006. 
 
No matter the private or social value generated or carried by a patent before the outcome of its 
opposition procedure, once revoked it would become totally unenforceable hence much less 
valuable to its owner. The impact of amendments are more difficult to assess since they might 
affect a very limited portion of the claims and have hence a limited impact on their value or 
they might compromise the essence of the scope of protection in which case the amended 
patent would be worth nothing or very little following the amendment. The maintenance of a 
patent beyond opposition may nevertheless suggest that some value has survived to the 
opposition justifying to the patentee the costs of maintaining its rights.  
 
Table 4.2 shows that out of all opposition cases in the dataset 50% of the patents concerned 
have been renewed after the decision was rendered. Excluding cases which were not yet 
decided in 2003,123 this number rises to a more relevant 65%. Table 4.3 presents some 
statistics on the renewal rates and term of maintenance of opposed and unopposed patents 
filed in the period 1980-1995 by decision rendered in the opposition. On average, opposed 
patents which survived the opposition were maintained about 2 years longer than undisputed 
patents. The table also reveals that about 8% of patents that survived an opposition 
unamended were not renewed two years after the end of the procedure.124 Surprisingly, the 
same proportion applies to patents amended, suggesting that amendments do not lead to 
patents being abandoned, at least not more than rejected oppositions do. Nonetheless, the 
table shows that patents amended tend to be maintained for slightly less long than patents 
                                                                                                                                                        
shall be filed in a written reasoned statement. It shall not be deemed to have been filed until the opposition fee 
has been paid. The opposition shall apply to the European patent in all the Contracting States in which that 
patent has effect. An opposition may be filed even if the European patent has been surrendered or has lapsed for 
all the designated States. Opponents shall be parties to the opposition proceedings as well as the proprietor of the 
patent. Article 99 (EPC). 
123 This threshold allows two years beyond the end of the opposition procedure to observe whether the patent 
was renewed or not. 
124 This is in line with Calderini and Scellato (2004) who find that 14% of patents which survived an opposition 
in the telecom industry were not renewed in the first four years after the end of the opposition procedure. 
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which survived their opposition unamended (6.38 years vs. 6.85 years).125 This issue will be 
more thoroughly investigated in chapter 6. 
 
Table 4.3 – Renewal rates and opposition outcomes 
 
Maintenance beyond 
opposition (in years) % Maintained 2
years after opp. 
Maximum term (years) of 
maintenance reached (a) 
  Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
Oppositions rejected 6.85 7.00 3.95 91.67% 14.28 14.00 3.91 
Oppositions closed 6.86 7.00 4.33 89.01% 13.90 14.00 4.07 
Patents amended 6.38 6.00 3.68 91.73% 15.03 15.00 3.60 
Unopposed patents       11.97 12.00 4.11 
Patents filed 1980-1995 
(a) Maximum age reached over the EPC area (MAXAGE as defined in Equation 4.7) 
 
This therefore does not preclude the possibility that amended patents lost a large share of their 
value in the amendment. Consequently, a conservative approach would consider oppositions 
rejected as the only cases in which one can be certain that the patent and its value remained 
unaffected by the opposition procedure. 
 
4.3.2 Puzzling value indicators 
The abundant literature reviewed in the previous section has focused on identifying 
correlations between the value of patents (measured or proxied through inventors surveys, 
firm value or other economic indicators) and some of their features that may hence be used as 
more direct indicators of value. All indicators reviewed here above have appeared somewhat 
positively correlated with patent or firm value. However, little attention has been paid so far 
to their coherence as well as to their broad evolution within the European patent system at 
large, except a small number of papers examining the issue at an aggregate firm, sector or 
national level (Kleinknecht et al., 2000, 2002; Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003; Jensen and 
Webster, 2004). Indeed, forward citations for instance are of a reduced reliability as a value 
indicator if the application has not been granted anyway. 
 
These considerations may be summarised into two broad questions: first, do all indicators 
identify the same patents as highly valuable or do some indicators credit no value at all to 
some applications credited much value by other proxies (i.e. do the different indicators ‘look’ 
into the same direction)? And second, are there signs of any trend in the average value of 
incoming patent applications filed at the EPO since its inception? These two questions are 
discussed in what follows. 
 
4.3.2.1 Recurring characteristics and trends 
The severe skewness of citation counts reported in Figure A4.2 (in the appendix) may also be 
observed in Figures A4.3, A4.4, and A4.5 with family sizes, renewals, and the Extended 
                                                 
125 The fact that their total lifespan looks slightly longer on average (15.03 years vs. 14.28) simply betrays the 
fact that the opposition procedure lasts longer on average (over 1 more year) when the patent is amended than 
when it is simply maintained as such. 
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Scope-Year Index. This common property of most potential value indicators, along with a 
common overdispersion in raw terms of all discrete variables presented in Table 4.2 (the 
variance is higher than the average), is in line with expectations on the value distribution of 
innovations (Griliches, 1990). This is also true with binary value indicators such as grants, 
oppositions and opposition outcomes. Indeed, whereas 67% of patent applications filed 
between 1980 and 1995 have been granted and validated, 58% are triadic, but less than 5% 
have been opposed and barely 1% of all filings were maintained as such after an opposition. 
 
An additional feature shared by half of the indicators is their downward trend over the period 
1980-1995, as reported in the last column in Table 4.2 showing the average annual growth 
rate of each variable over this period. For instance, the grant and validation rate has decreased 
by 0.6% a year, the international family size and the initial EPO family size have decreased 
by 0.1% a year despite the institutional expansion of the EPO over the same period (from 11 
to 17 countries in 15 years), the share of patents which survived 10 years in 5 countries 
decreased by 1.5% a year, the Scope-Year Index by 1 to 2% a year, and the opposition rate 
lost more than 3% a year. 
 
Figure 4.10 – Evolution of value indicators of EPO Applications (1980 = 100%) 
 
 
The only upward oriented indicators are the share of triadic applications, the share of patents 
which survived 10 or 15 years in Europe, the share of patents opposed which were maintained 
beyond the end of the opposition procedure, and most of all the number of 5-year citations 
received. Nonetheless, some institutional or systemic drivers may shed a critical light on these 
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Firstly, from Figure 4.10, it appears clearly that most of the increase in the share of triadic 
applications filed to the EPO occurred in the early eighties, that is, at the time the young EPO 
gained its popularity. Since the mid eighties, once the EPO procedure became well 
established in the European patent system, this share has in fact remained remarkably stable. 
 
Secondly, the increase in the rate of renewals beyond 10 years is balanced by the contraction 
in geographical scope observed here above, so that the join trend within the Scope-Year Index 
is overall negative (see Section 4.2 above). 
 
And thirdly, the most striking observation relates to the evolution of the average number of 5-
years forward citations received, which has increased by 70% in 15 years. A similar 
observation has been made by Hall et al. (2001) with US citations. At first sight, this sharp 
increase might denote an increasing importance of patent filings, but this would be in 
contradiction with the downward inclination of the other indicators. However, four 
institutional factors may artificially drive this surge in forward citations to a large extent. 
 
Figure 4.11 – Evolution of value indicators of EPO Applications (1980 = 100%) 
 
 
First, the surge in patent applications filed to patent offices worldwide ipso facto expands the 
cohort of citing documents and hence boosts the number of forward citations received by 
preceding filings. Recent filing or patenting strategies such as picket fences, divisional filings, 
or patent thickets (see Guellec et al., 2007) tend to multiply the number of filings covering 
each single invention and hence potentially citing the existing patent literature. Second, the 
increase in the number of forward citations goes along with an increase in the average number 
of backward citations (which have increased by 30% between 1985 and 1995), suggesting that 
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nowadays patented inventions are more incremental than radical. Should this be ever 
confirmed, it could mean that the nature of the citing documents has changed and hence that 
nowadays citations are not worth the same as before. Third, the Examination Guidelines of 
the EPO mention that the search and examination should be made on the basis of the claims. 
Therefore, the dramatic increase in the average number of claims included in patent 
applications observed in chapter 2 should lead to an increasing number of references in the 
search reports drafted by the examiners. Finally, the increase in citation occurrences may also 
have been fostered by improvements in bibliographic resources and search tools available to 
patent examiners over the past decades. Figure A4.6 in the appendix exhibits the evolution of 
the number of searchable patent and non patent documents available at the EPO. This is the 
first driver advanced by Hall et al. (2001). These factors dictate to consider the evolution in 
forward citations with much care as it may reveal changes in scale rather than an increasing 
value of patents over time. 
 
4.3.2.2 Geographical and technological patterns 
As it may be expected all value indicators are varying widely across countries and 
technologies. Oppositions may be more frequent in fields where patents play a more 
important role in competitive processes, technology life cycles are longer in certain fields 
leading to higher renewal rates, geographical scopes may be more concentrated in traditional 
industries with high barriers to entry and broader in some high technologies, etc. Similarly, 
there may be some differences in the average value of patents issuing from European versus 
non European countries or even between European countries. As some countries are highly 
specialised (e.g. Denmark), the value of their patents may be perceived as higher or smaller 
depending on the indicator. In addition, European patents are not insensitive to home 
advantage biases. For instance, Japanese and US patent applications filed at the EPO are more 
easily triadic (for they have already been expanded outside their national borders), they may 
be the result of a stronger selection based on a domestic assessment of their value. 
 
Figures 4.12 and 4.13 represent the average value of patents filed by applicants from different 
countries or pertaining to different technology joint clusters, with the US and industrial 
chemistry as references respectively (statistics for all countries and clusters are provided in 
Tables A4.2 and A4.3 in appendix). 
 
At first look, Figure 4.12 shows large discrepancies in the average value of patents across 
countries of applicants. For instance, German granted patents filed in 1995 have been opposed 
twice as much as Japanese patents. Conversely, Japanese applications are two times more 
frequently triadic than German filings. From Table A4.2 in the appendix, even larger 
differences may be observed with all indicators. In particular, average grant rates (the share of 
non-pending applications which have been granted and validated) per country vary between 
47 (for Australia) and 73% (for Japan and Germany), opposition rates (the share of 
applications granted by the EPO which have been opposed) between 2 or 3% (for Korea and 
Japan respectively) and 10% (for Denmark), the triadic rate (the share of EPO applications 
which have been filed in JPO and USPTO) from about 25% (Italy, Spain) to 85% (Japan), the 
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SY Index between 24 (Korea) and 40 (Austria), and the average number of citations received 
5 years from the publication date ranges from about .70 (Spain) to about 2 (Finland, US). 
 
Figure 4.12 – Average value by country of applicant (EPO 1995 Filings – US = 100) 
 
 
A similar exercise is proposed in Figure 4.13 with technological areas, identified by EPO’s 
Joint Cluster examining division where applications were dispatched to.126 Likewise 
countries, technological sectors experience large discrepancies in the average value of patents. 
Biotechnology patents are twice as cited as civil engineering ones, but they are less likely to 
be granted. Patents in the industrial chemistry sector are 3 to 4 times more frequently opposed 
than in the Audio, Video and Media sector. From Table A4.3 in the appendix, variations 
analogous to those in Table A4.2 with countries appear. In particular, average grant rates vary 
between 50% (in the telecommunications sector) and 72% (in the automotive industry), 
opposition rates between 2% (for telecoms and audio, video and media patents) and 8% (in 
chemical sectors), the triadic rate ranges from about 37% (in civil engineering) to 77% (audio, 
video and media), the SY Index between 23 (in computers) and 42 (in organic chemistry and 
biotechnologies), and 5 years forward citations vary between about .95 (civil engineering, 
handling and processing) and 2.84 (telecommunications). 
 
All these results suggest that there is a high variance of value indicators across countries and 
technologies. This means that geographical and sectoral specificities render patent value 
indicators hard to compare from one country or one sector to the other. In addition, the 
amplitudes observed within value indicators suggest that countries or sectors with high values 
                                                 
126 See chapter 2 for a description of joint clusters and the way they are constructed. 
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along one dimension may be of little value along others, possibly because different indicators 
capture different dimensions of value and hence identify different patents as most valuable. 
 
Figure 4.13 – Average value by technology cluster (EPO 1995 Filings  – Ind. Chemistry = 100) 
 
 
4.3.2.3 Complementary indicators 
The statistical evidence reported in the previous section suggests that patent value indicators 
are weakly correlated with each other. Table 4.4 reports Spearman rank correlations between 
the 5 main value indicators considered in the previous section, namely the number of 5 year 
citations received, the extended SY Index, the “triadicness”, whether the patent has been 
granted and validated, and whether granted patents have been opposed.127 
 
Table 4.4 – Spearman’s rank correlation matrix of patent value indicators 
Indicator 01 02 03 04 05 
01 5-year Forward Citations Received 1.000   
02 ESY Index (10 countries over 10 years) 0.143 1.000   
03 Triadic 0.190 0.227 1.000   
04 Granted and Validated 0.104 0.770 0.230 1.000  
05 Patent has been opposed 0.084 0.051 -0.033 -0.063 1.000 
All coefficients significant at 1% probability level 
Dataset: Applications filed between 1980 and 1995 | Pending applications excluded for "grant" indicator 
Non-granted applications excluded for "opposed" indicator 
 
The only coefficient above 50% is to be found between grant status and the ESY Index, which 
is only mechanical as the index is mainly based on patents’ life after grant. Therefore, one 
                                                 
127 Pearson’s pairwise correlations are reported in Table A4.4 in the appendix but exhibit no major difference. 
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may consider that the grant dimension is largely embodied within the ESY Index. Citations 
seem weakly correlated with the other variables and the second best correlations are observed 
between the ESY Index and granted on the one hand, and triadic on the other hand, at a 
significant 23%.128 
 
This relatively low level of correlation between the indicators considered (in the order of the 
ones found by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004)) suggests that they do not necessarily 
identify the same patents as most valuable for they may not measure or capture the same 
dimensions of value.129 For instance, the fact a patent has been refused, withdrawn or revoked 
precludes it from carrying a large private value to the owner, whereas forward citations may 
be an indication of the relevance or importance of a patent within one specific field of 
technology but be associated with no economic value. 
 
As a matter of fact, there are about 30,000 patent applications in the cohort of applications 
filed at the EPO between 1990 and 1995 which were never granted but were cited at least 
twice by subsequent patents. Similarly, Harhoff et al. (2003) find higher estimates of patent 
value from their survey of inventors than previous estimates based on renewals and gauge that 
these differences come from a different perspective taken in the measure: whereas renewals 
denote the value of maintaining a patent as compared with letting it lapse, inventors surveys 
such as PatVal assess the value of keeping a patent versus selling it to someone else who 
could then “prevent the original patent holder from practicing the subject invention or 
demand license fees approaching the value of profits foregone” (Harhoff et al., 2003, p. 284). 
 
Despite their “non-grantedness”, highly cited applications may have some social value for 
they contribute to the state of the art and may prevent further appropriation of knowledge by 
any economic agent. See also Nagaoka (2006) for an illustration of this issue in Japan where 
almost 60% of cited patents have in fact never been granted. Similarly, over the same period, 
one third of patents that survived an opposition have in fact never been cited. This confirms 
that highly cited patents and patents opposed are not necessarily the same. 
 
Using different indicators allows us to map the value of patent applications on different 
dimensions. Figure 4.14 proposes such cartography of patents filed to the EPO between 1990 
and 1995. This figure compares forward citations (indicating the level of contribution to the 
art) with triadic, granted and opposition indicators (scaling the effort incurred by applicants to 
obtain and maintain their rights). 
                                                 
128 Note that a factor analysis performed on the four main indicators (citations, triadicness, ESY index and 
oppositions) confirmed the weak correlations observed between them, since a minimum of 3 factors were needed 
to reproduce these 4 indicators, and given that all variables kept over 85% of uniqueness in any case (a principal 
component analysis also failed to identify any single factorial axis that would explain more than 20% of the 
sample). However, multiple correspondence analysis could constitute a promising avenue for further 
investigation of the common factors underlying these indicators in the future. 
129 Quite on the contrary, Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) found very high correlations between patent count, 
citation-weighted patent counts, R&D expenditures and new product announcements at the firm level in different 
sectors. 
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Two key messages may be drawn out of Figure 4.14: first, a significant share of patent filings 
has a low value on one dimension but a high value on the other dimension; and second, very 
few patents reach the maximum value simultaneously on several dimensions. For example, 
one third of patents which survived an opposition were never cited and one fifth of the most 
cited applications have never been granted (hence opposed). Conversely, only 77 patents out 
of more than 370,000 applications have been simultaneously granted, triadic, opposed, 
maintained after opposition and cited 10 times or more. This shows that focusing on high 
value patents on all dimensions would make an excessively selective indicator. 
 
Figure 4.14 – Map of the value of patent applications filed to the EPO between 1990 and 1995 
 
 
In a similar way, Figure 4.15 presents a map of value for applications filed to the EPO in 1990 
and 1991. Instead of triadic indicators, it uses the term reached after grant to rank patents 
according to the maximum age they reached in at least one EPC Contracting State. Out of 
about 125,000 applications, only about 5000 were opposed, among which as few as 23% were 
maintained 10 years or more after the opposition got rejected, 4% were cited 10 times or more 
(which is nevertheless 4 times higher than the average application), and barely 8 patents were 
opposed, had their opposition rejected, were maintained 15 years, and received 10 citations or 
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Figure 4.15 – Map of the value of patent applications filed to the EPO in 1990 and 1991 
 
 
4.4 Toward a composite indicator of patent value 
The preceding section leaves us with a puzzling picture. An extensive review of the literature 
on patent value revealed 5 different indicators available within patent databases, which have 
all been found positively and consistently correlated with the value of patents or firms. These 
indicators clearly share some features (a high degree of skewness and significant variations 
across countries and technologies), but are confusing in many respects. First of all, they rely 
on different rationales and have varying horizons of measurability. Second, they exhibit 
contradictory trends in their evolution in the period 1985-1995: geographical scopes, grant, 
and opposition rates declined whereas the share of triadic patents remained stable, the share of 
patents surviving 10 years or more increased, and the number of citations surged – though in a 
very questionable way. Third, adding to these contradicting trends, an analysis of their 
correlations revealed a significant degree of orthogonality between these 5 dimensions (except 
for the rate of grant, which appeared largely reflected in the survival rate and geographical 
scope (combined into the ESY index)). And finally, plotting an entire cohort of patents along 
these 4 or 5 indicators reinforced this puzzling picture, since it revealed that each indicator 
misses a number of patents that were considered most valuable along other dimensions. These 
results clearly suggest that the four main indicators proposed and frequently used in the 
literature do not look into the same direction, actually capture different dimensions, and 
should hence be seen as complements rather than substitutes. 
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Several lessons may be drawn from this exercise. First, it is clear that relying on one single 
indicator to capture the value of patents would be a highly hazardous enterprise. Second, 
investigating the drivers of patent value requires therefore disembodying its different 
dimensions and looking for potential differences in their determinants. Third, the differences 
in scale and units between the indicators (some are binary, one represents a number of filings 
referring to any given patent, another one a number of years, and the last one a number of 
countries) and the fact that they become available at very different points in time, would make 
it very difficult to provide a single authoritative measure based on them that would reflect the 
economic value of patents. There is indeed little ground for positively asserting that a patent 
that has been cited by many others and has survived an opposition is economically more 
valuable than one that has been cited by as many patents but were never opposed. 
 
However, one may argue that the former is more likely to be associated with some economic 
value than the latter, given the converging array of indication we observe. Indeed, despite 
their significant degree of orthogonality, all the indicators considered in this chapter have 
been consistently found positively correlated with the economic value of patents in the 
literature. Therefore, if our objective is simply to highlight potentially more valuable patents 
from a huge mass of applications, rather than to quantify the monetary value of each filing on 
a given scale, we could rather look at the indicators as ‘probabilistic markers’ signalling a 
potential above average value. In other words, suppose our objective is to address the 
following question for every patent: how much indication (or information) do we have to 
believe that this patent is more valuable than average? In this perspective, it may be worth – 
as a complementary approach – summarizing all the information available on each patent 
along each dimension by summing up all converging indications. 
 
This approach would consist of considering each indicator as providing a certain probability 
of being valuable along one axis. To do so, each indicator should be reduced to a scale 
between 0 and 1 (which is immediate for binary indicators), and the measures obtained by so 
doing should be simply summed up. If we consider the four main dimensions from the 
previous sections (number of citations, geographical scope, term of survival and oppositions), 
this would provide us with a measure in the range 0 to 4, according to the general form 

























where CVi is the composite value of application i, and OPPi is a dummy variable taking value 
1 if the application has been opposed and 0 otherwise.130 
 
                                                 
130 Another option in the future could be to scale the different indicators down to the interval 0-1 by technology 
class to account for different standards in different technological or industrial areas. For instance, the number of 
forward citations received by each patent could be divided by the maximum number of citations received by 
patents in the same technology class.  
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If – building upon Section 4.2 – we opt for the Extended Scope-Year Index, it should be 
granted the weight of the two dimensions it encapsulates. However, given that the ESY Index 
is only an EPC-wide measure, it may be worth adding to it the triadic indicator reflecting the 
intercontinental coverage. As it also represents a measure of geographical scope, the option 
we propose is to combine it with the ESY Index so that they account together for two 
dimensions in total. Finally, oppositions actually constitute a two-step indicator: it indicates 
whether a patent has been opposed or not, but it also indicates whether a patent survived the 
opposition filed or not (provided the information is already available). Should a patent be 
revoked in opposition, it would mean that it was mistakenly granted and would lose its private 
value, and the revocation of a patent should therefore cancel the positive indication provided 
by the fact it was opposed in the first place. On the contrary, should it appear that the patent 
survived the opposition unamended, its opposition would gain even more relevance. 
Therefore, we should also account for this reinforcement mechanism. One possible 
























where ESY is the extended Scope-Year Index defined in Equation 4.9, TRIi is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if application i is a triadic one and 0 otherwise, OPPi is a dummy variable 
taking value 1 if the application has been opposed and 0 otherwise, REJi is equal to 1 if the 
opposition was rejected or closed, and REVi takes value 1 if the application was revoked as a 
result of the opposition procedure. The weights wsy and wop are chosen between 0 and 1.131 
 
Equation 4.12 proposes one possible form of this index based on the values found in our 
dataset, with wsy=.8 and wop=.4.132 To improve its readability, the proposed index is scaled in 
the range 0 to 20 (instead of 0 to 4), so that each dimension should account for 0 to 5 units.133 
 











Descriptive statistics of this indicator are provided in Table 4.5. Given its timeliness (the 
indicator is measurable ten years after filing) it is described over the sample of all EPO 
applications filed between 1980 and 1995. The average value of the index for applications 
filed in the period considered is slightly below 3 and approximately equal to the standard 
                                                 
131 If firm-level data or more direct measures of patent value were available, regressing them on the different 
indicators available would provide estimated coefficients that could some guide in choosing the weights. 
132 The first weight (wsy) has been chosen to avoid having the geographical scope (with the triadic indicator) 
taking to much importance vis-à-vis the length (or age reached), and the second (wop) is set at a level that values 
the signal provided by oppositions filed, but adds a premium for patents that are known to have survived. 
133 Given the actual values in the dataset, taking the logarithm of the number of citations has as effect to reduce 
them to a scale from 0 to 5, while reducing its severe skewness. In addition, given the average time to grant and 
the minimum of 3 countries that make a European application worth it, values of the ESY index in the range 0-
20 add no information. Therefore, we shift it by 20 units (out of 100) to the left, leaving it with a maximum of 
80. Note finally that the composite may be rounded to the closest integer to make it easier to read and graph. 
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deviation, which indicates a strong overdispersion in raw terms. It is interesting to notice that 
the maximum score reached is 18 over 20, which confirms the difficulty for a patent to 
achieve the maximum score in all dimensions. As a reference, summary statistics are also 
provided over the entire dataset. It logically shows a lower mean, as post-1995 applications 
are disadvantaged (as of 1996 onwards, the maximum score is cut by about one unit a year). 
 
Table 4.5 – Descriptive statistics of the composite indicator 
Sample Period Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
All applications 1980-1995 744454 2.84 2.82 0 18 
All applications 1980-2002 1409676 2.08 2.48 0 18 
Grants only 1980-1995 497137 3.81 2.91 0 18 
 
As expected, the distribution of this composite indicator – depicted in Figure 4.16 – presents a 
high level of skewness, with a very long right tail and a majority of filings associated with no 
or very little value, in line with most of the literature in the field (Scherer, 1965; Griliches, 
1990; Lanjouw, 1993; Schankerman, 1998; Scherer and Harhoff, 2000; Scherer et al., 2000; 
Silverberg and Verspagen, 2004). 
 
Figure 4.16 – Frequency distribution of the composite indicator 
 
 
Geographical and technological patterns are depicted in Figures 4.17 and 4.18. The former 
figure shows the average composite value of applications filed in 1995 by country of 
applicant. It shows that all countries are roughly contained within a 1 unit frame, between 3.5 
and 4.5 except Italy and Spain. Nevertheless, the composite index of the country with the 
lowest average value (Spain) is only two third of the best performing countries, which appear 
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Figure 4.17 – Average composite value by country of applicant (Applications filed in 1995) 
 
The same exercise with technological clusters is presented in Figure 4.18. It also highlights 
major sector to sector differences, with chemical industries clearly heading the race, and 
particularly organic chemistry and biotechnology. At the end of the ranking, civil engineering 
and automotive industries present the lowest average composite values. 
 
Figure 4.18 – Average composite value by technology cluster (Applications filed in 1995) 
 
 
These disparities in the average composite value across countries and sectors, confirm 
previous observations by many scholars (e.g. Schankerman and Pakes, 1986; Lanjouw et al., 
1998) and illustrated here above, which clearly hampers cross-country and cross-sector 
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The evolution of the average composite value over time is presented in Figure 4.19 (with a 
95% confidence interval). In raw terms, a clear declining trend appears in the evolution of our 
composite index, in apparent contradiction with Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) whose 
quality index – based on forward citations, families, claims and backward citations – has 
increased in the period 1975-1991, possibly due to the observed inflation in patent size 
observed in chapter 2. Similarly, Schankerman and Pakes (1986) found that the quality of 
patents has increased in France, Germany and the UK in the period 1955-1975. It is however 
to be noticed that our indicator has also slightly increased in the early eighties (probably due 
to the increasing share of triadic filings resulting from the rise of the PCT) and has started 
declining ever since 1985 until the early nineties when the average value became relatively 
stable. Together with the empirical evidence recalled here above, this suggests that the trend 
in patent value has been overturned in the mid-eighties, in line with our results on the Scope-
Year Index. 
 
Figure 4.19 – Evolution of the composite index and the national propensity to patent 
 
 
Figure 4.19 also depicts the average national propensity to patent, measured as the ratio of 
EPO filings originating from one country each year over the total R&D expenditures of that 
country in the same year. Although highly anecdotal, the figure suggests an anti-symmetrical 
evolution. The increasing propensity to patent has given rise to different interpretations. 
Kortum and Lerner (1999), analysing this phenomenon in the US, concluded that the “jump in 
patenting reflects an increase in US innovation spurred by changes in the management of 
research.” But in their book published 5 years later, Jaffe and Lerner (2004) share their 
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The trends depicted in Figure 4.19 may – at first sight – appear as supporting the more 
pessimistic view defended by Jaffe and Lerner. However, the interpretation of this trend is not 
clear-cut and it is probably not sufficient to definitely rule out which view is right. Because 
our composite index is not an approximation of patent value, but rather reflects the intensity 
of the signal provided by each constituting indicator on the potential value of each patent, its 
apparent decline should not too quickly be interpreted as a drop in average patent value, but 
rather first as a rarefaction of this signal. Two different factors might explain this 
phenomenon. One obvious possibility is that the average value or quality of patents has really 
decreased in the period 1985-1995. Another possibility, however, is that the indicators 
provided by the literature are increasingly unable to reflect or capture the value of patents, and 
hence that their decline may not be indicative of an erosion of the average patent value.134 The 
only confidence we may have at this point is that the empirical evidence produced in this 
chapter does not bring much support to the optimistic view once defended by Kortum and 
Lerner (1999). 
 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
The objective of the present chapter was to review the literature on patent value in order to 
identify the available indicators based on patent data and to analyse their consistency and 
evolution over a large sample. To reach this objective, the analysis relied on a unique 
database, rich of about 1.4 million applications filed to the European Patent Office between 
1980 and 2002, and focused on the distribution and evolution of five classical indicators of 
patent value: forward citations, grant rates, families, renewals, and opposition incidences, 
which have all been found consistently and positively correlated with patent or firm value in 
the literature. 
 
Patent value has been assessed in the economic literature with many different indicators, 
which differ in rationale, form and availability in a patent’s life. The main teaching from this 
chapter is that although these indicators have in common a highly skewed distribution and a 
serious delay in their measurability, they are in fact weakly correlated with each other and 
exhibit opposite evolutions. This is probably due to the fact that each indicator represents a 
different dimension of a patent, which all reveal the existence of some market for the patented 
innovation, and which may hence all contribute to its value in some way as confirmed by 
numerous studies. In particular, the recent PatVal survey, conducted by Gambardella et al. 
(2006), has confirmed that most of these dimensions are correlated with the monetary value of 
patents as perceived by their inventors. 
                                                 
134 Note that it could also be argued that the observed evolution depends on the weights chosen in Equation 4.12. 
But if we stick to the general form of Equation 4.10 (i.e. giving the same weight to each of the 4 dimensions 
included into the composite), playing with the only weights available, i.e. wsy and wop, will not change much of 
the story. Of course, totally different options, favouring one dimension or the other could be considered as well 
and might then provide a very different picture (should for instance the number of citations be dominant). 
Nonetheless, Figure A4.7 in the appendix depicts the evolution of different specifications of the composite, with 
wsy varying between 0.6 and 1.0, and wop varying between 0.2 and 0.6. In addition, Figure A4.8 shows the 
evolution of the composite with the weights proposed in Equation 4.12, but where the number of citations is 
divided by its maximum (as in Equation 4.10) rather than taken in logarithm. 
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These orthogonalities between the five classical indicators make it difficult to measure value 
with a single one of them and clearly dictate any attempt to analyse the determinants of patent 
value to make use of several indicators at the same time and track down potential 
discrepancies in their drivers. These indicators seem indeed complementary rather than 
substitutable, for each of them would miss some patents which were identified as important or 
valuable by other indicators. But the cross-indicator differences in scale and availability make 
it difficult to aggregate them into a single measure of the actual economic value of a patent. 
 
Looking at these indicators as revealers of the potential value of a patent on the market, we 
nonetheless developed one potential approach to construct a composite index that would treat 
each indicator as an equal source of information. The sum of all these units of information 
reflects the intensity of the signal indicating that a given patent may be of a higher value than 
average. In this sense, the composite measure we propose should not be seen as a raw 
measure of the economic value of each patent, but rather as a degree of probability for each 
patent to be of more value than the others. Because of that, this measure only offers one 
complementary approach, which has the advantage of synthesizing the available information 
into one variable, but which is not aimed at replacing all other measures.135 
 
A closer look at the cross-country and cross-sector distribution of our composite indicator 
reflects the existence of significant geographical and sectoral patterns in the value of 
European patents. In line with the Scope-Year Index analysed in the first section of the 
chapter, the evolution of our composite over the period 1980-1995 exhibits a clear decline 
between the mid-eighties and the mid-nineties. This observation can give rise to two 
interpretations: either the indicators established by the literature have become less reliable in 
capturing the value of patents (possibly due to fundamental changes in technology markets), 
or there has really been a decline in the average value or quality of patents. In the latter case, 
the boom in patenting observed over the past two decades (see chapter 2) has been 
contemporaneous with a general decrease in value or carries over many applications of 
dubious value. This trend provides some empirical support to the concerns about a decreasing 
quality of patents shared by Jaffe and Lerner (2004) and Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 
(2007), and may be related to the snowball effect characterizing today’s patent world in which 
inventors patent in advance any potential improvement to their inventions in order to avoid 
being invented – or patented – around (see chapter 1). 
 
Therefore, the next chapter will focus on the filing strategies developed by applicants and 
investigate the extent to which these strategies are associated with more valuable patents, as 
measured along the different dimensions identified and discussed here above. Based on the 
preceding results, four families of value indicators can be used (citations, families, renewals 
and oppositions) and a composite index, but no one can be preferred to the others. 
                                                 
135 Nonethteless, the validation of our composite index against more direct measures of value such as firm 
profits, stock market quotations, or inventors’ survey would be a valuable exercise, worth some research in the 
future. Schettino et al. (2007) provide a validation of the like of our composite index on a small sample of 
patents belonging to Italian SMEs and find it strongly correlated with the value index proposed in Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2004) and Hall et al. (2007). 
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“Vives les nébuleuses se trissaient en formant un espace 




5.1 Research objectives 
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate to what extent the filing strategies developed by 
patent applicants to the European Patent Office may be indicative of the value of their patents. 
This requires two types of measures: indicators of patent value to be used as dependent 
variables, and measures to identify these filing strategies to be tested as determinants of value. 
 
The former set is defined based on the findings made in the previous chapter. As the analysis 
of the classical measures of patent value concluded that these measures present a certain 
degree of orthogonality, the analysis presented in the coming pages will rely on all these 
indicators and the composite index of value proposed in the previous chapter, in order to 
assess the sensitivity of the results to the indicator chosen. 
 
The second set of variables needs to be constructed. To do so, the present chapter proposes a 
comprehensive review of the literature on the determinants of patent value and builds upon it 
a model that includes different dimensions of filing behaviours and some more classical 
determinants. Filing strategy indicators are therefore proposed, pertaining to the filing route to 
reach the EPO and the style of drafting (excess claims, construction, divisional filings). 
 
A multivariate analysis is then performed to test the association between our filing strategy 
indicators (as well as the more classical determinants) and the different indicators of patent 
value. The size and richness of the dataset allows in addition the evaluation of the sensitivity 
of the results to the indicator and the sample used in the analysis, which brings an additional 
contribution to the literature on patent value. 
5.2 Patenting practices as determinants of patent value 
Patent systems worldwide have been characterised by two related trends: an unprecedented 
boom in the number of patent applications and a parallel increase in their size. The growing 
number of patent filings is due to many factors (e.g., the globalization of markets, new 
generic technologies, the emergence of dynamic countries like South Korea or China, and the 
arrival of new actors like universities). One of these factors, strategic patenting, is believed to 
substantially affect patent systems because it both increases the number of patent applications 
and reduces their average quality: firms apply for more patents for a given invention or have a 
higher propensity to patent inventions of a lower quality. The direct consequence of these 
“strategic hypes” is a sharp increase in the workloads – and hence backlogs – for patent 
offices, generating uncertainty on the markets for technology.137 
                                                 
136 Queneau, R. (1950), Petite cosmogonie portative, Gallimard. 
137 The determinants and consequences of the boom in patent applications has been analysed by Kortum and 
Lerner (1999) and Jaffe and Lerner (2004) for the US patent system and by Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 
(2007) for the European patent system. 
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Over the past 20 years, research scholars (e.g., Narin et al. (1987), Trajtenberg (1990), 
Scherer and Harhoff (2000) and Hall et al. (2001)) have developed models essentially aimed 
at setting an appropriate weighting scheme to count patents, or at finding the most promising 
patents within the ocean of codified knowledge published each year by patent offices. 
 
The early surveys provided by Dixon and Greenhalgh (2002), Reitzig (2004a) and Sapsalis 
and van Pottelsberghe (2007) show – as recalled in chapter 4 – that three broad types of 
determinants have been proposed to predict the potential value of patents. The first is based 
on the characteristics of the patents themselves. They include measures such as forward 
citations, family sizes, renewals, grant decisions, or opposition incidences, which are probably 
the most classical determinants, have in common that they all indicate the presence of a 
potential market for the patented invention, and have therefore regularly been used as 
dependent variables as well, in order to test the influence of new potential determinants on 
patent value. Patent characteristics further include different measures of technological 
complexity (backward patent or non-patent citations, technological classes, inventors, etc.), 
which have also been successfully tested as determinants of value but were never used as 
dependent variables. The second type of determinants is related to the applicants’ profile and 
ownership structure (e.g. the type and size of the firm, whether it is active in cross-border 
ownership, and whether it enters into co-application), and the third – introduced by a more 
recent stream of research – is based on contextual data gathered directly from surveys of 
patentees or inventors, which provide additional information on the motivations of the 
applicant and the organisational and technical characteristics of the patented invention. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to contribute in three ways to this burgeoning literature on the 
determinants of patent value. Firstly, it proposes a comprehensive review of the state of the 
art summarizing the dominant results to date and underlining their ambiguities. Secondly, it 
puts forward a new class of potential value determinants, related to the filing strategies 
adopted by applicants. Certain dimensions of the manner in which applicants draft their 
applications and manage the granting process have indeed never been accounted for in the 
literature and there is strong presumption that they may be associated with higher value 
patents. And thirdly, it aims at testing the robustness of the most trusted results in the 
literature by relying on several indicators of value as dependent variables138 and on a 
comprehensive sample of patents granted by the EPO. 
 
Several dimensions of filing strategies have already been described and typified by Harhoff 
(2006) and Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe (2007). However, they have rarely or never 
been used as such as potential determinants of patent value. Our main objective here is to 
discuss why these dimensions should be correlated with patent value indicators and to 
evaluate empirically to what extent they are. These strategies range from the structure and 
quality of the drafted document (the amount of excess claims filed, the number of claims 
                                                 
138 Throughout the remainder of this paper the various measures of patent value used as dependent variables will 
be referred to as ‘patent value indicators’, though they are only used as proxies for the unobserved monetary 
value.  
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abandoned in the course of the examination, the construction of the draft by assembly or 
disassembly) and the filing of divisional applications, to the route chosen to reach the EPO 
(via the PCT process or not) and the request for accelerated search. 
 
Our set of explanatory variables is completed with different classical measures evoked here 
above and relating to the complexity of inventions (patent characteristics) and the ownership 
of patents. In terms of dependent variables, the five patent-based indicators reviewed in 
chapter 4 that the literature has found most strongly correlated with patent value and which all 
reveal the existence of a market for the patented technology are exploited: forward citations, 
European family sizes, triadic applications, renewals, and opposition incidences.139 As these 
classical indicators capture different dimensions of patent value, the composite index 
proposed here above (see chapter 4) is also used to integrate their various degrees of 
orthogonality and obtain a synthetic coefficient representing the overall association of each 
determinant with the latent variable. The different features of filing strategies and the more 
classical determinants (patent characteristics and ownership) are then tested against each of 
the five classical indicators and the composite index.  
 
The econometric estimates are run over a large dataset including all granted patents that were 
filed to the EPO between 1990 and 1995 (about 250,000 patents). This unique ‘size’ and 
‘breadth’ of the sample, including data on the validation and renewal of European patents that 
is available for the first time at such a large scale, allows bringing a second contribution to the 
literature, by testing whether and to what extent existing results have been affected by 
sampling methodologies (i.e., the geographical origin of the applicant or the technological 
area under investigation) or by the chosen indicator of patent value. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 1 proposes a comprehensive review of the 
empirical literature on patent value and its classical indicators and determinants by 
summarizing most results available to date and underlining some of their ambiguities. Section 
2 introduces the different dimensions of patent filing strategies, their measures and evolutions, 
and discusses their expected association with patent value. Section 3 presents the empirical 
implementation, the results of which are discussed in section 4. Section 5 proposes some 
concluding remarks and potential policy implications induced by the results. 
 
The results first show that most dimensions of patent filing strategies are positively associated 
with more valuable or more important patents and that they constitute the most stable 
determinants of all. This is particularly the case with the amount of excess claims filed, the 
drafting by assembly, the choice of the PCT route, and the parents of divisional applications. 
The results further confirm the positive impact of some of the most popular determinants 
(such as the number of inventors), but also points to strong sensitivities to the sampling 
methodology (country- or industry-wise) and the patent value indicator used as dependent 
variable. 
                                                 
139 See chapter 4 for a detailed analysis of those indicators and their evolution over time for European patents. 
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5.2.1 The literature on patent value 
The burgeoning empirical literature on patent value has been surveyed by Reitzig (2004b), 
Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe (2007) and Greenhalg and Rogers (2007).140 A particularity of 
the numerous contributions in this field of research is that they cannot be easily summarised, 
as their empirical design diverge over three dimensions: i) in the measure of patent value used 
as dependent variable; ii) in the number and type of explanatory variables (i.e. the potential 
determinants of value), and iii) in the adopted sampling strategy. Most empirical 
implementations take the following form: 
 
),,( iiii IIPOPCfV =          (5.1) 
 
where iV  is a measure of the value of patent i, iPC  is the vector of characteristics of patent i, 
iPO  is the vector defining the characteristics of patent i’s ownership, and iII  is a vector of 
variables, based on insider information gathered directly from patentees, characterizing the 
underlying invention and the context in which it was made or patented. The heterogeneity 
across the literature comes from the various measures of V and from the numerous 
determinants within each of the three classes included in the empirical models. 
 
5.2.2.1 Diversity in indicators of patent value 
Roughly speaking, classical measures of patent value used on the left-hand side of Equation 
5.2 can be divided into two broad categories: those that come from outside the patent system 
and those that come directly from it, respectively ‘market-based’ and ‘patent-based’ measures, 
as summarised in Table 5.1. The former measures mainly consist of financial or economic 
indicators, the most popular being Tobin’s q and stock market values for works at the firm 
level, and surveyed estimates for studies at the patent level. In the case of firm market values, 
the heroic underlying assumption is that the value of a firm’s patent portfolio should be 
somehow reflected in its market value, provided that financial markets are efficient. In the 
case of the surveyed monetary value of patents, the underlying rationale is no less heroic as it 
assumes that inventors or managers know the financial value of their patents. 
 
The latter group of measures, henceforth designated ‘patent-based’, are much more diverse in 
nature and rationale. The state of the art provided by Chapter 4 in this respect has concluded 
that 4 families of indicators have been consistently found positively correlated with the value 
of patents or firms: citations, families, renewals, and oppositions. Given their relatively high 
degree of orthogonality and the divergences in their evolution, no one can be preferred to the 
other. The metes and bounds of these different indicators need be defined precisely prior to 
being measured. As a complement, the composite indicator proposed in the previous chapter 
will also be regressed in an attempt to obtain a synthetic coefficient representing the overall 
association of each variable on the latent variable, thereby easing the interpretation of the 
results. The consistency of the results across indicators will nevertheless deserve a careful 
analysis. 
                                                 
140 Reitzig (2004b) discusses in particular the theoretical and conceptual meaning of various indicators and 
determinants. 
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Table 5.1 – Typology of patent value indicators in the literature 
Group Indicator
Market-based measures (MKT) 
Firm value Tobin’s q
 Stock Market
 Sales/ Benefits
 New firm creation
 Technologic Strength
 R&D Performance
Estimated patent value Royalties
 Valuation by inventors or managers 




Technological importance (CIT) Forward citations
Geographical scope (Families) (FAM) Triadic
 Number of countries worldwide
 Number of EPC validation States
Length (Renewals) (REN) Age at lapse
Grant decision (GRT) Patent has been granted




Table 5.2 proposes a typology of the empirical studies available so far on patent value, based 
on the value indicator used and the sample construction method (Table A5.1 in the appendix 
provides the names of the authors of the studies depicted in Table 5.2). It appears first that 
some indicators of value are much more popular than others, namely market-based measures, 
citations and oppositions. Second, many indicators have never been used on a large scale (this 
is logically the case for market value measures over a full sample, since such measures can 
only be gathered manually – hence selectively – at the patent level). Third, very few studies 
have relied on full samples of patents, i.e. without making any arbitrary choice on the sample 
construction to be made. Focused approaches – i.e., limited to one country or one sector - are 
clearly the most frequent, with 35 studies at the patent level and 14 at the firm level. As joint 
data on patents and firms is difficult to obtain, focused approaches are a logical solution. 
 
5.2.2.2 Diversity in sampling strategies 
Despite the richness of the empirical literature, there are nearly as many samples as papers. 
First, sampling strategies vary widely, from a few dozen observations in studies at the 
aggregate level to full-scale samples with up to tens of thousands of patents. Many papers 
work at the patent level, but many others test value indicators at the firm level, while a few 
others study patent value at the industry or country level. Second, most samples are limited to 
one specific country or industry. These ‘focused’ samples are much more frequent than full-
scale samples, which comprise a full cohort of patents from one patent office, no matter the 
country or industry. Obviously, samples based – even partially – on the answers to any survey 
are constrained by the unavoidable selection inherent to any survey. The different levels of 
observation (aggregate, firm, or patent) and types of samples (surveyed, focused or full-scale) 
are represented on the vertical axis in Table 5.2. It clearly appears that ‘focused’ approaches 
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are by far the most frequently used. These studies are most frequently limited to a particular 
industry in a given country, and one may therefore logically wonder to what extent the 
empirical results found in such ‘focused’ pieces of research can be generalised.  
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5.2.2.3 Diversity in the determinants 
Summarizing the literature is complex not only for the diversity of dependent variables that 
have been used or for the high heterogeneity in the sampling strategies, but also because the 
type and number of explanatory variables vary widely across studies. To start with, some 
explanatory variables that are significantly correlated with an independent value measure of 
proven reliability have subsequently been used as new indicators of value on their own. This 
has been the case, for instance, with forward patent citations, which are the most important 
determinant of patent value for market-based measures, but have been used as dependent 
variable in at least 8 studies. This is also the case with renewals and legal disputes. In addition 
to these measures with well supported though imperfect reliability, research scholars have 
identified a range of extra features or characteristics of patents as potential value 
determinants, which can be grouped into the three different classes of variables introduced in 
Equation 5.1: various characteristics of each patent application (PC), the characteristics of 
patent owners (PO), and some contextual information gathered from surveys, pertaining to the 
context of the invention or the patenting motives pursued by the applicant (II). This typology 
of patent value determinants is summarised in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3 – Typology of patent value determinants 
Group Determinant
Patent characteristics (PC) 
Technological importance (CIT) Forward citations (after N years)
 Forward citations by type of citation (after N years) 
 Institutional origin of forward citations 
Geographical scope (Families) (FAM) Triadic
 Number of countries worldwide
 Number of EPC designated States
 Number of EPC validation States
Length (Renewals) (REN) Age at lapse (REN)
Grant decision (GRT) Granted (GRT)
Legal disputes (DIS) Litigation incidences (LIT)
 Opposition incidences (OPP)
 Opposition outcomes (OTC)
 Multiple opponents (MOP)
Complexity Number of backward patent citations (BPC) 
 Share of Self Citations (by same applicant) 
 Generality index
 Basicness/Originality index
 Number of backward non-patent citations (NPC) 
 Number of claims (CLM)
 Number of IPC classes (at different levels) (IPC) 
 Number of inventors listed (INV)
Filing route PCT (Chapter I/Chapter II) vs. EP Direct (PCT) 
 Accelerated Search Request (ASR)
 Accelerated Examination Request (AEX) 
 
Patent Ownership (PO) 
Ownership structure Co-Applicants (COA)
 Cross-border ownership (CBO)
Applicant profile Portfolio size (CUM)





Insider information (from surveys only) (II)
Patenting motives (MOT) Offensive vs. Defensive
 Blocking vs. Protection
 Research Collaboration





The class of determinants based on patent characteristics include different subsets of variables 
with very different rationales. The first four subsets correspond to the four groups of patent-
based indicators described here above, which have been used on both sides of Equation 5.1: 
forward citation counts (and derived measures), measures of the geographical scope (patent 
families), measures of the length (renewals), and variables identifying legal disputes, their 
characteristics and outcomes. The rationale of these four subsets of variables has been 
detailed here above (see chapter 4) and they have consistently been found positively 
associated with patent value according to the literature. These four types of measures will 
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constitute the dependent variables for the model presented in the next section and will 
therefore only be used as indicators (i.e. on the left-hand side of Equation 5.1) in this chapter. 
 
Two additional subsets of determinants in the same class have been widely tested in the 
literature: measures of complexity and indications on the adopted filing route. The former set 
includes backward patent citations (indicating the existing technological background of the 
invention) and derived measures,141 non patent citations (denoting the link of the invention to 
basic research, as in Carpenter et al. (1980) or Narin et al. (1987)), the number of claims 
(supposedly informative on the legal breadth of the protection, cf. Tong and Frame, 1994), the 
number of IPC classes (a proxy for the technological scope or architectural nature of the 
invention (Lerner, 1994), but subject to the aggregation level chosen in the classification (van 
Zeebroeck et al., 2006b)), and the number of inventors listed in the application (indicating the 
research efforts made to design the invention).142 All those complexity indicators are expected 
to be positively correlated with patent value and have proved so in some empirical studies. 
The latter set summarizes the path followed by each application to reach a given patent office 
and is considered in the present chapter as fully part of its filing strategy as will be discussed 
in the next section. The corresponding variables will therefore be included in our model as 
one dimension of filing strategy. 
 
The second class of determinants represents the characteristics of a patent’s ownership. This 
class first includes the structure of the ownership: the presence of multiple applicants 
introduced by Duguet and Iung (1997) denotes joint research efforts, and the cross-border 
ownership of patents (i.e. at least one inventor and one applicant residing in different 
countries) defined by Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2001) indicates an international 
organization of research. Both measures are expected to be associated with more valuable 
inventions and thus to be positively correlated with patent value. 
 
The second set of determinants in this class of patent ownership act as ‘qualifiers’ for the 
applicant and include different measures (the size of the applicant, academic applicants, 
occasional applicants, and of the size of the patent portfolio). One, the size of the applicant 
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1997) has an ambiguous relationship with patent value (larger 
firms may produce higher quality research, but may also be less discriminating in choosing 
which inventions to patent or not). For the same reason, independent inventors also have an 
unclear expected relationship with patent value (Gambardella et al., 2006). Two, academic 
patents are thought to relate to more basic research, which is expected to produce higher value 
inventions (cf. Harhoff et al. (2002) and Sapsalis et al. (2006)). Academic patents might be of 
a higher scientific value but of a lower market value (due for instance to the uncertainty 
                                                 
141 Czarnitzki et al. (2005) and Hall et al. (2005) observe that self backward patent citations (i.e. made to patents 
owned by the same individual or firm) are more valuable than citations coming from third-party patents, while 
Palomeras (2003) and Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe (2007) obtain more nuanced results, except for self non-
patent citations. 
142 Note, however, that Brusoni et al. (2006) found the number of inventors to be strongly correlated with the 
size of the applicant firm, probably indicating differences in the organisation of research activities according to 
the size of firms. Therefore, this variable may also capture in some way the size of the applying firm. 
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induced by unproven concepts), and patent value is therefore difficult to predict. Three, the 
inexperience of a patentee with the patent system (Allison et al., 2003) may be the sign of a 
highly valuable invention (valuable enough to convince a newcomer to enter the patent arena) 
or of a small invention that did not pass a careful screening prior to being patented. As a 
result, here again the expected relationship of this determinant with patent value is unclear. 
And four, the size of the applicant’s patent portfolio (Shane, 2001) has also been included in 
many empirical models. On the one hand, the larger this number, the more experienced the 
applicant should be with the patent system and the most valuable his patents could be. On the 
other hand, very large portfolios may be a sign of patentees who have a very high propensity 
to patent, possibly inducing many applications of lower value to be filed. Therefore, the 
expected sign of the association between portfolio sizes and patent value is undetermined. 
 
As a complement to the richness of the information available from patent databases, various 
dimensions of the inventing and managerial processes underlying a patent have been explored 
thanks to inventors’ surveys, providing some sort of ‘insider information’ on the context in 
which a given invention was made and on the motivations to patent it. These variables make 
the third class of patent value determinants, which is in more of an embryonic state at this 
stage. A large scale example of such surveys was conducted in Europe a few years ago under 
the name PatVal, whose authors gathered detailed information on about 9000 European 
patents and their underlying invention (Gambardella, 2005; Brusoni et al., 2006; Gambardella 
et al., 2006).143 
 
5.2.2.4 Consistency within the existing literature 
The main results obtained by most contributing papers in the field are summarised in Table 
5.4,144 which shows the number of empirical estimates in which each potential value 
determinant appeared associated with each potential indicator. At first sight, some areas 
appear obviously much more crowded than others. It first confirms that the most popular 
indicators used as dependent variables are market value indicators with 71 estimated 
parameters (at the patent or firm level), followed by oppositions and forward citations, with 
respectively 67 and 24 estimated parameters. This last variable is however the most frequently 
used determinant, followed by families, backward patent citations and claim counts, then 
renewals, IPC classes, PCT, the size of the applicant, non-patent references, and patent 
portfolio sizes. 
 
A closer look at the table shows that many inconsistencies have occured in the literature. 
Whereas renewals and forward citations have almost always been positively associated with 
patent value indicators, backward patent citations and even more so backward non-patent 
references, claims, and IPC classes – not to mention many less frequently tested measures – 
seem to have a much more ambiguous or unstable relationship with the different value 
                                                 
143 Earlier examples in the US included Scherer (1965), Carpenter and Narin (1983), Narin et al. (1987), Albert 
et al. (1991), Cohen et all (2000), and Jaffe et al. (2000) and in Europe, Crépon et al. (1996), Duguet and Iung 
(1997), Harhoff et al. (1999, 2002, 2003), Scherer and Harhoff (2000), Scherer et al. (2000), Kleinknecht et al. 
(2002), Reitzig (2002, 2003), and Silverberg and Verspagen (2004). 
144 Detailed results found in the literature are provided in Table A5.9 in the appendix. 
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indicators. This may of course be due to the different indicators actually capturing different 
dimensions of patent value, and hence characterised by different drivers, but it may also come 
from significant correlations among determinants. All these results and the notable 
inconsistencies that have appeared across the various specifications tested in the literature call 
for a more comprehensive exercise conducted at the largest possible scale to investigate any 
potential indicator, geographical or industrial patterns in the observed correlations. 
 
Table 5.4 – Empirical evidence on value indicators so far (as of May 2007) 
 
Value Indicators 
MKT CIT GRT REN FAM OPP OTC LIT 












MKT    0  2 2    0 0 0 0  0    0 2 2
CIT 2  14 15   0 2  1 3 3 3 0 2 6 8 1 2 3   5 5 38 34
FAM 1  5 5 2  2 1 2  3 1 1 2 0 2 6 8 3  3   2 2 26 22
REN   13 13  1 1    0 0 0 1 1  0    0 15 15
DIS   4 4   0    0 1 1 0 0  0   1 1 6 6
MOP    0   0    0 0 0 0 1 1 2    0 2 1
BPC 1  3 4  3 3 2 1  3 2 2 0 5 5 1  1 3  2 5 23 21
NPC 1  2 3 2 1 3    0 0 0 4 1 5 1  1 1   1 13 12
CLM  1 3 4  2 2 1   1 1 1 0 2 5 7 1 1 2   5 5 22 19
IPC 1  3 4  1 1 1 2  3 0 0 1 1 1 3  0 2  1 3 14 12
INV  1  1 1 1  2    0 0 0 2 2 1 1    0 6 5
PCT    0   0 1  2 3 0 0 4 3 7 3  3 1   1 14 11
AEX    0   0    0 0 0 5 5 2 1 3    0 8 5
ASR    0   0    0 0 0 1 2 3 1 1  2    0 5 3
COA    0  2 2   1 1 1 1 0 2 2 1  1    0 7 6
CBO    0   0   2 2 0 0 0  0    0 2 2
CUM 2  2 4  1 1  2  2 0 0 2 1 3  0  2  2 12 11
APS 2 1 2 5  1 1    0 1 1 0 1 1 1 3 2  2 2   2 14 12
ACA  1  1   0    0 0 0 1 1  0    0 2 2
APP 1   1   0 1   1 0 0 0  0 1   1 3 2
OCC    0   0    0 0 0 0  0   1 1 1 1
MOT    0 1  1    0 0 0 1 1  0    0 2 1
DIA   1 1   0    0 0 0 0  0    0 1 1
ICH 3   3   0    0 0 0 0  0    0 3 3
 T 14 4 52 68 6 1 14 21 9 7 6 22 5 0 6 11 0 0 0 0 24 7 33 64 13 5 6 24 10 2 17 29
 W    39   8    5 4 0 9  2    7 67
A: Ambiguous, N: Negative, P: Positive, T: Total, W: Distinct Works 
 
5.2.2 Filing strategies 
As patent systems evolve and become increasingly popular, new strategies emerge in terms of 
managing patenting processes and maximizing the legal protection of inventions; also the 
empirical investigation of strategic patenting and patent thickets has recently intensified 
among scholars (e.g., Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Noel and Schankerman, 2006; Harhoff et al., 
2007a). In this chapter, the focus is more on a downstream issue: the filing strategies adopted 
by firms when applying for a patent. Harhoff (2006) has developed the notion of patent 
constructionism,145 illustrating how firms build patent portfolios by merging several priority 
filings or using divisional applications.146  Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe (2007) have 
scrutinised the numerous options patentees use along the patenting process at the EPO and put 
                                                 
145 Harhoff (2006) defines patent constructionism as the “strategies and tactics used by patent applicants to 
construct patent portfolios by constructing overlapping, multiple filings with high similarity from smaller 
building blocks (claims, first filings) or by recombination of smaller building blocks (claims, first filings).” 
146 Some applicants merge several national priority filings to file a single patent application at a regional patent 
office, whereas others file very large patents including many pages and or claims and later divide them into 
smaller subsequent patents. 
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forward a typology of four broad filing strategies based on patenting routes, drafting styles, 
and the behaviour adopted for the interacting with the EPO examiners. These typologies range 
from ‘good will and fast track’ to ‘deliberate abuse of the system’. The latter clearly covers 
the exploiting of every procedural possibility offered by the system to delay the granting 
process or to obtain the broadest possible scope of protection.147 
 
The costs and additional red tape associated with most of these strategies suggest at first sight 
that the underlying inventions must be worth the effort involved, and that the resulting patents 
must be of higher value. However, patent filing strategies have never been analysed as such as 
potential determinants of patent value. The objective of this chapter is precisely to address 
this question and so doing, to contribute to this literature. This objective requires the 
construction of several variables to identify the filing strategies which are described in Table 
5.5, and which also includes their expected impact on value indicators. They are essentially 
twofold: some of them relate to the path followed to reach the EPO and be granted a 
European patent; the others pertain to the way each application has been drafted. The former 
group of strategies has already been accounted for in different papers, but the second – to the 
best of our knowledge – has so far not been tested as determinants of value. 
 
Table 5.5 – Summary Statistics of Filing Strategies Variables 
Variable Acronym Obs. Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
PCT Filing PCT 248,856 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Accelerated Search Requested ACCSRC 248,856 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Excess claims (compared to JC median) CLMDEV_MED 248,848 1.21 0.90 0.07 37.40 
Excess claims (compared to JC mean) CLMDEV_MN 248,848 0.99 0.73 0.06 28.67 
# Claims lost in examination phase CLMLS_NB 245,194 1.63 6.28 -152.00 350.00 
% Claims lost (as % of granted claims) CLMLS_% 245,194 0.29 1.05 -1.00 116.50 
# Priorities PRIO 248,856 1.20 0.84 0.00 49.00 
# Equivalents EQUIV 248,856 0.13 0.53 0.00 24.00 
Application has divisionals HASDIV 248,856 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Application is a divisional ISDIV 248,856 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO data – Granted patents filed 1990-1995 
 
5.2.1.1 Filing routes (and speed) 
Applicants may follow several routes to file their applications at the EPO. They may either 
file a priority application directly at a national patent office or at the EPO. Since the Paris 
Convention (1883), applicants have one year from the date of their first (priority) filing to 
extend their patent application to any other country in the world, including the EPO. Until 
recently, most patentees used to file an application at their domestic patent office and transfer 
it to other offices within 12 months.  Before the mid eighties this was the case for more than 
90% of all applications filed at the European Patent Office (EPO). Since then, the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) – signed in 1978 – has offered patent applicants a new option to 
delay the international extension of their priority filings from 12 to 31 months to patent 
                                                 
147 Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe (2007), for instance, show that two additional claims (from the median 
application) on average lead to an additional communication between the examiner and the applicant, and one 
additional communication in turn leads to one year of delay in the outcome of the examination process (see also 
chapter 6 for a more comprehensive approach to this issue). 
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offices worldwide. The PCT multiplied the number of potential routes toward the EPO, which 
are now entirely part of the strategic choices that any patent applicant needs to make before 
reaching the EPO.148 
 
This longer assessment time has convinced many applicants to opt for the PCT process, so 
that about 53% of applications filed at the EPO in 2005 were transferred through the PCT 
route.149 Over the period considered in the present analysis (1990-1995), about 30% of the 
granted patents were filed via the PCT option. The PCT procedure may carry applications that 
are clearly aimed at being widely extended worldwide and may hence be associated with a 
higher economic value. But it may also concern applications that were filed very early in the 
innovation process, at a time when the invention’s market potential was still unclear (see 
chapter 3). In such a case, the patentee may have preferred to delay by an extra 18 months the 
time when a final decision as to whether the application is worth being extended abroad or not 
would have to be made, and so the application itself may be of much or of very little value, if 
any. Therefore, the overall association between the PCT option and patent value is a priori 
unclear. 
 
Whereas the main effect of the PCT route is a substantial delay in the patenting process, at the 
time the application is filed at the EPO the patentee is allowed to file a request for accelerated 
search and/or examination so that the file may be processed more rapidly. Table 1 shows that 
accelerated searches (ACCSRC) are requested in as little as about 2% of the cases. One 
particular strategy associated with this procedural option consists of filing a Euro-Direct 
application (i.e. non-PCT) with an accelerated search request, so that a preliminary opinion on 
the patentability of the invention may be obtained very quickly and a decision to pursue the 
granting process may be taken within a short period of time. Accelerated searches and 
examinations may also be used by patentees who are very confident about the patentability of 
their invention and just want their patent to be granted as fast as possible. Consequently, the 
association between accelerated search requests and patent value is also a priori ambiguous. 
 
5.2.1.2 Drafting styles 
The drafting style of patent applications is made of three main dimensions related to the 
number of claims, the merger or split of national priority filings (or patent constructionism) 
and the reliance on divisionals. Chapter 3 has suggested that these dimensions are sometimes 
strategically exploited by some applicants in order to reinforce the legal strength of their 
patents, to circumvent the disclosure requirement, or to create smoke screens or uncertainty in 
a specific area, which justifies the present analysis of their relationship with patent value. 
 
One, the number of claims. In chapter 3, we have shown that the severe inflation in the size of 
patent applications at the EPO was notably due to a progressive harmonization of drafting 
styles toward American drafting modes, themselves largely influenced by legal changes in the 
US patent system. We observed in addition that the number of claims in an application is 
                                                 
148 See Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe (2007) for a comprehensive overview of these routes. 
149 EPO Annual Report, 2005. 
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strongly influenced by the technology at stake (biotechnologies and computers being 
associated with the largest numbers). The literature on patent value has frequently used the 
number of claims as a proxy for the breadth or complexity of patents (Tong and Frame, 1994), 
suggesting – and empirically demonstrating – a positive correlation with patent value. 
 
This complexity may induce uncertainty at the patent office and among competitors on the 
market, possibly to the benefits of the applicant. However, raw counts of claims may be 
biased by technology specific practices and their evolution over time. Therefore, the number 
of claims as such may not provide a fair indication of the strategic behaviour of a patentee in 
drafting an application. Rather, the deviation of the number of claims a given application 
contains as compared with the average or median number of claims contained in applications 
from the same sector and filed in the same year provides a more precise measure of the 
relative oversize of an application, potentially denoting a strategic behaviour. This deviation 








=         (5.2) 
 
In this equation, CLMDEVi is the relative deviation in number of claims of application i, Ci is 
the number of claims contained in application i, (Si,Yi) is the set of applications filed in the 
same technology joint cluster (Si) and year (Yi) as application i. Note that two parameters have 
to be set in this equation: the level of aggregation and the measure to compare with. In the 
present case, the deviation in claims will be computed with respect to the median number of 
claims in the same EPO Joint Cluster and the same year of filing. An alternative measure 
could rely on the average number of claims (the main econometric results will be presented 
under this option in the appendix and will exhibit no major difference).150 Table 5.5 shows 
that the average number of claims as a percentage of the same year country median is about 
121% (99% when using the mean instead of the median), which means the deviation is on 
average slightly positive. However, the extrema ranging from 6% to 3740% suggest the 
presence of large outliers and a high level of skewness in the distribution. To deal with this 
severe skewness, the variable will be taken in logarithm within the estimated equations. Given 
the cost incurred by excess claims (the EPO charges additional fees for claims in excess of 
10), and because excess claims may represent more robust or larger patents (including more 
fall-back positions or encapsulating a larger scope of protection), this variable is expected to 
be positively associated with patent value. 
 
As a complement, the claims abandoned in the course of the examination proceedings may be 
a good indicator of potentially abusive drafting strategies. It should be recalled here that the 
                                                 
150 In terms of aggregation levels, we tried different options based on the IPC classes (at 3 or 4 digits). However, 
the large number of classes at such aggregation levels induces a large proportion of them with a very small 
number of applications filed in any given year, so that the median or average number of claims does not make 
much sense (for a discussion on these issues, see van Zeebroeck et al., 2006b). In addition, chapter 3 clearly 
showed strongly market technological discrepancies at the JC level and a clear trend, marked by a significant 
annual increase in the average number of claims. 
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examination process often takes the form of an interactive process between the examiner and 
the patent agent, which ends in a final set of claims that would be allowed for grant by the 
examiner. In this respect, the number of claims abandoned as a percentage of the number of 
claims remaining in a granted patent (CLMLS) is informative of the scope of protection that 
has been refused by the examiner and is therefore expected to have a detrimental effect on 
patent value. The average number of claims lost is about 1.6, and the extreme case had a loss 
of 350 claims. Note, however, that this figure may sometimes be negative, denoting an 
increase in the raw number of claims during the examination process. Such an increase would 
in most circumstances be due to the division of certain claims into smaller ones. This may be 
dictated by the examiner when he thinks the claims are too complex or lack unity. It is legally 
forbidden to add extra substance within a given application once filed, and hence a negative 
value of CLMLS should normally never denote an expansion in the scope of protection. 
 
Two, patent constructionism. The progressive shift from single patent strategies to patent 
portfolio strategies has led patentees to no longer rely on a single patent to protect an 
invention, but rather to build a set of intellectual property rights. The size and strength of the 
patent portfolio therefore matters more than the quality of each individual patent. This change 
in reliance on and use of the patent system contributed to the well known surge in patent 
filings around the world (Kortum and Lerner, 1999) and has given rise to new schemes in 
constructing patent filings (Harhoff, 2006). In particular, applicants increasingly split national 
priority filings into a set of applications with a common root that they file or extend to the 
EPO (cf. Harhoff’s Type I construction), and conversely merge several national priority 
filings to form one single EPO application (cf. Harhoff’s Type III construction).151 The 
average number of EP equivalents (EP filings having at least one priority in common) or 
EQUIV is about 0.13, but ranging from 0 (no EP equivalents) to 24 (extreme case of Type I 
construction), and the average number of priorities per EPO application (PRIO) is just over 1 
(about 1.2), but actually ranges from 0 (EPO first filings) to 49 (extreme case of Type III 
construction).152 Such EP equivalents may potentially contribute to the creation of a patent 
thicket, “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its 
way through in order to actually commercialize a new technology”, according to Shapiro 
(2001)’s definition, though the identification of patent thickets is a very complex issue that 
goes beyond the scope of this chapter.153 
 
At first sight, the drafting and procedural costs associated with such strategies suggest that 
only higher value inventions would justify them, and the corresponding variables should be 
associated with more valuable patents as a result. However, should a given scope of 
protection be split into different filings, one could hardly foresee the way the value of the 
underlying invention would spread across these filings. Assuming that most value could 
                                                 
151 Harhoff’s Type II construction referring to the possibility for applicants to file independent priority filings 
covering a same invention and extend them to the EPO as such is much more difficult to identify because such 
applications are not related by common priority numbers. 
152 Note that the computation of the EQUIV variable excluded from recognised equivalents those applications 
that were in fact divisionals of the original filing, see below. 
153 See e.g. Harhoff et al. (2007a) for an empirical investigation of patent thickets. 
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remain concentrated in one application in the case of a Type 1 construction, such a strategy 
would generate one highly valuable filing and several filings of much less value. Hence, the 
expected sign of the association between construction strategies and patent value is uncertain. 
 
Three, divisional filings. An additional feature of the European Patent System which has 
become increasingly successful these past two decades is the possibility to split one European 
application into several divisional filings that will follow their own track in the examination 
process, while keeping the same filing date as the parent application from which they 
originate. This option is mostly used when the original application is said to lack unity and 
would hence be refused as such by the examiner. In such a scenario, the applicant may isolate 
different subsets of the initial claims and encapsulate them into different divisionals, while the 
now smaller original filing follows its initial path up to grant, usually carrying the core of the 
claims. Therefore, divisional filings frequently reveal excessively large or unfocused 
applications, sometimes resulting from the premature patenting of an invention or from a 
deliberate willingness to deceive competitors and examiners by hiding the true invention in 
the middle of many non inventions, or to maintain a case pending for as long as possible. 
 
Divisional filings sometimes emerge as a new form of de facto submarine patents (see 
Graham and Mowery, 2004 and Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe, 2007 as well as here 
above in chapter 3). Indeed, although Article 76(1) of the European Patent Convention 
provides that divisionals “may be filed only in respect of subject-matter which does not extend 
beyond the content of the earlier application as filed”, some applicants file divisional 
applications beyond this requirement to amend them later, during prosecution. Some even file 
divisionals of divisionals that they amend even later in the process. This has led to concerns 
that the divisionals system can be abused, thereby reducing legal certainty for third parties.154 
 
Nonetheless, the administrative burden induced by the filing of divisionals suggests that such 
strategies would only be used when the root application is unusually valuable. Hence parents 
of divisionals are expected to be strongly associated with patent value. The sign of the 
association between divisional filings is much less clear, as no one could predict which part of 
the subject matter from the original filing (the core of the invention or some accessory 
features) will be encapsulated into each divisional. Should the two effects materialize 
(divisionals concern more valuable patents, but most value remains within the original filing), 
the association would be ambiguous. From Table 5.5, one may notice that about 4% of all 
granted patents filed at the EPO in the period considered have given rise to divisional filings 
(HASDIV) and 3% only were divisionals themselves (ISDIV). Since by definition each parent 
has given rise to at least one divisional application, this difference readily suggests that 
divisional filings are less likely to be granted than their parents.155 
 
                                                 
154 Nurton, J., “EPO Enlarged Board rules on divisionals”, in MIP Weekly News July 4, 2007. 
155 Divisionals are identified in our dataset from two sources. One variable extracted from an EPO internal 
database indicates the number of divisional filings each application gave rise to (enabling the identification of 
parent filings), and the second source is provided by the “Continuation” table in PatStat (identifying children). 
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The numerous combinations of these different strategic dimensions may be grouped into a 
typology described by Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe (2007) as fast vs. slow tracks and 
good-will vs. abusive behaviours. For example, the authors argue that a jumbo application 
(with an outrageous number of claims) followed by several generations of divisionals is 
clearly suggestive of an attempt to abuse the system and slow down the examination process 
as much as possible. On the contrary, a short application, filed with a request for accelerated 
search or examination, rapidly giving way to a granted patent with the exact same set of 
claims is suggestive of a good-willing patentee whose application has been efficiently drafted. 
 
Figure 5.1 – Evolution of Patent Filing Strategies at the EPO (1980-1995) 
 
Sample: All applications filed to the EPO in the period 1980-1995 
 
Figure 5.1 depicts the evolution of the different dimensions of patent filing strategies for the 
period 1980-1995. It shows at first sight that all these strategies have become increasingly 
frequent over the period considered. The most striking evolutions are the share of applications 
filed through the PCT route and the share of applications that were followed by one or more 
divisional applications (HASDIV). With a less pronounced evolution, the average number of 
claims and of EP equivalents have also experienced a continuous increase over the entire 
period, whereas the average number of priorities has remained remarkably stable around 1 
priority, suggesting that the construction by assembly, though more frequent today than 
before, remains largely exceptional. 
 
Whereas most patent value indicators have decreased or remained mitigated over the same 
period (see chapter 4), all strategic filing indicators exhibit a (sometimes severe) upward 
trend. These opposite evolutions could actually suggest a negative impact of filing strategies 
on patent value, against the common sense intuition evoked earlier in this section. This further 
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5.2.3 Empirical implementation 
To measure the potential association between filing strategies and patent value and to test the 
robustness of some classical variables as determinants of patent value, a specific dataset 
needed to be constructed from different sources: OECD (2004), PATSTAT (EPO, 2006), 
OECD (2006) and different internal EPO databases. This dataset is composed of all 
applications that were filed to the EPO between 1990 and 1995 and were granted by the 
Office no later than in January 2006, which represents a total of about 250,000 European 
patents. Indeed, since the measurability horizon of most value indicators is about 10 years, 
including post 1995-filings would induce right censoring on the data on most value indicators. 
In addition, some variables (e.g. claims lost in examination) were not available for pre-1990 
patents.156 
 
The model to be estimated is an extension of the classical model represented by Equation 5.1: 
 
),,,( iiiii CVPOPCFSfV =         (5.3) 
 
where iFS  is the vector of variables characterizing the filing strategy adopted by patent i’s 
applicant and iCV  is a vector of control variables composed of technological, geographical 
and time dummies. The indicators and determinants included in the model are described in the 
two following sub-sections. 
 
5.2.3.1 Dependent variables (value indicators) 
Since the objective of the present chapter is to perform an econometric analysis at the patent 
level and on a full-scale basis, the dataset is limited to the information that can be found 
within patent databases, therefore excluding any market value indicator as dependent variable. 
However, in order to obtain results that would be less dependent on the chosen indicator, a 
multi-indicator approach is preferred, in which the same model is to be estimated with 
different indicators as dependent variables (V). Building on the previous chapter, five 
different indicators are used in order to approximate patent value on the left-hand side of the 
models, which represent the four most classical types of patent-based value measures 
discussed in section 2, and which all strongly suggest the existence of a market for the 
patented technology: the number of X and Y forward citations received by each application 
within 5 years from its publication date (CITE5),157 the number of EPC Contracting States in 
which the patent has been validated after grant (EPCFM),158 whether the patent was still 
enforced in France, Germany and the UK 10 years after it had been filed (SRV10), whether 
the patent is a member of a triadic patent family (i.e. has been applied for or granted at the 
USPTO and JPO)159 (TRIAD), and whether the granted patent has been opposed at the EPO 
                                                 
156 Note that since our dataset only comprises granted patents, the following results may not hold for pending, 
withdrawn and refused applications. 
157 See Webb et al. (2005) for a detailed overview of the main issues with patent citations data. Following 
Harhoff et al. (2007c), we only include X and Y (i.e. particularly relevant) citations received. 
158 Using EPO databases for renewals, validation records with a lapse within the first year from the date of grant 
are discarded as they denote in fact lapses ‘ab initio’ (see chapter 4). 
159 See Dernis et al. (2001), Dernis and Khan (2003) and Webster et al. (2007) 
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(OPPOS).160 Note that the two former indicators are discrete variables and the three latter are 
binary variables. In addition, to integrate these different dimensions of patent value, a sixth 
indicator (COMPO) is made of the composite value index ranging from 0 to 20 defined in 










































where COMPOi is the composite value of application i, r(x) is a function that rounds its given 
parameter to the closest integer, SYi is the Scope-Year Index (the composite measure of the 
geographical scope and term of maintenance defined in chapter 4), REJi is equal to 1 if the 
opposition was rejected or closed, and REVi takes value 1 if the application was revoked as a 
result of the opposition procedure. By definition, this indicator may be expected to provide a 
synthetic view of the aggregate effect of each explanatory variable in the model, should these 
effects differ from one indicator to the other. 
 
Table 5.6 – Summary Statistics of Value Indicators (dependent variables) 
Variable Acronym Obs. Mean St.Dev. Min Max Model 
Patent is triadic TRIAD 248856 0.66 0.47 0 1 Probit 
Patent survived 10 years in DE,FR and GB SRV10 243894 0.50 0.50 0 1 Probit 
Patent has been opposed OPPOS 248856 0.06 0.24 0 1 Probit 
Number of X and Y citations received CITE5 248856 0.56 1.19 0 46 Neg. Bin. 
Geographical scope of validation (in EPC10) EPCFM 243886 5.38 3.51 1 16 Neg. Bin. 
Composite Index (cf. chapter 4) COMPO 248856 3.54 2.79 0 18 Neg. Bin. 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO data – Granted patents filed 1990-1995 
 
Summary statistics of these six dependent variables are provided in Table 5.6 (quantiles are 
reported in Table A5.22 and box plots in Figures A5.1 to A5.3). It shows that about 66% of 
patents in the sample belong to a triadic family (TRIAD), 50% were still in force in Germany, 
France and the UK 10 years after their filing date (SRV10), and 6% have been opposed 
(OPPOS). The average number of citations received within 5 years (CITE5) is about 0.5 with 
a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 46, the number of EPC Contracting States in which 
patents in the sample were validated (EPCFM) ranges from 1 to 16 with an average of over 5 
countries,161 and the average composite value in the sample is about 3.54, ranging from 0 to 
18. The evolution of these six indicators over time is depicted in Figure 5.2. As already shown 
in chapter 4, most of the indicators witness some decrease in value between 1990 and 1995, 
with the exception of the number of citations, which has increased, and and the rate of 10-year 
survival in the three largest countries (Germany, France and the UK) which increased before 
declining back to its 1990 level at the end of the period. Hall et al. (2001) nevertheless 
observe that the increase in the number of forward citations is probably influenced by 
systemic factors, which may not be associated with any increase in value (essentially relating 
                                                 
160 See Priest and Klein (1984) for a theoretical model underlying this choice. 
161 Note that data on validations and renewals at the Italian Patent Office are excluded due to data unavailability. 
CHAPTER 5 - PATENTING PRACTICES AND THE VALUE OF PATENTS 
N. VAN ZEEBROECK - ESSAYS ON THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PATENT SYSTEMS 137 
to changes in the nature and creation of citations or to the increasing number of claims 
included in patent filings), and we argued in chapter 4 that the increase in the rate of 10-years 
survival is tempered by a contraction in the geographical scope of protection and an 
expansion of the grant lag.162 
 
Figure 5.2 – Evolution of Patent Value Indicators 1990-1995 
 
1990 = 100% - Sample: All granted patents filed at EPO in the period 1990-1995 
 
The model described in Equation 5.3 is to be estimated with each of the 6 value indicators, 
using probit estimators for dummy variables and maximum likelihood for discrete ones, with 
a negative binomial specification given the suspected overdispersion in the distributions.163 
 
5.2.3.2 Explanatory variables (value determinants) 
The model (cf. Equation 5.3) extends the classical models insofar as it adds to Equation 5.1 
the indicators of filing strategies introduced in section 2, which represent filing routes and 
drafting styles. A Spearman rank correlation matrix of all explanatory variables included in 
the model is presented in Table A5.3 in the appendix. However, as compared with Equation 
5.1, the present model excludes any insider information (II) because of the size of the dataset, 
and uses the first four sets of patent characteristics only on the left-hand side of the equation 
as indicators of patent value. This leaves only measures of complexity from the class of patent 
characteristics, and the different measures of patent ownership (structure and profile). Three 
sets of control variables will allow potential technological, country and time effects to be 
                                                 
162 The Examination Guidelines of the EPO mention that the search and examination should be made on the 
basis of the claims. Therefore, an increasing number of claims should lead to an increasing number of references 
in the search reports drafted by the examiners. 
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accounted for. Descriptive statistics for the complexity, ownership, and control variables are 
provided in Table A5.2 in the appendix (quantiles are reported in Table A5.22 and box plots 
in Figures A5.4 to A5.12).164 
 
The complexity measures (PC) include four variables: the number of inventors listed in the 
application (INVENT), ranging from 1 to 32 with an average of 2.4 inventors; the number of 
IPC classes at 8 digits associated with the patent (IPC8), ranging from 1 to 43 with an average 
of about 2 classes per patent; the number of references made by each patent to earlier patent 
documents (BPC), ranging from 0 to 99 with about 4.5 backward citations on average, and the 
number of references made by each patent to non patent documents such as scientific papers 
(NPC), which has a maximum of 61 and an average of about 1 non patent citation per patent. 
 
Figure 5.3 – Evolution of the complexity of patent applications 
 
Sample: All applications filed to the EPO in the period 1980-1995 
 
The evolution of these four complexity measures is depicted in Figure 5.3. It shows that most 
complexity indicators have increased in the period 1980-1995, especially the number of 
backward patent and non patent references to the prior art. This may reveal that inventions are 
becoming more incremental or architectural – an intuition which is supported by the 
concomitant but slower increase in the number of IPC classes and inventors –, but may also 
be driven by systemic factors such as better electronic documentation and search techniques 
allowing examiners to more easily find relevant pieces of the prior art. As reviewed in section 
2, the theoretical foundations of these four variables suggest that they should be positively 
associated with patent value, but the numerous empirical models found in the literature have 
                                                 
164 Note that in order to reduce the potential impact of the outliers present in most discrete variables included, the 
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produced many ambiguous results (cf. Table 5.5). The present implementation, conducted 
over a large sample and with 6 different value indicators, will allow sensitivity tests to be 
performed on the chosen value indicators and samples. 
 
The ownership characteristics (PO) include: CUMUL, which gives the total number of 
applications filed at the EPO by the same applicant in the same year and five previous years 
(minus the application under consideration), which provides an overview of the cumulative 
portfolio size of the applicant (see chapter 3). This represents on average about 410 EPO 
applications with a maximum of 4832. OCCAS is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the 
cumulative portfolio size (CUMUL) is 0 (in which case the application being considered is the 
first one applied by the same applicant over the previous 5 years), and 0 otherwise. This 
variable therefore identifies filings made by very inexperienced patentees, which represented 
about 21% of the patents in the sample. ACAD is a dummy variable identifying patent 
applications originating from academic institutions and public research centres, which 
represents about 2% of all patents in the sample.165 Finally, CBOWN is a dummy variable 
identifying patents with at least one applicant residing in another country than the country of 
one inventor, also known as cross-border ownership (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2000; 
2001). This is the case for about 1 patent in 10 in the sample and should be related with higher 
value patents as they denote an international organization of research activities. 
 
To complete the model and account for potential industry, country, or time effects, three sets 
of dummy variables have been constructed as control variables (CV): 14 dummy variables 
represent the 14 Joint Clusters representing different technological areas at the EPO (see 
chapter 2), 19 country dummies identify the country of residence of the applicants, and 6 year 
dummies represent the year of filing of each patent at the EPO (ranging from 1990 to 1995). 
The three sectors with the largest number of patents granted from the sample are ‘handling 
and processing’, ‘organic chemistry’ and ‘industrial chemistry’, with 14, 13 and 12% of the 
patents respectively, and the 3 largest countries of residence of applicants represent about 
70% of the sample (the US, 26%; Japan, 22%; and Germany, 20%). The sample is well 
balanced over the period considered as 16% to 17% of the patents had been filed in each of 
the 6 years in the period. 
 
The correlation matrix of all explanatory variables (cf. table A5.3 in the appendix) shows 
some interesting results. For instance, the variable HASDIV is relatively highly correlated 
with the claim size variables. This would have been expected as these patents are generally 
purposefully large, and later split into several divisional applications. The number of 
backward patent citations is also highly correlated with the claim deviation variable, 
suggesting that patents with a large targeted scope (in terms of the number of claims) are 
subject to a larger knowledge base, or prior art. The number of backward citations to the 
scientific literature is positively correlated with the number of inventors, the academic 
                                                 
165 This variable was created based on the presence of the roots of the words “University”, “Institute” and 
“Centre” in the name of the applicant. It is therefore imperfect and should be interpreted with care. In addition, 
not all academic patents are applied for by universities, as shown by Saragossi and van Pottelsberghe (2003) and 
Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe (2007). 
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patentees and the biotech joint cluster. In other words, biotech inventions are performed by 
large teams that rely heavily on the scientific literature. 
 
5.2.4 Empirical results 
The results of the consecutive estimations with the six alternative indicators of value are 
reported in Table 5.7 with robust standard errors (estimates of the coefficients for the control 
variables are provided in Table A5.11 in the appendix).166 The first observation to be made is 
that most parameters are significant and positive, evidencing that patent filing strategies are 
positively correlated with patent value. Generally speaking, the log-deviation in claims 
(CLMDEV), the number of priorities (PRIO), the parents of divisionals (HASDIV), and the 
PCT route (PCT) are associated with the most significant parameters across all indicators.167 
Nonetheless, some discrepancies appear across indicators that may reveal some differences in 
the respective models, and, therefore, are worth being emphasized. 
 
5.2.4.1 Filing strategies 
According to most existing studies, the number of claims is positively associated with patent 
value, although it has been reported as non significant or at least ambiguous in a few papers 
and even negative in one.168 The log-deviation in claims is associated with a significant and 
positive coefficient for all six value indicators, which is consistent with most of the literature, 
but whereas it is one the 2 or 3 most significant parameters of the model in five cases out of 
six (especially with the number of citations and the composite indicator), it appears relatively 
less significant with the likelihood to be opposed.169 It sounds logical, therefore, that the share 
of claims abandoned in the course of the examination should have a detrimental effect on 
patent value, except that it does not in any way reduce the likelihood to be opposed. In other 
words, the number of claims seems strongly related with patent value. Patents with excess 
claims are associated with more citations (arguably because the scope of the patent is then 
larger and hence increases the probability that future applications rely on it as prior art), tend 
to be applied for in more countries within and outside the EPC, and tend to live longer. 
However, claims have a much smaller effect on oppositions. This result may arguably be 
regarded as surprising since the main objective of oppositions is to reduce or destroy the legal 
scope of protection provided by a patent, which is made of the claims. In a nutshell, this result 
                                                 
166 Despite the robustness estimates reported in section 5.2.4.7 below, the results must be interpreted with care, 
due to the imperfection of the measures, particularly with the portfolio variables, the construction of which relies 
on uncleaned applicant names, the potential endogeneity of the number of claims with respect to many other 
covariates, and the potential simultaneity of the model due to the potential endogenous behaviour of applicants. 
167 Table A5.13 in the appendix reports the R² of OLS regressions of the different sets of determinants on the 
composite index. The results reveal that – apart from the technological control variables (Joint clusters) – the 
filing strategies make the most significant contribution (an extra 4%) to the R-squared of the model, followed by 
the technical complexity, then patent ownership characteristics. 
168 Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999), Graham et al. (2002), Schneider (2006), Calderini and Scellato (2004) and 
Wagner (2004) obtain ambiguous coefficients, and Palomeras (2003) a negative one. 
169 Note that Cincera (2007), among others, finds the number of claims to be one of the most significant 
determinants of the likelihood to be opposed. 
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suggests that opponents target the substance defined by the independent claims rather than the 
subtleties such as fall back positions (mostly made up of dependent claims) of a patent.170 
 
The two constructionism variables differ in significance but not in sign across the six value 
indicators. Their correlation with patent value is positive in most cases but insignificant in 
some respects. The number of priorities is associated with a particularly strong positive 
coefficient for citations, triadicness and composite value, but – consistently with the claims – 
has no effect on oppositions. Conversely, the number of equivalents is associated with a 
positive coefficient for all indicators, including oppositions, but not for the number of 
citations. The interpretation of these results is not straightforward. 
 
A patent linked to a larger number of priorities can be seen as an aggregate of several 
domestic first filings. If one assumes that its scope may therefore be larger than the standard 
application, this might explain why they tend to receive more citations from subsequent 
applications. This extra substance embedded into the patent may also explain why it tends to 
be validated in more countries in and outside Europe and why it seems more likely to be still 
active after 10 years. However, the fact that such patents are not more likely to be opposed 
suggests that their complex construction does not increase the probability that a third party 
will find them embarrassing enough to incur the costs and risks associated with filing an 
opposition. Should this line of reasoning be true, there would be no reason to believe that 
patents with sibling (equivalent) EP filings should receive more citations, hence the non 
significance of the parameter for the number of citations might have been expected. But the 
fact they belong to a kind of bundle of filings aimed at protecting a same core invention 
shows that the applicant found the invention important enough to opt for this costly 
construction strategy. It would then seem consistent that the applicant should extend its patent 
to more countries and maintain it for longer as is suggested by the econometric results. In 
particular, this strategy is strongly associated with triadic patents. The higher likelihood for 
such patents to be opposed may reveal that at least some of the patents in the family are 
expanding the geographical scope of protection in such a way that third parties are more 
likely to find one of the members embarrassing. 
 
The dummy variables identifying divisional strategies provide very interesting results as well. 
The HASDIV variable – identifying the parents of divisional filings – is one of the very few 
variables associated with a highly significant positive coefficient for all 6 indicators. That is, 
parents of divisional filings are significantly associated with more important patents, no 
matter how value is measured: they are more likely to receive citations, to be validated in 
more countries, to be applied in the trilateral offices, to be maintained 10 years at least and to 
be opposed. However, the ISDIV variable, identifying divisional filings themselves, presents 
similar results though with smaller significance levels on oppositions and families and a 
                                                 
170 To check for a potential sensitivity of the results to the construction of the CLMDEV variable, Table A5.19 
reports similar estimates with the deviation computed with respect to the mean instead of the median number of 
claims in the same Joint Cluster, and Table A5.20 reports estimates with the raw number of claims instead of the 
deviation. All results are globally in line with those reported in Table 5.7. 
  
Table 5.7 – Econometric estimates for the 6 indicators of patent value 
5yrs Citations
Neg. Bin. II 
EPC Family








Neg. Bin. II 
Variables Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
(a) ln(CLMDEV_MED) 0.30 0.14 44.43 (**) 0.03 0.16 16,16 (**) 0,12 0,04 23,83 (**) 0,08 0,03 18,38 (**) 0,02 0,00 2,91 (**) 0,10 0,34 41,27 (**) 
(b) ln(1+CLMLS) -0.14 -0.06 -13.21 (**) -0.06 -0.31 -19,58 (**) -0,09 -0,03 -11,65 (**) -0,03 -0,01 -4,54 (**) 0,02 0,00 1,89  -0,08 -0,26 -20,61 (**) 
(c) ln(1+PRIO) 0.36 0.17 22.99 (**) 0.05 0.24 9,98 (**) 0,62 0,21 41,60 (**) 0,06 0,03 5,88 (**) 0,03 0,00 1,71  0,17 0,57 29,33 (**) 
(d) ln(1+EQUIV) 0.02 0.01 1.42  0.01 0.04 1,66  0,19 0,07 14,25 (**) 0,07 0,03 5,72 (**) 0,08 0,01 4,54 (**) 0,05 0,16 8,32 (**) 
(e) HASDIV 0.25 0.13 13.90 (**) 0.13 0.70 22,42 (**) 0,21 0,07 11,92 (**) 0,34 0,13 23,95 (**) 0,30 0,04 16,08 (**) 0,21 0,79 34,55 (**) 
(f) ISDIV -0.27 -0.11 -9.09 (**) 0.03 0.13 3,19 (**) 0,47 0,14 19,89 (**) 0,45 0,17 24,27 (**) 0,10 0,01 3,42 (**) 0,11 0,38 11,83 (**) 
(g) PCT 0.09 0.04 9.13 (**) 0.09 0.46 30,36 (**) 0,29 0,10 40,11 (**) 0,08 0,03 12,02 (**) 0,00 0,00 -0,42  0,13 0,46 36,57 (**) 
(h) ACCSRC 0.07 0.03 2.50 (*) 0.03 0.18 3,82 (**) 0,10 0,03 3,82 (**) 0,17 0,07 8,29 (**) 0,11 0,01 3,38 (**) 0,06 0,21 5,85 (**) 
Technical Complexity (PC) 
(i) ln(INVENT) 0.18 0.08 26.55 (**) 0.02 0.12 11,73 (**) 0,11 0,04 20,50 (**) 0,07 0,03 14,66 (**) 0,07 0,01 8,82 (**) 0,08 0,27 31,10 (**) 
(j) ln(IPC8) 0.31 0.14 41.46 (**) 0.03 0.16 14,12 (**) 0,06 0,02 10,61 (**) 0,03 0,01 6,55 (**) -0,01 0,00 -0,85  0,09 0,29 30,85 (**) 
(k) ln(1+BPC) 0.21 0.10 25.41 (**) -0.01 -0.06 -4,88 (**) -0,07 -0,03 -11,27 (**) 0,02 0,01 4,30 (**) 0,25 0,03 26,11 (**) 0,03 0,10 10,14 (**) 
(l) ln(1+NPC) 0.06 0.03 9.62 (**) -0.01 -0.04 -3,54 (**) 0,08 0,03 14,91 (**) 0,08 0,03 16,66 (**) 0,09 0,01 11,18 (**) 0,03 0,10 12,20 (**) 
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
(m) ln(1+CUMUL) 0.01 0.01 6.62 (**) -0.03 -0.14 -44,01 (**) 0,10 0,03 58,45 (**) 0,02 0,01 11,85 (**) -0,05 -0,01 -21,15 (**) -0,01 -0,02 -7,93 (**) 
(n) OCCAS 0.00 0.00 0.18  -0.03 -0.17 -8,68 (**) -0,10 -0,04 -11,42 (**) -0,07 -0,03 -8,53 (**) -0,05 0,00 -3,54 (**) -0,07 -0,24 -14,30 (**) 
(o) ACAD 0.09 0.04 3.52 (**) 0.00 -0.02 -0,48  -0,09 -0,03 -4,02 (**) -0,04 -0,02 -1,85  -0,11 -0,01 -3,46 (**) -0,02 -0,06 -1,78 
(p) CBOWN 0.06 0.03 4.21 (**) 0.04 0.20 9,35 (**) -0,08 -0,03 -7,88 (**) 0,01 0,00 0,73  0,11 0,01 7,86 (**) 0,03 0,11 6,21 (**) 
Model 
# Observations 242048 239528 242048 239536 242048 242048 
Pseudo R² 0.05 0.06 0.21 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Log likelihood -229208 -566606 -122987 -157502 -52296 -539243 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 25308.79 (0.00) 111635.71 (0.00) 47.755 (0.00) 16.288 (0.00) 4.252 (0.00) 57101.86 (0.00) 
LR Test of alpha=0
(P>chibar²) 
42000 (0.00) 35000 (0.00) 
   
51000 (0.00) 
 
Granted Patents filed 1990-1995 - Robust Standard Errors - Coefficients significant at the 5% probability level (*) or at the 1% probability level (**) 
(°) Marginal elasticities (dy/dx) computed for a hypothetic patent characterised by all explanatory variables equal to their average value. Elasticity to dummy variable X is defined 
as dy when X changes from 0 to 1. | 18 Technology dummies, 14 country dummies and 6 Time dummies included in the regression and reported in Table A5.11 
(a) Deviation in claims, (b) Claims dropped (as % of granted claims), (c) # Priorities, (d) # Equivalents, (e) Has divisionals, (f) Is a divisional, (g) PCT Filing, (h) Accelerated Search 
Requested, (i) # Inventors, (j) # IPC-8 Classes, (k) # Backward Patent Citations, (l) # Non patent citations, (m) 5-yr Cumulative filings, (n) Inexperienced patentee, (o) 
Academic patentee, (p) Cross-border ownership 
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negative coefficient for citations received. That they tend to survive longer may be a mere 
consequence of a longer application and examination process. It is in the very nature of 
divisionals to be associated with longer pendency times as discussed here above; hence the 
likelihood for them to be still active at the end of their tenth year from filing is systematically 
higher, and more significantly so than their parents. Similarly, if the parents are triadic, then 
the children will necessarily be considered triadic as well since triadic families are built on 
priority numbers (this does however not explain why their impact on the likelihood to be 
triadic is twice as large as the impact of their parents). But the fact that they are less 
significantly associated with large EPC families and high opposition rates than their parents, 
and more importantly their negative coefficient for citations received, suggest that most value 
of divisional applications remains within the original application. This could explain why the 
parents are more likely to be cited, opposed, and validated in more countries. In other words, 
it is likely that applicants making use of divisionals tend to keep the core or essence of their 
invention defined in the root application and spread surrounding inventions or secure fall back 
positions into divisionals. 
 
Contrary to what could have been expected, but in line with some evidence produced in the 
literature, the PCT route is also generally associated with higher value. The PCT variable 
performs particularly well in predicting the size of the family or the likelihood to be triadic, 
which in these particular cases is consistent with the very objective of the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty to simplify the extension of domestic patents abroad. It is therefore no surprise that 
patent applications filed in the three major offices (JPO, USPTO and EPO) or extended in 
many European countries, given their international promise, were filed through the PCT 
route. PCT filings being also associated with more forward citations and a higher likelihood 
to be maintained for ten years confirms earlier evidence that the PCT route witnesses more 
valuable patent applications (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2000, 2002; Graham et al., 2002; 
Reitzig, 2004a). Nonetheless, the PCT dummy is associated with a coefficient 2 to 3 times 
smaller than the coefficient of divisionals’ parents with forward citations, survival rates and 
the composite, suggesting that this strategy option is not strongly associated with value than 
the filing of divisionals. In addition, these results are counterbalanced by the fact that the PCT 
variable has no effect on the likelihood to receive an opposition, which is consistent with 
Harhoff and Hall (2002), Harhoff and Reitzig (2004), Reitzig (2004b) and Wagner (2004). 
 
Finally, the request for accelerated search is associated with a positive and significant 
coefficient for all 6 indicators. This result is in contradiction with earlier empirical evidence 
(Graham et al., 2002; Jerak and Wagner, 2003; Reitzig, 2004a), though the ACCSRC variable 
had only been tested as a determinant of oppositions. However, the same authors as well as 
Harhoff and Hall (2002) found positive and significant coefficients for accelerated 
examination requests. Our results support the idea that the strategy consisting of getting the 
patent granted faster is also associated with patents of higher value, and that this effect 
prevails. Nonetheless, in terms of magnitude, its impact is smaller than the impact of the PCT 
option in most cases, except with survival rates (where it is twice as large) and with 
oppositions (where the PCT was found not significant). 
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5.2.4.2 Complexity 
The set of variables expressing the technical complexity of patents is also associated with 
many significant coefficients. Most of them are consistent with the literature. The number of 
inventors is associated with strong positive coefficients for all indicators (in line with Reitzig, 
2004b), as is the case for non patent references (in line with Carpenter et al. (1980) and Narin 
et al. (1987), but in contradiction with Reitzig (2004b), who obtained a negative coefficient, 
and Allison and Lemley (1998), Harhoff and Hall (2002), Harhoff et al. (2002), Harhoff and 
Reitzig (2004), and Wagner (2004), who all obtained non-significant correlations). 
 
The number of IPC classes (a measure of the technological scope according to Lerner (1994)) 
achieves similar coefficients, except that it is associated with a slightly smaller probability for 
the patent to be opposed. The same variable was associated with a negative coefficient in 
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002) as well as Harhoff and Reitzig (2004), and a non 
significant or ambiguous parameter in Lanjouw and Schankerman (1997, 2001), Harhoff et al. 
(2002), Reitzig (2004a) and Schneider (2006). One of the most frequently tested determinant, 
backward patent citations has been found positively correlated in 13 empirical pieces of 
research listed in Table A5.1 in the appendix and 9 times non significant, but negative in only 
one case, for the probability for a patent to get granted (Schneider, 2006). In the present 
estimations, backward patent citations counts are associated with more citations and a higher 
likelihood to be maintained 10 years or opposed, but also with smaller EP families and a 
smaller likelihood to be triadic, making it one of the most unstable variables across indicators. 
 
5.2.4.3 Patent ownership 
The three variables identifying different types of applicants shed some additional light on 
these results. Two preliminary observations may be made when looking at the CUMUL and 
OCCAS variables, expressing the experience or lack of experience of applicants in terms of 
their cumulative portfolio of patent applications at the EPO: first, that the sign of their 
coefficient varies widely between indicators; and second, that they are usually in opposition 
with each other: the coefficient of these two variables (CUMUL and OCCAS respectively) is 
non-significant vs. negative on citations, negative vs. positive on EPC family size and 
opposition likelihood, then positive vs. negative on likelihood to be triadic and maintained for 
10 years. These puzzling results – in line with the literature – may be interpreted as follows.171 
As compared to large applicants, inexperienced patentees are less likely to have their patents 
cited, to build triadic patent families and to maintain their patents for 10 years or more; but 
they tend to validate their patents in more European countries and are more likely to see their 
patents opposed.172 On the contrary, academic patents are associated with slightly more 
forward citations, but slightly lower probabilities to be triadic, maintained for 10 years or 
                                                 
171 The portfolio size has been found 2 times non significant, 4 times positive and 6 times negative on 5 different 
indicators throughout the literature listed in Table A1 in the appendix. 
172 Allison et al. (2003) found a positive correlation of a similar measure of inexperience with a probability of 
litigation. 
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opposed.173 Finally, the dummy variable identifying cross-border applications (CBOWN) is 
associated with more citations, larger EPC families and more frequent oppositions, but also 
with a smaller likelihood to be triadic and no particular survival rates.174 
 
The main question these confusing results raise is whether the correlation of patent filing 
strategies with patent value varies when the type of applicant is different. In other words: does 
the effect of filing strategies depend on the profile of the applicant who is implementing them, 
or do different profiles of applicant induce differences in filing behaviours? To answer this 
question, a separate regression, reported in column 1 of Table A5.6 in the appendix, has been 
performed with interaction terms between patent filing strategy variables with applicant 
profile variables. 
 
The coefficients associated with these interaction terms shed some new light on the main 
results presented above. In a nutshell, they suggest that the effect of patent filing strategies on 
patent value is slightly affected by the type of applicant implementing each strategy. 
Generally speaking, the academic dummy is not affecting the correlation between most patent 
filing strategies and patent value but divisionals and accelerated search, which may be related 
with the imperfect identification of academic applicants in the dataset. Academic patents 
which are either divisionals or for which an accelerated search was requested are nonetheless 
slightly more positively correlated with patent value. In terms of applicants portfolio size or 
experience, it appears that most strategies are in fact associated with even higher a coefficient 
when implemented by small or inexperienced patentees than by larger ones. This is 
particularly the case for the log-deviation in claims, the two types of constructionism, and 
both dummies denoting divisionals strategies. These results suggest that there may be 
differences in the recourse to different strategies according to the experience of the applicant 
with the patent system. 
 
Another way of addressing this question consists of running clustered regressions by type of 
applicant (i.e. occasional patentees only, academic patentees only, and all the others). The 
results of these clustered regressions are reported in Tables A15 to A17 in the appendix. 
Generally speaking, the results appear largely in line (in terms of significance and size of the 
estimated coefficients) with the pooled estimates reported in Table 5.7, particularly (but 
logically) so for the non academic and non occasional patentees, as they represent about 75% 
of the sample. Some discrepancies across clusters deserve a few comments. The most striking 
result is that the complexity variables lose most their significance with academic patents, 
especially the number of backward patent and non patent citations. This suggests that the 
nature of citations made by academic patents may not be entirely comparable with those made 
by non-academic patents, possibly due to the more basic nature of academic inventions. 
Regarding filing strategies, the main differences appear with the divisional and route 
                                                 
173 Gambardella et al. (2006) found a negative correlation of academic patentees with the surveyed monetary 
value of patents and Harhoff and Hall (2002) found no effect of the same variable on the probability of 
opposition. 
174 Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002) found the same variable positively correlated with the probability 
to get granted. 
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variables. The parents of academic divisional are not associated with extra citations or with an 
increased likelihood to be opposed, but divisionals filed by academic patentees are associated 
with larger family sizes (EPC and triadic) than non-academic divisionals. This suggests a 
different use of divisional filings by academic than non-academic applicants. Similarly, the 
claims seem more significantly related with the probability to be opposed for academic than 
for non academic patents (larger deviations in claims strongly increase the likelihood of 
academic patents to be opposed, whereas larger shares of claims lost in examination induce a 
much lower risk of conflict). 
 
Occasional or inexperienced patentees differ less from larger patentees than academic ones, 
but still exhibit a few discrepancies that are worth being mentioned. First, the number of 
equivalents has a positive effect on citations and EPC family size (which was non significant 
in the pooled estimates). Second, divisional filings have no effect on citations and 
oppositions, but a positive one on EPC families and a strong positive one on the composite 
(where its coefficient is 5 times larger than for non academic and non occasional patentees). 
Third, PCT filings by inexperienced patentees reduce the likelihood to be opposed instead of 
increasing it. And fourth, the request for accelerated search by inexperienced patentees has no 
significant effect on triadic patents and renewals, but a positive one on oppositions. These 
results reinforce the idea that filing strategies may be implemented differently by different 
applicants. It would be worth validating and further investigating this possibility with firm-
level data (such as data on patenting motives and firm size) in the future. 
 
5.2.4.4 Technology and industry effects 
When looking at country and technological dummies (reported in Table A5.11 in the 
appendix), the most striking observation is that there seem to be very significant geographical 
and industrial effects, and that the coefficients are highly variable from one indicator to 
another – even more so for countries than for technological areas. The most significant 
parameters are to be found for the chemical and biotechnology clusters. Organic chemistry 
and biotechs, in particular, are associated with the most significant variables of the model to 
explain the size of the European family; in other words, patent families seem significantly 
larger in these clusters than in others. The reason for this is probably to be found in market 
structures, competitive processes and the importance of the patent system in these sectors. 
 
Four sectors seem to be characterised by more forward citations on average: organic 
chemistry, polymers, biotechnologies and telecommunications, which may be due to 
inventions being more frequently incremental in these areas (hence patent applications are 
more frequently or more intensively relying on the state of the art), or to the state of the art 
being more easily identifiable in these fields, possibly thanks to a higher degree of 
codification and standardization in the description of inventions. These technological patterns 
are confirmed by a Wald test for equality of the coefficients reported in Table A5.23 in the 
appendix, where the only non-significantly different coefficients are found between organic 
chemistry, multimedia and computers, between optics and vehicles, and between handling and 
processing and human necessities. Triadic families and oppositions also look more frequent in 
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pretty much the same areas, but patents are also more frequently triadic in the multimedia 
industry. The industries experiencing the longest survival rates are biotechnologies, 
multimedia and telecommunications, and oppositions look also more frequent in the 
automotive industry, an industry otherwise associated with lower value patents. At the lower 
end of the ranking, handling and processing, automotive, civil engineering, electricity and 
measuring optics sectors are associated with significant negative coefficients for almost all 
indicators, especially citations, triadic and survival rates. In particular, the measuring optics 
cluster is associated with the smallest family sizes and lowest opposition rates. 
 
In addition to these technological patterns in the different value indicators, clustered 
regressions technology by technology have been run and are reported in Tables A5.25 to 
A5.30. In terms of relevance, most patent filing strategy and technical complexity variables 
appear largely stable across joint clusters (see below in sub-section 5.2.4.8). In terms of 
magnitudes, however, some interesting fluctuations appear which suggest a different impact 
of specific strategies in different industries. For instance, the parents of divisional are 
associated with a coefficient three times larger in the organic chemistry sector than in the 
handling and processing cluster when explaining the number of forward citations. On the 
contrary, the impact of the PCT option is three times smaller in organic chemistry than in the 
measuring optics cluster. When explaining the scope of validation in Europe, the PCT option 
also has three times as large an impact in the telecom industry than in the computers sector, 
suggesting that the PCT process is much more strongly associated with higher value patents in 
the former sector than in the latter. The same difference appears between the organic 
chemistry and the civil engineering sectors when looking at survival rates. In terms of the 
composite index, most patent filing strategies are fairly stable in significance and magnitude, 
but the strategy variables appear more consistently stable in some sectors than in others, 
suggesting that they are more strongly associated with patents of higher value than in other 
sectors where these practices may be more common: they appear particularly relevant in the 
telecoms, optics, and handling and processing sectors, but relatively less so in the multimedia, 
electronics, computers, and vehicles industries. 
 
5.2.4.5 Geographical patterns 
These large discrepancies across industries are also observable across countries of applicants, 
and indicator to indicator variations are even more perceptible. The most remarkable countries 
are also the largest patent filers at the EPO: the United States, Japan and Germany, all with 
very striking fluctuations across indicators. Japanese and US patents are logically the most 
triadic ones (two-thirds of the way to a triadic family is covered when a Japanese or US patent 
is filed at the EPO) along with patents from Nordic European countries. US and Japanese 
patents are also the most frequently cited (along with British patents) and experience the 
highest survival rates. But they are associated with the smallest EPC families and the lowest 
opposition rates. This might suggest that patents from Japan or the US extended to and 
granted by the EPO are of higher value on average, but that patentees from these two 
countries are more selective in choosing the states where they would like their inventions to 
be protected (supposedly they target the most relevant European countries for their business, 
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usually the three largest according to chapter 4) and produce patents that are less likely to be 
opposed. This might be an indication of lower value, but it may also very well be that having 
successfully passed the granting process in one or two major triadic offices and having 
crossed at least one ocean to reach the EPO, these patents are more robust and less likely to be 
successfully challenged in oppositions. Conversely, German patents are characterised on 
average by the largest EPC families (along with their Austrian and Swiss counterparts) and 
exposed to the highest risk of being opposed (together with Danish and Dutch patents), but 
they are the least likely to be triadic and among the least cited. 
 
It is very likely that these discrepancies across countries are to a large extent related with 
home disadvantage biases. Being a European applicant, one is more likely to file a patent at 
the EPO as this is the first natural step for any European patentee willing to seek protection 
beyond one’s domestic borders.175 But since a European applicant could be less selective in 
which patents to extend to the EPO, the average value of his EPO filings might be lower than 
that of Japanese or US applicants who had to make a more difficult decision to cross the 
ocean or not and were then probably more selective. 
 
5.2.4.6 Trends in patent value indicators  
The coefficients associated with time dummies confirm the apparent negative trend with most 
indicators (hereby suggesting a significant decline in patent value over the period 1990-1995) 
except for the number of forward citations received, which seems to have continuously 
increased over the same period. This is consistent with conjectures on a declining trend in 
patent quality made by Jaffe and Lerner (2004) and Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007), as 
well as with statistical evidence reported in the previous chapter. 
 
Therefore, the results presented here clearly bring a positive answer to the question raised in 
the beginning of the chapter: patent filing strategies are positively associated with more 
valuable patents. As a complement, these results empirically confirm the observed decline in 
most patent value indicators (except citations), although the sources and correct interpretation 
of this trend remain to be explored in the future.176 
 
Indeed, the same determinants included in our model might not be able to explain the opposite 
evolution of the different value indicators. Figures A5.13 to A5.18 in the appendix depict the 
evolution of the 6 indicators of value as observed or fitted with different models (using 
within-sample prediction). At first sight, the fit looks fairly good for the full model (reported 
in Table 5.7) with time dummies. However, two additional sets of estimates have been run: 
without time dummies, and with all explanatory variables interacted with a time trend. The 
latter specification – reported in Table A5.24 in the appendix – allows the identification of a 
potential increase or decrease in the explanatory power and magnitude of each determinant to 
                                                 
175 This is the classical argument of the well-known home advantage bias (van Zeebroeck et al., 2006b). 
176 In addition, note that the regression on the composite value indicator provides excellent aggregate effects that 
may be used to summarize the correlation of each explanatory variable with the different indicators of patent 
value into one aggregate coefficient. Therefore, in the remainder of this section, we will focus on regression 
coefficients for the composite value indicator. 
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be made. The most striking result from this exercise is that the interacted terms are mostly 
non significant in most regressions, suggesting that the effect observed in the main 
regressions have been globally stable over the period.177 More specifically, the impact of 
patent filing strategies has not much evolved over the period, except for a few variables in a 
few cases: claims have had a decreasing effect on triadic but an increasing one on 
oppositions; the share of claims lost is associated with an increasing effect on EPC families, 
triadic and the composite but with a decreasing one on oppositions; the impact of priorities 
has continuously decreased on triadic, survivals, oppositions and the composite; the effect of 
parent divisional has slightly decreased on citations and survivals whereas divisional filings 
show a decreasing impact on survivals but an increasing one on EPC families; the PCT is 
associated with a strongly increasing effect on EPC families, also increasing on triadic and the 
composite, but slightly decreasing on survivals, and accelerated search requests have slightly 
gained in effect on citations, but decreased in explaining survivals.178 
 
5.2.4.7 Robustness estimates 
In order to assess the robustness of our results, several additional specifications of the model 
have been successfully tested (including Poisson regressions with robust standard errors 
instead of negative binomials for the count dependent variables). Several additional 
specifications of the model have been tested. The first concern to be addressed is the potential 
effect of leverage points in the dataset. The presence of some outliers in most discrete 
variables may substantially influence the results. To limit this pitfall in our estimates, all 
discrete variables have been taken in logarithm in the main estimates, but this might not have 
been sufficient. Therefore, Table A5.18 in the appendix reports the results from a robust 
regression on the composite index in the form of Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares, using 
robust corrections for influence of the outliers (Mächler and Chatterjee, 1995).179 The results 
are totally in line with the estimates reported in the last column of Table 5.7 (in terms of 
significance levels and marginal effects). Nonetheless, Table A5.14 reports the results from 
                                                 
177 When looking at the predicted values from these different specifications, it appears that the model performs 
much less efficiently without time dummies. The fit of citations and triadic is relatively close to the observed 
increase in the former indicator and decrease in the latter, but the two-stage evolution of the survival rates 
(increasing for two years then decreasing for the next 3 years), the complex fluctuations of EPC families, and the 
declining trends of the oppositions and composite are much more difficult to predict without time dummies. 
Nonetheless, trend interactions improve the fit of all six models considerably. The inadequacies of the model in 
fitting the observed trends without time dummies probably reflect potential unobserved factors (probably to be 
found outside patent databases, for instance in the evolution of technology markets and competitive 
environments) or different models (particularly so for oppositions). If the objective were to identify the sources 
of the evolution of the average patent value, these factors should be analysed at a lower scale (i.e. over a smaller 
sample of patents matched with firm and industry-level data). 
178 Even more stable effects appear with technical complexity and applicant profile variables. Only the 
cumulative portfolio size within the latter group is associated with a growing positive impact (on citations, 
survivals, oppositions and the composite) whereas occasional, academic and cross-border ownership are 
associated with a slightly decreasing effect on the composite. In terms of technical complexity, only a few 
significant interacted terms look relevant: the impact of backward patent citations has slightly increased on 
citations, triadic, survivals and oppositions, but has decreased on EPC family sizes and has remained stable (and 
positive) on the composite; the effect of non patent citations has slightly increased on EPC families and 
oppositions; and the number of inventors is associated with a decreasing impact on opposition incidences. 
179 See also Yaffee (2002) for a brief discussion of this regression model. 
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additional estimates where discrete variables are use in raw terms (instead of in logarithm). 
The results here also seem globally in line with our main estimates. 
 
The second potential issue to be address is the potential sensitivity of our estimates to the 
specification of the model. To investigate this possibility, an additional set of estimates – 
reported in Table A5.21 for the composite index180 – consisted in dropping some variables 
from the model to check for the consistency of the estimated coefficients. Columns 2 and 6 in 
Table A5.21 present estimates of models without the technical complexity variables, which 
are otherwise included in the 4 other models reported in the table. As it can be observed, the 
results look highly robust to changes in model specifications. In addition, robustness estimates 
using one dependent variable at a time (in addition to the three sets of control dummies) were 
performed as well.181 
 
One potential concern, though, would be a plausible endogeneity of the claims with respect to 
the other explanatory variables as evidenced in chapter 3. This issue should not be too much 
of a problem, given the insensitivity of the results to the inclusion or exclusion of the claims-
related variables and the fact that these variables do not express the number of claims in itself, 
but rather the relative deviation of the claims with respect to the industry yearly average 
(CLMDEV) and the amount of claims lost in the course of the examination process as a 
percentage of the number of claims granted (CLMLS). Nonetheless, one could argue that the 
issue could only be solved with an instrumental regression. Unfortunately, there is simply no 
optimal instrument with this type of data. For lack of a better alternative, the instrument we 
propose consists of the number of legal representatives involved in each application. It is used 
to estimate the number of claims in each application – from which we then recompute the 
fitted deviation from the estimated yearly industry average (CLMDEV_RECEST) – and to 
estimate the deviation itself, providing CLMDEV_EST. These instrumental regressions are 
presented in Table A5.7. These fitted values are then used in the main regression model in 
place of the original CLMDEV variable. The results of these new estimates are provided in 
Table A5.8 and look here again highly stable. 
 
In order to investigate a potential interaction between the deviation in claims (CLMDEV) and 
the share of claims abandoned (CLMLS), columns C and D in Table A5.8 provide estimates of 
the main model where CLMLS or the number of claims abandoned in raw terms 
(CLMLS_ABS) are respectively included in interaction with the estimated log-deviation in 
claims. Here again, the results look globally unaffected by this change in the model 
specification. 
 
5.2.4.8 On the consistency of the results 
In addition to these robustness estimates, a check was carried out for sensitivity of the results 
to the sample used in the regression (i.e. to investigate potential country or industry specific 
effects or effects solely due to the size of the sample). To do so, the main model presented in 
                                                 
180 Results for the 5 other value indicators are available upon request. 
181 The results of these estimates are not reported here for the sake of conciseness but are available upon request. 
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Table 5.7 was run for each of the six value indicators on 14 industry samples, 18 country 
samples, and 32 random samples representing 3% of the dataset each. For each indicator, the 
number of times each explanatory variable got a positive (+), a negative (-), or a non-
significant (/) estimated coefficient was computed and reported in Table A5.4 for the 14 
industry regressions, in Table A5.5 for the 18 country regressions and in Table A5.12 for the 
32 random sample regressions. All three tables are found in the appendix. 
 
By looking at each indicator in isolation (in Tables A5.4, A5.5 and A5.12), the stability of the 
explanatory power of each variable on the value indicator considered can easily be assessed. 
In particular, all filing strategy variables – except divisional filings (ISDIV) – are consistently 
associated with patent value no matter the indicator. However, these tables mostly confirm the 
sensitivity of many results to the indicator used. All classical determinants – except the 
number of references to the scientific literature (NPC) and the number of inventors (INVENT) 
– vary in sign or significance from one indicator to another. This is probably due to these 
different indicators capturing different dimensions of value and hence potentially driven by 
different factors. 
 
Many fluctuations in the results also appear across industries and countries. Most complexity 
indicators and filing strategies are insensitive to the industry, but all applicant profiles 
variables depend on the industry. Three of them (portfolio sizes (CUMUL), academic 
patentees (ACAD) and cross-border ownership (CBOWN)) are even unstable across all 
dimensions. This, however, may be due to the construction of these variables relying on 
uncleaned applicant names (possibly leading to an underestimation of the actual portfolio size 
and an incomplete identification of academic patentees). In terms of country dependencies, 
only four dimensions of filing strategies remain stable (claims (CLMDEV), priorities (PRIO), 
parents of divisional (HASDIV) and the PCT route (PCT)), two complexity indicators 
(inventors (INVENT) and IPC8 (IPC8)), and the variable identifying inexperienced patentees 
(OCCAS). All other variables have associations with patent value that depend on the country 
of residence of the applicant. 
 
All these results have highlighted a number of country, industry and sample size dependencies 
in the correlation between filing strategies and technical characteristics of patents and the six 
value indicators. These sensibilities are summarised in Figure 5.10. In order to dichotomise 
the robustness or sensitivity of each variable with respect to the indicator, country or industry 
used, we define the following thresholds: a variable is considered robust (independent) with 
respect to one dimension if its coefficient kept the same sign in all regressions across this 
dimension and remained significant at the 5% probability level in at least two thirds of the 
regressions. This means a maximum of 2 non-significant parameters in the six indicators 
regressions (from Table 5.7), maximum 4 in industry regressions on the composite indicator 
(from the sixth column in Table A5.4), 6 in country regressions on the composite indicator 
(from the sixth column in Table A5.5), and 11 in random sample regressions on the composite 
indicator (from the sixth column in Table A5.12). 
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From Figure 5.10, it appears that only 5 variables would pass this independence test, most of 
them being in fact part of our filing strategy variables: excess claims, the number of priorities, 
parents of divisionals, the PCT route and the number of inventors. Interestingly, four out of 
the five variables measuring filing strategies turn out to be amongst the most stable or regular 
determinant of value (claim deviations, the number of priorities, divisional applications and 
the PCT route). On the other hand, five variables are highly sensitive to the three dimensions: 
cross-border ownership, divisionals, applicant’s portfolio, academic patentees and the number 
of backward patent references. These instabilities are probably rooted in the nature of the 
different indicators and in the specificities of the patenting practices and the inventions across 
technologies and countries. 
 
Figure 5.10 – Stability or instability of explanatory variables 
 
5.3 Concluding remarks 
We started this chapter by suggesting that one class of potential patent value determinants had 
been largely ignored in the existing literature: the strategies adopted by the applicants in 
drafting, filing and managing their patent applications. Whereas a few of these filing 
strategies (the raw number of claims, the PCT route, the requests for accelerated search or 
examination) have been accounted for in different papers, a substantial number of 
characteristics relating to the structure and quality of the drafts (the amount of excess claims 
filed, the share of claims lost in the examination, the construction of the drafts by assembly or 
disassembly, and the filing of divisionals) had so far barely been heard of. The objective of 
this paper was to test whether these strategies are consistently and positively associated with 
patent value. 
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The literature on patent value has proposed many potential determinants. The latter may be 
grouped into three classes: patent characteristics, ownership characteristics, and ‘insider’ 
information obtained from field surveys or interviews. Filing strategies have barely been 
accounted for, and we noticed that several ambiguous results emerge from the state of the art. 
The impact of some factors varies in sign and significance across papers, possibly due to their 
sampling strategies or indicator of value used as dependent variable. 
 
Our empirical implementation relied on a unique dataset made up of about 250,000 EPO 
patent grants and on six different indicators of value as dependent variables. The explanatory 
variables included the filing strategy indicators proposed in this chapter, completed with more 
established determinants: complexity measures and ownership characteristics. 
 
The results of this chapter first show that most dimensions of filing strategies are positively 
associated with more valuable patents, and that they constitute the most stable determinants of 
all. This is particularly the case with the amount of excess claims filed, the drafting by 
assembly, the choice of the PCT route, and the parents of divisional applications. The results 
further confirm the positive impact of some popular determinants (such as the number of 
inventors), but also underline strong sensitivities to the sampling methodology (country- or 
industry-wise) and the patent value indicator used as dependent variable. In particular, well 
established determinants of patent value such as backward patent citations and the applicant’s 
patent portfolio size appear to have a very ambiguous relationship with patent value, which 
heavily depends upon the country from which patents originate, the technology area they are 
related to, and the value indicator chosen. In other words, much care is prescribed before 
generalising results obtained with a single value indicator or a restricted sample of patents. 
 
The strikingly strong relationship between filing strategies and patent value raises several 
policy issues. The recent surge in the size of patent applications witnesses an exploitation of 
all procedural possibilities offered by patent systems to build the most suitable filing strategy 
(see chapter 3 as well as Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe (2007)). The present chapter 
empirically establishes that these filing strategies consisting in drafting excessively long 
patents – often by assembly or disassembly – and in particular the filing of divisional 
applications, are indicative of more important patents. 
 
The benefits of such divisional or drafting strategies to patent holders can easily be guessed: 
they may induce complexity and uncertainty on the market, not to mention a larger field of 
exclusive exploitation for the patent owner. A common denominator of these strategies is that 
they may also induce considerable delays in the granting process. This possibility needs to be 
more carefully investigated in the next chapter. 
 
Although the factual or empirical evidence in this matter is very scarce, there is a distinct 
danger that such strategies could derive to real abuses of the patent system, possibly to the 
benefits of the owner and to the expense of consumers (see Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe, 
2007). For instance, by re-filing the same subject-matter over and over again by means of 
CHAPTER 5 - PATENTING PRACTICES AND THE VALUE OF PATENTS 
N. VAN ZEEBROECK - ESSAYS ON THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PATENT SYSTEMS 154 
divisionals over several generations, a patentee could unduly keep some subject-matter alive 
from a parent application that had been refused for grant by the Office. By filing divisionals 
of the application, embedding the valuable subject matter, and then divisionals of divisionals, 
and so on for up to twenty years, such a strategy could provide the applicant with a 
provisional protection as provided by Article 67 EPC182 over some subject-matter which had 
already been judged unpatentable by the Office. In a recent ruling,183 the EPO Enlarged Board 
of Appeal confirmed that this strategy is a legitimate exploitation of the procedural 
possibilities afforded by the EPC as it is, although some consider it “an abuse in relation to 
the law as they think it ought to be […].” The Board nonetheless found it “unsatisfactory that 
sequences of divisional applications each containing the same broad disclosures of the 
original patent application [i.e. with the same description] should be pending for up to twenty 
years.” But the Board decided that “it would be for the legislator to consider where there are 
abuses and what the remedy could be.”184 
 
The results of this chapter reinforces Harhoff (2006)’s assertion that such strategies may well 
be an endogenous response to value, suggesting that applicants simply need more time and 
flexibility in the patenting process when the perceived value of their future patents is 
higher.185 This statement will be further investigated in the next chapter. Distinguishing 
between this legitimate quest for flexibility and abusive behaviours may be a very delicate 
task – which should be achieved in view of social or economic optima – in order to determine 
whether the legal framework, or the examination practice, should be adapted to better control 
these strategies. 
 
In any case, this chapter confirms that developments in patent filing strategies are something 
policy makers and all stakeholders of the patent system at large should care about for they 
signal more important patents that will become unavoidable in the state of the art (they are 
more frequently cited), remain active for longer in more countries (they have higher survival 
rates and larger family sizes), and tend to be more frequently opposed (clearly witnessing 
economic value on the market). These developments are also something the economic 
literature on the determinants of patent value should consider as this chapter shows they 
provide the most stable determinants available so far. 
 
                                                 
182 According to Article 67 EPC, a pending application provisionally confers upon the applicant the same rights 
in all designated States as if the patent were granted (see van Zeebroeck, 2007). 
183 Cases G0001/05 and G0001/06, decided on June 28th, 2007. The full transcription of the decision is available 
on the EPOLINE website. 
184 EPO EBA Decision in case G0001/05 rendered on June 28, 2007, pp. 44-45. 
185 Should this assertion be correct, the results presented in this chapter should be taken with care as simultaneity 
issues may slightly bias the results of our estimations. 
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“Ici les veillées sont superflues. 
Les nuages ont du respect pour l’étendue. 




6.1 Research objectives 
In this chapter, we focus on one particular dimension of value discussed in the preceding 
pages: the length of patent rights. Our motivations are threefold: first, the particular nature of 
the corresponding measure (which consists of a certain period until a patent lapses into the 
public domain and is hence subject to right censoring) dictates the recourse to specific models 
that go beyond the simple estimation of a dummy variable corresponding to a certain cut-off 
time (10 years in the preceding chapter). Second, the renewal of patents has been frequently 
investigated in the theoretical and empirical literature on patent value (see chapter 5), but – to 
the best of our knowledge – its determinants have never been analysed in a comprehensive 
approach. And third, most the empirical literature on patent length considers only the renewal 
of granted patents, but there are several reasons to enlarge this perspective to the entire life of 
patents – from filing to lapse –, which our data enables for the first time. 
 
One reason is that patentees may enjoy – by virtue of the European Patent Convention (EPC) 
as will be advocated later – some sort of exclusive rights during the examination phase, which 
is much less expensive than the maintenance (or enforcement) period. Therefore, patent 
holders may in some circumstances be satisfied – at least for a certain period – with this 
provisional protection, and considering only the post-grant life of patents ignores the 
exclusive rights entitled by such pending applications. 
 
Another reason for analysing the overall length of patent rights is that this length also includes 
the period during which applications are under examination at the office. Because during this 
period it is very difficult to assess the exact geographical scope, breadth and legal validity of 
the rights (the geographical scope will be set upon post-grant validation, the breadth will 
depend on the claims that will be accepted for grant, and the legal validity is subject to the 
effective issuance of a grant by the office), pending applications are surrounded by a high 
degree of legal uncertainty and consume a great deal of resources (drafting of the application, 
patent attorneys, administrative costs, examination by experts at the patent office, etc.) while 
they generate limited revenues for patent offices (as most of their revenues actually come 
from the renewal of granted patents). Therefore, whether the filing strategies discussed in the 
preceding chapter may result into substantially longer pendency times, is a question of utmost 
importance. Should this be the case, there will be additional grounds for putting these 
strategies, their evolution, and their social desirability to question. 
 
Our objective in this chapter is therefore to analyse the effect of patenting practices 
(essentially the filing strategies defined in chapter 5) on the length of patent applications, 
                                                 
186 Guillevic, E. (1977), Du domaine, Gallimard. 
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including the time it takes to examine them and the period during which they are renewed 
once and if they have been granted, as well as on the outcome of the decision process. 
6.2 The determinants of patent life 
Patents are mainly seen in the economic literature as a way to encourage innovation by 
granting inventors a temporary monopoly in exchange for the disclosure of their inventions. 
As a consequence, the ex-post observation of the period for which patents were renewed by 
their holders provides powerful insights into their potential private value (see chapters 4 and 
5). The empirical literature has been prolific around the issues of patent length and 
geographical scope. Since obtaining patent protection in any additional country or 
maintaining a patent enforceable in one country in particular is costly, research scholars have 
long assumed that patents protected in many countries (Putnam, 1996) or maintained for a 
long period (Pakes and Schankerman, 1984) carry more private value to their holders than 
those that are protected in a small number of countries or are abandoned very quickly.187 
 
Most of the empirical literature on patent length and scope has actually focused on simulating 
value distributions from the costs of patenting in various countries (Putnam, 1996) or the cost 
of renewing patent rights (Pakes and Schankerman, 1984; Pakes, 1986; Schankerman and 
Pakes, 1986; Pakes and Simpson, 1989; Lanjouw et al., 1998; Schankerman, 1998; 
O’Donoghue et al., 1998; Cornelli and Schankerman, 1999) on the basis that rational 
patentees would only file or maintain patents when the anticipated net return on patent rights 
may be positive. But for lack of detailed information on the extension (or validation) and 
renewal of patents, together with their characteristics, none of this abundant literature has so 
far offered a systematic analysis of the determinants of patent scope or length, though with a 
few exceptions: in chapter 5, we analysed the determinants of the size of European and triadic 
families and the probability that European patents have been maintained 10 years or more, 
along with other value indicators. Maurseth (2005) and Svensson (2007) propose two 
different attempts to model the length of patents using survival time analysis, but are limited 
to very small samples and sets of explanatory variables. 
 
Our first objective in the present chapter is therefore to further investigate the issue addressed 
in chapter 5 by analysing in more details the length of patents and its determinants. By so 
doing, we may therefore improve our understanding of the relationships between patent filing 
strategies and patent value. 
 
Nonetheless, a side but detrimental effect of patents may come from the legal uncertainty they 
induce in certain circumstances. This is because under legal uncertainty, firms have to hedge 
or avoid the risks of litigation, which may result in an underinvestment in the development 
and commercialization of new inventions around the patented one. This uncertainty induced 
by patents is essentially rooted in the difficulty of assessing their exact validity and 
                                                 
187 A similar rationale could be applied to the inventive step or technological breadth (see e.g. Lerner, 1994), but 
since these dimensions are much more difficult to quantify and to objectivise, they have seldom been 
investigated empirically (Reitzig, 2004b). 
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technological coverage (or breadth). This uncertainty is obvious when a patent application is 
under review (i.e. pending). Indeed, from the publication of a patent (coming 18 months after 
its date of priority filing by law) until a final decision is reached concerning its grant, the 
market is informed that some rights might be granted to someone, but is unsure of their exact 
breadth, geographical scope and legal validity. 
 
What is more, by virtue of the provisions of the European Patent Convention, pending patent 
applications are enforceable in all European States designated by the applicant at the time 
when the application was filed (see chapter 1). Compensation damages could therefore be 
claimed from potential infringers, at least theoretically. Hence, pending patent applications 
are somehow enforceable on the market and may therefore impede competition and represent 
a cost for the consumer, even before they are granted (or not, as the case may be). In addition, 
this theoretical enforceability may be credible enough to provide substantial negotiation 
power to the owner of a pending application. Should the application prove to be ultimately 
unpatentable and refused by the office, such bargaining power may have been quite unfair. 
 
In addition, the filing and examination phases consumes many resources (drafting by patent 
attorneys, administration processing and examination by qualified experts at the patent office) 
while generating limited revenues in compensation for these efforts (the major costs of a 
European patent come from their validation, translation and renewal in all national offices 
where protection is sought (see van Pottelsberghe and François, 2006)).188 
 
Therefore, the length of the examination procedure represents the amount of time during 
which there will be significant uncertainty around each patent application and during which 
some provisional exclusive rights might be exploited at least as a bargaining instrument. As a 
matter of fact, statistical evidence suggests that the granting process is increasingly long at the 
European Patent Office (EPO) as in other offices around the world. As Jensen et al. (2007) 
suggested it, the optimal pending period represents a trade-off between speed and accuracy: 
faster examinations reduce business uncertainty before grant, but they will fail to exclude 
trivial and non-obvious inventions, leaving uncertainty after grant (as no authority has 
guaranteed the validity of the granted rights). In this sense, the care devoted by patent offices 
to the examination of patent applications represents a trade-off between uncertainty before 
and after grant.189 
 
As a matter of consequence, it is not enough to understand the association of patent filing 
strategies with the maintenance of granted patents, but it is critical to assess their effect on the 
overall duration – from filing to decision or lapse – to account for the potential 
embarrassment occasioned during the examination phase. Disentangling the two stages in the 
                                                 
188 Van Pottelsberghe and François (2006) estimate that the fees charged by the EPO for filing, examining and 
granting a typical patent total about 4,000 EUR. By contrast, maintenance of a patent for 10 years in 13 
European countries would cost approximately 16,000 EUR in fees for 10 years of maintenance and about 
90,000 EUR for 20 years. Half of the renewal fees perceived by EPC Member States from EPO grants return to 
the EPO. 
189 For a discussion on this trade-off, see Lemley (2001) and Régibeau and Rockett (2003). 
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life of a patent will then enable the assessment of some differences in the effect of patenting 
practices on the granting process and on the renewal of patents. 
The present chapter contributes to this debate in three respects. First, using an unmatched 
dataset on European patent applications, their characteristics, outcome, validation and renewal 
in every European country, it presents a comprehensive analysis of the duration of patents and 
its determinants. Second, contrary to most of the literature on patent value, the analysis 
presented in this chapter is not restricted to granted patents, but takes all patent applications 
into account. And third, we evaluate the impact of the many procedural options offered to 
European patentees in filing and managing their patent applications as well as many 
additional characteristics of patents on the length of their rights. 
 
To address this research question, a survival time model is estimated over the entire cohort of 
applications filed to the EPO between 1980 and 2000. In addition, since the duration of 
patents is conditioned to the procedural events that may occur (refused and withdrawn patents 
will never be renewed, and granted patents revoked in an opposition would lapse immediately 
as a result of the proceedings), understanding the factors that may affect the chances for a 
patent to survive the examination procedure or an opposition will bring additional light on the 
issue of patent length. 
 
The results of this chapter are threefold. First of all, they clearly establish that the length of 
patent rights in Europe has significantly increased over the eighties and the nineties despite an 
apparent (but slow) decline in the average grant rate and the overall drop in different value 
indicators observed in chapter 4. This increase is due to the expansion of the examination 
process (significant increase in decision lags) and to higher maintenance rates (significant 
increase in patent renewals). Secondly, filing strategies considerably expand the decision 
process and so doing generate uncertainty on the markets, which may be an expected result 
for some patentees. And thirdly, more important patents (i.e. more cited or with larger family 
sizes) take more time to be examined, are more likely to be granted, and tend to be renewed 
for longer periods, providing strong support to the widely shared view of patent renewals as 
value indicators, and hence reinforcing the results from chapter 5. On the contrary, the 
complexity of patent applications logically induces longer decision lags as well, but is 
associated with lower grant and renewal rates. Policy implications derive from the potential 
consequences of a higher legal uncertainty, raising the need to better understand the 
motivations of firms in using certain filing strategies or in deliberately delaying the grant of 
their patents (different interpretations are indeed possible in this context), so as to amend the 
patent system if and as needed. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised into 6 sections: section 1 details the institutional 
framework in which European patents are applied, examined, and eventually maintained. 
Section 2 presents empirical evidence on the evolution of patent applications length and 
outcomes. Potential explanatory factors are presented in section 3, whereas the empirical 
implementation is introduced in section 4, the results of which are discussed in section 5. 
Section 6 concludes. 
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6.2.1 Institutional framework 
As depicted in Figure 6.1, a patent has two distinct lives: one that goes from filing to the grant 
decision – henceforth referred to as the ‘provisional’ life –, and one from the grant decision to 
the lapse of the patent – henceforth the ‘active’ life. Once granted, however, patents may be 
opposed within 9 months and are then susceptible to be maintained, amended or revoked. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, all empirical studies on the length of patent rights focus either 
on the provisional life (time to decision) or on the active life (term of maintenance). Papers 
from the former group include Harhoff and Wagner (2003), Popp et al. (2003), Régibeau and 
Rockett (2003), and Yang (2007), and aim at understanding the drivers of the time required to 
examine and grant patents in different offices. The latter group of papers, including Maurseth 
(2005) and Svensson (2007), focus on the determinants of the renewal of patents as an 
indicator of patent value. 
 
Figure 6.1 – Overview of institutional framework and related empirical studies 
 
° Only for patents granted | * Optionally 
 
However, by virtue of Article 67 EPC, “a European patent application shall, from the date of 
its publication under Article 93, provisionally confer upon the applicant such protection as is 
conferred [to granted patents] by Article 64, in the Contracting States designated in the 
application as published” (Article 67(1) EPC). In addition, “every State shall ensure at least 
that, from the date of publication of a European patent application, the applicant can claim 
compensation reasonable in the circumstances from any person who has used the invention in 
the said State in circumstances where that person would be liable under national law for 
infringement of a national patent” (Article 67(2) EPC). Therefore, a European patent 
application, as soon as it has been published – which occurs no later than 18 months after the 
date of priority – produces the same legal effects and provides the same protection as if it 
were granted. Naturally, the enforceability of these legal rights before of a court and the 
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amount of compensation that could be claimed in case of infringement may vary considerably 
from country to country depending on the national case law and would in most cases be 
smaller than if the patent was granted. But the legal effect still exists, allowing the applicant at 
least to threaten his competitors, granting him a non-negligible bargaining power. 
 
Consequently, to measure the length of patent rights in time, we prefer to consider the entire 
life of patents and not restrict our analysis to the post-grant maintenance period. Indeed, most 
non granted applications (withdrawn or refused) will have had sufficient time to produce legal 
effects and to entitle the applicant a legitimate provisional protection for his invention (see 
chapter 1). Should the application be ultimately refused by the Office, such protection might 
be seen ex post as unfair. If a patent filing remains pending for years before it is ultimately 
turned down, the applicant will have benefited from a very long, but very questionable legal 
protection, not to mention the legal uncertainty induced as discussed here above. Therefore, 
the duration of the granting process of patent applications matters as much – if not even more 
– as the term of maintenance of granted patents, and the entire life of all patent applications, 
from filing to lapse, should be analysed instead. 
 
In addition, the costs incurred during the granting process are limited compared with the 
amount of renewal fees needed to maintain a granted patent in many countries, and 
provisional protection may even be extended to the entire EPC area for free (since as of the 7th 
designated State onward, no additional fees are due for additional designations). As a result, it 
is often in the interest of patentees to face as long pendency times as possible, especially 
when they know that their chances of obtaining a patent granted are low or when they would 
prefer to enjoy an abusively large scope of protection for as long as possible.190 
 
Figure 6.2 – Possible trajectories of European patents 
 
                                                 
190 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to dissert on the optimal duration of the granting process to establish the 
proper balance between the benefits of a careful examination to maximize the legal certainty and its social costs 
in terms of potential abuses. For such a discussion, see Lemley (2001) and Régibeau and Rockett (2003). 
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For these reasons, it is extremely important to understand the peculiarities of patent 
application procedures and the numerous potential happenings in a European patent’s life 
prior to analysing the determinants of patent length. The whole story of a European patent – 
summarised in Figure 6.2 – starts with the filing of an original application to the patent office 
in any country around the world (most often the country of residence of the inventor). This 
original filing is known as the priority filing. By virtue of the Paris Convention (signed in 
1883), the inventor is offered 12 months from the date of priority to extend his application to 
any other patent office, such as the EPO. A priority filing may be filed directly to the EPO, 
but as a matter of fact most EPO applications are second filings. 
 
Since the early eighties, inventors are offered an additional option to transfer their 
applications throughout the world with the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) signed in 1970. 
The PCT provides an option to delay the costly transfer of patent applications to many offices 
by an additional 18 months. The typical process is then the following: the inventor files a 
priority filing in his/her country of residence, extends it to the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO, located in Geneva) within 12 months, and waits for up to 18 additional 
months before he/she orders the WIPO to transfer his/her PCT filing to any designated 
regional or national patent office. This is today the most common route for reaching the EPO. 
 
Figure 6.3 – Granting process at the EPO 
 
 
Once received by the EPO, any patent filing will follow a similar process, depicted in Figure 
6.3. No matter the route, it will be searched for relevant prior art (in an attempt to assess the 
novelty of the claimed invention) and published after 18 months from the date of filing (or as 
soon as it reaches the office), along with the search report if it has already been produced. 
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Based on the search report, applicants will decide either to proceed with the examination 
phase or to withdraw their filing. If requested, the application will then be examined in view 
of the patentability requirements (inventive step, subject matter). The opinion on the 
patentability of the invention expressed by the examiner may induce applicants to withdraw 
their file at some point (see Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe, 2007), which is the case for 
about 30% of all applications filed. Another 5% are refused by the examiner (a decision 
which may be appealed by the applicant), and the remaining 65% are granted. From the latter 
group, a small fraction (about 5% of all applications) will never be validated in any 
contracting State, provoking the patent to lapse immediately (ab initio). 
 
As mentioned earlier, patents granted by the EPO may be opposed by any third party within 9 
months following the notification of the decision. About 6% of EPO patent grants are 
opposed, and opposition proceedings may lead to the maintenance, amendment or revocation 
of the patent (each outcome is observed in about one third of the cases). 
 
Applicants who have been granted a patent by the EPO still have to validate them in all 
European States in which they would like their protection to be enforced. Consequently, there 
is no such thing as a European patent per se, but rather a bundle of national patents. This 
validation step, to be completed within 12 months from the notification of the decision, 
requires applicants to pay validation fees in each country where protection is desired and to 
provide a translation of the patent in the national language of each country. Once validated, 
the applicant will be requested to pay maintenance fees in each State on a regular basis 
(usually each year). Failure to pay the required renewal fees will provoke the patent to 
irremediably lapse in the country concerned. The statutory limit of patent rights is 20 years in 
the EPC area, starting from the date of filing at the EPO. 
 
The granting process has been modelled in five different papers. Harhoff and Wagner (2003) 
use Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor function and a piecewise constant exponential 
model (allowing different risk models for each outcome) in a Bayesian framework (using 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation techniques) to identify the determinants of decision 
lags. The authors account for non linearities with P-Spline regressions, but consider each 
covariate to be time-invariant. Their results show that more complex patents (identified by the 
number of claims, backward patent citations and IPC classes) imply longer decision lags and 
that a higher workload at the EPO (measured as the number of pending applications per 
examiner) expands the lags. The authors also suspect an endogenous behaviour of applicants 
to slow down the process and observe moderate non-linearities with some independent 
variables. In a contemporary paper, Popp et al. (2003) perform a similar exercise with U.S. 
patent applications and find differences across technologies to be most important. In addition, 
inventor characteristics are associated with small but significant effects. Régibeau and 
Rockett (2003) build a theoretical model to link grant lags with the importance of patent 
applications. The authors find that the welfare-maximising patent approval delay decreases 
over time, conditional on the importance of innovations, and that controlling for a patent’s 
position in the new technology cycle, the optimal examination time should decrease with the 
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importance of patents. Their empirical implementation tends to confirm the prediction of their 
theoretical model. Focusing on the Chinese patent system, Yang (2007), finds that grant lags 
at the Chinese Patent Office are shorter for Chinese residents than for foreign patentees. 
Using a matched sample of 5,597 patent applications filed to different patent offices, Jensen et 
al. (2007) analyse examination request lags (one component of delays in the granting period) 
and find evidence of strategic behaviour by applicants, controlling for differences between 
patent offices. 
 
The renewal of patent rights – intensively discussed in the literature as indicative of patent 
value or used to simulate value distributions of patents – has been subject to even less 
empirical modelling. Deng (2005) estimates the value of European patents based on renewals 
in the three largest countries, but does not provide empirical evidence on their drivers. 
Maurseth (2005) pioneered the use of survival time analysis methods to identify determinants 
of maintenance terms. Unfortunately, his empirical implementation is based on a very small 
dataset (about 600 Norwegian patents filed between 1980 and 1994 which were extended to 
the EPO) and his model only tests the effect of citations and their structure on renewals. The 
author nevertheless finds statistically significant associations of forward citation counts with 
patent renewals. Svensson (2007), using data from a survey on the actual exploitation of 867 
Swedish patents granted to small firms or individual inventors, finds that patents licensed tend 
to be maintained longer than non commercialised patents. To the best of our knowledge, no 
empirical investigation of the like has ever been performed on a larger scale to date. 
 
6.2.2 Descriptive statistics 
The institutional structure of patent lives enables the observation of the age of patents and of 
the events affecting their life expectancy at different points in time, as identified in Figure 6.1. 
The age may be observed at the time of decision (corresponding to the decision lag) or at the 
time of lapse (corresponding to the entire lifespan of patents). These measures are of course 
systematically equal for patents that have not been granted. Although our dataset covers 
applications filed up to the year 2000, there are applications (representing 9% of our dataset) 
that were still pending when the data on decisions was extracted, that is on March 10, 2006, 
inducing right censoring in the figures. This issue will be discussed later. 
 
Granted patents of course may have experienced a certain maintenance period (completed if 
the patent has already lapsed or censored if it is still active). This period may be computed as 
the difference between the entire life (from filing to lapse) and the decision lag (from filing to 
decision). 
 
Whereas the computation of the decision lag is quite straightforward (it is a simple difference 
between two dates), the maintenance period requires some choices to be made as discussed in 
chapter 4. In particular, while the granting process is centralised in one place (the EPO) the 
renewal of EPO patent grants may be observed in any EPC contracting State. European 
patents may indeed be validated in any contracting State, but from then on will be split into a 
set of national patents that will live on their own. Consequently, a European patent could 
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lapse in one country in a given year, but still be maintained in other countries. Therefore, to 
measure the maintenance duration of a European patent, one needs to choose the area where it 
is to be measured (see chapter 4). In this respect, one might choose to focus on one country in 
particular (e.g. Germany) and consider a patent as lapsed when it lapses in the chosen country, 
or on a given set of countries (e.g. France, Germany and the UK) and consider the patent 
lapsed once it lapses in all these countries. But such arbitrary choices would exclude 
European patents that were not validated in the chosen country or countries. Another option 
would be to consider the patent lapsed as soon as it lapses in any country where it had been 
validated. But this option would largely underestimate the maintenance term of patents as 
smaller countries tend to be abandoned much earlier (see chapter 4). On the contrary, the 
option adopted in this chapter is to consider a European patent as lapsed only once it has 
lapsed in all EPC contracting States. The assumption underlying this choice is that as long as 
a patent is renewed in at least one country, it must still carry some value to its owner and is 
still enforceable somewhere.191 
 
Table 6.1 – Summary statistics of patent life indicators 
Variable Unit Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Survival Times       
Entire life duration (from filing to lapse) Years 1189058 8.15 4.56 0.00 20.00 
Entire life duration is censored Y/N 1189058 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Granting process duration (from filing to decision) Years 1189058 4.41 1.97 0.00 20.00 
Granting process duration is censored Y/N 1189058 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Granting process took 10 years or more Y/N 1189058 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
Maintenance period (from grant to lapse) Years 671334 6.63 4.02 0.00 20.00 
Maintenance period is censored Y/N 671334 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
       
Grant Decisions       
Deemed Withdrawn Y/N 1189058 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Withdrawn Y/N 1189058 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Refused Y/N 1189058 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Granted Y/N 1189058 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Lapsed ab initio (non validated) Y/N 1189058 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Granted and validated Y/N 1189058 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Pending on March 10, 2006 Y/N 1189058 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
# Communications during Examination Phase Discrete 1186556 3.52 2.61 0.00 31.00 
       
Opposition Decisions       
Opposed Y/N 671334 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Opposition closed Y/N 45742 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Opposition rejected Y/N 45742 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Patent maintained (opp. rejected or closed) Y/N 45742 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Patent amended Y/N 45742 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Patent maintained or amended Y/N 45742 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Patent revoked Y/N 45742 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Opposition pending on March 10, 2006 Y/N 45742 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 
 
                                                 
191 It would however be worth in the future testing the sensitivity of our results to this arbitrary choice. The 
results from chapter 5 (estimating the probability for a patent to be maintained at least 10 years in the three 
largest countries (France, Germany and the UK) will provide one potential validation instrument.  
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Here again, only those patents that were filed before 1986 have had a chance to be renewed to 
the end of the statutory limit of 20 years. But many of the patents filed in 1986 and after were 
still active when the data on renewals and lapses was extracted, generating right censoring on 
the entire life and maintenance durations. This is the case with about 34% of all applications 
and 45% of all patents granted. This issue will also be discussed later. 
 
6.2.2.1 The dataset 
Our analysis relies on all patent applications filed to the EPO between 1980 and 2000, about 
1.2 million observations in total. A huge amount of information had of course to be gathered 
and merged together to make this analysis possible. Detailed data on all patent applications 
was obtained by merging an extraction from the main EPO database kindly provided by the 
Office and the PATSTAT (EPO, 2006) database with Triadic Patent Families (OECD, 2004). 
Together, these databases allowed the construction of all grant decision variables (including 
decision lags) and most explanatory variables (presented in the next section). The most 
valuable part of our dataset is made of detailed renewal and lapse data on all European patents 
from all contracting States (except Italy).192 This dataset, kindly provided by the EPO, 
allowed the computation of the maintenance duration variables and – by summing them up 
with the decision lags – of the entire life of patents. To complement these data, we also 
merged these with two additional EPO datasets: one is made of all opposition cases and their 
outcomes, and the second provides detailed information on all communications exchanged 
between the Office and the applicants for each application. This dataset allowed the 
construction of an additional variable, the number of communications during the examination 
phase, which may provide some additional information on the intensity of the arguments 
exchanged between the applicants and the Office. All those indicators of patent life are 
summarised in Table 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.4 – Evolution of EPO Patent Applications Entire Life (from filing to lapse) 
 
                                                 
192 Italian data on European patent renewals is indeed not available. 
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From this table, it can be noticed that European patent applications live on average about 8 
years.193 Figure 6.4 shows how this duration evolved in the eighties and nineties. The 
apparent decline from 1986 onward is, of course, a spurious effect of right censoring. 
 
Figure 6.5 – Evolution of EPO Patents Entire Life (from filing to lapse) 
 
 
When disentangling the entire life into the two parts discussed here above, Table 6.1 reveals 
that the granting process takes about 4.4 years on average (including 9% of censored 
observations), but took more than 10 years in 1% of the cases, and even reached the statutory 
limit of patent rights, i.e. 20 years, in some cases. Granted patents are maintained on average 
6.6 years beyond the date of their grant (8.7 years for (uncensored) patents filed before 1987). 
Statistics on grant decisions reveal that about 21% of all applications have been deemed 
withdrawn,194 6% were explicitly withdrawn, 3% were refused, 9% were still pending, and 
61% were granted. Within those 61% of patents granted, 4% were lapsed ab initio195 and the 
remaining 57% were properly validated in at least one EPC contracting State. Figure 6.5 
presents the breakdown of patent life between granting and maintenance phases (for granted 
patents only). Here again, the drop in average pendency time in recent years is an artefact due 
to censoring, as is the maintenance period from the mid-eighties. 
 
Because of censoring, it is of course difficult to precisely assess the extent to which more 
recent patents live longer, but this may be concluded from the following figure (Figure 6.6) 
                                                 
193 This figure is however affected by right-censored observations. The average length in uncensored cohorts (i.e. 
patents filed between 1980 and 1986) is 9.8 years. 
194 i.e. The applicant did not explicitly withdraw his/her application, but failed to comply with the procedural 
requirements to pursue the examination procedure. 
195 i.e. Granted by the office but never validated by the applicant. 
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depicting the share of granted patents from two different cohorts (those filed in the period 
1980-1984 and those filed in the period 1990-1994). It clearly appears that the share of 
patents surviving up to ten years is larger in the second than in the first cohort, confirming 
that patents from the more recent cohort are more likely to be maintained longer. 
 
Figure 6.6 – Share of granted patents maintained at the end of each year from their filing date 
 
 
This figure also reveals that from the patents filed in the early eighties, only about 14% have 
reached the statutory term of maintenance. Censoring, of course, makes it impossible to 
determine whether this proportion will increase with more recent patents. 
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Figure 6.5 clearly illustrated a substantial increase in the average time it takes to reach a 
decision on a patent application filed to the EPO. From slightly over 3 years on average in the 
early eighties, the granting process took almost 5 years for patents filed in 1997, a close to 50 
per cent increase. In addition, record pendency times are increasingly encountered, as attested 
by Figure 6.7. This figure exhibits the evolution in the average share of patents filed to the 
EPO with a time to decision of 10 years or more. From virtually none in the early eighties, 
such record pendency times represented about 4.5 percent of applications filed in 1995. 
 
Much of this expansion of the granting process may be understood by recalling the surge in 
patent applications filed to the EPO over the same period as depicted in Figure 6.8. 
 
Note that the drop in post-1996 granting rates is partly due to the fact that it takes longer for 
patents to get granted than to get withdrawn, hence the share of withdrawn applications in the 
stock of non-pending applications is artificially higher in recent years. 
 
Figure 6.8 – Evolution of the number of filings and the average grant rate at EPO 
 
 
Given that patent offices are unable to hire examiners at the same pace as filings are booming, 
the backlog mechanically increases, expanding the time it takes to process any application. 
But this is also because the process is increasing in complexity and intensity, as is suggested 
by the number of communications exchanged between the applicant and the patent examiner 
regarding each application.196 According to Table 6.1, between 3 and 4 communications are 
exchanged per application during the examination phase, but this number actually ranges 
from 0 communications (which is the case for all applications withdrawn before the 
examination phase) to 31. 
                                                 
196 Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe (2007) use this information as a way of assessing the impact of the examiner 
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This measure may provide a valuable complementary indication of the intensity of the process 
as it indicates whether something is actually happening during the examination phase. One 
would of course expect it to be highly correlated with decision lags (since communications 
take time to be written and processed), but a low number of communications associated with a 
long decision lag would suggest that the decision lag was mainly made of latency, whereas 
others lags were made of highly intense arguments between examiner and applicant. Figure 
6.9 presents the evolution in the average number of communications exchanged. 
 
Figure 6.9 – Average number of communications per filing (pending applications excluded) 
 
Except for the drop in the late nineties due to censoring, this number has continuously 
increased, by 50 percent overall between 1980 and 1995. Several hypotheses may be drawn to 
explain this surge: a higher complexity or a lower quality of applications inducing more 
requests for clarifications from examiners, a more intense eagerness of patentees to get their 
cases granted so that they are less inclined to withdraw their applications spontaneously, or a 
mere increase in red tape during the process. In any case, each of these communications 
induces an extra workload for patent examiners who need to process or issue them. 
 
A frequent concern in the patent system is that there seems to be a decline in the value or 
quality of applications (as suggested e.g. by Jaffe and Lerner (2004), Minoo (2006), Guellec 
and van Pottelsberghe (2007) and observed in chapter 4). This conjecture finds additional 
support in Figures 6.10 and 6.11. The former figure shows that applications withdrawn have 
increased by about 25% on average between the early eighties and the late nineties, mainly at 
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Figure 6.10 – Decisions on patent applications filed to the EPO 
 
Figure 6.11 shows that the opposition rate (defined as the share of granted patents that 
received an opposition for each year of filing) declined from about 10% in 1980 to less than 
4% in 2000. Some of this decline may be due to censoring as patents granted very recently 
may not yet have been opposed, but this effect is limited since oppositions have to be filed 
within 9 months from the date of grant. 
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All these observations clearly suggest that the surge in patent filings at the EPO and their size 
(cf. Part I) has been accompanied by a decline in value (cf. Part II) and inflation in decision 
lags and in the average term of maintenance of patents and in a decrease in grant and 
opposition rates (as already observed in chapter 4). Given the development in patenting 
practices observed and analysed in chapters 3 and 5, it is indeed important to understand 
whether these evolutions are related with each other. 
 
6.2.3 Potential explanatory factors 
The objective of this chapter is to determine whether patent filing strategies may induce 
longer pendency times and whether they are associated with patents that live longer. To test 
these hypotheses, our dataset includes different groups of explanatory variables, summarised 
in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2 – Overview of explanatory variables used in econometric estimations 
Group Determinant Notation 
Filing strategies (FS)
Filing routes PCT vs. EP Direct RTE_PCT 
 Accelerated Search Request RTE_ACCSRC 
 Number of legal representatives RTE_LEGREP* 
Drafting styles Number of claims in application filed DRF_CLAIMS 
 Number of specification pages in application DRF_PAGES_DSC* 
 Presence of illustrations in the application DRF_PAGES_DRW* 
 Share of claims lost in examination DRF_CLMLS* 
 Number of priorities listed in application DRF_PRIO 
 Number of EP equivalents DRF_EQUIV 
 Application followed by divisionals DRF_HASDIV 
 Application is a divisional DRF_ISDIV 
 
Patent characteristics (PC) 
Value Forward citations (after 5 years) – X and Y IMP_FWDCIT5 
 Triadic IMP_TRIADIC 
 Number of designated states
(within initial EPC area (10 countries)) 
IMP_DSTATES_B10* 
 Number of EPC validation States IMP_VSTATES* 
Complexity Number of backward patent citations CMP_BPC 
 Number of backward non-patent citations CMP_NPC 
 Number of IPC classes (at different levels) CMP_IPC 
 Number of inventors listed CMP_INV 
 
Patent Ownership (PO) 
 Co-Applicants APP_MULTIPLE 
 Cross-border ownership APP_CBOWN 
 Portfolio size APP_CUMUL 
 Inexperience APP_OCCAS 
(*) Variables not included in main models but only in some complementary specifications 
 
The first set is made of the dimensions of filing strategies analysed in chapter 5 (some of 
which are based on Harhoff, 2006) and includes different indications on the route followed by 
each application to reach the EPO (PCT option (RTE_PCT), filing of a request for accelerated 
search (RTE_ACCSRC), number of legal representatives (RTE_LEGREP)) and of different 
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characteristics of the drafted document as filed: number of claims (DRF_CLAIMS), number of 
specification pages (DRF_PAGES_DESC), presence of illustrations in the document filed 
(DRF_PAGES_DRAW), percentage of claims abandoned in the course of the examination 
proceedings (DRF_CLMLS), number of priorities merged to form the application 
(DRF_PRIO), number of EP equivalents (separate EP filings having at least one priority in 
common, DRF_EQUIV), whether the application was split into divisional filings 
(DRF_HASDIV), and whether it is a divisional filing in itself (DRF_ISDIV). Note that the two 
latter variables are mutually exclusive and that parent divisional filings are excluded from the 
number of EP equivalents. 
 
Table 6.3 – Summary statistics of potential explanatory factors 
Variable Type Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Filing routes       
RTE_ACCSRC Y/N 1189058 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
RTE_PCT Y/N 1189058 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
RTE_LEGREP Discrete 1189058 0.89 0.32 0.00 3.00 
RTE_US1ST Y/N 1189058 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
RTE_XUS1ST Y/N 1189058 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Drafting       
DRF_CLAIMS Discrete 1188907 13.33 10.81 1.00 592.00 
DRF_CLMLS Continuous 517037 0.28 1.05 -1.00 116.50 
DRF_PAGES_DESC Discrete 1181840 12.71 21.78 0.50 5502.50 
DRF_PAGES_DRAW Y/N 1181840 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 
DRF_PRIO Discrete 1189058 1.16 0.87 0.00 136.00 
DRF_EQUIV Discrete 1189058 0.15 0.65 0.00 39.00 
DRF_HASDIV Y/N 1189058 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
DRF_ISDIV Y/N 1189058 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Value       
IMP_TRIADIC Y/N 1189058 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
IMP_FWDCIT5 Discrete 1187863 0.47 1.10 0.00 70.00 
IMP_DSTATES_B10 Discrete 1189058 6.88 2.89 0.00 10.00 
IMP_VSTATES Discrete 671439 5.31 3.31 1.00 18.00 
Complexity       
CMP_BPC Discrete 1137261 4.49 2.90 0.00 125.00 
CMP_NPC Discrete 1137261 0.95 1.81 0.00 170.00 
CMP_INV Discrete 1189058 2.33 1.68 0.00 49.00 
CMP_IPC4 Discrete 1184888 1.51 0.78 1.00 13.00 
Ownership       
APP_MULTIPLE Y/N 1189058 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
APP_CUMUL Discrete 1189049 364.22 853.19 0.00 6904.00 
APP_OCCAS Y/N 1189049 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
APP_CBOWN Y/N 1189058 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Opposition Track Record       
OPP_MULTIPLE Y/N 45742 0.18 0.08 0.00 1.00 
OPP_ORALPROC Y/N 45742 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 
Descriptive statistics for all explanatory variables are provided in Table 6.3. It shows that 
about 31% of applications filed in the period 1980-2000 were filed through the PCT option, 
that only 2% of applications have been subject to an accelerated search request, and that the 
average number of legal representatives solicited by EPO applicants is close to 1 (some firms 
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have in-house agents who represent them before the Office, in which case this number should 
be 0). The average number of claims per application in the sample is slightly over 13 (with a 
maximum of 592), but on average 28% of these claims were abandoned in patents granted. 
The average application at EPO contains about 13 pages of specification (with a maximum of 
about 5500) and 81% of them include at least one illustration. Patent filings have on average 
one priority filing (zero for EP first filings and up to 136 for second filings), and 0.15 
equivalents at the EPO. Finally, 3% of applications are parents of divisionals and a similar 
share are divisionals (suggesting that divided patents give on average rise to only 1 divisional 
filing). The evolution of these variables is presented in Figures A6.1 to A6.3 in the appendix. 
 
The second group of explanatory variables is made of two sets of patent characteristics 
frequently found in the literature on patent value (see chapter 5): value indicators and 
complexity indicators. The former set includes whether the application is triadic (i.e. has been 
filed or granted at the USPTO and the Japanese Patent Office, IMP_TRIADIC), the number of 
forward citations received within 5 years from the date of publication (IMP_FWDCIT5), the 
number of designated states197 among the 10 initial EPC contracting States (Italy excluded, 
IMP_DSTATES_B10) and the number of contracting States in which the application was 
validated (IMP_VSTATES) (this latter information is of course only available for granted 
applications). Table 6.3 shows that about 56% of all EPO applications are triadic and that they 
received on average 0.47 citations within 5 years.198 The evolution of these two former 
indicators is depicted in Figure A6.4 in the appendix. 
 
The latter set of patent characteristics denotes the complexity of inventions and includes: the 
number of citations made to prior patent (CMP_BPC) and non patent (CMP_NPC) documents 
(about 4.5 and 1 on average respectively), the number of inventors who contributed to the 
creation of the invention (CMP_INV, 2.33 on average) and the number of IPC classes at four 
digits (CMP_IPC4) associated with the application (about 1.5 on average). The evolution of 
these variables is depicted in Figure A6.5 in the appendix, suggesting that the complexity of 
applications has significantly increased over time. 
 
The last group of explanatory variables allows the ownership structure (co-application 
(APP_MULTIPLE) to be accounted for, as well as cross-border ownership (APP_CBOWN) as 
defined by Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000)), and the size of the applicant’s portfolio as 
measured by the cumulated number of applications filed to the EPO by the same applicant 
over the previous 5 years and the current year (APP_CUMUL). Note, however, that the 
current observation is disregarded from this total (see chapter 5). When the size of the 
applicant portfolio is zero, the applicant can be considered a very inexperienced patentee and 
an additional dummy variable (APP_OCCAS) takes the value 1, which is the case with about 
17% of EPO applications. 
                                                 
197 The number of designated states has been frequently included in the empirical literature. Therefore we 
include it in some specifications of our model for the sake of comparability. However, the costless option to 
designate the entire EPC area makes it a very unreliable measure of geographical scope, prescribing much care 
in interpreting its estimated impact. 
198 Following Harhoff et al. (2007c), only X and Y citations (i.e. most relevant) are accounted for. 
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6.2.4 Empirical implementation 
In order to estimate the determinants of patent length, the econometric model needs to 
account for the right censoring of the data. As some applications were still pending (about 
9%) and many granted patents were still active in some countries (about 45%) at the time the 
data on grant decisions and renewal were extracted, many observations have logically been 
right censored. Therefore the most natural option consists of survival time models. 
 
The aim of these models is to estimate the time to a certain event (called a ‘failure’). In our 
case, a failure occurs when a patent application or grant exits the patent system and falls into 
the public domain. This may be the case for different reasons: applications may fail because 
they are withdrawn, refused or lapsed ab initio, and granted patents may disappear either 
because they were revoked in an opposition or because they were lapsed in all countries. In 
any case, the survival time to be modelled will be the age (in days) from the date of filing at 
the EPO to the date of withdrawal, refusal, revocation or lapse. For censored observations 
(pending applications and active patents), the survival time will be the difference between the 
date of extraction of the data (March 10, 2006) and the date of filing, that is, the age reached 
to date by each application or grant. An ad-hoc variable has been constructed to indicate 
which reason made the patent lapse. This variable is set at zero for censored observations, 
denoting the absence of observed failure for these observations.199 
 
However, one may expect that the reason why some characteristics of patents might be 
associated with longer patent activity may be due to different causes: patents may live longer 
because they take more time to be processed, because they are more likely to be granted, or 
because they are renewed for longer. For the sake of robustness as well as to refine our 
estimates, we will therefore also disentangle a patent life into its different stages 
(examination, decision, opposition decision, renewals) and investigate the determinants of 
each lag or outcome to identify potential particularities in the overall determinants of patent 
length. Understanding what makes patents disappear may indeed prove as important as 
understanding why they remain active for long. 
 
To model patent length, one needs to estimate the survival, failure or hazard functions. The 
duration of a patent is a realization of a random variable T with a given cumulative 
distribution function F(t) and probability density function f(t). In the duration analysis 
literature, F(t) is frequently denoted as the failure function and is defined as )Pr()( tTtF ≤= , 
that is the probability that the patent died before or at time t. The survival function, denoted 
S(t) where t is the elapsed time since the patent was filed, can be computed as 
                                                 
199 In this case, censored observations drop out of the estimation of the hazard functions at the point when they 
become censored. Note that this way of accounting for the censoring of the data is probably far from optimal. 
Indeed, censored observations are not randomly distributed across time, but increase in share with the year of 
filing and might depend on the explanatory variables. In this first approach to modelling renewal data (over such 
a large sample) using survival time analysis, we nonetheless opt for this approach. However, tobit-like models 
might be worth being investigated as an alternative option in the future, to better deal with this potential 
selectivity bias. As a complement to the estimates presented in the coming pages, tobit-like estimates (i.e. 
censored normal regressions) are also reported in appendix and appear globally in line with our Cox estimates. 
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)(1)Pr()( tFtTtS −=>= . Since it represents probabilities, the survival function lies between 
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whereas f(t) summarizes the concentration of exit times at each instant along the time axis, the 
hazard function )(tθ summarizes the same concentration, but conditional on the survival up to 
that instant. It can therefore be thought of as summarizing the instantaneous ‘transition 






−== ∫ θ         (6.3) 
 
Therefore, the failure, survival, hazard and cumulated hazard functions are all related in a 
one-to-one relationship: knowing the form of any of these functions, the three others can be 
derived from it. The objective of the following survival analysis will be to model the hazard 
function, which may be achieved using non parametric and parametric (or semi-parametric) 
methods. Both methods are introduced below. 
 
Table 6.4 – Life table of EPO applications entire life (in years) 
Interval Beg. Total Deaths Lost Survival S.D. [95% Conf. Int.] 
0 1 1189058 4747 0 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
1 2 1184311 48598 0 0.96 0.00 0.95 0.96 
2 3 1135713 84547 0 0.88 0.00 0.88 0.88 
3 4 1051166 91407 0 0.81 0.00 0.81 0.81 
4 5 959759 91925 0 0.73 0.00 0.73 0.73 
5 6 867834 81021 44663 0.66 0.00 0.66 0.66 
6 7 742150 65443 52886 0.60 0.00 0.60 0.60 
7 8 623821 55131 46927 0.54 0.00 0.54 0.55 
8 9 521763 45931 42471 0.49 0.00 0.49 0.50 
9 10 433361 37997 36985 0.45 0.00 0.45 0.45 
10 11 358379 31963 32751 0.41 0.00 0.41 0.41 
11 12 293665 27062 28233 0.37 0.00 0.37 0.37 
12 13 238370 22472 24656 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.33 
13 14 191242 18238 21423 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.30 
14 15 151581 15125 18820 0.27 0.00 0.27 0.27 
15 16 117636 12276 16641 0.24 0.00 0.24 0.24 
16 17 88719 10151 14217 0.21 0.00 0.21 0.21 
17 18 64351 8181 10800 0.18 0.00 0.18 0.18 
18 19 45370 7283 8050 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.15 
19 20 30037 12928 5774 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.08 
20 21 11335 9048 2287 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 
                                                 
200 Note that as we observe in days (at the one day margin) periods which are actually several years long, it 
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Figure 6.12 presents Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival function and a smoothed estimate 
of the hazard function. They show that the hazard function strongly increases during the first 
five years of application (corresponding to the average decision lag), then remains constant 
until the 15th year of activity before it dramatically (but logically) increases in the last 5 years 
as the statutory limit approaches. 
 
The upper right chart in Figure 6.12 exhibits Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival function 
by stratum, where each stratum corresponds to a given reason for exit. It appears that the first 
three strata, corresponding to the three reasons for lapse in the granting process (respectively 
withdrawal, refusal and lapse ab initio) are almost parallel and separated by about one year. 
This simply confirms that applications withdrawn disappear more quickly than applications 
refused, which in turn disappear faster than applications granted but not validated (it takes 
about one year from the date of grant to observe that the application has indeed never been 
validated anywhere). A close and quasi-parallel stratum is made of patents granted but 
revoked in opposition. Here again, given that opposition proceedings last for 2 years on 
average, it is quite logical that these patents tend to live slightly longer than patents merely 
lapsed ab initio. 
 
What is more interesting to observe is the parallelism between the next three strata, 
comprising patents granted and validated, but never opposed, and patents opposed, which 
were either maintained or amended in opposition. It suggests that patents that survived an 
opposition tend to live longer than unopposed patents, and that patents amended in opposition 
event tend to survive longer than patents maintained as such. This result – anticipated in 
chapter 4 – will be further investigated below. Finally, the last stratum made of pending 
opposition cases seems to cross the stratum of patents maintained in opposition, but its twice 
censored nature (patents are still active and the outcome of the opposition is itself censored) 
and the low number of cases it represents makes it difficult to interpret. 
 
6.2.4.2 Semi-parametric analysis 
The right censoring widely present in the data dictates the use of a survival time model. Given 
the difficulty to determine ex ante the form of the hazard function, a semi-parametric 
approach will be used in the form of a Cox proportional hazard model. This model allows the 
relationship between the hazard rate and explanatory variables to be estimated without having 
to make any assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard function (Jenkins, 2005). It 
makes use of a partial instead of a maximum likelihood estimation method, starting with the 
classical proportional hazard specification provided in Equation 6.4, where ),( iXtθ  is the 
hazard function, iX  is the vector of explanatory variables, and β  is the vector of slope 
coefficients to be estimated: 
 
)exp()(),( 0 ii XtXt βθθ ′=         (6.4) 
 
which reduces to an easily estimated linear model: 
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Cox (1972) proposed a method to estimate β  without needing to specify the functional form 
of the baseline hazard function, )(0 tθ , which represents the individual heterogeneity. 
Contrary to the maximum likelihood estimators, which rely on spells, the partial likelihood 
used by Cox works in terms of the ordering of events. The Cox model nonetheless relies on 
two main assumptions: the proportional hazard assumption, which states that any absolute 
difference in X implies a proportionate difference in the hazard at each t, and the log-linearity 
of the relationship between the hazard function and the covariates. The sustainability of these 
assumptions will be discussed later.202 
 
Different constructions of the estimates can be implemented, from a simple OLS regression 
(not accounting for the right censoring issue) of the age (in days) lived by each application to 
get a broad overview of the explanatory power of each potential determinant, to a Cox 
regression. Unstratified, the Cox model implies that both the baseline hazard function and the 
coefficients are to be the same no matter the reason why the patent disappeared. However, the 
Kaplan-Meier estimates presented in Figure 6.12 have shown that this assumption is not 
realistic as the survival functions are quite different across stratum, though fairly parallel.203 
 
Therefore, estimates of the hazard function should rather be stratified by reason for death of 
the patent. By doing so, the model lets each stratum have a specific baseline hazard function 
( )(0 tθ ), but still requires the coefficients to be the same across stratum. 
 
As already stated, the Cox model relies on two main assumptions: the proportional hazard 
(PH) assumption and the log-linearity of the association between the hazard rate and the 
covariates, represented by Equation 6.5. The PH assumption may also be derived from 
Equation 6.5 (Jenkins, 2005): For some tt = , and for two persons i and j with vectors of 
characteristics iX  and jX , 
 
                                                 
202 However, one potential drawback in the model is the possibility that several observations share the same 
survival time. Given that it is measured in days for such long periods, this issue of tied outcomes should be very 




























where id  is the number of patent applications which lapsed after it  days. 
203 One may legitimately argue that there are two distinct groups of stratum: the first one sharing parallel survival 
functions is made of pre-grant failures and the second is made of post-grant failures. To account for the 
possibility that the actual coefficient might differ between those two groups, the next sections will focus on and 
estimate pre-grant and post-grant durations separately. 
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θ         (6.7) 
 
Since, in Equation 6.7, the right-hand side of the expression does not depend on survival time, 
it follows that the proportional difference in hazards is constant. If, in addition, i and j are 
totally identical except on the kth characteristic and if their difference on this characteristic is 












=          (6.8) 
 
and )exp( kβ  is precisely the hazard ratio. 
 
It follows that the PH assumption may be violated either with some covariates or at the entire 
model level. This may be tested in two steps. The first step consists of testing the PH 
assumption using the Schoenfeld residuals ( sr ) generated by the Cox estimation: 
 

























         (6.10) 
 
and )( itR  is the risk set at time it . Should this test show that the PH assumption does not 
hold, time-varying covariates will have to be included in the model. Should they appear 
significant in the model, it would confirm that the PH assumption was indeed violated. 
 
6.2.4 Empirical evidence on the determinants of patent length 
6.2.5.1 Modelling the entire life of patents 
In order to investigate potential determinants of patent length, we first use non parametric 
methods in the form of Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival function where the estimates 
are stratified by categorical variables. These estimates are presented in Figure 6.13. The 
different charts in this table exhibit estimates of the survival functions for different values of 
the variables presented in section 3 (discrete variables are categorised by their quartiles for 
that purpose). 
 
The figures suggests at first sight that there are very few differences in the survival function 
according to the number of claims and of equivalents, the ownership structure (multiple 
applicants or cross-border ownership) and the complexity (except for moderate differences 
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according to the number of inventors). Moderate differences in hazard rates appear according 
to the route taken (accelerated search or PCT), the number of priorities (all leading to slightly 
greater longevities), and patent applications filed by inexperienced patentees seem to have 
lower life expectancies than those filed by owners of larger portfolios. Very large differences 
show up with four factors: divisional filings and their parents tend to live much longer than 
regular applications. This is also the case with triadic patents and the number of citations. The 
two latter results are consistent with most of the literature on patent value (see chapter 4). 
 
Note that in most cases the survival functions across strata are fairly parallel, suggesting that 
the proportional hazard assumption underlying the econometric model presented below does 
not seem unreasonable in most cases. This question will be investigated in more detail later. 
 
Finally, to determine whether the hypothesis of a trend toward higher survival rates 
formulated in section 2 (and observed in chapter 4) is true, a log-rank test for trend in the 
survival function is proposed in Table 6.5. This exercise, aimed at testing for equality across 
strata and for the order of the strata in case of significant differences, does not allow the 
rejection of the null hypotheses of significant differences in the survival function across filing 
years and of an increasing order in survival functions over time. This confirms that the life 
expectancy of patents has indeed increased significantly over the two decades considered, or 
that patents have an increasing propensity to live longer. 
 
Table 6.5 – Test for trend in survival function over entire life 

























Test for trend of survivor functions
Chi²(1) 346.83
P>Chi² 0.00
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In order to evaluate the impact of these covariates on the length of patents, a multivariate 
model had to be implemented. The results of the main econometric estimates presented in this 
chapter are summarised in Table 6.6, the first column of which reports the estimates of the 
stratified Cox model for the entire life of patents. 
 
Different constructions of the estimates have been implemented which are detailed in Table 
A6.3. The first column presents the results of a simple OLS regression of the age (in days) 
lived by each application to get a broad overview of the explanatory power of each potential 
determinant. The estimated coefficients can be interpreted here as contributions of each 
variable to the number of days lived.204 The third column reports a non-stratified Cox 
regression. The stratified model is reported in the first column of Table 6.6. A log-likelihood 
ratio test confirms at the 1% probability level that the latter fits the data better than the 
unstratified model. Therefore all remaining estimates will be stratified. 
 
The results of the stratified Cox estimates of the hazard function are presented in the first 
column of Table 6.6.205 The estimated coefficients may be interpreted as contributions to the 
rate of hazard, which means that a negative coefficient induces a proportional decrease in the 
hazard rate, that is, a higher probability of patent survival. Therefore, a significant negative 
coefficient suggests that the covariate increases the probability for a patent to survive longer. 
 
The stratified estimates of the Cox model – strongly in line with OLS and censored normal 
estimates – first show that all potential determinants included in the model are significant and 
that most of them have a positive effect on the length of patents. In particular, the 
IMP_TRIADIC variable is associated with a very significant reduction in the hazard rate and 
four variables are associated with very significant parameters as well: the PCT route, forward 
citations received, and divisional filings – much more than their parents – are associated with 
very significant reductions in the hazard rate. Except the number of priorities and the dummy 
identifying multiple applicants, all covariates are associated with significant coefficients, and 
only the portfolio size (APP_CUMUL) and the dummy identifying inexperienced patentee 
(APP_OCCAS) are associated with an increased hazard ratio. 
 
To take a closer look at the different sets of covariates is nonetheless worth the effort: it 
shows that both route options are associated with higher survival rates overall. This may 
sound logical for the PCT dummy as the international route is institutionally longer, but it is 
more surprising for the request of accelerated search as it should by nature result in a 
contraction of the decision lag. Therefore, the only explanation would be that it is associated 
with patents which have a higher expectancy of being either granted or renewed, or both. 
                                                 
204 In addition, the second column presents the results of a tobit-like estimate (censored normal regression). 
205 Despite the robustness estimates reported in section 6.2.5.1.1 below, the results must be interpreted with care, 
due to the imperfection of the measures, particularly with the portfolio variables, the construction of which relies 
on uncleaned applicant names, the potential endogeneity of the number of claims, as well as the triadic and 
forward citations indicators with respect to many other covariates, and the potential simultaneity of the model 
due to the potential endogenous behaviour of applicants, and the potential selection biases induced by the large 
censoring of the data. 
  
 
Table 6.6 – Econometric estimates of patent life 
 Entire Life Time to Decision Pending 10 yrs Communications Granted Maintenance Survived Oppos. 
Model Cox Cox Probit Poisson Probit Cox Probit 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z H.R. z Coef. z 
Filing routes                      
RTE_ACCSRC 0.91 -9.99 (**) 0.94 -7.62 (**) 0.17 6.13 (**) 0.08 17.88 (**) 0.10 9.19 (**) 0.93 -4.58 (**) 0.01 0.11  
RTE_PCT 0.79 -72.92 (**) 0.82 -75.19 (**) 0.13 10.26 (**) 0.02 15.27 (**) 0.19 53.47 (**) 1.03 6.49 (**) 0.05 2.13 (*) 
Drafting          
DRF_CLAIMS 0.99 -43.76 (**) 0.99 -65.60 (**) 0.01 17.07 (**) 0.00 24.05 (**) 0.00 -14.40 (**) 1.00 -12.62 (**) 0.01 6.00 (**) 
DRF_PRIO 1.00 -1.54   1.00 0.11   0.02 4.24 (**) 0.01 5.30 (**) 0.00 1.30   1.00 -0.36   0.03 2.45 (*) 
DRF_EQUIV 0.93 -21.52 (**) 0.90 -33.33 (**) 0.15 19.46 (**) -0.01 -8.75 (**) -0.04 -15.95 (**) 0.99 -2.48 (*) 0.00 -0.31  
DRF_HASDIV 0.67 -44.13 (**) 0.64 -68.58 (**) 0.61 34.51 (**) 0.33 122.07 (**) 0.85 75.61 (**) 0.80 -21.04 (**) 0.01 0.32  
DRF_ISDIV 0.29 -124.38 (**) 0.22 -212.41 (**) 2.09 150.93 (**) -0.05 -10.31 (**) 0.05 4.26 (**) 0.94 -3.83 (**) -0.03 -0.45  
Importance          
IMP_TRIADIC 0.77 -97.34 (**) 0.85 -63.78 (**) 0.19 16.08 (**) 0.24 170.16 (**) 0.65 214.57 (**) 0.85 -42.08 (**) 0.28 17.26 (**) 
IMP_FWDCIT5 0.92 -61.36 (**) 0.96 -42.89 (**) 0.04 11.52 (**) 0.03 35.73 (**) 0.07 36.50 (**) 0.89 -55.65 (**) 0.02 2.84 (**) 
Technical Complexity       
CMP_BPC 0.99 -17.04 (**) 0.98 -49.46 (**) 0.01 6.49 (**) 0.01 31.05 (**) 0.00 -6.93 (**) 1.00 -0.06   0.03 10.49 (**) 
CMP_NPC 0.97 -33.77 (**) 0.96 -61.22 (**) 0.04 12.24 (**) 0.00 11.61 (**) -0.03 -29.43 (**) 1.00 3.06 (**) 0.04 8.36 (**) 
CMP_INV 0.99 -16.07 (**) 0.99 -19.72 (**) 0.01 5.48 (**) 0.01 19.35 (**) 0.01 13.07 (**) 0.99 -7.23 (**) 0.00 0.77  
CMP_IPC4 0.99 -6.20 (**) 0.98 -15.18 (**) 0.05 8.96 (**) 0.01 10.71 (**) -0.02 -12.31 (**) 1.02 8.07 (**) -0.03 -2.68 (**) 
Applicant Profiles          
APP_MULTIPLE 1.00 0.79   1.04 7.43 (**) -0.02 -1.00   -0.02 -6.13 (**) 0.01 2.27 (*) 1.02 2.32 (*) -0.07 -2.14 (*) 
APP_CUMUL 1.00 21.34 (**) 1.00 7.10 (**) 0.00 -4.61 (**) 0.00 -15.79 (**) 0.00 -9.73 (**) 1.00 16.75 (**) 0.00 -4.46 (**) 
APP_OCCAS 1.01 4.04 (**) 0.89 -36.66 (**) 0.20 14.56 (**) -0.03 -13.56 (**) -0.18 -48.28 (**) 1.11 21.10 (**) 0.06 2.81 (**) 
APP_CBOWN 0.95 -12.20 (**) 0.94 -16.33 (**) 0.10 5.88 (**) 0.04 20.04 (**) 0.13 27.13 (**) 0.97 -5.01 (**) 0.03 1.22  
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry)       
JC-01 - Ind. Chem. 1.07 17.52 (**) 1.12 29.70 (**) -0.13 -7.63 (**) 0.05 25.80 (**) 0.08 17.10 (**) 1.02 3.03 (**) -0.11 -5.10 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0.96 -9.16 (**) 0.91 -24.35 (**) 0.05 3.00 (**) 0.04 19.75 (**) 0.02 5.09 (**) 0.99 -0.90   0.01 0.45  
JC-04 - Biotech 0.86 -33.71 (**) 0.76 -67.39 (**) 0.47 32.29 (**) 0.00 1.55   -0.23 -44.76 (**) 1.02 2.99 (**) -0.10 -3.31 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecoms 0.69 -58.91 (**) 0.58 -98.91 (**) 0.49 24.65 (**) -0.16 -43.92 (**) -0.14 -18.48 (**) 0.93 -6.73 (**) -0.05 -0.86  
JC-06 - AV/Media 0.83 -29.26 (**) 0.76 -52.53 (**) 0.12 6.01 (**) -0.08 -24.91 (**) -0.01 -1.64   0.90 -12.44 (**) -0.16 -3.14 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics 0.90 -22.06 (**) 0.80 -54.41 (**) -0.11 -5.41 (**) -0.05 -22.41 (**) 0.00 -0.60   0.99 -0.91   0.02 0.50  
JC-08 - Electricity 0.93 -17.03 (**) 0.88 -33.81 (**) 0.13 7.77 (**) -0.11 -51.19 (**) -0.04 -8.48 (**) 1.01 1.12   -0.05 -1.76  
JC-09 - Computers 0.75 -44.08 (**) 0.65 -76.39 (**) 0.26 12.38 (**) -0.07 -17.70 (**) -0.11 -15.51 (**) 0.96 -3.87 (**) -0.12 -2.26 (*) 
JC-10 - Optics 0.95 -11.80 (**) 0.91 -23.84 (**) -0.10 -6.66 (**) -0.08 -36.70 (**) 0.03 6.82 (**) 1.00 -0.52   0.03 1.08  
JC-11 - Handling 1.08 18.55 (**) 1.19 46.71 (**) -0.33 -14.49 (**) -0.05 -25.69 (**) 0.09 20.31 (**) 0.97 -5.83 (**) 0.10 4.31 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles 1.05 10.34 (**) 1.21 46.31 (**) -0.36 -12.47 (**) -0.04 -21.17 (**) 0.18 36.59 (**) 0.91 -15.25 (**) 0.14 5.18 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Eng. 1.04 7.45 (**) 1.11 22.98 (**) -0.35 -11.87 (**) -0.03 -13.25 (**) 0.14 26.28 (**) 0.94 -9.62 (**) 0.17 6.31 (**) 
JC-14 - Human Nec. 0.99 -2.98 (**) 1.03 6.55 (**) -0.14 -8.03 (**) -0.07 -32.57 (**) 0.05 11.36 (**) 0.92 -13.78 (**) 0.17 6.83 (**) 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France)       
AT 1.04 2.71 (**) 0.99 -0.86   -0.10 -1.36   -0.01 -2.06 (*) 0.01 0.78   1.06 3.52 (**) -0.04 -0.72  
AU 0.83 -13.03 (**) 0.54 -50.35 (**) 0.27 5.66 (**) -0.11 -11.31 (**) -0.69 -39.91 (**) 1.17 6.19 (**) -0.15 -1.18  




 Entire Life Time to Decision Pending 10 yrs Communications Granted Maintenance Survived Oppos. 
Model Cox Cox Probit Poisson Probit Cox Probit 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z H.R. z Coef. z 
CA 1.02 1.52   0.80 -20.58 (**) -0.02 -0,47   -0,04 -6,76 (**) -0,36 -26,06 (**) 1,17 8,28 (**) -0,23 -2,65 (**) 
CH 1.03 3.38 (**) 0.90 -14.43 (**) -0.01 -0,23   -0,05 -13,08 (**) -0,15 -18,24 (**) 1,04 4,31 (**) -0,02 -0,49  
DE 1.00 -0.07   0.93 -14.67 (**) -0.03 -1,21   0,00 0,53   0,00 -0,30   1,02 3,42 (**) 0,04 1,51  
DK 0.89 -6.65 (**) 0.76 -17.66 (**) 0.18 3,28 (**) -0,02 -2,46 (*) -0,08 -4,36 (**) 0,92 -3,14 (**) 0,11 1,36  
ES 1.04 1.99 (*) 0.80 -14.02 (**) -0.27 -2,09 (*) -0,08 -7,50 (**) -0,37 -18,94 (**) 1,24 6,86 (**) 0,17 1,12  
FI 0.79 -17.28 (**) 0.64 -41.99 (**) -0.04 -0,67   0,01 1,79   -0,10 -6,05 (**) 0,91 -3,62 (**) 0,01 0,12  
GB 1.05 7.50 (**) 0.83 -30.84 (**) 0.02 0,78   -0,06 -18,52 (**) -0,39 -57,37 (**) 1,12 12,99 (**) -0,19 -5,41 (**) 
IL 1.05 2.45 (*) 0.74 -16.89 (**) 0.11 1,57   -0,17 -13,01 (**) -0,62 -28,54 (**) 1,37 8,74 (**) -0,01 -0,03  
IT 1.04 4.64 (**) 0.81 -30.15 (**) -0.07 -1,62   -0,04 -10,06 (**) -0,19 -23,52 (**) 1,14 12,33 (**) 0,04 0,83  
JP 0.82 -38.66 (**) 0.60 -103.37 (**) 0.06 2,78 (**) 0,02 9,48 (**) -0,13 -22,65 (**) 0,97 -4,30 (**) -0,03 -0,94  
KR 0.93 -3.51 (**) 0.68 -25.21 (**) 0.07 0,78   -0,07 -6,94 (**) -0,42 -19,25 (**) 1,01 0,28   -0,17 -0,74  
NL 1.06 7.36 (**) 0.85 -22.75 (**) 0.00 -0,03   -0,03 -7,73 (**) -0,17 -19,96 (**) 1,17 16,63 (**) -0,06 -1,43  
SE 1.04 4.55 (**) 0.75 -33.22 (**) -0.05 -1,26   -0,10 -18,71 (**) -0,39 -37,98 (**) 1,28 16,96 (**) -0,12 -1,77  
US 0.86 -15.07 (**) 0.69 -44.57 (**) 0.09 2,04 (*) -0,05 -11,81 (**) -0,21 -18,32 (**) 0,92 -6,16 (**) -0,11 -2,03 (*) 
RoW 0.93 -14.09 (**) 0.66 -89.86 (**) 0.11 5,77 (**) -0,09 -40,01 (**) -0,58 -109,27 (**) 1,14 21,38 (**) -0,25 -8,59 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990)        
1980 1.24 22.60 (**) 1.82 44.85 (**) -0.24 -4,16 (**) -0,27 -51,15 (**) 0,21 17,97 (**) 1,11 11,12 (**) -0,23 -4,82 (**) 
1981 1.19 19.45 (**) 1.56 39.61 (**) -0.08 -1,95   -0,37 -71,30 (**) 0,18 17,37 (**) 1,15 15,10 (**) -0,20 -4,66 (**) 
1982 1.16 17.29 (**) 1.34 30.47 (**) -0.17 -4,08 (**) -0,34 -71,19 (**) 0,20 19,23 (**) 1,20 20,31 (**) -0,15 -3,70 (**) 
1983 1.10 11.91 (**) 1.12 12.94 (**) 0.01 0,31   -0,27 -61,30 (**) 0,18 18,70 (**) 1,24 24,32 (**) -0,11 -2,71 (**) 
1984 1.08 9.69 (**) 0.99 -0.84   -0.01 -0,46   -0,36 -84,12 (**) 0,13 14,03 (**) 1,29 30,20 (**) -0,02 -0,54  
1985 1.04 5.26 (**) 0.90 -14.74 (**) -0.08 -2,68 (**) -0,34 -80,25 (**) 0,11 11,78 (**) 1,35 36,03 (**) -0,02 -0,51  
1986 0.91 -11.90 (**) 0.90 -14.21 (**) -0.09 -3,03 (**) -0,30 -71,16 (**) 0,07 7,93 (**) 1,11 11,08 (**) -0,02 -0,50  
1987 0.96 -4.86 (**) 0.87 -20.14 (**) -0.10 -3,55 (**) -0,21 -51,82 (**) 0,01 0,85   1,10 10,47 (**) -0,02 -0,51  
1988 0.96 -4.88 (**) 0.89 -18.40 (**) -0.06 -2,32 (*) -0,12 -33,10 (**) -0,04 -4,65 (**) 1,08 8,46 (**) -0,01 -0,17  
1989 0.98 -3.07 (**) 0.91 -14.72 (**) 0.06 2,34 (*) -0,04 -11,83 (**) -0,07 -8,89 (**) 1,05 5,59 (**) -0,01 -0,13  
1991 0.99 -1.71   1.03 4.14 (**) 0.07 3,33 (**) 0,01 2,15 (*) 0,06 7,18 (**) 0,96 -4,85 (**) -0,03 -0,89  
1992 0.97 -4.07 (**) 1.03 4.27 (**) 0.21 10,06 (**) -0,01 -2,64 (**) 0,03 3,77 (**) 0,93 -7,78 (**) -0,04 -1,08  
1993 0.90 -12.88 (**) 0.96 -6.63 (**) 0.11 5,28 (**) -0,01 -3,81 (**) 0,04 5,53 (**) 0,90 -10,73 (**) -0,05 -1,12  
1994 0.81 -25.96 (**) 0.86 -22.76 (**) 0.20 9,65 (**) -0,02 -7,92 (**) 0,02 2,85 (**) 0,86 -14,79 (**) -0,06 -1,56  
1995 0.72 -42.20 (**) 0.75 -44.33 (**) 0.34 16,57 (**) -0,05 -16,73 (**) -0,02 -2,46 (*) 0,83 -17,50 (**) -0,09 -2,01 (*) 
1996 0.66 -54.50 (**) 0.68 -64.29 (**)   -0,08 -24,67 (**) -0,08 -9,74 (**) 0,80 -19,14 (**) -0,09 -1,96  
1997 0.67 -56.47 (**) 0.66 -71.39 (**)   -0,13 -41,33 (**) -0,14 -18,99 (**) 0,74 -22,77 (**) -0,17 -3,21 (**) 
1998 0.77 -37.16 (**) 0.74 -54.13 (**)   -0,20 -60,59 (**) -0,21 -27,49 (**) 0,69 -23,53 (**) -0,17 -2,74 (**) 
1999 1.07 9.39 (**) 0.94 -11.12 (**)   -0,25 -73,06 (**) -0,23 -30,39 (**) 0,73 -17,67 (**) -0,21 -2,72 (**) 
2000 1.69 74.08 (**) 1.29 44.29 (**)   -0,30 -81,29 (**) -0,20 -25,87 (**) 0,80 -11,04 (**) -0,49 -4,61 (**) 
Model                      
# Subjects / Observations 1134860 1134856 704758 1039608 1039622 647426 34512 
# Failures / Pseudo-R² 739924 1039618 0.37 0.04 0.08 347552 0.03 
Log pseudolikelihood -8536509 -12279390 -41014 -2392439 -603310 -4208305 -21167 
Wald chi²[65] (P>chi²) 125 250 (0.00) 206 417 (0.00) 36 914 (0.00) 154 849 (0.00) 99 175 (0.00) 20 615 (0.00) 1 159 (0.00) 
All z-statistics based on heteroskedastic-robust standard errors
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Drafting variables are more mitigated: the number of claims and EP equivalents, divisional 
filings and their parents are associated with higher survival rates, but the number of priorities, 
positively associated with most value indicators (see chapter 5), is not significant here. 
 
Both value indicators – as already mentioned – are clearly associated with lower hazard rates. 
This brings at last strong support for the widely accepted idea that more valuable or more 
important patents do live longer overall. The complexity indicators are also all associated with 
higher rates of survival. This suggests that more complex patents also tend to live longer. 
Arguably, these variables might turn out to have different effects on both parts of a patent life, 
a hypothesis that will be investigated later. 
 
Finally, applicant profiles provide additional interesting results: whereas multiple applicants 
have no significant effect on the hazard rate – a confirmation of what was suggested by 
Kaplan-Meier estimates presented in Figure 6.13 –, portfolio sizes seem to increase the rate of 
hazard, suggesting that patents filed by very small and very large applicants tend to live 
shorter lives than those filed by more average applicants, and the cross-border ownership of 
patent rights is associated with longer patents as well. This last result might have been 
expected since Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002) showed that this variable is 
associated with higher likelihood to be granted and given that granted patents, de facto, live 
longer than non granted ones. 
 
In terms of sectors and countries, significant discrepancies appear as well: patents in the 
telecommunications and computers sectors survive much longer, whereas patents in industrial 
chemistry, handling and processing and vehicles live slightly shorter lives than average. 
Similarly, US, Australian, Japanese and Scandinavian patents tend to live longer than average, 
while UK and Dutch patents live shorter lives. 
 
Figure 6.14 – Goodness of fit of the stratified Cox model (entire life) 
 
 
Note also that looking at the coefficients associated with time dummies, a quasi linear 
relationship appears, so that the hazard rate decreases more and more as years of filing 
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increase, up to 1997 when the effect of censoring probably cancels higher life expectancies. 
This result reinforces the log-likelihood ratio test for trend in the survival function presented 
above, and clearly establishes that patents have an increasing propensity to live longer. The 
remainder of this section will elucidate whether this propensity actually comes from longer 
decision lags, from higher grant rates, from longer renewals, or from all of these factors. 
 
The overall goodness of fit of the stratified model – in addition to the log likelihoods and 
likelihood ratio tests presented in Table A6.3 – can be assessed by plotting the Nelson-Aalen 
cumulative hazard against the partial Cox-Snell residuals. This plot is exhibited in Figure 
6.14. A Cox model fitting the data well should produce residuals along the 45° line, which is 
not perfectly the case here. 
 
To test the hypothesis that the actual coefficients may vary across stratum, a model with 
competing risks has been estimated as well. It consists of running the same model with each 
stratum separately. The results of these competing risk estimates are also provided in Table 
A6.22. They suggest that the coefficients are largely stable across the first three strata (pre-
validation lapses) and between validated and opposed patents. The stratum made of pending 
opposition cases looks slightly different, but the limited number of observations it contains 
means it is probably of limited influence on the pooled estimates. It appears in particular that 
the PCT option is associated with a much more significant coefficient for pre-grant than post-
grant exits, suggesting that the PCT option induces a delay in the granting process, but not so 
much a higher rate of renewal. This will be further tested below. Most the other coefficients at 
least keep the same signs and roughly the same orders of magnitudes across strata. However, 
applicant profiles provide an interesting case. In particular, the indicators of co-application 
(APP_MULTIPLE) and inexperienced patentees (APP_OCCAS) were insignificant in the 
pooled regression, but turn negative with withdrawn patents (inducing longer time to 
withdrawal) and positive on hazard rates for lapsed ab initio and non opposed patents 
(suggesting a lower rate of renewal). These differences will be further investigated below. 
 
A test of Schoenfeld residuals is presented in Table 6.7. Non-significant results imply the PH 
assumption, whereas significant results imply the PH assumption to be rejected for the 
covariate concerned or for the entire model. 
 
Table 6.7 suggests that the PH assumption might be violated on the overall model and more 
specifically with 10 variables (at the 3% probability threshold): RTE_PCT, DRF_CLAIMS, 
DRF_PRIO, DRF_EQUIV, DRF_HASDIV, DRF_ISDIV, IMP_TRIADIC, CMP_NPC, 
CMP_IPC4, and APP_CBOWN. To check and account for this possibility, a second step 
consists of including these variables as time-varying covariates in the model and assessing the 
significance of their estimated coefficients. However, the computational intensity required to 
estimate a Cox model with time-varying covariates prevents running it on the entire sample. 
Therefore, a random sample representing 10% of the dataset has been drawn and the stratified 
model has been run on this reduced sample, without and then with time-varying covariates 
included. The results of these estimates as well as competing risks estimates are presented in 
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Table A6.2 in the appendix. By so doing, they first provide an interesting opportunity to test 
the robustness of the estimates presented in Table 6.6 against a random sample (by comparing 
columns 1 and 2 in Table A6.2). This shows that the results are strongly stable, all covariates 
keeping the exact same estimated coefficient across samples, except with RTE_ACCSRC and 
CMP_IPC4, which were the least significant variables in the original estimates and lost most 
of their explanatory power with the reduced sample. 
 
Table 6.7 – Test of the PH Assumption in Entire Life Model 
  rho chi2 df Prob>chi2 
Filing routes  
RTE_ACCSRC 0.00 0.30 1.00 0.58 
RTE_PCT 0.05 203.88 1.00 0.00 
Drafting  
DRF_CLAIMS 0.02 35.81 1.00 0.00 
DRF_PRIO 0.01 8.43 1.00 0.00 
DRF_EQUIV -0.01 4.76 1.00 0.03 
DRF_HASDIV 0.02 19.04 1.00 0.00 
DRF_ISDIV 0.06 227.32 1.00 0.00 
Importance  
IMP_TRIADIC 0.06 302.80 1.00 0.00 
IMP_FWDCIT5 0.00 0.14 1.00 0.70 
Technical Complexity  
CMP_BPC 0.00 1.29 1.00 0.26 
CMP_NPC 0.01 14.61 1.00 0.00 
CMP_INV 0.01 2.03 1.00 0.15 
CMP_IPC4 0.01 9.70 1.00 0.00 
Applicant Profiles  
APP_MULTIPLE 0.01 4.51 1.00 0.03 
APP_CUMUL 0.00 0.12 1.00 0.73 
APP_OCCAS 0.00 0.30 1.00 0.59 
APP_CBOWN 0.01 5.77 1.00 0.02 
Global Test 2646.88 68.00 0.00 
Cox Regression Model - Breslow method for ties 
 
When looking at the third column of Table A6.2, all time-varying coefficients look 
significant, except again with the number of IPC-4 classes. This confirms the suspected 
violation of the assumption for these variables and suggests that the latter model should be 
used instead. In almost all cases, the fixed effect of each covariate has kept the same sign and 
significance, with fixed effects reducing the hazard rate and time-varying effects increasing it. 
The only exception is found with the number of equivalents, though with small significance 
levels. In all other cases, it seems that the fixed-effect coefficient outweighs the time-varying 
coefficient so that the overall effect of each variable should remain negative on the hazard 
rate. It nevertheless suggests that these covariates decrease the hazard rate more sharply in the 
early ages of patents than in long survival times, possibly because they expand decision lags 
more than renewal rates. A deeper investigation of the determinants of the two distinct lags 
introduced below will clarify this possibility. 
 
In terms of the goodness of fit, the model with time-varying covariates outperforms the basic 
model. The log likelihood is slightly higher; a likelihood ratio test confirms this at the 1% 
probability level; and the Cox Snell residuals against the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard – 
depicted in Figure 6.15 – exhibits a better fit of the data than the basic model in Figure 6.14. 
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Figure 6.15 – Goodness of fit of the stratified Cox model with time-varying covariates 
 
 
6.2.5.1.1 Robustness estimates 
A first issue that deserves further attention is the potential bias induced by the large share of 
right-censored observations in the data. To comfort our results, the same model has been run 
on a smaller sample excluding observations filed after 1987 (when the effect of censoring 
appears). By doing so, we guarantee, that no censored observations should be present in the 
data, but this restricts the analysis to a period when the filing strategies we are analysing were 
only starting to appear (the PCT option, for instance, only became popular in the late 
eighties). The results – reported in Table A6.3 in the appendix – seem globally in line with 
our main estimates, despite a few variations in the magnitude of the hazard ratios with some 
filing strategy variables, probably due to their lower exploitation in the sub-period considered 
(accelerated search requests, equivalents, and divisional variables).206 In addition, a tobit-like 
model (censored normal regression) is reported in the same table and appears very strongly in 
line with the preceding results. 
 
In order to further assess the robustness of the estimates presented in Table 6.6 to the presence 
of outliers in the data, Table A6.3 also reports the estimates of a similar model where all 
discrete variables have been taken in natural logarithm so as to reduce the potential influence 
of their skewed distribution. The results are globally in line with what precedes.  
 
In addition, alternative specifications, including only one set of explanatory variables at a 
time, are presented in Table A6.23 in the appendix. An additional model where all variables 
are included except the two value indicators (IMP_TRIADIC and IMP_FWDCIT5) is also 
reported in the eighth column of Table A6.23. These robustness estimates largely demonstrate 
that most estimated coefficients are insensitive to the specification apart from some minor 
fluctuations. The only major exception is the case of the number of priorities, which recovers 
its significance level as soon as the value indicators are removed from the model, probably 
due to the significant positive association between the number of priorities and most 
indicators of patent value highlighted in chapter 5. 
                                                 
206 Similar fluctuations can be found in Table A6.26, reporting clustered estimates by type of applicant. 
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Generally speaking, the significant association of most explanatory variables with patent 
value indicators (evidenced in chapter 5) calls for the implementation of instrumental variable 
regressions in order to account for these potential endogeneity issues. The same issue may be 
raised concerning the number of claims, which is also significantly correlated with most other 
variables in the model (see chapter 3). Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to obtain 
performing instruments to help fit patent characteristics such as the triadic nature, number of 
claims, and forward citations received. In chapter 5, the best fits we could achieve on a 
complete dataset were unable to explain more than 20% of the variance in these three 
indicators. 
 
Results of instrumental regressions are nevertheless presented in the appendix. Table A6.4 
presents estimates of the three variables potentially subject to some endogeneity issues, whose 
fitted values are then used in new estimates of the Cox model reported in the penult column of 
Table A6.3. For lack of better options available, the instruments we use are the number of 
legal representatives for the number of claims and pages, the number of designated states for 
the triadic dummy, and the number of pages (itself instrumentalized) for the citations 
received. These instruments are unfortunately weak performers, but they are the best 
instruments – or let us say the least bad ones – available in the dataset. 
 
Their inclusion in the full Cox model in place of the corresponding original variables 
produces very similar results for the other covariates when the value indicators are removed, 
which – in our opinion – proves that the instruments are insufficiently reliable predictors 
rather more than that these coefficients are more consistent. In addition, the three instrumental 
variables almost entirely lose their explanatory power in the survival model (the claims 
become insignificant and the triadic dummy even appears to increase the rate of hazard in a 
slightly significant way), but forward citations remain significant and negatively affect the 
rate of hazard. Again, these results are probably rather due to the level of heterogeneity in 
these three variables, which is lost when fitting them with the instruments, and one should 
rather rely on the estimates including one set of variables at a time to obtain the most accurate 
idea of the exact explanatory power of each covariate. What is more, a likelihood ratio test 
indicates that the model with instrumental variables is in fact a less reliable predictor than the 
original model. Consequently, it seems reasonable to consider the basic model (ideally with 
time-varying covariates) as the most reliable. 
 
Overall, the main message from these results is that there seem to be some significant 
differences between the association of most covariates and survival times before and after 
grant decisions. Therefore, the remainder of this section will disentangle the different steps in 
the life of a patent to more precisely identify the drivers of grant decision lags and renewal 
periods respectively.207 
 
                                                 
207 In addition, it might be argued that even the Cox model with time-varying covariates does not account for 
potential non log-linearities in the association between the hazard rate and the covariates. This does indeed leave 
some area for further research to improve the fit of this model. 
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6.2.5.2 Disentangling patent life 
Factors affecting the probability for a patent to be renewed for a long period of time may not 
necessarily be the same as factors resulting in an expansion of the examination process or in 
higher grant rates. Indeed, whereas the renewal of patents only results from choice on the part 
of their holders, their influence on the decision lags should be limited. It is however essential 
to assess the extent to which their filing strategies (e.g. accelerated search, divisionals) may 
impact the duration of the examination process. Therefore, estimates similar to those 
presented in the first column of Table 6.6 have been computed using different dependent 
variables: decision lags, likelihood for the examination process to last more than 10 years, 
number of communications exchanged with the examiner, likelihood to be granted, 
maintenance periods, and probability to survive an opposition. 
 
Figure 6.16 – Time to grant decisions by number of pages in initial application (1978-1996) 
 
 
In a complementary specification, we also test the effect on decision lags of the number of 
legal representatives, the number of pages in the specification, and the presence of drawings 
as indicators of the amount of information to be processed by the examiner.208 Statistical 
support for including these voluminosity variables in the model may be found in Figure 6.16, 
depicting the average time to decision (in months) according to the number of pages in the 
application filed, clearly suggesting a proportional (and quasi linear) relationship. 
 
Life tables of the time to decision and maintenance periods on EPO patent applications are 
provided in Tables A6.5 and A6.6 in the appendix, and Kaplan-Meier estimates of the 
survival and hazard functions are provided in Figures A6.6 to A6.10 in the appendix as well. 
In particular, the Kaplan-Meier estimates presented in Figure A6.6 show that the hazard 
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function associated with decision lags strongly increases during the first five years of 
application (corresponding to the average decision lag), but then strongly decreases until 
about the 15th year of activity. The upper right chart, exhibiting Kaplan-Meier estimates of the 
survival function by stratum, where each stratum corresponds to a particular decision on the 
grant, slightly refines the results from Figure 6.12. Namely, explicit withdrawals are observed 
faster than deemed withdrawals, which is highly logical (it takes some time before an 
application can be considered deemed withdrawn). But it appears that decisions to refuse a 
file are in fact longer to take than decisions to grant a patent. This result is actually in line 
with the findings of Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe (2007). In any case, it appears that after 
about 10 years, there should remain virtually no applications in the pipeline. Even more than 
with entire patent durations from filing to lapse exhibited in Figure 6.12, the different strata 
look here almost perfectly parallel. 
 
Kaplan-Meier estimates presented in Figure A6.8 for maintenance periods alone show that the 
hazard rate is slightly increasing in the first ten years after filing, then surges until the 17th 
year and finally decreases in the last years before the statutory limit. The upper right chart, 
exhibiting Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival function by stratum, where each stratum 
corresponds to a particular cause of lapse, slightly refine these results. It first shows that – as 
expected – patents revoked in opposition almost surely disappear within 10 years (the average 
grant and opposition lags total about 8 years on average). The survival rate of granted but 
unopposed patents decreases continuously and quite smoothly throughout the years, but 
patents opposed and not revoked tend to survive a few years longer than unopposed ones. The 
effect of opposition outcomes on patent maintenance deserves a closer examination. 
 
Table 6.8 – Test for trend in survival function over opposition and outcomes 
Filing Year Events observed Events expected 
Patent unopposed 340011 330171.60 
Opposition rejected or closed 6771 11093.42 
Patent amended in opposition 5617 11133.96 
Total 352399 352399.00 
Chi2(2) 5473.54  
P>Chi² 0.00  
 
Test for trend of survivor functions
Chi²(1) 5222.93  
P>Chi² 0.00  
 
A test for differences and trend in the survival function across opposition outcomes is 
presented in Table 6.8. This test confirms that the survival functions of patent unopposed, 
opposed but maintained as such, and amended in opposition are significantly different from 
each other and that they are increasing in this order. This validates the results from the 
Kaplan-Meier estimates presented in Figure A6.8 that patents amended tend to be maintained 
longer than those that survived an opposition unchanged and those that were not opposed. 
This result may be quite unexpected as one might have thought that amendments at least 
sometimes remove some scope of protection from a patent, reducing its value to the owner 
CHAPTER 6 - ON THE DETERMINANTS OF PATENT LENGTH 
N. VAN ZEEBROECK - ESSAYS ON THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PATENT SYSTEMS 194 
and the interest of the latter in maintaining the patent. It is nonetheless in line with the 
commonly accepted view that opposed patents are more valuable than average. 
 
Tests for trends in the survival functions for decision lags and maintenance periods, reported 
in Tables A6.7 and A6.8 in the appendix, bring strong support for the assumption that 
decision lags have considerably increased over the past decades. This result is depicted in 
Figure A6.10, where an almost two years difference between the first period (applications 
filed in 1980-1984) and the latest one (1995-2000) appears. There is also a significant trend in 
the maintenance of granted patents. 
 
The main regressions on each dependent variable are reported in Table 6.6. Detailed 
estimates, competing risks, models with time-varying covariates and robustness estimates for 
the decision lags and maintenance periods are provided in the appendix as well.209 
 
6.2.5.2.1 Decision lags 
The results of the estimates of decision lags – provided in the second column of Table 6.6 – 
are very close to the estimates of the entire life – though logically more stable across strata – 
and will thus not be discussed in details (the significance levels and coefficients are globally 
the same). Generally speaking, the factors which lead to longer patent rights are also leading 
to longer decision lags. More specifically, the PCT option induces much longer decision lags 
(which may be due to institutional factors as recalled by Harhoff and Wagner (2003)), so do 
the number of claims (contrary to Harhoff and Wagner’s paper, the number of claims is here 
significant across all strata) and of EP equivalents. Divisional filings are by far associated 
with the longest decision lags, which is nonetheless an unavoidable consequence of what they 
are: subsequent filings issuing from an original application (older by assumption). More 
valuable patents (triadic or with more forward citations) take longer to get granted, so do 
patents on more complex inventions. The only striking differences concern the applicant 
profiles: multiple applicants are now associated with shorter decision lags and inexperienced 
patentees are now associated with much longer lags. 
 
The fifth column in Table A6.12 presents the results of an additional specification in which 
four new variables are included: the number of legal representatives, the number of pages in 
the specification of the patent application, the presence of some illustrations in the document, 
and the number of designated states. All these variables are significant without affecting the 
estimates with the preceding covariates, and they do improve the fit of the model very slightly 
but significantly (according to a likelihood ratio test at the 1% probability level). In particular, 
the higher the number of legal representatives, the higher the hazard rate (that is, the shorter 
the decision lag), though this effect is of limited magnitude. On the contrary, the number of 
specification pages and the presence of drawings do significantly decrease the hazard ratio, 
that is, they tend to inflate the examination procedure. This is probably due to the extra 
workload that many pages and illustrations induce for the examiner. Finally, the number of 
                                                 
209 Robustness estimates and alternative specifications – including a tobit-like regression – are reported in Tables 
A9 to A12 and A6.24 in the appendix, and clustered estimates by type of applicant are reported in Table A6.27. 
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designated states (restricted to the first 10 member States of the EPC except Italy) is also 
associated with a slightly lower hazard rate. If one considers the number of designated states 
as indicative of the expected value of the application (for a larger geographical coverage ends 
up more expensive than a limited coverage), then this result only corroborates the observation 
– already made by Harhoff and Wagner (2003) as well as in the preceding model – that more 
valuable patents take more time to be granted. 
 
Overall, the main message from these results is that most filing strategies lead to longer 
decision lags, suggesting some endogenous behaviour of the applicants as pointed out by 
Harhoff and Wagner (2003), and suggested by chapter 5 in which we observed that such 
strategies are associated with higher value patents. In particular, the PCT option, the volume 
of applications and the recourse to divisional filings induce considerable delays in decision 
lags – hence much legal uncertainty on the market –, which are probably anticipated if not 
expected by patentees. 
 
This result is reinforced by an alternative estimation in which the dependent variable – instead 
of the decision lag itself – is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the granting process exceeded 10 
years and 0 otherwise. This variable is estimated with a probit regression over a sample 
limited to applications filed up to 1995 and the results are reported in the third column of 
Table 6.6.210 These results widely confirm those from previous estimates and clearly establish 
that the most significant factor associated with abnormally long pending times is to be a 
divisional filing. The other factors inducing longer decision lags (routes, drafting, value and 
complexity) also increase the probability to be pending for more than 10 years, but to a much 
smaller extent than divisionals. In other words, if one wants the process to last for an 
outrageously long period of time, the best thing to do is clearly to file divisional applications, 
over several generations if needed. This is not to state that all divisional filings are purely 
aimed at postponing the decision on a given application, but rather that it is the most efficient 
way to do it should someone be willing to. Given the numerous reasons applicants may have 
to slow the granting process down (see section 1), one may reasonably argue that there must 
indeed be some cases of endogenous behaviours of applicants to file divisionals with the aim 
to maintain the application undecided in the process. In fact, 43% of the applications that 
were pending for 10 years or more are divisional filings (against 3% in the overall sample). 
 
One of the consequences from very long pendency times is that it makes the validation of 
patents much less profitable given the very short time span left to enjoy the monopolistic 
power granted by the patent until the statutory term. This translates into 5 times as high a 
proportion of non validated granted patents (lapses ab initio) than for applications with 
normal decision lags (20% of lapses ab initio against about 4% for patents with standard 
decision lags), despite similar granting rates. Note that this might also be a sign that some 
applicants found the provisional protection entitled by a pending patent sufficient and 
financially highly attractive, and hence deliberately used divisional applications to maintain 
                                                 
210 Robustness estimates and alternative specifications are reported in details in Table A13 and A14 in the 
appendix. 
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this provisional protection for as long as possible. In addition, within applications with over 
10 years decision lags, more than 6% have been refused, which is twice as much as for 
standard applications. Now one could arguably question the legitimacy of the provisional 
protection enjoyed by some applicants who used divisionals to maintain their file pending for 
more than 10 years and end up with the patent being refused by the Office, meaning that the 
patentability requirements were not met in the first place. 
 
Harhoff and Wagner also point out the impact of the workload at the EPO (in terms of the 
number of pending applications per examiner) in increasing decision lags, which the model 
presented here does not account for (though this latent variable is probably partly captured by 
the joint cluster dummies, which correspond to the different examining divisions at the 
Office). Besides, the present model provides an idea on the factors which increase the length 
of the examination process, but does not model the intensity of this process in terms of 
communications between applicants and examiners. Therefore, we use a similar model to 
estimate the number of communications exchanged during the examination phase as a 
measure of the intensity of the process according to the same characteristics of applications. 
This information has been considered by Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe (2007) in their 
analysis of the ‘induced’ withdrawals and appeared as positively affected by the number of 
claims in an application. 
 
Given the count nature of the endogenous variable, a Poisson regression is used, whose results 
are reported in the fourth column of Table 6.6.211 Generally speaking, these results suggest 
that the factors inducing longer decision lags also induce more communications exchanged. 
By far, the most significant contributions are associated with the parents of divisional filings 
and triadic patents. In addition, a few exceptions are worth being stressed out: the number of 
legal representatives, which had a small negative impact on decision lags, has a strongly 
positive impact on the number of communications. Conversely, specification pages and 
illustrations are associated with longer decision lags but with actually much less 
communications. Whereas parents of divisionals are huge inducers of communications, their 
derived divisional filings are associated with less communications. This suggests that 
divisional filings take a considerable time to be issued but are actually easier to process, or 
that they are just a convenient device to postpone the final grant decision. Finally, 
inexperienced patentees are associated with slightly longer decision lags, but in fact with less 
communications, which may be a sign that they are less reactive during the granting process. 
 
Overall, since most explanatory factors considered increase both the overall life expectancy of 
patent applications and their time to decision, the next question is whether they also increase 
their post-grant active life. Prior to examining this question, one should recall that only 
granted patents may be validated and maintained. Therefore, longer patents on average might 
simply come from higher grant rates. This is why the same model is applied to estimate the 
probability for each patent application to get granted. 
 
                                                 
211 Robustness estimates and alternative specifications are reported in details in Table A15 in the appendix. 
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Some empirical analyses of the like have been conducted in recent years, from the pioneering 
work by Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002). In their first paper, the authors found 
that the PCT route, technological diversity, domestic and international R&D collaborations 
and/or co-applications, and the mix of designated states for protection increase the probability 
for patents to be granted. In their companion paper (2002), the authors refined their earlier 
findings by showing that the geographical and technological specificities of filing strategies 
also influence the likelihood of grant. Using a matched sample of 70,000 non-PCT triadic 
applications, Webster et al. (2007) examine grant outcomes at the trilateral offices with a 
multinomial logit model. They show that application outcomes do vary systematically across 
all three patent offices and in particular, that the geographical origin of patent applications has 
a strong effect on the outcome of decisions at the JPO and, to a lesser extent, the EPO. 
Finally, Schneider (2006) analyzes the determinants of grant decisions on patents applied for 
by Danish firms at the EPO and observes that the size and grant rate of the patent portfolio of 
the applicant increases the likelihood to reach the examination phase, that quality measures of 
patents and the PCT route are also associated with higher grant likelihoods. 
 
The model presented in the fifth column of Table 6.6 estimates the influence of filing strategy 
variables on grant decisions.212 These econometric results bring some nuances to the 
preceding observations on the determinants of longer or more intense granting procedures. 
The route variables and value indicators are positively associated with the probability to get 
granted, but drafting options for instance are more balanced: the number of claims, often seen 
as a value determinant in the literature (Tong and Frame, 1994; Graham et al., 2002; Harhoff 
and Hall, 2002; Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004; Gambardella et al., 2006) is in fact associated with 
a slightly smaller probability to be granted. The same applies with the number of pages in the 
specification, but illustrations slightly increase the probability of a positive outcome. The 
number of priorities is non significant in the first specification (and slightly positive in 
another one), but the number of equivalents negatively affects grant decisions. On the 
contrary, parents of divisionals are much more likely to be granted (one of the most 
significant parameters in the model), but divisional filings themselves are only associated 
with a very small positive contribution. This suggests that the main – and supposedly the most 
valuable – substance from the original application remains in the parent filing whereas minor 
or surrounding inventions are spread into divisionals. Triadic applications are much more 
likely to be granted (by far the most significant parameter in the model), and forward citations 
received are also associated with a slightly higher grant rate, suggesting that more valuable 
patent applications are more likely to pass the examination successfully. However, the 
number of designated states is in fact reducing the chance of positive outcomes, suggesting 
that a larger expected geographical scope of protection is not necessarily associated with 
higher quality applications. This may also be related with the possibility offered by the Office 
to designate many countries at no cost, which renders the designated scope of coverage a 
lousy approximation of the actual cost the patentee would be ready to incur to obtain and 
maintain a large scope of protection. 
 
                                                 
212 Robustness estimates and alternative specifications are reported in details in Table A16 in the appendix. 
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Complexity indicators also provide very striking results. Indeed, most complexity indicators 
(backward patent and non patent citations, IPC classes) are associated with lower grant rates. 
In a sense, this result may not be so surprising. Indeed, the number of backward citations – 
usually seen as a sign of cumulative inventions – denotes in the first place the presence of 
potentially killing prior art, at least susceptible of reducing the patentable scope of protection 
claimed for. And a high number of IPC classes, related with the technological scope of 
protection desired (Lerner, 1994) and sometimes indicative of more architectural inventions 
(see chapter 3), may also provide advanced notice of a potential lack of unity in the 
application. On the contrary, the number of inventors is always associated with higher grant 
rates. Brusoni et al. (2006) have emphasised that this variable may actually be essentially 
related with the size of the inventing firm as larger teams of inventors are typical of the 
organisation of research activities within large firms. In this sense, it may sound quite logical 
that large firms – supposedly better advised – tend to file patent applications which are more 
likely to meet the patentability requirements. Though, in the view proposed in chapter 3 that a 
larger team of inventors involves a larger set of skills and expertise, this result may be seen as 
a confirmation that inventions developed by such teams lead to patents of a higher quality. 
 
Finally, in terms of applicant profiles, co-application does not seem to affect probabilities of 
grant but cross-border ownership – as observed by Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000, 
2002) – does increase them. However, contrary to Schneider (2006)’s findings, the 
cumulative size of the applicant portfolio has a small negative effect on grant rates (though 
Schneider accounted for the historical grant rate of applicants instead of sheer portfolio sizes 
as is the case here), and inexperienced patentees (identified by the APP_OCCAS dummy 
variable) are associated with much lower grant rates. 
 
Note also that – consistently with Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2002) – the present results 
highlight very large differences across countries and industries. In particular, the 
biotechnologies, telecommunications and computers clusters are associated with the lowest 
grant rates, whereas the vehicles, civil engineering and handling and processing ones are 
associated with the highest grant likelihoods. These results suggest that emerging (or at least 
more recent) technologies either induce a higher propensity to file patents on inventions of 
more dubious patentability, or that patenting practices and standards are still evolving in these 
technologies, inducing a smaller predictability of the patentability requirements and 
patentable subject matters. The latter hypothesis particularly applies to computers with the 
huge uncertainties surrounding software patents and biotechnologies with the very complex 
discussions on the patentability of genetic discoveries and material. 
 
Looking at the broad picture offered by the various regressions presented in this section, the 
following observations may be made. First, filing strategies are all inducing longer decision 
lags, possibly due to the extra workload induced by longer and more complex patent filings, 
hence suggesting at least some endogenous behaviour from the patentees to slow down the 
process or delay the decision. Such behaviour may be guided by an abusive willingness to 
exploit the provisional protection entitled by Article 67 EPC on non-patentable inventions or 
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by a legitimate need to avoid or postpone the important costs of validating and maintaining a 
granted patent. But they may also be dictated by the relative immaturity of the invention at the 
time of filing. Because patentees increasingly tend to file their applications as soon as 
possible in the invention process (see chapter 3), they may have to file a patent to cover an 
invention which is still largely unclear and unfocused to avoid being invented or patented 
around before their invention gets clearer and commercially exploitable. Consequently, they 
will need to exploit any procedural possibility offered by the patent system (e.g. the PCT 
route to delay by 30 months the time of international extension, then the filing of divisionals 
at the EPO) to claim the broadest possible scope of protection, and maintain their application 
pending for as long as possible, at least until the invention’s market potential gets more 
certain. But these strategies do not lead to higher grant rates. Quite on the contrary, longer 
documents in terms of claims and specification pages and larger EP families induce lower 
grant rates. Nevertheless, root filings issuing subsequent divisionals are associated with some 
of the highest grant rates, suggesting that such strategies usually surround large inventions 
with a highly valuable core but too broad a scope at filing. 
 
Second, both patent value indicators included in the regressions (IMP_TRIADIC and 
IMP_FWDCIT5) are strongly associated with longer and more intense decision lags and with 
higher grant rates (especially triadic patents). This is consistent with Harhoff and Wagner 
(2003) and may again be a sign that patentees are ready to bargain more intensively with the 
patent Office to get their patents granted when they think them more valuable. 
 
Third, technological complexity logically induces a longer and more complex granting 
procedure, but most complexity indicators – frequently used in the literature as positive 
determinants of patent value – are in fact associated with lower grant rates. This again 
suggests that they may also be indicative of a smaller inventive step or a lack of unity in the 
application. 
 
Finally, applicant profiles provide the most nuanced results from the model: co-applicants are 
associated with more efficient granting procedures (shorter decision lags and smaller number 
of communications exchanged), but they do not significantly affect the probability to get 
granted. On the contrary, cross-border ownership of patents (at least one inventor and 
applicant reside in different countries) – a sign of an international organization of research 
activities (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2000) – is associated with longer and more intense 
decision lags but also with higher grant rates. Inexperienced patentees (applicants with no 
earlier filing at the EPO in the five previous years) witness longer but less intense decision 
lags (longer time to grant but less communications), suggesting that these newcomers to the 
patent system are less reactive during the granting process than incumbents. Their lack of 
experience also translates into much lower grant rates. Nonetheless, the size of applicant 
portfolios is somewhat associated with shorter and less intense granting processes, but they 
are also associated with slightly lower grant rates. This may be a sign that the relationship 
between applicant portfolios and the duration, intensity and outcome of the granting process is 
not entirely linear, which opens some avenues for further empirical investigation. 
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6.2.5.2.2 Maintenance periods 
We now turn to the second life of patents, their ‘active’ or post-grant life. A preliminary 
though trivial observation, only granted patents get a chance to live this second life. As 
already discussed, a choice had to be made as to the geographical scope over which the 
renewal and lapse of patent rights should be observed. The choice made in the present 
analysis is the entire EPC area, considering that as long as a patent may still be enforced 
somewhere – should it be in only one small contracting State – it is still enforceable and must 
still be worth some value to its owner. On this basis, the period of maintenance of patents can 
be estimated as such using a Cox model. The results of these estimates are provided in the 
sixth column of Table 6.6.213 
 
The results reported in Table 6.6 are very close to previous estimates of the entire life – 
though logically more stable across strata – and will thus not be discussed in details. 
Generally speaking, the factors which lead to longer patent rights are also associated with 
longer maintenance periods. If one recalls that this period is entirely under control of patent 
holders214 (they are free to choose to renew their patents up to 20 years), and significantly 
indicate the perceived value of their patents, these results actually confirm our previous 
findings from chapter 5 that filing strategies are positively associated with patent value. 
 
The main observed difference is on the effect of the PCT procedure, which led to much longer 
decision lags but look here associated with slightly shorter renewal periods. This suggests that 
the institutional characteristics of the PCT route which result in delays in the granting process 
do not necessarily predict longer active patent rights. Another very important difference 
appears with the significance of the DRF_ISDIV variable, the most significant variable in 
explaining longer decision lags, which is here weakly associated with slightly longer 
maintenance periods. The most unstable group of explanatory variables is nevertheless the set 
of complexity indicators. Most of them are indeed completely overturned when looking at 
maintenance periods instead of decision lags: backward patent and non patent citations – 
major contributors to longer decision lags – have no significant effect on maintenance rates or 
a very slightly negative one, and the number of IPC classes, also associated with longer 
decision lags, appears associated with shorter active lives. 
 
In a complementary specification, we also test the effect of two additional variables: the share 
of claims lost in the course of the examination proceedings and the number of EPC member 
States in which each patent was validated as a complementary measure of its value. One 
would expect the former variable (CLMLS) to be negatively affecting the survival rate of 
patents (chapter 5, we showed that it reduces the value of patents). The second factor is more 
ambiguous. On the one hand it is frequently considered as an indicator of patent value and 
                                                 
213 Robustness estimates and alternative specifications – including a tobit-like regression – are reported in details 
in Table A17 to A20 and A6.25 in the appendix, and clustered estimates by type of applicant are reported in 
Table A6.28. 
214 Of course, market conditions and new innovations by competitors may render a technology obsolete and 
make it no longer justified to incur the costs of renewing it, but the decision not to renew would still be taken by 
the patent holder. 
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should therefore be associated with longer survivals, but on the other hand chapter 4 has 
shown that the scope of validation and the likelihood to survive 10 years or more have 
actually experienced opposite trends in the eighties and nineties (the former decreasing while 
the latter increased). These opposite trends might suggest at first hand a negative association 
between EPC family size (IMP_VSTATES) and patent renewals. 
 
The results reported in the fifth column of Table A6.20 show that the first conjecture was 
right: the share of abandoned claims is indeed associated with slightly shorter maintenance 
periods. But the empirical results clearly show that larger validation scopes within the EPC 
are strongly associated with longer active lives. This is clearly in line with the dominant 
interpretation that the geographical scope of validation is a credible indicator of patent value, 
but it may also be a sign that when a patent is validated in more European countries, the 
probability that it will be maintained in at least one is also higher. 
 
The non parametric estimates of survival and hazard functions reported above have clearly 
illustrated the potential impact of opposition cases on the survival of patent rights. On the one 
hand, a patent revoked in an opposition is by definition immediately lapsed and can no longer 
be maintained, but patents which survived an opposition are unanimously said to be of much 
higher value (Graham et al., 2002). Therefore, the outcome of an opposition case filed against 
a European patent is a major determinant of the patent’s life expectancy. 
 
Numerous empirical works – in addition to chapter 5 here above – have analysed the 
determinants of the likelihood to be opposed (Graham et al., 2002; Harhoff and Hall, 2002; 
Jerak and Wagner, 2003; Calderini and Scellato, 2004; Hall and Harhoff, 2004; Harhoff and 
Reitzig, 2004; Reitzig, 2004a; Cincera and Propokieva, 2005). In chapter 5, we showed that 
parents of divisionals and backward patent and non patent citations were the most significant 
determinants of opposition incidences in addition to very strong technological and 
geographical patterns, and that the size of an applicant’s patent portfolio was the only very 
significant protection against oppositions. 
 
What is most critical here is what increases the chances that a patent would survive an 
opposition case – provided it has been opposed. This question has been addressed in two 
previous empirical works (Graham et al., 2002, Reitzig, 2004b) which provided many 
ambiguous results, where only the number of inventors appeared consistently and positively 
associated with the likelihood to be maintained. The last column of Table 6.6 reports 
estimates of the probability to be maintained (amended or not) after an opposition for all EPO 
patents against which an opposition was filed (pending opposition cases excluded).215 
 
These results confirm that many explanatory factors included in our model have no significant 
effect on the probability to survive an opposition. Nevertheless, from the filing strategy 
variables, the PCT route and the number of claims and priorities are all associated with a 
slightly higher likelihood. Both value indicators (triadic patents and forward citations) are 
                                                 
215 Robustness estimates and alternative specifications are reported in details in Table A21 in the appendix. 
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also associated with higher opposition survival rates, and surprisingly enough, so is the 
number of backward citations. However, the number of IPC classes has an opposite effect and 
the number of inventors is not significant. For as far as applicant profiles are concerned, only 
co-application and the size of the portfolio are found negatively associated with higher 
survival rates, suggesting that although large portfolios tend to have a dissuasive effect on 
potential opponents (for chapter 5 showed they are associated with lower opposition rates), 
they do not increase the chances for their patents to survive an opposition. On the contrary, 
the chances for an opponent to get a patent from an occasional patentee revoked are lower. 
 
The third column of Table A6.21 provides the results of an alternative specification in which 
two additional characteristics of the opposition procedure are included as potential 
explanatory factors: the presence of multiple opponents (previously found positively 
associated with opposition survival rates in Graham et al., 2002), denoting an even higher 
potential embarrassment caused by the patent in the market (which is the case in about 18% of 
all oppositions), and the recourse to oral proceedings in the course of the opposition, which 
take place on average in about 45% of all opposition cases (the evolution of these 
characteristics is depicted in Figure A6.11 in the appendix, where the drop in the average 
incidence of oral proceedings in recent years is of course an artefact due to censoring). 
 
To the best of our knowledge, this latter variable had never been examined in the empirical 
literature. The results reveal that these two additional variables are actually the most 
significant determinants of the outcome of opposition cases: multiple opponents are strongly 
increasing the chances to get a patent revoked, and oral proceedings are clearly having the 
opposite effect. This suggests first that the characteristics of an opposition are the most 
important factors influencing the future outcome of the proceedings, second that when 
multiple opponents join their forces in the battle, they increase their chances to get the patent 
revoked but possibly also render any potential off-proceedings settlement much more difficult 
as more than two parties are involved, and third, that oral proceedings more frequently play in 
favour of the patent holder. 
 
Some key messages may be drawn from these results on the post-grant life of European 
patents. Firstly, these results provide at last strong empirical support to the idea that more 
valuable patents (identified by more citations received, a larger scope of application or 
validation, or which survived an opposition) also tend to live longer. This result had been 
anticipated for long in the literature and justified the simulation of value distributions of 
patents (Pakes and Schankerman, 1984), but they find here an empirical confirmation. 
 
Secondly, as a consequence, it is quite logical that the factors that were found positively 
associated with patent value in chapter 5 are also found positively associated with longer 
maintenance rates here. 
 
Thirdly, however, it appears that this is not true with all explanatory factors. Not all filing 
strategies lead to longer renewal rates – see in particular the case of the PCT option and 
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divisional filings – and complexity indicators are almost all associated with longer decision 
lags but with lower renewal rates. 
 
Finally, most filing strategies are more strongly associated with longer decision lags than with 
higher renewal rates, suggesting that they contribute to the length of patent rights more 
through an expansion of the granting process than through a higher likelihood to be 
maintained. In particular, most strategies do not increase the probability for a patent opposed 
to survive the opposition. 
6.3 Concluding remarks 
The objective of this chapter was to investigate the determinants of patent length in Europe 
with a large-scale survival time analysis, in order to identify its association with filing 
strategies, thereby confirming their association with patent value, and providing an indication 
of the potential embarrassment caused by these developing practices in terms of longer 
pendency times and legal uncertainty. 
 
The main originality of this chapter resides in three elements: first it takes into account the 
entire life of patent applications from filing to lapse, no matter they were granted a patent or 
not, second it covers all applications filed to the EPO between 1980 and 2000, and third it 
includes a large number of explanatory variables, among which many have frequently been 
found positively associated with patent value and the other consist of the main dimensions of 
patent filing strategies at the EPO. To obtain more nuanced results and track potential 
punctual effects of some particular factors at different stages in a patent’s existence, the entire 
life of patents has been disentangled into different steps, made of lags and decisions, whose 
drivers have been carefully analysed. Five messages may be drawn from this exercise. 
 
First of all, the present chapter clearly establishes that the length of patent rights in Europe 
has significantly increased over the eighties and the nineties despite an apparent (but slow) 
decline in the average grant rate. This increase is due to the expansion of the examination 
process (significant increase in decision lags) and to higher maintenance rates (significant 
increase in patent renewals). 
 
Second, these developments were not even across technology fields. In particular, our results 
suggest that emerging technologies, which also make the most controversial subject matter in 
today’s patent system (i.e. biotechnologies, computers and telecommunications), are 
associated with the longest decision lags but also with the lowest grant rates and average 
renewal periods. This means either that they are characterised by a higher propensity to file 
patents on inventions of more dubious patentability, or that patenting standards are still 
evolving in these technologies, resulting in a smaller predictability of the patentability 
requirements and hence more complexity in the examination. This inference is also consistent 
with the hypothesis – tested in chapter 3 – that these sectors are characterised by a less 
established vocabulary, resulting in larger patent applications. 
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Third, it clearly appears that most filings strategies are associated with longer patent rights, 
confirming their positive association with patent value observed in chapter 5, but actually 
mostly result in substantial delays in the examination procedure. This impact of filing 
strategies in the two phases in a patent life is therefore essentially complementary. In other 
words, the strategies that inflate decision lags also indicate higher value patents that survive 
longer (except for the PCT option). However, some of these dimensions (the number of 
claims and of equivalents) actually translate into lower grant rates. This proves that the main 
effect of filing strategies – deliberate or not, expected or not by patent applicants – is to slow 
down the examination process. The PCT may induce this result for institutional reasons, but 
the size of applications (in terms of claims or pages) probably increases the time needed to 
examine them (recall that the search for prior art is to be performed at the claim level), and 
divisional filings are the ultimate instrument to delay a decision when the application is 
lacking unity or when the invention is still unclear or unfocused. 
 
Although increasingly popular, the filing of divisionals remains an exceptional practice (about 
4.5% of applications filed in the late nineties were divisionals), but they represent almost 50% 
of the applications whose examination took 10 years or more. It is easy to imagine the 
potential abuses of the patent system this procedural option offered to patentees could lead to, 
as acknowledged by the EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal.216 By filing divisionals of an 
application, embedding the valuable subject matter, and then divisionals of divisionals, and so 
on for up to 20 years, such a strategy could provide the applicant with a provisional protection 
as provided by Article 67 EPC217 over some subject-matter which had already been judged 
unpatentable by the Office. The present chapter clearly establishes that this possibility is real. 
 
A similar phenomenon is actually observed in the United States with the counterpart of 
European divisionals: patent continuations.218 A frequently cited case in the US is Lemelson’s 
patent on automated analysis (US patent 5,283,641), which has been followed by 11 
continuations and remained pending for about 40 years. Quillen and Webster (2001) show 
that US applicants actually use repeated continuations to wear down a patent examiner and 
gain a patent, and Lemley and Moore (2004) added that the US continuations are used to 
extend the review process and modify the claims to incorporate ideas from the competitors or 
covering competing products. In particular, they suggested that US continuations make it 
almost impossible for a patent examiner to ever reject an application: the applicant always has 
a chance to respond to any concerns raised by the examiner. In a world of infinitely-repeated 
interactions, the examiner has a (perverse) incentive to give up objecting to the applicant’s 
claims (Webster et al., 2007).  
 
                                                 
216 Cases G0001/05 and G0001/06, decided on June 28th, 2007. The full transcription of the decision is available 
on the EPOLINE website. See also the conclusions from chapter 5. 
217 According to Article 67 EPC, a pending application provisionally confers upon the applicant the same rights 
in all designated States as if the patent was granted (see chapter 4). 
218 Note that there are different types of continuations in the US (continuation application, continuation in parts 
and division) which do not have the exact same features and objectives as European divisional filings. Their 
closest equivalent in the US is nonetheless the divisions. 
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Fourth, more important patents (i.e. more cited or with larger family sizes) take more time to 
be examined, are more likely to be granted, and tend to be renewed for longer periods. One 
reason why an inventor could decide not to renew a given patent may come from random 
technological advances, causing a successful innovation to make one technology obsolete or 
redundant (another motive could obviously be the absence (or insufficiency) of market 
potential for the invention). But, arguably, the average time needed to invent substitutes for 
patented items should be proportional to the size of the initial inventive step or quality of 
patents. Therefore, it should be profitable for high quality patents to be renewed longer than 
low quality ones on average. As a matter of consequence, for either quality invention, if 
decision lags are expanded by external factors (such as complexity or specific filing 
strategies), then the maintenance duration should be reduced on average. This is what we 
observe with the complexity of patent applications, which logically induces longer decision 
lags but is associated with lower grant and renewal rates. On the contrary, since filing 
strategies (as well as being triadic or having many citations) have been found consistently and 
positively associated with patents of higher value, they result in an increase in both segments, 
pre-grant and post-grant. 
 
Fifth, the first look at the number of communications exchanged between patentees and 
examiners in the course of the examination procedure presented in this chapter provides a 
valuable complement to the analysis of decision lags. It indeed reflects the intensity of the 
examination process in the sense that it illustrates what is actually happening during the 
examination. This offers a validation tool for the determinants of decision lags – as most 
factors inducing delays in the granting process are also associated with larger numbers of 
communications exchanged – but also nuances some of the results, especially with the effect 
of patent constructionism: all forms of patent constructions (see Harhoff, 2006) induce longer 
decision lags (except the number of priorities), but priorities and parents of divisionals are 
associated with more communications whereas EP equivalents and divisional filings are 
associated with less. This suggests that patent constructions are requiring much more effort 
and time to be processed, whereas their parts or building blocks are in fact easier to process. 
 
Overall, these results stress out the role of filing strategies in the duration of the granting 
process and in the resulting backlogs – with all potential consequences in terms of legal 
uncertainty – and emphasize a particular side effect of increasing decision lags: they result in 
European patent applications and grants living overall longer. This effect of filing strategies 
on decision lags clearly suggests some strategic behaviour on the applicants’ side, as 
forcefully argued by Jensen et al. (2007) who find evidence of a strategic behaviour by 
patentees in delaying their request for examination. Different interpretations of such 
behaviour may be advanced. One is that applicants simply and legitimately need more time 
and flexibility in filing their patents when they think their inventions more important. Though, 
another interpretation is that some patentees are exploiting any procedural possibility to 
uphold their provisional protection for as long as possible while maintaining uncertainty on 
the market. As the EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal stated it, it is for the legislator to determine 
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“Pour un observateur superficiel, la vérité scientifique est 
hors des atteintes du doute; la logique de la science est 
infaillible et, si les savants se trompent quelquefois, c’est 




7.1 Concluding summary 
The main argument throughout this dissertation is that patenting practices – in particular the 
way applications are drafted and filed to the EPO – have substantially evolved in the past 
three decades and that these developments have affected the patent system and may 
compromise its ability to fulfil its economic purpose. Our main objective was therefore to 
empirically analyse recent developments in patenting practices, and to identify their 
dimensions, determinants, association with the value of patents, and some of their potential 
economic consequences. The originality of the present essays was rooted in three elements: 
the novelty of the questions discussed, the unique database specifically built to address them, 
and the wide range of statistical methods used for this purpose. 
 
In chapter 2, different measures of patent voluminosity were discussed as well as their 
benefits and drawbacks in an attempt to analyse the evolution in patent drafting. It appeared 
that the most relevant and accessible indicators of patent size would be the number of claims 
and the number of pages. The evolution of these indicators and some preliminary evidence 
related to their potential drivers and implications were then discussed. The statistics show that 
the size of patent applications has doubled over the past two decades, and that this evolution 
is particularly associated with the PCT procedure and applications originating from the U.S. 
 
Chapter 3 focused on the determinants of the size of patent applications and tested four 
different hypotheses: the diffusion of national practices through the harmonization of 
patenting procedures, the technological complexity of inventions, emerging sectors and patent 
portfolio structures. The econometric results confirmed that the volume of patents filed to the 
EPO has severely increased in the past two decades and that all four hypotheses do impact 
this volume. In particular, patents from common law countries appear significantly longer and 
include more claims on average than their counterparts from civil law countries. More 
generally, it appears that the surge in volume is largely due to changes in patenting practices, 
which led to the harmonisation of drafting styles in favour of U.S. standards through the 
increasing success of the PCT procedure. These results confirm that the practice of patent 
drafting and filing has significantly changed, with a strong suspicion that the size of patent 
applications may sometimes be instrumentalised by patentees in an attempt to deceive 
examiners or competitors, or as a result of the evolving construction of their patents. 
 
These observations raised the need to better understand the link between the strategies 
developed by applicants to file their patents and the value of these patents, and the potential 
consequences of such strategies. These questions were developed in Part II. 
                                                 
219 Poincaré, H. (1905), La valeur de la science, Flammarion. 
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In chapter 4, several candidates for indicators of patent value based on patent-level data were 
discussed. The richness and exhaustiveness of our dataset enabled a comprehensive analysis 
of the five most classical indicators of patent value proposed in the literature: family sizes 
(triadic and European), patent renewals (within Europe), grant decisions, forward citation 
counts (received within five years from the publication date), and opposition cases (at the 
EPO). All these measures have been found positively correlated with patent value in the 
literature, and all denote the existence of a potential market for the patented technology. 
 
Two of these dimensions, families and renewals, are closely connected: any measure on one 
dimension requires a subjective choice to be made on the other. A composite measure of 
patent value based on families and renewals was therefore proposed: the Scope-Year Index. 
The evolution of this index suggests that the average value of patents may have declined 
between 1985 and 1995 due to patents being renewed longer in smaller sets of countries 
despite the expansion of the EPO over the same period. It is however difficult to conclude as 
firms may simply have increasingly assessed that any extra value from protection in more 
countries was insufficient to justify the extra costs. 
 
The larger analysis presented in the second section of chapter 4 shows that the five classes of 
indicators actually capture different dimensions of value and therefore present a high degree 
of orthogonality. Their correlations are relatively low, each of them considers as low-value 
some patents that are considered high-value patents by another indicator, and they present 
opposite evolutions: most indicators have declined, except that the share of patents renewed 
ten years and the number of citations received increased (probably due to changes in the 
citation making process for the latter), and the share of triadic filings remained stable since 
the mid-eighties. These indicators also differ in scale, time of measurability, and applicability. 
 
The main message these observations bring is that it seems hazardous to base an analysis of 
the determinants of patent value on one of these ‘classical’ indicators only. In addition, these 
indicators appear as complements rather than substitutes. Therefore, if the objective is simply 
to identify the potentially more valuable patents within a large database such as the one used 
throughout this dissertation, the different indicators should be combined in such a way as to 
maximize the chances not to miss any potentially valuable filing. 
 
In order to achieve this objective, we proposed a composite index of patent value, which 
could complement the five indicators it is based upon. This composite index reflects the 
intensity of the signal provided by the classical indicators on the value of each patent, rather 
than an ordinal measure directly proportional to the monetary value of each patent. It is a 
convenient way to reflect the level of confidence one may have based on the indicators 
validated in the literature that any given patent is of a higher value than others. Built on a 
scale from 0 (no indication of value whatsoever) to 20 (all indicators converge in denoting a 
particularly high value patent), this composite index confirms the well-known properties of 
patent value: a severe skewness and significant country and technology patterns. It exhibits in 
addition a declining trend between 1985 and 1995. 
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Based on these five plus one indicators (the five classical measures and the composite index 
proposed in chapter 4), chapter 5 focused on the determinants of patent value to empirically 
evaluate the relationship between patenting practices and the value of patents. This chapter 
therefore introduced different dimensions of patenting practices and proposed some indicators 
for them. These practices consist of the strategies adopted by patentees in drafting and filing 
their applications to the EPO, which are essentially twofold: they are made of the procedural 
route followed to reach the EPO (recourse to the PCT option and the filing of a request for 
accelerated search) and of the form and construction of the patent draft (presence of an 
excessive number of claims, large share of claims abandoned in the course of the 
examination, construction of the draft by assembly or disassembly, and filing of divisional 
applications). All these strategies have become increasingly popular over the past 2 decades. 
 
The analysis consisted of econometric estimates of a similar model on 6 different value 
indicators as dependent variables. The model itself was made up of our filing strategy 
variables, complemented by a set of more classical determinants (relating to the complexity of 
the inventions and the profile of the applicants) and a set of technology, country and year 
dummies. The empirical results clearly revealed a positive and consistent association between 
filing strategies and patent value, and confirmed the positive association between some 
determinants and patent value found in the literature. However, a systematic sensitivity 
analysis, based on the results from about 200 clustered regressions, showed that most 
determinants classically used in the literature are in fact highly sensitive to the indicator used 
(confirming the result from chapter 4 that different indicators capture different dimensions of 
patent value) and to the country or technology included in the sample. Only a few 
determinants (most of them actually belonging to our filing strategy variables) are in fact 
robust with respect to the indicator, the country and the industry. These observations reinforce 
the statement that filing strategies are indicative of more important patents. 
 
In chapter 6, we focused on the determinants of one particular dimension of patent value – the 
length of patents – to investigate whether and how it is influenced by the developing filing 
strategies observed in the preceding chapters. Different elements justified this particular 
focus: first, the need to investigate the length of patents in a more precise way than through 
the mere estimation of a binary variable corresponding to an arbitrary age; second, the 
availability in our database of sufficient data to analyse for the first time the determinants of 
patent renewals in a comprehensive way and including in particular our indicators of filing 
strategies; and third the need to investigate the impact of patent filing strategies at different 
stages in a patent life: on the examination process, on the outcome, and on the renewal. The 
latter motive is itself justified by the legal uncertainty induced by pending applications on the 
market, and by the (cheap) provisional protection such pending patents grant to their holder.  
 
The results from chapter 6 were threefold: first, they revealed that European patents are 
becoming increasingly long despite an apparent decline or at least a stability in the average 
grant rate and in the average scope of protection claimed for in Europe (as observed in chapter 
4). This increase is due to the expansion of the examination process (a significant increase in 
CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUDING REMARKS 
N. VAN ZEEBROECK - ESSAYS ON THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PATENT SYSTEMS 211 
decision lags) and to higher maintenance rates (a significant increase in patent renewals). 
Second, it clearly appeared that the most direct effect of filing strategies was to slow down the 
examination process, notably because the size of patent applications determines the time 
required to search for relevant prior art (a procedure that must be performed at the claim 
level) and to examine the patentability of the application. In addition, divisional filings 
appeared as the delaying instrument by excellence, whether it be a deliberate objective of the 
applicant or not. And third, more valuable patents (identified as such by being triadic or 
having many citations) take more time to be examined, are more likely to be granted, and tend 
to be renewed for longer periods, which is consistent with most theoretical and empirical 
evidence in the literature. On the contrary, the complexity of patent applications logically 
induces longer decision lags as well, but is associated with lower grant and renewal rates. 
Overall, the main message from this chapter was that filing strategies are significantly 
associated with longer patent rights, but mostly because they expand grant decision lags, 
possibly leading to abusive behaviours. 
 





The logic in the main arguments and econometric models discussed in the dissertation is 
summarised in Figure 7.1, where the arrows represent influences empirically observed. 
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7.2 Avenues for further research 
The arguments and empirical analyses presented in this work have several limitations that 
need to be considered before policy implications are discussed. They may also offer some 
avenues for further empirical and theoretical research. 
 
The main limitation of this dissertation is the downside of its main strength: it relies on a 
uniquely comprehensive dataset, which only contains patent-level data that are readily 
available within patent offices’ databases. The main benefits of this are the relative absence of 
selection bias in our empirical investigation (except probably in the survival analysis of patent 
renewals in chapter 6 due to right censoring) and the observation of large trends in the patent 
system. The pitfalls, however, come from the indirect measurement of most dimensions in the 
analyses: patent complexity, patent volume, filing strategies, and patent value (see Fig. 7.1). 
 
Firstly, the measures of complexity introduced in chapter 3, for instance, may give rise to 
different interpretations.220  In addition, they do not allow to distinguish between the 
complexity of an invention and the complexity of the patent document (intricacy of the 
claims, cross-references between claims, wording, etc.) 
 
Secondly, the measures of voluminosity proposed in chapter 2 – the number of claims and 
pages – are no more than an indication of the amount of information embedded into an 
application, but this may reflect the amount of disclosure as well as the legal scope of 
protection claimed or the degree of complexity of the patent draft, but disentangling these 
dimensions in an application could substantially refine the results and interpretation of this 
dissertation. A first step in this direction would be to distinguish between independent and 
dependent claims, or between the four different types of independent claims: product, process, 
apparatus or use. This is not a difficult exercise for anyone skilled in patent law, but since 
these data have not been systematically recorded by the EPO, they may only be obtained by 
parsing each patent’s claims and identifying which is independent and which is not. In 
addition, claim counts – however precise – would only provide a very raw measure of patent 
breadth, the actual scope of a legal document being strictly limited by its wording. Therefore, 
only a manual assessment by experts in the field could ever provide a clear – though probably 
subjective – measure of patent breadth. The same applies with page or word counts as 
indictors of patent disclosure. 
 
Thirdly, patent filing strategies are not easier to capture. They may be suspected from the 
procedural track records of each application, but these can hardly reveal the objective that was 
pursued by the applicant, and it is the intention that makes the strategy. Patenting and 
                                                 
220 Backward citations have sometimes been regarded as indicative of the technological certainty surrounding an 
invention (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Ziedonis, 2007), of the density of the patent rights in the field 
(Noel and Schankerman, 2006; Harhoff et al., 2007a), or of the sources of knowledge involved in the patented 
technology (Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe, 2007); the number of inventors is sometimes seen as a proxy for the 
size of the applying firm (Brusoni et al., 2006); and as far as the number of IPC classes is concerned, it was first 
seen as a proxy for the technological scope of an invention (Lerner, 1994). 
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procedural motives could only be obtained from applicants themselves (or at least from their 
patent agents) – a move already pioneered in a survey reported by Blind et al. (2006). 
 
And finally, the main argument that might be used against such empirical work – an argument 
frequently used by practitioners in the field as they contempt empirical research on patent 
systems – is that measures of patent value based on patent data are very remote from the 
actual monetary value of patent rights. This is undoubtedly a relevant objection, but such 
research is again limited to the information that may systematically be obtained for all 
patents. This does not make all research on patent value irrelevant, but it clearly highlights the 
need for additional empirical validation of the observed determinants of value against more 
reliable and direct measures of patent value. This has been done to a large extent for most of 
the indicators of value used in these works, but it clearly remains to be done for the new 
determinants of patent value proposed in this dissertation in the form of patent filing strategies 
as well as for our composite value index.221 
 
Assessing patent value is clearly an unsolved challenge. This is because it partly resides in its 
intrinsic properties (essentially its level of novelty and inventive step and the quality of its 
draft that will condition its ability to stand in courts), and partly depends on market forces. 
These different dimensions are either difficult to observe and quantify, or hard to predict. 
Still, there are relevant indices, both conceptually and empirically validated, which have 
provided the 5 classes of indicators used in chapters 4 through 6. For instance, it may be 
argued that a patent with a small inventive step would be easier to invent around or to 
improve and hence that it would quickly become economically unattractive to renew it. This 
is the main argument in favour of renewal-based indicators, but they may ignore differences 
in technology life-cycles in different industries and may require 20 years to become fully 
observable. Nonetheless, the fact that a given application has been granted a valid patent is 
proof that the patent examiner in charge considered the inventive step at least sufficient to 
fulfil the patentability requirements. In this sense, a minimum binary measure of inventive 
step is already included as part of most of the empirical analyses performed here.222 
 
Text mining techniques may someday help construct more accurate measures of complexity, 
breadth, disclosure or inventive step, but in the meantime manual assessment as is currently 
applied by patent examiners is the only way out. Therefore, these limitations of the variables 
built from patent databases and used in the present analysis call for some additional empirical 
research strengthened by more detailed and contextual data that could help validate the results 
obtained in the present work and their interpretability. At present, such validation could only 
be achieved on a lower scale – that is over smaller samples – with all the potential selection 
                                                 
221 In particular, the burgeoning literature focusing on patent licenses and their prices (levels of royalties, upfront 
or milestone payments, etc.) (e.g. Miller and Bertus, 2005; Chi and Levitas, 2007; Leone and Oriani, 2007; 
Ziedonis, 2007) offers some possibilities to validate these value determinants or indicators. Large scale inventor 
surveys such as PatVal (Gambardella et al., 2006; Brusoni et al., 2006) may provide additional value metrics in 
the form of inventor evaluation of their patents that may be used as validation instruments. The results from 
chapter 5 would clearly gain from being validated against such direct measures of patent value in the future. 
222 However, the fact that an application has been withdrawn or refused is by no means proof that the required 
level of inventive step was lacking, since a patent may be refused or withdrawn on many other grounds. 
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issues and ambiguities that may emerge in the results. Nonetheless, the variables used to 
capture applicant profiles and ownership structures have been found associated with 
significant coefficients in most empirical models. Their construction relying on uncleaned 
applicant names make them difficult to interpret and call for more research in the future to 
validate the observed correlations. Matching a sample of patents with firm-level data could 
here again be a valuable exercise for the future. 
 
In addition, a large avenue for further research remains in the quantitative assessment of the 
economic impacts of patents and patenting practices. The in-depth study of some real cases 
would help here in determining the benefits and costs of each strategy on every stakeholder, 
much in the way imagined by Hall and Ziedonis (2001). 
 
More generally, given its exploratory nature, this dissertation has observed and highlighted 
some developments in the patent system and their potential economic consequences. These 
findings and their interpretation should now be supported by a theoretical model. The 
development of such a model explaining the strategic behaviour of firms applying for patents 
to the EPO could therefore provide some potential for more theoretical research in the field. 
7.3 Some implications for IP policies 
The picture of the European patent system drawn by this dissertation may be puzzling. It has 
experienced a surge in patent filings and in the propensity to patent, a concomitant surge in 
the volume of applications, a decline in grant rates, an increase in some value indicators 
(citations and renewals), but a decrease in others (geographical scope and oppositions), an 
increase in decision lags at the EPO, and in the middle of all this, developing patenting 
practices, which seem related with all these developments. Indeed, these practices induce 
more filings (divisionals and equivalents indicate a higher number of patent applications per 
family),223 are associated with longer and broader documents (including more pages and 
claims per patent application), and induce longer decision lags, but they concern more 
valuable applications with longer maintenance. Therefore, one may wonder whether these 
developments are good or bad for patent offices, for inventive firms, and for society in 
general, and beforehand, whether we should care about them or not. 
 
The results presented in this dissertation suggest that developments in filing strategies are 
something policy makers and all stakeholders in the patent system should care about, for they 
signal more important patents that will become unavoidable in the state of the art (they are 
more frequently cited), remain active for longer in more countries (they have higher survival 
rates and larger family sizes), tend to be more frequently opposed (witnessing economic value 
on the relevant market), and induce more legal uncertainty (they remain pending for longer 
periods). The economic literature on patent value should also give due consideration to these 
developments as this dissertation shows they provide the most stable determinants available. 
                                                 
223 Blind et al. (2007) show for instance that patenting in smaller steps (and strategic motives in general) leads to 
more applications being filed and fewer citations received. 
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For patent offices, these developments first translate into a boom in workload, the result of 
which is a growing stock of pending applications, contributing to the expansion of decision 
lags,224 and possibly reducing the quality due to an extra pressure on examiners. Given the 
time needed to hire and train patent examiners, the possible response to any increase in the 
workload could indeed take several years before it becomes effective. This in turn also 
represents a loss of per application revenues. Since renewal fees are much higher than 
processing fees,225 and given the statutory term of 20 years, a larger part of this period being 
consumed by the granting process means a shorter period during which maintenance fees 
could be perceived.226 In addition, the increasing amount of communications exchanged 
between patentees and examiners during the proceedings and the filing of divisional 
applications sometimes over several generations, strongly suggests that the granting process is 
becoming an increasingly fierce bargaining process, which may result in an increasing 
amount of office resources consumed per application, and a growing difficulty for patent 
examiners to refuse applications that immediately reappear in the form of a divisional.227 
 
For firms, growing backlogs and decision lags clearly mean an increasing amount of legal 
uncertainty, which is also exacerbated by large or very large patent publications, sometimes 
even unsearchable. In this context, it becomes more difficult to guarantee the freedom to 
operate in any technological endeavour, and the risk of patent litigation rises. As a result, 
some scholars fear that the patent holder may under-invest in technology, that potential 
competitors may reduce their R&D efforts for the same invention, and that the threat of 
litigation costs would become critical if both the patentee and its competitors have sunk 
considerable investments (Hall and Harhoff, 2004). 
 
Because of the legal uncertainty generated by long pendency times, many patent applications 
that are promised to a withdrawal or refusal are actually providing their applicants with an 
increasingly long provisional protection. The risk for firms – as underlined by Alison 
Brimelow228 – is that some companies could use the backlog of applications for their own 
economic gain by playing what she described as a “rich man's poker”. This concept is defined 
as a game typically played by large IT, pharmaceutical and biotech companies in which firms 
build up large portfolios of patents awaiting examination. They then supposedly negotiate 
licensing deals despite the fact that their patents may never be granted.229 
 
In addition, since post-grant review and (to a large extent) patent litigation focuses on the 
individual patent as the unit of conflict resolution (Harhoff, 2006), the costs of legal disputes 
increase with the number of filings in a patent family. These costs and risks associated with 
                                                 
224 Harhoff and Wagner (2003) show that the workload at the office (measured as the number of pending 
applications per examiner) is significantly expanding decision lags as well. 
225 See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007) for a presentation of the overall cost structure of European patents. 
226 The net financial effect for the EPO is however difficult to assess given the extra revenues generated by a 
growing number of applications filed. 
227 See in this respect the work of Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe (2007) on the way examiners induce 
withdrawals by the applicants themselves. 
228 President of the EPO, quoted by Managing IP. 
229 Managing IP, Weekly Newsletter, February 5, 2007. 
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legal disputes may sometimes be high enough to discourage small or medium-sised 
entrepreneurs and may hence constitute a burden for entrepreneurship. In a recent survey, 
13% of European SMEs said that their fear of litigation costs was very high and 36% stated 
that litigation costs are a significant factor in their decision making.230 Sometimes, defending 
a patent can even mean betting the company.231 In addition, validity and infringement 
challenges in European national courts are usually suspended to the end of pending actions at 
the EPO, typically oppositions. But given the pace at which opposition cases are processed at 
the Office, this adjournment of court proceedings may be critical for the survival of a 
patentee’s and a potential infringer’s product.232 
 
These perceived limitations and drawbacks of the patent system may in turn induce some 
mistrust for patents to manufacturing firms, because of the risk of having competitors 
inventing around, the disclosure obligation and the high application and litigation costs (see 
Levin et al., 1987; Scotchmer and Green, 1990; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999). 
 
For society, the consequences of all these developments are more difficult to assess and need 
to be balanced. Patents play a key role in the economy by granting a temporary monopoly in 
exchange for the disclosure of an invention to encourage research activities. Two cases would 
therefore be undesirable from a social perspective: if incentives to innovate are compromised, 
or if the game is not played fair by some applicants who abuse the system to obtain and 
maintain at no cost a provisional protection from a patent that fails to meet the patentability 
requirements. These two cases are briefly discussed here below in view of our results. 
 
First, incentives to innovate depend on the extent to which the results from innovative 
activities can be appropriated or easily disseminated within or across industries (Veugelers 
and Cassiman, 1999). In addition, higher spillovers from knowledge and technology diffusion 
foster R&D collaboration between firms (Veugelers, 1998; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002a). 
Therefore, if appropriation and disclosure mechanisms ensured by patents are hampered, the 
incentive function and beneficial spillovers from the patent system may be compromised. 
 
The results reported in this dissertation simply suggest that the appropriation conditions are 
more difficult today (it takes more time to obtain valid rights because of increasing pendency 
times), that the disclosure obligation is sometimes avoided by aggressive filing strategies (e.g. 
jumbo applications), and that the patent system is characterised by an increasing degree of 
legal uncertainty and an increasing number of patents (sometimes several filings per priority 
application), which may hamper the diffusion of knowledge. In addition, the extra risks and 
costs for innovative firms could result in a decrease in the level of R&D, innovation or 
entrepreneurship. This concern is lacking empirical support (see e.g. Dixon and Greenhalgh, 
2002) and should be further investigated in the future, but it has not been eliminated either. 
                                                 
230 This concern has stimulated the debate over the need for affordable patent litigation insurances. See CJA 
Consultants (2003), Study relating to Patent Litigation Insurance for The European Commission, January 2003. 
231 E.g. in Dyson v. Hoover (2001), Dyson would have been powerless should its infringement claims against 
Hoover have been rejected). http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1440.html. 
232 ____, “UK judge denies stay in European patent dispute”, Managing IP, September 2007. 
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Second, the sequential equilibrium aimed at with patents would be compromised if 
monopolistic patent rights can be obtained from abusive patent applications and filing 
strategies. The EPC provides that an invention, to be patentable, needs to be novel, non-
obvious, and useful. According to the economic justification of patents referred to in 
chapter 1, patents should be granted for inventions that would not have been made without the 
economic incentive provided by the temporary monopoly granted to the patent holder. 
 
Both the economic and legal views therefore suggest that patents are worth the 
embarrassment “when they describe inventions that are truly new, rather than inventions that 
are already in widespread use but not yet patented” (Hall and Harhoff, 2004). In addition, the 
Law in Europe has specifically excluded some fields from the scope of patentable inventions; 
these include scientific discoveries, software, business methods, or animal and plant varieties. 
Therefore, the fact that some inventors might exploit any procedural possibility offered by the 
patent system to enjoy undue provisional patent protection (i.e. on an invention that either 
lacks the required level of inventive step, usefulness or disclosure, or simply lies outside the 
scope of patentable inventions) and maintain it pending for as long as possible (e.g. by means 
of divisional filings over several generations) is undesirable both legally and economically. 
 
The increasing propensity to patent and the resulting surge in patenting have given rise to two 
different interpretations. Kortum and Lerner (1999) see it in an optimistic way as the result of 
an increase in the productivity of research activities spurred by changes in the management of 
research. Nonetheless, they acknowledge that more favourable courts have lead to the 
patenting and renewal of more marginal inventions. In an opposite view, Jaffe and Lerner 
(2004) as well as Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007), share their concern of a decreasing 
average quality of patent applications, encouraged by more favourable courts, laws and 
practice, that may have an adverse effect on innovation for the reasons discussed above. The 
evidence presented in this dissertation is not sufficient to determine which view is right, but it 
does just not bring much support to the optimistic one (to start with, we observe a surge in the 
average patent to R&D ratio but a decline in the average grant rate). 
 
Nonetheless, an opposite argument, defended by Lemley (2001), is that the social cost of 
granting patents lacking novelty and inventive step is actually low anyway. The owners of 
such weak patents would indeed more likely refrain from charging too high prices for their 
products or licenses in order not to encourage a challenge in court. There may hence be some 
arguments to change the balance between careful examinations and faster delivery in favour 
of the latter and letting the courts decide the important disputed patents, except that Sanyal 
and Jaffe (2004) have shown that a decrease in the quality standards applied by patent 
examiners would induce a significant increase in the number of filings. 
 
Europe has chosen a system with high quality standards to reduce business uncertainty, but 
developing patenting practices are leading to growing legal uncertainty and may sometimes 
be used to exploit the patent system in an abusive way, possibly compromising the balance 
the system aims at ensuring. 
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As a result, the European patent system is in a paradoxical situation: on the one hand the 
European patent authority engages considerable efforts (and costs) to maintain high quality 
standards in order to preserve the legal certainty surrounding granted patents, so that it is 
among the most expensive systems (van Pottelsberghe and François, 2006; Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe, 2007).233 But on the other hand it applies a sort of rational ignorance principle 
in granting provisional rights to pending applications (under Article 67 EPC) and is unable to 
prevent a huge amount of legal uncertainty to accumulate around pending applications, 
significantly due to the filing strategies developed by patent applicants. 
 
However, these observations do not mean that the social impact of the observed developments 
is negative in the end. It may be that the system just works fine, and that the grant procedure 
is correctly filtering lower quality applications (as suggested by decreasing grant and 
opposition rates). This thesis just shows that the strategic use of patenting procedures has 
increased, and that the current system is jeopardised by backlogs, delays and revenue drops 
for patent offices. 
 
There may however be two different scenarios for filing strategies: they may reflect a 
legitimate need for more time and flexibility in the patenting process when inventions are 
more important, or they may be a sign of some abusive strategies aiming at exploiting the 
procedural possibilities offered by the system to draw an unfair benefit from it (thanks to the 
uncertainty induced or the provisional protection provided by the EPC). Distinguishing 
between these two cases would be a difficult task. Should they appear abusive in some cases, 
these abuses should be fought, as they constitute a waste of resources (to draft and process 
them) and create uncertainty. But if they are legitimate, then understanding the reasons why 
applicants need so much time and flexibility would be critical, in order to adapt the 
procedures accordingly in a way that would be less resource-intensive and uncertainty-maker. 
 
Indeed, the development of the patenting practices analysed in this work may partly be a 
consequence of the inadequacy of the patent system to the needs of present-day inventors. 
First, one of the conclusions from chapter 3 was that an increasing number of patent 
applications seem to cover less mature, hence unfocused inventions. The present patent 
system is maybe not properly adapted to deal with these very early filings and their 
potentially detrimental effects. And second, the progressive shift from an individual patent 
view to a patent portfolio view (as evidenced by the increasing number of EP equivalents per 
EP application and hypothesised by Shapiro (2001) and Harhoff (2006)) may lead to 
increasing reliance on multiple filings to cover each invention. This may also be a sign that 
the existing patent system – considering the patent as the only unit of protection and of 
dispute resolution – is not adapted to competitive processes in today’s technology markets. 
If these concerns were justified, then these developments – good or bad – would have 
occurred outside any deliberate choice by policy makers. It is therefore important that the 
legislator – properly informed by economists – should take matters in hand again to draw 
adequate policies that will ensure that the economic objectives of the patent system are met 
                                                 
233 Note that this is not only due to higher fees but also to translation and validation costs. 
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and that the changing needs of inventors can be taken into account in an increasingly 
knowledge based economy. No matter what the degree of adequacy or inadequacy of the 
system to today’s technology markets, a situation which is based on disrespect for or abuse of 
the law cannot be a desirable situation. Therefore, either the law as it is should be more 
strictly enforced, or it should be adapted to better fulfil its economic purpose. 
 
So far, the only reaction from policy makers has consisted in setting new patent fee regimes, 
mainly by increasing claim-based fees. Although such actions may prove efficient in reducing 
the number of claims embedded into each application (see chapter 2 as well as van 
Pottelsberghe and François, 2006), they appear more like desperate reactions to contain the 
surge in workload than the result of any economic policy aimed at fine-tuning the fragile 
equilibrium of the patent system. What is more, there is a downside risk with claim based 
fees, which is that a point is crossed when it would become cheaper to file several 
applications with fewer claims than a single application with more claims. Moreover, it 
results from chapter 3 that the main driver of the inflation in patent volume is actually the 
PCT procedure and the absence of claim-based fees at WIPO. Since PCT applications have to 
be searched for and published before entering the regional phase (and facing the processing 
costs due in national or regional offices), it is costless for patent applicants to include 
excessive numbers of claims in their PCT applications with two direct consequences: these 
jumbo filings are published as such and hence pollute the state of the art, and they steal a 
great deal of examination resources.234 Therefore, if changes in fee regimes are the 
appropriate response to the inflation in patent size, then the first place where they should be 
reformed is at the WIPO. 
 
In addition, different solutions have been evoked to master the workload and reduce the 
backlogs at patent offices in order to increase legal certainty and avoid undesirable patents to 
be granted. One avenue that is currently being debated at the international level consists of 
improving the collaboration between major patent offices to – for instance – share the 
workload of searching for prior art. Another promising approach has been proposed by some 
of the world's largest companies, including General Electric, Hewlett-Packard, IBM and 
Microsoft, which have teamed up with the USPTO and the New York Law School in October 
2006 to launch a system of peer review for software patents.235 Such a solution could open 
some avenue for managing the workload at patent offices. Of course, this may not be a 
panacea either, and it would certainly raise some governance issues. 
 
Most of these concerns and potential solutions are currently being debated at patent offices 
and beyond, as illustrated by EPO’s Scenarios for the future (2007), the recent US rule on 
continuations236 (the counterpart of European divisionals) and the subsequent debate this 
                                                 
234 A very clear illustration of this issue was provided in chapter 2 with the jumbo application filed by a Swiss 
biotech company under the PCT with almost 20,000 claims, whereas the remaining set of claims filed to the EPO 
when the same application entered the regional phase was reduced to about 350 claims. 
235 Managing IP, Weekly Newsletter, October 30, 2006. 
236 As a result of these new rules, which are to come into force on November 1, 2007, US patent applicants will 
be limited to filing two continuing applications and one request for a continued examination. 
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decision raised,237 or EPO’s Enlarged Board of Appeal’s ruling on divisionals (see chapter 5). 
It is clearly essential that economists join the debate and feed it with appropriate directions, as 
forcefully argued by Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007). 
 
More generally, in order to deal with these developments with potential detrimental effects for 
the social welfare, the four parameters of the patent system might have to be reconsidered 
with strong theoretical and factual support: the statutory term of patent rights may need some 
adjustment or could be made variable depending on the technology at stake and its life 
cycles;238 the required unity of the applications may need to be restated in order to limit the 
possible breadth of patent rights; the required inventive step might have to be increased in 
order to avoid too many weak patents polluting a field or surrounding a core invention and 
making it impossible to exploit it separately; legal support should be given to patent 
examiners to more rapidly and more easily reject applications covering non-patentable subject 
matter;239 and opposition and litigation should allow similar patents to be addressed 
simultaneously, when they share priorities, claims or elements of the description (Harhoff, 
2006a). Given the apparent elasticity of patent filings to prices (van Pottelsberghe and 
François, 2006; de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe, 2007), fees could also be adjusted to 
discourage abusive behaviours and undesirable patent constructions. Finally, the status of 
pending application and the extent of the provisional protection they confer might have to be 
adjusted as well. 
 
Whether the developments in the patent system observed throughout this dissertation are good 
or evil in the end cannot be concluded from the evidence presented here. Different 
interpretations remain possible, and filing strategies could be legitimate or abusive. But this 
dissertation shows that these strategies strongly impact the European patent system in terms 
of backlogs, uncertainty and potential abuse of provisional rights, calling for urgent reflexion. 
In the light of its fundamental objectives and of rapidly changing legal and technological 
circumstances, policy makers, informed by economists, should determine which strategies 
constitute abuses, and which are in fact legitimate uses of the system as it is, presumably 
because of its inadequacies to the evolving needs of inventors. The identified abuses should 
be fought, and the patent system should be adapted where necessary. This may be the price to 
pay for its sustainability. 
 
                                                 
237 The USPTO’s new rules limiting claims and continuations have been attacked as “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion and otherwise not in accordance with law” in a lawsuit filed in August 2007 (Managing IP, 
28th of August, 2007). 
238 Stoneman (1987) and Nordhaus (1969) show that uniformity in patent length is not likely to be optimal. ‘The 
duration of protection should vary according to the nature of demand for the product, being short for elastic 
demand and longer for inelastic demand, so the IP system should reserve longer protection for items without 
close substitutes to minimise the welfare distortions’ (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007). 
239 In this respect, EPO examiners sometimes complain that divisionals make it impossible for them to get rid of 
an application that they have already refused for grant as each time they refuse it, a new divisional is filed with 
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Chapter 1 
A1.1 On the European Patent System 
The European Patent Office – headquartered in Munich, Germany – has started its activities 
in 1978, with the aim of offering a centralized procedure for granting patents in Europe on the 
grounds of the EPC. Starting with a tenth of Contracting States, the EPO has experienced a 
very large institutional expansion to reach 31 Contracting States to date. Though its role is 
limited to examining patent applications and deciding whether they may be granted a patent 
or not, but it is by no means to enforce them. In addition, the EPO is only an option for 
inventors seeking patent protection in several European countries but it does not replace 
national patent offices and is not the only way to obtain patent rights in Europe. Indeed, 
inventors may still file independent patent applications in every European country where they 
would like their rights to be enforced, but they will have to manage several granting 
procedures in parallel, potentially leading to different outcomes, and multiplying the costs of 
the filings. Therefore, as soon as three or more European States are targeted it becomes 
financially more attractive to file an application to the EPO, either directly or by extending an 
application previously filed to another office (inside or outside Europe). 
 
The routes toward a valid patent application to the EPO are in fact multiple. One may choose 
to file an application to the EPO directly, prior to any filing in any country around the world. 
Such applications are called European Patent (EP) first filings. This is of course the most 
direct route to the EPO but it is not the most popular (they represent only 9% of all 
applications filed to the EPO in 2006).1 Long the most popular way, many applicants prefer to 
file an application in their home country first (or any other country of their choice) and then to 
extend their domestic filing (European or not) to the EPO. By virtue of the Paris Convention 
signed in 1883, patentees have 12 months from the date of the original domestic filing (called 
the “priority” application) to extend it to any other patent office without risking their original 
filing to be considered as part of the prior art for the subsequent (or second) filings. 
 
Since 1970, however, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) offers applicants an easier and 
cheaper way to manage the extension of their priority filings throughout the world. The PCT 
system managed by the World Intellectual Property Organization (or WIPO, a UN Agency 
based in Geneva) and supplementing the Paris Convention, has as main objective to 
rationalize worldwide filing, extension and grant procedures. To do so, the PCT option offers 
inventors the possibility to extend their priority filings to the WIPO instead of their individual 
targeted national or regional offices. Their patent application thus becomes a PCT filing that 
will be processed in the language chosen by the applicant and for which he may designate any 
PCT Member States as targets for the ultimate extension of their filing. The WIPO will then 
manage the processing of the application and its extension in the countries designated. 
 
However, the role of the PCT procedure is limited to searching for prior art and eventually 
providing a preliminary opinion on the patentability of the application, but it may not 
                                                 
1 EPO Annual Report, 2006. 
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guarantee that the application fulfils the patenting requirements provided by the national or 
regional patent law in all designated States. The search for prior art is performed by one 
authorized patent office – selected by the applicant – which will be referred to as the 
International Search Agency (ISA). By so doing, the PCT procedure offers an extra 18 
months in addition to the 12 months provided by the Paris Convention for the applicant to 
extend his filings worldwide – including the EPO if so desired – and expose the heavy costs 
of national procedures. Such applications forwarded to the EPO under the PCT procedure are 
known as Euro-PCT filings, by contrast with Euro-Direct (first or second) filings.2 
 
Once an application reaches the EPO – no matter the route taken – it will follow a 
standardized granting procedure, which consists – in the most logical order – in a search for 
prior art, the publication of the application as filed alongside the search report, the substantive 
examination in view of the patentability requirements, and the decision by the examiner to 
grant a patent or not. However, the applicant has at any time the possibility to withdraw his 
application, but can not prevent it from being published once the 19th month from the priority 
date is reached. Should a patent be refused by the examiner, the applicant still has the 
possibility to appeal the decision, but if the refusal of the patent is confirmed, the applicant 
has then no further recourse to get his patent granted in Europe. 
 
Provided the office has notified the applicant its intention to grant him a patent, he has 12 
months to validate his patent in all national offices that he designated for final protection. This 
validation step requires a translation of the patent in one of the national languages of each 
targeted country and payment of validation fees.3 Failure to provide this translation and the 
required payment in due time in a given country renders the patent unenforceable there, in 
which case the patent is said to have lapsed “ab initio” in the given country. Due to the costs 
induced by these multiple translations and validation fees, many patents accepted for grant by 
the EPO are in fact never validated at all (about 5% of all patents granted), and most of them 
are validated only in some of the countries originally designated. 
 
Once a patent has been validated in different countries, the result for the holder is not a 
European patent, but rather a bundle of national patents which will need to be enforced 
separately in each country. 
 
Arguably one of the main disadvantages of the European patent system as compared to other 
major markets in the world is this impossibility to challenge granted patents or sue potential 
infringers in one court in Europe. The European Patent Litigation Agreement, debated for 
years in different instances, has so far failed to instate a central court for patent litigation in 
Europe, such as the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit in the United States. 
 
                                                 
2 For a more detailed review of the patenting routes and the granting process at the EPO, see Stevnsborg and van 
Pottelsberghe (2007). 
3 Note that the recently ratified London Protocol should remove this obligation to provide translations into all 
national languages where protection is seek. 
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There is, however, one possibility for third parties willing to get rid of a European patent to 
challenge it in a central place. This post-grant review system called “opposition” is managed 
by the EPO itself. The only constraint is that the opposition needs to be filed within 9 months 
from the date the mention of grant has been published. Beyond this date, the only way to get 
rid of the patent would be to file a nullity action in every European country where it has been 
validated. The opposition procedure has therefore a major role in the European patent system 
as it acts as a sort of “cleaning” element. Any third party convinced that a patent has been 
mistakenly granted by the office may indeed oppose it before the EPO and provide arguments 
to defend his case. Opposition cases may result in four different scenarios: the patent may be 
maintained by the Board, revoked or amended, or the opposition may be closed (the opponent 
withdraws his opposition, though the office may decide to pursue with the proceedings 
anyway). The decision may nonetheless be appealed before the EPO. 
 
On the contrary, should a patent holder be willing to sue a third party who is allegedly 
infringing his patent, he would have to file an infringement action before all jurisdictions 
where the patent has been validated and where the infringement has been suspected. This 
would of course induce considerable expenses. 
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A1.2 On the design parameters of patent systems 
Although patents are theoretically justified, their implementation in practice raises many 
issues. The design of a patent system will draw the line between the inventions that may be 
granted a patent and those that are not, and will determine the amount of technological 
territory that may be protected by a single patent, as well as the maximum geographical scope 
and duration for patent rights. Excessively long and broad patent rights would make the 
welfare loss disproportionate in comparison with the social benefits from the invention and 
the balance would be compromised. Therefore, the settings of the patent system must be 
carefully fine-tuned in order for the system to adequately fulfil its economic objectives. In this 
respect, there are five essential dimensions that need to be adjusted by the law and the 
procedural practice: the patentable subject matter, the inventive step, the technological 
breadth, the geographical scope and the length.4 
 
Firstly, the European Patent Convention (EPC), ratified in 1973 and updated in 2000, 
provides that a patent may be granted under the following conditions: it must cover an 
“invention” (a concept which is left undefined in the law but that the practice usually 
interprets as a “technical solution to a technical problem”), which must be new with respect to 
the existing worldwide prior art (it must have never been made available to the public before 
the first patent application covering the invention is filed), is must involve an “inventive step” 
(usually considered as non-obvious for a person normally skilled in the art), be susceptible of 
an “industrial application”, and must be licit, that is non excluded as patentable subject matter 
by the law. In this respect, the EPC provides that a patent cannot be granted for discoveries 
(scientific theories, mathematical methods, etc.) for lack of technical effect, for aesthetical 
creations as well as schemes, rules, business methods and software (because of their abstract 
nature), for medical methods (for political and ethical reasons), for vegetal or animal species 
(for legal reasons) and for inventions in contradiction with the “public order”. Some of these 
statutory exceptions have been subject to intense debates (e.g. software and genetic material) 
and have been progressively reduced by the practice and a series of rulings by the EPO 
Boards of Appeal. 
 
Secondly, the assessment of the inventive step always requires some subjectivity. It is 
nonetheless essential as it defines the minimal technological increment involved in an 
invention in order to be patented. Too small a required increment would result in very weak 
patents being granted, possibly leading to tiny improvements of major innovations being 
patented, depriving the inventor of the original invention from his rights. Indeed, if a very 
small improvement of a given invention is patented by a third party so that it becomes 
impossible to use or commercialize it without this improvement, the initial patent holder 
would be excluded from the market of his own invention and would be forced to deal with the 
owner of the improvement. Conversely, too large a required inventive step would exclude 
many inventions from the patent system, compromising its role as a research and disclosure 
incentive. 
                                                 
4 See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007), Chapter 5, for a discussion on these dimensions. 
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Thirdly, the breadth defines the extent of the exclusive rights that may be entitled by each 
patent. Here again, it is a matter of balance. Too broad patents make it very difficult for 
competitors to invent alternative products and to develop new inventions based on the 
patented one. But too narrow patents make it too easy to invent around and produce non-
infringing patents that are in fact very close to the initial invention. This again would reduce 
the exclusive rights of the original inventor to their simplest expression and compromise the 
incentive function of the system. 
 
Fourthly, the geographical scope covered by patents is a matter of international conventions. 
All industrialised countries and most developing countries have ratified the TRIPs (Trade-
Related aspects of Intellectual Property included in the WTO regulations signed in 1996) that 
ensure a minimum common framework for intellectual property rights in all member 
countries. Hence, patents may be obtained in all WTO member States, but in accordance with 
national regulations and procedures. In Europe, patent law largely remains a national issue 
since patents must be enforced on a country per country basis,5 although the EPC has instated 
a central office for processing European patent applications: the EPO.6 As a consequence, the 
geographical scope of a patent protection is entirely left at the discretion of the applicant and 
is to be chosen at the time of filing, extension, or grant. 
 
In particular, the length of patents is a very complex parameter of the system. The non-
exclusive nature of knowledge would require an infinite protection, whereas its non-rivalry 
requires no protection at all. Therefore the statutory limit to patent rights is an essential 





                                                 
5 There is no central European court for patent disputes to date despite the long-lived debates around the 
European Patent Litigation Agreement. 
6 Given this dissertation is focused on EPO patents, the roles and responsibilities of the EPO will be discussed 
later (in section 1.2). 
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Figure A2.1 – Average number of claims in published USPTO applications by region of origin 
 










































































































Filing date of US application
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A2.2 Tables 
 
Table A2.1 – Average number of pages per section in different sectors and countries 
EPO Joint Cluster Description Claims Drawings Pages 
Industrial Chemistry 14,14 2,99 4,02 21,15 
Organic Chemistry 33,88 5,14 4,89 43,91 
Polymers 17,96 3,24 2,86 24,07 
Biotechnology 39,69 4,84 12,30 56,84 
Telecommunications 15,06 3,87 7,39 26,32 
Audio/Video/Media 14,76 3,72 9,05 27,53 
Electronics 12,85 3,24 7,75 23,85 
Electricity & Electrical Machines 11,27 2,79 6,57 20,64 
Computers 22,47 4,95 11,14 38,57 
Measuring Optics 16,79 3,65 8,14 28,58 
Handling & Processing 9,58 2,58 5,37 17,53 
Vehicles & General Technology 8,11 2,29 5,22 15,63 
Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics 8,87 2,49 5,41 16,77 
Human necessities 13,02 3,24 6,72 22,97 
     
Country of residence of applicant Description Claims Drawings Pages 
US 26,29 5,17 9,49 40,96 
DE 10,94 2,48 3,59 17,02 
JP 14,64 2,36 9,84 26,84 
FR 11,20 2,46 4,07 17,74 
GB 18,35 3,35 5,95 27,65 
CH 12,91 2,78 3,82 19,51 
NL 12,52 2,23 3,85 18,61 
IT 8,00 2,07 4,01 14,08 
SE 14,57 3,37 4,44 22,38 
CA 22,50 4,68 9,10 36,29 
KR 15,24 3,15 7,39 25,78 
FI 11,77 3,00 4,31 19,09 
AU 19,25 3,89 9,36 32,50 
AT 10,27 2,24 3,79 16,29 
BE 15,88 2,56 5,91 24,35 
DK 21,58 3,91 7,36 32,85 
IL 21,58 5,27 9,53 36,38 
ES 7,74 1,79 3,71 13,24 
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Table A2.2 – Summary statistics of main dataset variables 
 Type Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max Sample
Voluminosity indicators          
# Claims at filing C 2 069 698 15.98 15.21 0 999 1978-2004
# Claims at grant C 524 739 11.20 8.41 0 658 1990-2004
Difference # claims at grant - at filing C 524 739 -1.56 6.17 -449 329 1990-2004
# Pages at filing C 1 670 969 22.53 34.73 1 9786 1988-2002
# Pages of Desc. at filing C 1 670 969 14.42 25.39 1 5503 1988-2002
# Pages of Claims at filing C 1 670 969 2.95 5.04 1 2567 1988-2002
# Pages of Drawings at filing C 1 670 969 5.17 15.22 0 7559 1988-2002
# Pages at grant C 670 905 14.01 14.20 1 810 1988-2002
# Pages of Desc. at grant C 670 905 6.27 9.24 1 694 1988-2002
# Pages of Claims at grant C 670 905 3.86 4.34 1 485 1988-2002
# Pages of Drawings at grant C 670 905 3.88 5.67 0 287 1988-2002
    
Application route          
Year of filing C 2 069 687 1996.02 6.75 1978 2004 1978-2004
PCT D 2 069 698 0.50 0.50 0 1 1978-2004
PCT within regional phase D 2 069 698 0.29 0.45 0 1 1978-2004
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WO9617378 Formfactor, Inc. US US G01R1/073 374 292 68 424 
WO9630822 Donald K. Forest US US G06F3/00 325 112 74 260 
WO9607271 Sony Corp. JP JP H04N5/91 238 166 84 302 
WO9600698 Pure Etch Co. US US C01F17/00 232 55 31 104 
WO9615484 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. US US G06F3/16 212 274 55 452 
1996 
WO9623010 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co.;  
Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
US US C08F210/16 562 408 94 503 
WO9715690 Curagen Corp. US US C12Q1/68 259 255 64 348 
WO9827065 Ontogen Corp. US US C07D233/70 267 105 95 202 
WO9709842 Verity Group. PLC GB GB H04R1/02 121 92 20 161 
WO9713501 Kevin J. Williams US US A61K9/127 229 60 51 142 
1997 
WO9819450 Sensormatics Electronics Corp. US US H04N1/00 592 238 124 521 
WO9734401 Xantel Corp. US US H04M1/64 356 113 49 177 
WO9747380 Project Earth Industries. Inc. US US B01J8/00 329 89 40 137 
1998 
WO9854727 Micron Technology. Inc. US US G11C7/00 762 213 107 566 
WO9929384 Baby Think It Over. Inc. US US A63H3/00 465 164 86 285 
WO9843149 Walker Asset Management Ltd. Ptns. US US G06F17/60 370 142 68 290 
1999 
WO9964627 Genostic Pharma. Ltd. GB GB C12Q1/68 559 394 348 745 
WO0068717 Steven R. Sedlmayr US US G02B5/30 489 124 183 360 
WO0028518 Broadcom Corp. US US G09G5/14 459 130 83 251 
WO9963805 Univ. of Saskatchewan Tech. Inc. CA CA A01H4/00 437 66 62 133 
WO0028734 United Video Properties. Inc. US US H04N5/445 358 72 73 212 
2000 
WO0106253 The University of Texas System US US G01N33/53 729 73 76 218 
WO0122310 Oleg K. Zommers 
RU/
US 
RU G06F17/60 505 36 58 98 
EP1045341 Fujitsu. Ltd. JP JP G06T7/20 290 213 95 481 
EP1244006 
The Institute of Computer Based 
Software Methodology and Tech. 
JP JP G06F9/06 174 291 62 525 
2001 
WO0239331 Orchestria. Ltd. 
GB/
US 
GB G06F17/60 923 115 208 349 
WO0229606 Computer Sciences Corp. US US G06F17/00 845 47 113 223 
WO0210962 Storymail. Inc. US US G06F17/00 840 215 115 342 
WO0184906 Virtual Assets Inc. US US G06F17/60 818 264 118 638 
WO0243195 Metro-Logic Instruments. Inc. US US G06K7/10 669 427 142 955 
WO200225708 KLA-Tencor-Inc. US US H01L21/00 625 147 96 265 
WO03020200 New River Pharmaceuticals. Inc. US US A61K 250 1992 60 2053 
2002 
WO02086018 Shell Oil Co. US US C01B3/24 7441 307 677 1226 
WO03046798 Paradigm Genetics. Inc. US US G06F19/00 2257 143 299 484 
WO03031565 Rosetta Genomics. Ltd. US IL G01N33/48 938 441 786 1668 
WO03040513 
Shell Oil Co. 




E21B 8958 91 154 284 
WO02085309 Epigenesis Pharmaceuticals. Inc. US US A61K0/00 78 745 8 764 
2003 
WO2004011423 Hawaii Biotech. Inc. US US C07C403/24 1015 78 161 277 
WO03082894 Pharmacia Corp. US US C07J1/00 188 90 78 168 
WO03082895 Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. US US C07J1/00 577 161 267 428 
WO03090673 RTC Research & Development. LLC US US A61K9/16 5895 76 779 855 
2004 
WO2005051444 Angiotech International AG US CH A61L27/00 19368 386 2189 2592 
WO2005049105 Angiotech International AG US CH A61L31/16 17517 1745 1597 3372 
WO2005051451 Angiotech International AG US CH A61L31/16 13305 450 1389 1874 
WO2005051871 Angiotech International AG US CH A61L27/00 11180 457 1128 1619 
WO2005046746 Angiotech International AG US CH A61L27/00 10247 1117 960 2095 
WO2005051452 Angiotech International AG US CH A61L31/00 8822 1008 901 1945 
WO2005046747 Angiotech International AG US CH A61L27/00 1738 327 189 541 
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Table A2.5 – Average size and number of EPO applications by country, sector and route 
 Claims Pages Filings 
Country/Sector/Route Average AAGR (%) Average AAGR (%) Average AAGR (%) 
Austria 11,01 3,50% 12,96 2,08% 733 8,01% 
Australia 17,72 4,04% 23,82 3,48% 829 11,14% 
Belgium 13,26 2,84% 16,92 2,25% 677 7,56% 
Canada 18,26 3,64% 26,25 3,44% 1082 14,15% 
Switzerland 13,35 2,60% 16,55 1,17% 2615 6,11% 
Germany 11,07 2,64% 14,02 0,82% 14265 7,05% 
Denmark 14,12 5,23% 21,80 4,62% 567 11,31% 
Spain 8,36 1,53% 12,19 0,15% 410 17,90% 
Finland 11,80 3,93% 14,39 2,13% 845 20,88% 
France 11,62 2,10% 14,12 1,44% 5376 6,22% 
United Kingdom 14,70 3,16% 19,52 2,47% 4253 5,82% 
Israel 18,92 5,32% 24,98 6,01% 460 20,34% 
Italy 10,79 2,63% 12,03 -0,05% 2341 12,03% 
Japan 12,18 1,77% 24,75 0,82% 12762 13,80% 
Korea 10,26 7,01% 18,54 5,89% 902 49,16% 
Netherlands 11,53 2,40% 13,99 1,51% 2665 9,51% 
Sweden 11,60 3,92% 15,95 2,95% 1759 8,72% 
United States 18,56 3,90% 28,22 2,54% 25388 9,73% 
Industrial Chemistry 14,37 2,90% 17,67 1,41% 8821 7,29% 
Organic Chemistry 15,80 3,86% 31,04 3,07% 10883 7,84% 
Polymers 14,64 2,92% 21,08 0,86% 7001 6,97% 
Biotechnology 17,74 3,88% 34,91 4,20% 10129 11,59% 
Telecommunications 14,29 4,13% 23,03 0,85% 4286 15,09% 
Audio/Video/Media 15,07 3,47% 24,43 1,49% 3799 13,33% 
Electronics 13,44 2,99% 20,29 1,16% 5609 8,60% 
Electricity & Elec. Machines 13,22 3,06% 16,83 1,65% 8294 8,78% 
Computers 16,21 4,17% 30,22 0,79% 4346 15,36% 
Measuring Optics 15,04 3,28% 21,62 2,51% 7004 8,88% 
Handling & Processing 12,79 2,28% 15,64 0,59% 9626 7,80% 
Vehicles & Gen. Technology 11,75 1,89% 14,39 0,39% 7497 9,19% 
Civil Engineering / Thermo. 12,24 2,09% 15,02 0,45% 6978 8,42% 
Human necessities 14,65 3,15% 18,09 1,85% 9182 9,98% 
Euro-Direct 12,10 1,84% 15,39 -1,38% 40093 4,66% 
PCT 16,19 2,89% 27,56 2,48% 39135 19,54% 
Overall 13,49 3,09% 20,99 2,05% 72551 9,91% 
All annual average | AAGR: Average Annual Growth Rate | Countries of residence of applicants 
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Table A2.6 – Test of equality of means in number of claims across filing routes 
 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Int. 
Euro-Direct 233527 1,45 0,02 1,07 1,45 1,46 
PCT 521904 2,19 0,03 2,13 2,18 2,20 
Combined 755431 1,96 0,02 1,90 1,96 1,97 
Diff -7,37 0,05 -7,49 -7,25 
Degrees of freedom: 755429 
H0: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
t -160,00 t -160,00 t -160,00 
P < t 0,00 P > |t| 0,00 P > t 1,00 
 




Table A2.7 – Test of equality of means in number of pages across filing routes 
 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Int.] 
Euro-Direct 142160 13,64 0,05 18,52 13,51 13,76 
PCT 294075 36,10 0,11 60,96 35,81 36,39 
Combined 436235 28,78 0,08 52,23 28,57 28,98 
Diff -22,46 0,17 -22,89 -22,03 
Degrees of freedom: 755429 
H0: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
t -140,00 t -140,00 t -140,00 
P < t 0,00 P > |t| 0,00 P > t 1,00 
 









Figure A3.1 – Average number of pages in Euro-Direct and PCT applications at EPO (1980-2002) 
 
Source – own calculations based on EPO data 
 
 
Figure A3.2 – Box plot of the number of claims 
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Figure A3.3 – Box plot of the number of pages 
 
EPO Applications filed 1988-2002 
 
 
Figure A3.4 – Box plot of the number of inventors 
 
EPO Applications filed 1982-2004 
 
 
Figure A3.5 – Box plot of the number of IPC7 Classes 
 
EPO Applications filed 1982-2004 
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Figure A3.6 – Box plot of the number of Backward patent citations 
 
EPO Applications filed 1982-2004 
 
 
Figure A3.7 – Box plot of the number of non patent citations 
 
EPO Applications filed 1982-2004 
 
 
Figure A3.8 – Box plot of the number of priorities 
 
EPO Applications filed 1982-2004 
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Figure A3.9 – Box plot of the number of cumulative filings 
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A3.2 Tables 
Table A3.1 – Estimates of Equation 3.1 for different application routes (1988-2000) 
Claims 1982-2004 (NEG BIN) Pages 1988-2002 (NEG BIN) 
EU-Direct Regional PCT EU-Direct Regional PCT 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
H1: Internationalization of application routes and diffusion of US modes (Reference for countries = France) 
Non US Applicant with US priority 0,71 48,16 (**) 0,67 67,92 (**) 0,49 44,40 (**) 0,35 58,82 (**)
US Applicant with non US priority -0,54 -29,22 (**) -0,58 -37,68 (**) -0,38 -28,32 (**) -0,33 -38,39 (**)
AT Applicant -0,10 -4,57 (**) 0,00 -0,08  -0,22 -12,13 (**) -0,12 -8,82 (**)
AU Applicant 0,62 11,95 (**) 0,53 28,72 (**) 0,46 10,15 (**) 0,26 23,89 (**)
BE Applicant 0,20 8,92 (**) 0,11 4,23 (**) 0,41 24,52 (**) 0,14 9,93 (**)
CA Applicant 0,52 20,07 (**) 0,24 13,14 (**) 0,47 22,64 (**) 0,25 23,93 (**)
CH Applicant 0,27 21,29 (**) 0,12 8,23 (**) 0,21 21,25 (**) 0,10 11,25 (**)
DE Applicant 0,00 -0,47  -0,13 -12,73 (**) -0,11 -17,11 (**) -0,03 -5,63 (**)
DK Applicant 0,13 3,35 (**) 0,35 16,85 (**) 0,16 5,11 (**) 0,29 24,21 (**)
ES Applicant -0,84 -25,20 (**) -0,46 -13,55 (**) -0,06 -2,34 (*) -0,51 -24,60 (**)
FI Applicant 0,15 5,15 (**) 0,02 1,16  -0,04 -1,90   -0,03 -2,55 (*)
GB Applicant 0,21 17,62 (**) 0,37 31,94 (**) 0,10 10,20 (**) 0,16 24,69 (**)
IL Applicant 0,47 11,45 (**) 0,49 19,72 (**) 0,90 30,52 (**) 0,34 24,05 (**)
IT Applicant -0,02 -1,75  0,00 0,18  -0,07 -6,51 (**) 0,00 0,39
JP Applicant 0,10 10,63 (**) -0,18 -17,33 (**) 1,09 164,21 (**) 0,44 54,97 (**)
KR Applicant 0,31 11,82 (**) -0,07 -2,60 (**) 0,56 27,74 (**) 0,33 21,34 (**)
NL Applicant -0,01 -0,76  -0,22 -15,57 (**) -0,07 -6,31 (**) -0,17 -21,68 (**)
SE Applicant -0,04 -1,73  0,03 1,83  -0,14 -7,39 (**) 0,07 8,77 (**)
US Applicant 0,73 85,12 (**) 0,77 85,90 (**) 0,75 114,34 (**) 0,58 111,89 (**)
Applicant from the ROW 0,10 5,70 (**) 0,04 2,71 (**) 0,26 19,21 (**) 0,02 2,53 (*)
Filing in a non-EPO (DE/EN/FR) language   -0,20 -17,03 (**) -0,46 -74,95 (**)
H2: Technological complexity 
# Inventors 0,06 43,03 (**) 0,05 46,88 (**) 0,12 113,60 (**) 0,09 138,31 (**)
# IPC-7 0,09 45,41 (**) 0,06 40,13 (**) 0,11 79,68 (**) 0,08 100,22 (**)
# Backward Patent Citations 0,06 70,28 (**) 0,04 56,09 (**) 0,02 33,75 (**) 0,01 33,89 (**)
# Non Patent Citations 0,04 24,26 (**) 0,03 31,45 (**) 0,04 33,92 (**) 0,04 67,33 (**)
H3 Emerging sectors (Reference = JC-02 - Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 0,02 2,65 (**) 0,04 6,08 (**) -0,44 -77,49 (**) -0,25 -63,19 (**)
JC-03 - Polymers 0,08 10,54 (**) 0,04 5,34 (**) 0,03 5,73 (**) -0,12 -26,85 (**)
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,32 34,82 (**) 0,29 41,90 (**) 0,49 70,45 (**) 0,38 98,01 (**)
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,27 23,61 (**) 0,31 31,40 (**) 0,11 13,60 (**) 0,05 8,28 (**)
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,34 31,66 (**) 0,36 33,73 (**) 0,23 30,75 (**) 0,14 23,04 (**)
JC-07 - Electronics 0,01 1,13  0,09 10,32 (**) 0,00 0,33   0,01 2,52 (*)
JC-08 - Electricity & Elec. Machines -0,02 -2,43 (*) 0,05 5,89 (**) -0,26 -46,49 (**) -0,16 -35,28 (**)
JC-09 - Computers 0,33 28,77 (**) 0,33 33,33 (**) 0,48 57,89 (**) 0,27 46,23 (**)
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,06 7,69 (**) 0,08 11,21 (**) -0,16 -26,44 (**) -0,11 -25,08 (**)
JC-11 - Handling & Processing -0,01 -1,76  -0,04 -5,45 (**) -0,27 -48,27 (**) -0,18 -40,44 (**)
JC-12 - Vehicles & Gen. Technology -0,22 -27,55 (**) -0,19 -22,24 (**) -0,42 -70,49 (**) -0,23 -46,63 (**)
JC-13 - Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics -0,16 -19,17 (**) -0,15 -16,57 (**) -0,38 -59,69 (**) -0,21 -39,60 (**)
JC-14 - Human Necessities 0,06 7,36 (**) 0,10 14,09 (**) -0,24 -40,48 (**) -0,09 -22,40 (**)
H4: Portfolio construction 
# Priorities 0,29 89,73 (**) 0,19 66,69 (**) 0,24 103,56 (**) 0,16 100,37 (**)
Application has issued divisionals 0,68 41,72 (**) 0,51 38,96 (**) 0,45 42,30 (**) 0,28 40,74 (**)
Application is a divisional -0,23 -18,73 (**) -0,87 -1,19  0,55 64,95 (**) -0,33 -0,89
Cumulative Filings (Coef. x10e3) -0,02 -8,90 (**) -0,09 -49,67 (**) 0,02 7,81 (**) -0,05 -41,23 (**)
Occasional (no filing in 5 prev, yrs) 0,12 20,92 (**) 0,08 15,24 (**) 0,00 -0,04   0,02 7,90 (**)
Constant -0,25 -17,21 (**) 0,52 18,80 (**) 0,31 30,60 (**) 2,24 151,35 (**)
Model 
Pseudo R² 0,02 0,03 0,06 0,06 
Log likelihood -1917837,90 -1590057,90 -1794820,20 -1769938,30 
LN(alpha) [Std.Err.] 1,40 [0,00] 0,76 [0,00] 0,41 [0,00] -0,56 [0,00] 
LR Test of alpha=0 5.500.000,00 (**) 4.800.000,00 (**) 4.400.000,00 (**) 6.900.000,00 (**)
# Observations 924.289 530.263 657.984 434.180 
Significance levels: (*) p < 5% - (**) p < 1% | 22 Time Dummies included in the model 
  
Table A3.2 – Estimates of Equation 3.1 for the sub-period 1988-1997 
Pages at filing Pages at grant 
Pages at filing 
(granted apps only)
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
H1: Internationalization of application routes and diffusion of US modes (Reference for countries = France)
PCT Filing 1,33 352,34 (**) 0,19 41,80 (**) 1,32 286,36 (**)
Non US Applicant with US priority 0,42 42,76 (**) 0,39 32,57 (**) 0,40 32,20 (**)
US Applicant with non US priority -0,37 -32,61 (**) -0,36 -25,91 (**) -0,41 -29,01 (**)
AT Applicant -0,20 -12,09 (**) -0,20 -10,87 (**) -0,19 -9,87 (**)
AU Applicant 0,34 17,37 (**) 0,31 11,41 (**) 0,30 11,07 (**)
BE Applicant 0,36 21,95 (**) 0,25 13,04 (**) 0,33 16,57 (**)
CA Applicant 0,39 23,62 (**) 0,30 14,60 (**) 0,36 17,14 (**)
CH Applicant 0,21 21,99 (**) 0,16 14,99 (**) 0,18 16,14 (**)
DE Applicant -0,13 -20,55 (**) -0,21 -29,63 (**) -0,14 -18,53 (**)
DK Applicant 0,32 16,32 (**) 0,13 5,62 (**) 0,29 12,27 (**)
ES Applicant 0,12 4,89 (**) 0,02 0,64   0,20 5,84 (**)
FI Applicant 0,00 -0,13 -0,27 -12,77 (**) -0,02 -1,00
GB Applicant 0,09 11,39 (**) 0,04 3,97 (**) 0,11 11,62 (**)
IL Applicant 0,76 30,95 (**) 0,35 9,81 (**) 0,51 14,09 (**)
IT Applicant 0,02 2,17 (*) -0,05 -3,99 (**) 0,08 6,02 (**)
JP Applicant 0,94 144,57 (**) 0,71 96,94 (**) 0,92 120,84 (**)
KR Applicant 0,47 19,32 (**) 0,34 11,13 (**) 0,45 14,26 (**)
NL Applicant -0,09 -9,00 (**) -0,22 -19,84 (**) -0,09 -8,09 (**)
SE Applicant 0,10 7,53 (**) -0,25 -17,18 (**) 0,04 2,87 (**)
US Applicant 0,69 114,83 (**) 0,53 76,11 (**) 0,65 89,74 (**)
Applicant from the ROW 0,18 15,10 (**) 0,04 2,77 (**) 0,17 10,93 (**)
Filing in a non-EPO (DE/EN/FR) language -0,64 -85,21 (**) -0,17 -19,93 (**) -0,59 -62,80 (**)
H2: Technological complexity 
# Inventors 0,12 124,67 (**) 0,11 97,39 (**) 0,11 97,09 (**)
# IPC-7 0,11 92,38 (**) 0,11 78,04 (**) 0,10 72,64 (**)
# Backward Patent Citations 0,02 32,64 (**) 0,01 23,58 (**) 0,02 27,69 (**)
# Non Patent Citations 0,03 32,39 (**) 0,02 16,37 (**) 0,02 18,83 (**)
H3 Emerging sectors (Reference = JC-02 - Organic Chemistry)
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry -0,38 -75,94 (**) -0,38 -65,44 (**) -0,36 -59,55 (**)
JC-03 - Polymers 0,00 0,78 0,03 5,14 (**) 0,05 7,33 (**)
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,32 57,81 (**) 0,34 48,63 (**) 0,28 38,88 (**)
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,09 11,35 (**) 0,12 11,63 (**) 0,12 11,02 (**)
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,21 28,45 (**) 0,21 24,56 (**) 0,23 26,29 (**)
JC-07 - Electronics 0,00 -0,02 0,00 -0,31   0,02 3,18 (**)
JC-08 - Electricity & Elec. Machines -0,27 -51,80 (**) -0,27 -43,36 (**) -0,24 -37,52 (**)
JC-09 - Computers 0,48 59,97 (**) 0,36 35,31 (**) 0,43 40,86 (**)
JC-10 - Measuring Optics -0,14 -25,61 (**) -0,14 -21,61 (**) -0,10 -14,69 (**)
JC-11 - Handling & Processing -0,25 -50,71 (**) -0,25 -43,17 (**) -0,22 -36,46 (**)
JC-12 - Vehicles & Gen. Technology -0,34 -60,63 (**) -0,35 -53,25 (**) -0,32 -47,48 (**)
JC-13 - Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics -0,31 -51,83 (**) -0,35 -49,63 (**) -0,29 -40,97 (**)
JC-14 - Human Necessities -0,22 -41,49 (**) -0,25 -38,89 (**) -0,19 -29,95 (**)
H4: Portfolio construction
# Priorities 0,25 117,05 (**) 0,22 86,84 (**) 0,26 97,85 (**)
Application has issued divisionals 0,40 46,60 (**) 0,26 28,61 (**) 0,42 44,82 (**)
Application is a divisional 0,58 70,17 (**) 0,21 17,76 (**) 0,47 38,74 (**)
Cumulative Filings (Coef. x10e3) 0,03 17,11 (**) 0,03 12,86 (**) 0,04 17,44 (**)
Occasional (no filing in 5 prev, yrs) 0,03 8,87 (**) 0,01 1,81   0,04 8,28 (**)
Constant 0,40 44,85 (**) 0,96 93,68 (**) 0,41 38,41 (**)
Model 
Adjusted R² / Pseudo R² 0,08 0,05 0,08 
F-Stat / Log likelihood -1882009,20 -1186973,10 -1189039,10
LN(alpha) [Std.Err.] 0,14 [0,00] 0,05 [0,00] 0,10 [0,00]
LR Test of alpha=0 5.000.000,00 (**) 2.400.000,00 (**) 2.800.000,00 (**)
# Observations 605.594 386.151 386.151





Table A3.3 – Estimates with time-varying effects (interactions with trend) 
Claims 1982-2004 (NEG BIN) Pages 1988-2002 (NEG BIN) 
Fixed effect Dynamic effect Fixed effect Dynamic effect 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
H1: Internationalization of application routes and diffusion of US modes (Reference for countries = France) 
PCT Filing 0,10 8,06 (**) 0,01 19,39 (**) 1,36 133,44 (**) 0,00 -2,89 (**)
Non US Applicant with US priority 0,67 24,39 (**) 0,00 0,26  0,48 19,00 (**) -0,01 -3,79 (**)
US Applicant with non US priority -0,52 -15,51 (**) 0,00 -1,61  -0,37 -11,40 (**) 0,00 -0,56
AT Applicant -0,70 -16,63 (**) 0,05 17,00 (**) -0,67 -15,39 (**) 0,03 11,73 (**)
AU Applicant 0,10 2,02 (*) 0,04 11,97 (**) -0,06 -1,19   0,03 9,67 (**)
BE Applicant -0,10 -2,41 (*) 0,02 7,92 (**) 0,14 3,19 (**) 0,01 5,12 (**)
CA Applicant 0,19 4,76 (**) 0,02 6,37 (**) 0,24 5,85 (**) 0,01 3,73 (**)
CH Applicant 0,15 6,99 (**) 0,01 4,93 (**) 0,01 0,60   0,01 6,80 (**)
DE Applicant -0,46 -33,06 (**) 0,03 40,45 (**) -0,53 -37,96 (**) 0,03 33,95 (**)
DK Applicant -0,42 -6,64 (**) 0,05 13,31 (**) -0,10 -1,77   0,03 9,03 (**)
ES Applicant -1,33 -18,23 (**) 0,05 10,59 (**) 0,12 1,95   0,00 -1,15
FI Applicant -1,12 -17,27 (**) 0,07 18,30 (**) -0,70 -13,57 (**) 0,05 15,75 (**)
GB Applicant -0,39 -21,18 (**) 0,05 41,85 (**) -0,36 -18,90 (**) 0,03 27,77 (**)
IL Applicant 0,03 0,40  0,03 8,33 (**) 0,90 13,80 (**) -0,02 -4,62 (**)
IT Applicant -0,94 -38,84 (**) 0,07 42,95 (**) -0,68 -26,27 (**) 0,05 32,06 (**)
JP Applicant -0,40 -25,42 (**) 0,03 29,02 (**) 0,38 26,17 (**) 0,04 41,43 (**)
KR Applicant -1,41 -14,82 (**) 0,09 18,86 (**) -0,13 -1,78   0,04 10,05 (**)
NL Applicant -0,37 -16,58 (**) 0,03 18,69 (**) -0,65 -26,76 (**) 0,04 27,43 (**)
SE Applicant -1,24 -33,81 (**) 0,08 36,16 (**) -0,56 -16,06 (**) 0,05 21,96 (**)
US Applicant 0,46 34,78 (**) 0,02 30,17 (**) 0,45 35,30 (**) 0,01 17,48 (**)
Applicant from the ROW -0,49 -15,96 (**) 0,04 22,73 (**) -0,16 -5,55 (**) 0,02 13,00 (**)
Filing in a non-EPO (DE/EN/FR) language    -0,50 -26,07 (**) -0,01 -10,47 (**)
H2: Technological complexity 
# Inventors 0,04 14,32 (**) 0,00 10,11 (**) 0,14 59,47 (**) 0,00 -16,32 (**)
# IPC-7 0,10 30,74 (**) 0,00 -8,82 (**) 0,15 50,97 (**) 0,00 -21,04 (**)
# Backward Patent Citations 0,05 32,89 (**) 0,00 -1,34  0,02 12,08 (**) 0,00 -1,78
# Non Patent Citations 0,04 12,51 (**) 0,00 0,43  -0,02 -7,08 (**) 0,00 23,35 (**)
H3 Emerging sectors (Reference = JC-02 - Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry -0,06 -4,75 (**) 0,01 7,40 (**) -0,57 -45,18 (**) 0,02 18,89 (**)
JC-03 - Polymers 0,04 3,18 (**) 0,00 1,80  0,08 6,10 (**) -0,01 -9,42 (**)
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,03 1,97 (*) 0,02 20,16 (**) -0,01 -0,39   0,03 31,75 (**)
JC-05 - Telecommunications -0,33 -12,74 (**) 0,04 26,08 (**) 0,02 0,88   0,01 5,00 (**)
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media -0,10 -4,58 (**) 0,03 22,52 (**) 0,00 -0,24   0,02 12,18 (**)
JC-07 - Electronics -0,24 -15,44 (**) 0,02 21,02 (**) -0,21 -13,41 (**) 0,02 16,03 (**)
JC-08 - Electricity & Elec. Machines -0,17 -12,71 (**) 0,01 16,37 (**) -0,58 -43,53 (**) 0,03 29,98 (**)
JC-09 - Computers -0,13 -5,78 (**) 0,03 22,74 (**) 0,54 26,26 (**) -0,01 -5,91 (**)
JC-10 - Measuring Optics -0,08 -5,44 (**) 0,01 11,47 (**) -0,32 -23,06 (**) 0,01 15,43 (**)
JC-11 - Handling & Processing -0,17 -13,73 (**) 0,01 12,93 (**) -0,47 -36,95 (**) 0,02 21,01 (**)
JC-12 - Vehicles & Gen. Technology -0,33 -22,70 (**) 0,01 9,61 (**) -0,54 -37,50 (**) 0,01 15,94 (**)
JC-13 - Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics -0,24 -15,79 (**) 0,01 7,15 (**) -0,55 -35,40 (**) 0,02 18,30 (**)
JC-14 - Human Necessities -0,09 -6,23 (**) 0,01 13,26 (**) -0,57 -41,97 (**) 0,03 31,70 (**)
H4: Portfolio construction 
# Priorities 0,34 61,99 (**) -0,01 -18,78 (**) 0,35 68,67 (**) -0,01 -30,04 (**)
Application has issued divisionals 0,90 24,11 (**) -0,02 -8,54 (**) 0,60 22,97 (**) -0,02 -8,85 (**)
Application is a divisional -0,55 -14,48 (**) 0,02 8,36 (**) 0,41 14,05 (**) 0,01 6,78 (**)
Cumulative Filings (Coef. x10e3) -0,25 -34,59 (**) 0,01 14,36 (**) 0,10 12,89 (**) 0,00 -6,31 (**)
Occasional (no filing in 5 prev, yrs) 0,17 17,55 (**) -0,01 -10,33 (**) 0,03 2,84 (**) 0,00 -0,38
Constant 0,17 21,31 (**) 0,62 118,47 (**) 
Model 
Pseudo R² 0,03 0,09 
Log likelihood -3344477,80 -3410733,80 
LN(alpha) [Std.Err.] 1,12 [0,00] 0,00 [0,00] 
LR Test of alpha=0 9.600.000,00 (**) 11.000.000,00 (**) 
# Observations 1.378.100 1.030.690 





Table A3.4 – Estimates of Equation 3.1 with and without Non-transferred PCT 
Claims 1982-2004 (NEG BIN) Pages 1988-2002 (NEG BIN) 
Non Reg. PCT excl. Non Reg. PCT incl. Non Reg. PCT excl. Non Reg. PCT incl. 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
H1: Internationalization of application routes and diffusion of US modes (Reference for countries = France) 
PCT Filing 0,29 82,44 (**) 0,26 80,25 (**) 1,27 542,64 (**) 1,26 576,12 (**)
PCT International Filing  0,19 49,29 (**)    -0,02 -8,88 (**)
Non US Applicant with US priority 0,67 78,92 (**) 0,70 99,17 (**) 0,37 64,36 (**) 0,39 77,79 (**)
US Applicant with non US priority -0,58 -48,54 (**) -0,65 -61,98 (**) -0,35 -45,26 (**) -0,35 -51,18 (**)
AT Applicant -0,07 -4,68 (**) -0,05 -3,81 (**) -0,18 -16,41 (**) -0,17 -17,20 (**)
AU Applicant 0,60 32,13 (**) 0,60 45,64 (**) 0,39 30,93 (**) 0,31 35,54 (**)
BE Applicant 0,15 9,63 (**) 0,15 10,67 (**) 0,35 31,51 (**) 0,32 31,69 (**)
CA Applicant 0,39 25,89 (**) 0,38 31,92 (**) 0,41 40,32 (**) 0,38 46,67 (**)
CH Applicant 0,23 24,24 (**) 0,21 24,73 (**) 0,16 25,47 (**) 0,15 25,31 (**)
DE Applicant -0,05 -7,57 (**) -0,04 -7,19 (**) -0,09 -21,04 (**) -0,08 -21,26 (**)
DK Applicant 0,27 14,63 (**) 0,26 16,78 (**) 0,39 31,67 (**) 0,35 33,40 (**)
ES Applicant -0,68 -29,82 (**) -0,67 -35,95 (**) 0,02 1,52   0,02 1,84
FI Applicant 0,11 6,69 (**) 0,06 4,54 (**) 0,13 12,19 (**) 0,08 9,36 (**)
GB Applicant 0,28 34,64 (**) 0,32 45,33 (**) 0,16 29,54 (**) 0,16 33,30 (**)
IL Applicant 0,53 23,99 (**) 0,60 35,61 (**) 0,59 41,04 (**) 0,52 46,15 (**)
IT Applicant -0,03 -3,59 (**) -0,02 -1,75  0,11 15,12 (**) 0,04 5,91 (**)
JP Applicant 0,06 8,75 (**) 0,02 4,01 (**) 1,00 221,98 (**) 1,00 242,70 (**)
KR Applicant 0,25 14,36 (**) -0,04 -2,83 (**) 0,51 41,47 (**) 0,56 59,33 (**)
NL Applicant -0,12 -12,69 (**) -0,11 -13,05 (**) -0,06 -8,76 (**) -0,07 -12,75 (**)
SE Applicant -0,06 -4,85 (**) -0,08 -7,97 (**) 0,19 23,97 (**) 0,14 20,43 (**)
US Applicant 0,76 126,81 (**) 0,86 159,95 (**) 0,69 167,25 (**) 0,68 187,09 (**)
Applicant from the ROW 0,07 6,74 (**) 0,01 1,68  0,20 26,80 (**) 0,20 33,54 (**)
Filing in a non-EPO (DE/EN/FR) language  -0,71 -155,87 (**) -0,58 -157,89 (**)
H2: Technological complexity 
# Inventors 0,06 66,62 (**) 0,06 81,54 (**) 0,11 180,56 (**) 0,11 202,94 (**)
# IPC-7 0,06 66,76 (**) 0,06 71,45 (**) 0,09 142,91 (**) 0,08 158,01 (**)
H3 Emerging sectors (Reference = JC-02 - Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 0,05 10,64 (**) 0,05 11,15 (**) -0,33 -97,78 (**) -0,32 -106,06 (**)
JC-03 - Polymers 0,07 12,38 (**) 0,05 11,41 (**) -0,03 -8,65 (**) -0,05 -14,10 (**)
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,26 47,30 (**) 0,26 56,79 (**) 0,38 104,85 (**) 0,39 126,35 (**)
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,27 36,14 (**) 0,26 41,36 (**) 0,08 17,41 (**) 0,07 17,10 (**)
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,34 46,77 (**) 0,33 51,83 (**) 0,24 50,20 (**) 0,22 53,21 (**)
JC-07 - Electronics 0,05 8,86 (**) 0,06 11,44 (**) 0,03 8,46 (**) 0,03 7,52 (**)
JC-08 - Electricity & Elec. Machines 0,01 2,81 (**) 0,01 2,97 (**) -0,21 -59,34 (**) -0,20 -65,04 (**)
JC-09 - Computers 0,33 45,36 (**) 0,32 53,99 (**) 0,42 86,57 (**) 0,39 98,59 (**)
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,10 18,31 (**) 0,09 19,25 (**) -0,10 -28,13 (**) -0,10 -32,90 (**)
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 0,01 1,74  -0,01 -2,86 (**) -0,22 -62,49 (**) -0,22 -72,46 (**)
JC-12 - Vehicles & Gen. Technology -0,18 -31,45 (**) -0,19 -38,57 (**) -0,32 -84,29 (**) -0,31 -91,73 (**)
JC-13 - Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics -0,11 -18,36 (**) -0,11 -21,06 (**) -0,27 -68,34 (**) -0,25 -73,16 (**)
JC-14 - Human Necessities 0,12 22,69 (**) 0,10 22,36 (**) -0,15 -42,21 (**) -0,16 -51,71 (**)
H4: Portfolio construction 
# Priorities 0,26 124,28 (**) 0,25 144,50 (**) 0,23 166,61 (**) 0,21 183,39 (**)
Application has issued divisionals 0,70 71,32 (**) 0,70 74,90 (**) 0,43 71,56 (**) 0,44 76,74 (**)
Cumulative Filings (Coef. x10e3) -0,06 -39,45 (**) -0,06 -50,16 (**) -0,01 -8,87 (**) -0,01 -12,85 (**)
Occasional (no filing in 5 prev. yrs) 0,11 30,21 (**) 0,09 29,68 (**) 0,04 15,99 (**) 0,03 13,13 (**)
Constant 0,12 10,89 (**) 0,13 13,18 (**) 0,54 80,81 (**) 0,58 95,10 (**)
Model 
Pseudo R² 0,03 0,03 0,09 0,08 
Log likelihood -3792362,80 -5040992,00 -3796548,00 -4797749,80 
LN(alpha) [Std.Err.] 1,14 [0,00] 1,05 [0,00] -0,01 [0,00] -0,11 [0,00] 
LR Test of alpha=0 11.000.000,00 (**) 16.000.000,00 (**) 12.000.000,00 (**) 16.000.000,00 (**) 
# Observations 1.551.434 1.931.631 1.136.676 1.382.317 





Table A3.5 – Estimates of Equation 3.1 with OLS and Neg. Bin. Regressions 
Claims 1982-2004 Pages 1988-2002 
OLS NEG BIN OLS NEG BIN 
Variables Coef. t-Stat Coef. z Coef. t-Stat Coef. z 
H1: Internationalization of application routes and diffusion of US modes (Reference for countries = France) 
PCT Filing 2,33 83,08 (**) 0,27 77,38 (**) 14,68 118,07 (**) 1,29 401,73 (**)
Non US Applicant with US priority 5,40 77,37 (**) 0,68 99,06 (**) 5,77 25,20 (**) 0,37 46,99 (**)
US Applicant with non US priority -4,20 -67,77 (**) -0,57 -52,78 (**) -6,43 -21,14 (**) -0,35 -35,62 (**)
AT Applicant -0,80 -11,02 (**) -0,07 -4,26 (**) -0,96 -5,99 (**) -0,19 -12,78 (**)
AU Applicant 4,11 30,12 (**) 0,58 42,82 (**) 3,21 7,32 (**) 0,38 27,18 (**)
BE Applicant 0,70 9,58 (**) 0,16 11,37 (**) 3,24 12,86 (**) 0,33 23,27 (**)
CA Applicant 2,01 17,50 (**) 0,38 29,24 (**) 3,46 10,13 (**) 0,38 30,88 (**)
CH Applicant 1,08 22,72 (**) 0,23 25,34 (**) 1,68 11,50 (**) 0,17 19,81 (**)
DE Applicant -0,40 -14,75 (**) -0,04 -6,32 (**) -0,82 -8,17 (**) -0,09 -16,32 (**)
DK Applicant 2,25 14,70 (**) 0,30 16,66 (**) 5,09 8,58 (**) 0,36 27,43 (**)
ES Applicant -4,12 -45,36 (**) -0,68 -21,71 (**) 1,63 6,53 (**) 0,02 0,89
FI Applicant 0,23 2,81 (**) 0,10 7,19 (**) -1,65 -10,24 (**) 0,10 8,54 (**)
GB Applicant 1,91 45,65 (**) 0,30 40,60 (**) 0,58 3,62 (**) 0,16 23,74 (**)
IL Applicant 4,45 22,67 (**) 0,51 29,39 (**) 5,78 8,70 (**) 0,59 12,87 (**)
IT Applicant -0,28 -6,92 (**) -0,03 -3,13 (**) 3,92 18,22 (**) 0,10 10,78 (**)
JP Applicant -0,42 -7,90 (**) 0,05 7,46 (**) 5,63 18,55 (**) 0,99 171,11 (**)
KR Applicant 0,02 0,17  0,19 10,85 (**) 1,01 3,42 (**) 0,50 35,28 (**)
NL Applicant -0,81 -20,48 (**) -0,12 -12,20 (**) -1,37 -11,91 (**) -0,07 -8,24 (**)
SE Applicant -0,06 -0,96  0,04 3,41 (**) 0,10 0,58   0,18 21,06 (**)
US Applicant 5,15 162,74 (**) 0,77 134,73 (**) 9,21 77,09 (**) 0,67 132,67 (**)
Applicant from the ROW -0,46 -6,85 (**) 0,08 7,19 (**) -0,85 -5,06 (**) 0,19 20,24 (**)
Filing in a non-EPO (DE/EN/FR) language   -7,18 -53,36 (**) -0,68 -120,78 (**)
H2: Technological complexity 
# Inventors 0,60 49,28 (**) 0,06 67,11 (**) 2,97 43,08 (**) 0,10 121,18 (**)
# IPC-7 0,53 44,15 (**) 0,07 64,33 (**) 2,69 37,06 (**) 0,09 87,14 (**)
# Backward Patent Citations 0,36 70,46 (**) 0,05 94,52 (**) 0,08 5,27 (**) 0,01 33,64 (**)
# Non Patent Citations 0,35 41,09 (**) 0,04 46,60 (**) 1,54 15,31 (**) 0,04 37,34 (**)
H3 Emerging sectors (Reference = JC-02 - Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry -0,10 -3,40 (**) 0,03 5,67 (**) -6,87 -84,56 (**) -0,35 -80,68 (**)
JC-03 - Polymers 0,26 7,85 (**) 0,07 13,68 (**) -3,87 -43,56 (**) -0,01 -2,90 (**)
JC-04 - Biotechnology 2,19 55,84 (**) 0,31 60,61 (**) 10,06 48,62 (**) 0,40 79,09 (**)
JC-05 - Telecommunications 1,87 37,28 (**) 0,29 41,38 (**) -0,43 -3,87 (**) 0,07 11,51 (**)
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 2,32 42,51 (**) 0,35 47,99 (**) 2,21 18,44 (**) 0,21 34,95 (**)
JC-07 - Electronics 0,25 7,00 (**) 0,04 6,73 (**) -0,12 -1,38   0,02 3,17 (**)
JC-08 - Electricity & Elec. Machines 0,12 4,02 (**) 0,00 0,86  -3,42 -50,13 (**) -0,22 -48,90 (**)
JC-09 - Computers 2,51 42,87 (**) 0,33 47,67 (**) 5,22 26,58 (**) 0,39 48,55 (**)
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,42 12,03 (**) 0,08 15,93 (**) -3,56 -32,49 (**) -0,11 -24,96 (**)
JC-11 - Handling & Processing -0,20 -7,44 (**) -0,02 -3,81 (**) -2,69 -30,99 (**) -0,23 -50,67 (**)
JC-12 - Vehicles & Gen. Technology -1,09 -40,01 (**) -0,21 -35,25 (**) -3,34 -42,21 (**) -0,34 -72,56 (**)
JC-13 - Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics -0,88 -29,71 (**) -0,15 -24,62 (**) -3,38 -37,46 (**) -0,30 -60,16 (**)
JC-14 - Human Necessities 0,59 18,03 (**) 0,08 16,82 (**) -1,78 -18,43 (**) -0,17 -39,16 (**)
H4: Portfolio construction 
# Priorities 0,81 8,09 (**) 0,25 92,23 (**) 4,74 7,73 (**) 0,21 67,45 (**)
Application has issued divisionals 5,98 54,23 (**) 0,62 72,14 (**) 6,72 19,49 (**) 0,38 49,98 (**)
Application is a divisional -2,63 -30,46 (**) -0,22 -17,88 (**) 3,20 8,01 (**) 0,59 63,34 (**)
Cumulative Filings (Coef. x10e3) -0,48 -57,80 (**) -0,06 -35,61 (**) -0,75 -33,01 (**) -0,01 -4,28 (**)
Occasional (no filing in 5 prev, yrs) 0,85 35,57 (**) 0,10 28,89 (**) 1,06 14,65 (**) 0,02 5,88 (**)
Constant 4,55 47,77 (**) -0,08 -6,72 (**) -8,45 -17,31 (**) 0,51 49,55 (**)
Model 
Adjusted R² / Pseudo R² 0,19 0,03 0,26 0,09 
F-Stat / Log likelihood 5.193 -3,53E+06 6.474 -3,62E+06 
LN(alpha) [Std.Err.] 1,14 [0,002] -0,01 [0,002] 
LR Test of alpha=0 10.000.000,00 (**) 11.000.000,00 (**) 
# Observations 1.454.552 1.454.552 1.092.164 1.092.164 
Significance levels: (*) p < 5% - (**) p < 1% | 22 Time Dummies included in the model 
  
Table A3.6 – Estimates of Equation 3.1 with discrete variables in logarithm 
Claims 1982-2004 Pages 1988-2002
Variables Coef. z Coef. z
H1: Internationalization of application routes and diffusion of US modes (Reference for countries = France)
PCT Filing 0,10 85,95 (**) 0,78 539,80 (**)
Non US Applicant with US priority 0,31 110,74 (**) 0,22 66,04 (**)
US Applicant with non US priority -0,26 -66,34 (**) -0,26 -57,31 (**)
AT Applicant -0,08 -15,42 (**) -0,09 -13,79 (**)
AU Applicant 0,27 44,48 (**) 0,24 32,60 (**)
BE Applicant 0,09 17,97 (**) 0,21 33,10 (**)
CA Applicant 0,14 27,64 (**) 0,22 37,05 (**)
CH Applicant 0,11 36,10 (**) 0,11 28,98 (**)
DE Applicant -0,04 -17,52 (**) -0,06 -22,33 (**)
DK Applicant 0,13 20,18 (**) 0,22 29,89 (**)
ES Applicant -0,40 -51,35 (**) 0,03 2,82 (**)
FI Applicant 0,03 6,27 (**) 0,00 -0,50
GB Applicant 0,14 50,98 (**) 0,07 22,27 (**)
IL Applicant 0,23 31,62 (**) 0,35 41,13 (**)
IT Applicant -0,03 -10,23 (**) 0,13 31,05 (**)
JP Applicant -0,04 -17,90 (**) 0,53 199,85 (**)
KR Applicant 0,01 2,01 (*) 0,25 33,87 (**)
NL Applicant -0,05 -17,83 (**) -0,07 -19,02 (**)
SE Applicant 0,01 2,07 (*) 0,07 14,38 (**)
US Applicant 0,34 174,94 (**) 0,42 175,68 (**)
Applicant from the ROW -0,01 -2,77 (**) 0,09 20,72 (**)
Filing in a non-EPO (DE/EN/FR) language  -0,38 -144,56 (**)
H2: Technological complexity 
ln(# Inventors) 0,09 108,82 (**) 0,20 205,30 (**)
ln(# IPC-7) 0,08 89,92 (**) 0,16 144,14 (**)
ln(# Backward Patent Citations) 0,11 111,90 (**) 0,03 22,02 (**)
ln(# Non Patent Citations) 0,05 63,06 (**) 0,08 83,23 (**)
H3 Emerging sectors (Reference = JC-02 - Organic Chemistry)
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry -0,01 -4,75 (**) -0,25 -123,26 (**)
JC-03 - Polymers 0,03 14,53 (**) -0,06 -30,17 (**)
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,13 71,38 (**) 0,30 138,15 (**)
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,12 50,80 (**) 0,01 5,07 (**)
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,15 61,23 (**) 0,11 39,78 (**)
JC-07 - Electronics 0,01 5,40 (**) 0,00 -0,52
JC-08 - Electricity & Elec. Machines 0,00 -1,94  -0,15 -73,21 (**)
JC-09 - Computers 0,15 60,02 (**) 0,24 82,31 (**)
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,02 13,03 (**) -0,10 -45,71 (**)
JC-11 - Handling & Processing -0,03 -16,39 (**) -0,14 -68,56 (**)
JC-12 - Vehicles & Gen. Technology -0,09 -50,52 (**) -0,20 -88,05 (**)
JC-13 - Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics -0,07 -37,25 (**) -0,18 -74,44 (**)
JC-14 - Human Necessities 0,03 17,44 (**) -0,09 -44,97 (**)
H4: Portfolio construction 
ln(# Priorities) 0,34 190,21 (**) 0,47 228,04 (**)
Application has issued divisionals 0,32 96,06 (**) 0,28 78,34 (**)
Application is a divisional -0,20 -57,79 (**) 0,35 90,44 (**)
ln(Cumulative Filings) -22,78 -82,75 (**) -1,69 -5,11 (**)
Occasional (no filing in 5 prev, yrs) -0,01 -5,95 (**) 0,03 16,19 (**)
Constant 1,85 461,44 (**) 1,61 355,29 (**)
Model 
Pseudo R² 0,04 0,11 
Wald chi²(65/58) 432360 936581
Log likelihood -4932379 -3953837
LN(alpha) [Std.Err.] -1,31 [0,001] -1,18 [0,002]
LR Test of alpha=0 4.000.000,00 (**) 7.900.000,00 (**)
# Observations 1.453.329 1.091.231
Significance levels: (*) p < 5% - (**) p < 1% | 22 Time Dummies included in the model 
  
Table A3.7 – Estimates of Equation 3.1 with Iteratively Weighted Least Squares 
Claims 1982-2004 Pages 1988-2002 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z 
H1: Internationalization of application routes and diffusion of US modes (Reference for countries = France) 
PCT Filing 1,12 83,41 (**) 9,70 553,47 (**) 
Non US Applicant with US priority 3,73 114,31 (**) 2,60 60,38 (**) 
US Applicant with non US priority -2,42 -55,30 (**) -3,09 -55,66 (**) 
AT Applicant -1,10 -19,32 (**) -1,06 -13,93 (**) 
AU Applicant 3,15 45,57 (**) 2,24 24,34 (**) 
BE Applicant 1,09 18,64 (**) 2,03 26,32 (**) 
CA Applicant 1,57 27,29 (**) 2,97 39,31 (**) 
CH Applicant 0,85 25,15 (**) 0,76 16,89 (**) 
DE Applicant -0,42 -18,88 (**) -0,63 -21,51 (**) 
DK Applicant 0,16 2,17 (*) 1,61 17,59 (**) 
ES Applicant -3,97 -48,53 (**) 0,37 3,48 (**) 
FI Applicant 0,33 5,55 (**) 0,15 1,97 (*) 
GB Applicant 1,50 50,59 (**) 0,47 11,92 (**) 
IL Applicant 2,46 29,66 (**) 3,32 31,20 (**) 
IT Applicant -0,48 -13,62 (**) 1,83 38,29 (**) 
JP Applicant -1,31 -56,62 (**) 4,51 144,65 (**) 
KR Applicant -0,91 -13,58 (**) 2,61 28,75 (**) 
NL Applicant -0,39 -11,61 (**) -0,38 -8,49 (**) 
SE Applicant -0,31 -7,09 (**) 0,21 3,65 (**) 
US Applicant 3,12 144,31 (**) 4,23 148,08 (**) 
Applicant from the ROW -0,70 -17,07 (**) 0,29 5,45 (**) 
Filing in a non-EPO (DE/EN/FR) language   -4,19 -133,02 (**) 
H2: Technological complexity 
# Inventors 0,25 76,06 (**) 0,68 157,14 (**) 
# IPC-7 0,33 76,52 (**) 0,56 100,92 (**) 
# Backward Patent Citations 0,22 113,40 (**) 0,14 56,10 (**) 
# Non Patent Citations 0,19 58,58 (**) 0,29 72,84 (**) 
H3 Emerging sectors (Reference = JC-02 - Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 0,13 6,89 (**) -1,73 -70,14 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,29 14,20 (**) -0,24 -9,05 (**) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 1,42 69,39 (**) 2,54 94,67 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 1,11 40,95 (**) 1,57 44,66 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,96 35,23 (**) 2,12 60,38 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,01 0,45   0,65 22,24 (**) 
JC-08 - Electricity & Elec. Machines 0,04 2,00 (*) -0,67 -26,22 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 1,18 42,42 (**) 2,81 77,59 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,16 7,96 (**) -0,07 -2,60 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing -0,14 -7,70 (**) -0,52 -21,13 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles & Gen. Technology -0,73 -35,78 (**) -1,05 -39,20 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics -0,56 -25,83 (**) -0,84 -29,47 (**) 
JC-14 - Human Necessities 0,26 13,49 (**) -0,13 -5,05 (**) 
H4: Portfolio construction 
# Priorities 1,37 290,03 (**) 2,65 457,09 (**) 
Application has issued divisionals 3,42 88,39 (**) 4,35 95,51 (**) 
Application is a divisional -3,01 -78,61 (**) 2,79 57,26 (**) 
Cumulative Filings (Coef. x10e3) -0,32 -56,80 (**) -0,18 -22,92 (**) 
Occasional (no filing in 5 prev, yrs) 0,45 32,52 (**) 0,30 16,17 (**) 
Constant 5,60 143,82 (**) 1,47 31,18 (**) 
Model 
F(65/58) 6906 20752 
P > F 0,00 0,00 
# Observations 1.454.551 1.092.162 
Significance levels: (*) p < 5% - (**) p < 1% | 22 Time Dummies included in the model 
  
Table A3.8 – Wald Test of pairwise equality of country coefficients in claims regression 
APP_AT APP_AU APP_BE APP_CA APP_CH APP_DE APP_DK APP_ES APP_FI APP_GB APP_IL APP_IT APP_JP APP_KR APP_NL APP_SE APP_US 
APP_AU 999,13*
APP_BE 122,25* 525,09*
APP_CA 500,50* 128,03* 154,33* 
APP_CH 271,37* 549,57* 21,66* 111,85*
APP_DE 3,75 2.218,90* 210,85* 1.093,74* 980,73*
APP_DK 242,44* 182,42* 38,88* 17,72* 11,32* 368,96*
APP_ES 302,20* 1.422,79* 622,25* 1.021,68* 815,57* 421,93* 762,33*
APP_FI 67,82* 708,77* 10,83* 266,44* 77,09* 107,38* 83,83* 540,19*
APP_GB 460,73* 421,06* 92,08* 39,34* 48,28* 2.471,62* 0,05 966,90* 199,77*
APP_IL 620,81* 12,88* 267,00* 38,19* 226,81* 1.036,10* 79,51* 1.144,69* 381,51* 141,33*
APP_IT 4,84° 1.590,40* 146,34* 766,46* 508,72* 0,75 291,38* 407,94* 70,33* 1.010,69* 830,25*
APP_JP 52,31* 1.560,09* 61,11* 649,03* 399,78* 243,27* 192,57* 545,30* 12,78* 1.191,67* 705,44* 69,44*
APP_KR 124,27* 358,45* 1,52 92,25* 6,17° 180,33* 20,96* 612,42* 17,54* 41,70* 187,89* 137,41* 65,56*
APP_NL 5,63° 2.110,36* 309,27* 1.172,99* 928,92* 69,57* 469,36* 309,39* 200,18* 1.581,20* 1.138,81* 48,13* 308,08* 268,37*
APP_SE 33,14* 1.114,34* 52,25* 486,25* 222,97* 51,48* 166,20* 486,20* 13,85* 493,17* 585,42* 27,17* 1,06 58,14* 136,46*
APP_US 2.561,22* 217,27* 2.014,43* 948,05* 4.219,03* 31.438,71* 757,39* 2.165,88* 2.574,99* 5.944,66* 245,68* 7.665,80* 19.811,84* 1.217,18* 10.046,83* 4.753,90* 
APP_OT 64,30* 952,94* 22,14* 385,35* 137,75* 124,54* 115,96* 548,64* 1,15 347,01* 492,93* 71,95* 7,81* 29,20* 226,47* 8,95* 4.217,02* 
Robust Neg Bin Regression, full model reported in T3.5 | Chi²(1) reported in table | *:P(>Chi²)<1% | °:P(>Chi²)<5% 
 
Table A3.9 – Wald Test of pairwise equality of country coefficients in pages regression 
APP_AT APP_AU APP_BE APP_CA APP_CH APP_DE APP_DK APP_ES APP_FI APP_GB APP_IL APP_IT APP_JP APP_KR APP_NL APP_SE APP_US 
APP_AU 860,09*
APP_BE 699,93* 6,89*
APP_CA 982,07* 0,01 8,69* 
APP_CH 475,41* 194,42* 112,04* 256,76*
APP_DE 40,77* 1.176,46* 895,09* 1.514,16* 983,13*
APP_DK 861,20* 0,73 3,49 1,08 185,60* 1.231,91*
APP_ES 46,88* 137,40* 100,96* 146,27* 25,66* 18,15* 129,40*
APP_FI 260,60* 282,87* 189,62* 357,21* 32,21* 297,52* 278,52* 6,01°
APP_GB 530,91* 243,19* 139,07* 312,11* 1,05 1.522,71* 233,10* 23,08* 29,10* 
APP_IL 263,45* 19,99* 30,25* 20,93* 84,45* 221,80* 23,15* 112,50* 112,71* 88,60*
APP_IT 310,18* 300,13* 198,00* 370,61* 31,35* 433,53* 295,48* 7,84* 0,42 28,14* 108,52*
APP_JP 6.524,61* 1.906,93* 2.167,31* 2.414,22* 9.655,90* 41.940,10* 2.279,00* 1.236,06* 6.725,33* 16.065,71* 71,89* 9.281,86*
APP_KR 1.236,40* 37,13* 75,09* 41,00* 461,89* 1.792,80* 51,06* 241,86* 567,79* 552,67* 4,16° 609,47* 1.316,26*
APP_NL 53,80* 851,72* 658,47* 1.114,84* 504,98* 8,43* 881,29* 10,86* 168,72* 555,10* 203,66* 224,23* 16.328,67* 1.354,90*
APP_SE 535,04* 170,83* 94,02* 225,25* 1,59 1.114,22* 163,26* 30,83* 47,51* 6,11° 79,33* 46,09* 9.642,55* 428,24* 565,64*
APP_US 3.626,59* 463,36* 605,41* 572,57* 4.134,44* 30.043,56* 575,84* 554,55* 2.901,21* 7.785,98* 2,75 3.937,27* 4.961,24* 165,53* 8.659,64* 3.911,06* 
APP_OT 535,57* 146,39* 78,25* 197,67* 4,37° 967,80* 136,84* 34,08* 52,27* 10,84* 75,54* 52,19* 7.510,24* 376,95* 540,66* 0,81 3.062,95* 





Table A3.10 – Wald Test of pairwise equality of JC coefficients in claims regression 
JC_01 JC_03 JC_04 JC_05 JC_06 JC_07 JC_08 JC_09 JC_10 JC_11 JC_12 JC_13 
JC_03 46,69* 
JC_04 2.039,67* 1.276,52* 
JC_05 1.129,02* 699,51* 7,84* 
JC_06 1.566,15* 1.071,50* 31,00* 48,86* 
JC_07 3,55 17,96* 1.324,89* 790,09* 1.148,23* 
JC_08 11,56* 102,56* 2.277,60* 1.278,54* 1.716,98* 22,57* 
JC_09 1.517,89* 999,18* 8,90* 22,90* 5,34° 1.037,13* 1.671,84* 
JC_10 70,40* 2,18 843,06* 591,73* 911,07* 29,20* 123,94* 864,64* 
JC_11 55,55* 192,09* 2.708,80* 1.566,59* 2.039,74* 69,46* 13,69* 1.992,68* 233,70* 
JC_12 1.186,16* 1.535,19* 5.589,41* 3.633,66* 4.147,57* 991,09* 884,86* 4.201,09* 1.560,83* 715,50* 
JC_13 638,66* 947,65* 4.183,80* 2.748,93* 3.260,19* 590,01* 461,71* 3.236,00* 977,11* 356,57* 51,37* 
JC_14 84,07* 2,24 1.216,44* 685,09* 1.031,68* 33,98* 152,21* 981,15* 0,00 279,08* 1.821,18* 1.151,55* 
Robust Neg Bin Regression, full model reported in T3.5 | Chi²(1) reported in table | *:P(>Chi²)<1% | °:P(>Chi²)<5% 
 
 
Table A3.11 – Wald Test of pairwise equality of JC coefficients in pages regression 
JC_01 JC_03 JC_04 JC_05 JC_06 JC_07 JC_08 JC_09 JC_10 JC_11 JC_12 JC_13 
JC_03 3.129,54* 
JC_04 16.287,35* 4.676,30* 
JC_05 4.009,88* 142,25* 2.279,21* 
JC_06 7.157,79* 1.007,51* 753,23* 332,10* 
JC_07 3.187,31* 21,98* 3.274,95* 46,65* 641,52* 
JC_08 527,79* 1.227,56* 10.962,10* 1.931,01* 4.164,56* 1.329,67* 
JC_09 7.435,45* 2.134,01* 0,59 1.126,34* 379,33* 1.641,02* 5.095,18* 
JC_10 1.657,28* 242,61* 5.225,86* 695,34* 2.060,79* 376,22* 326,80* 3.198,71* 
JC_11 480,74* 1.339,92* 11.157,69* 2.065,51* 4.351,47* 1.527,17* 4,11° 5.261,96* 424,66* 
JC_12 3,71 2.970,41* 14.724,18* 3.701,15* 6.535,32* 3.013,15* 466,76* 7.094,99* 1.443,41* 383,81* 
JC_13 68,17* 2.202,91* 12.438,62* 2.889,48* 5.378,21* 2.285,05* 205,21* 6.170,18* 933,65* 163,65* 39,97* 
JC_14 1.189,63* 630,03* 9.208,97* 1.326,94* 3.191,94* 907,48* 90,72* 4.181,89* 94,50* 139,18* 1.009,19* 574,99* 




Table A3.12 – Estimates with complexity variables interacted with JC 
Claims 1982-2004 Pages 1988-2002 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z 
H1: Internationalization of application routes and diffusion of US modes (Reference for countries = France) 
PCT Filing 0,12 97,40 (**) 0,79 556,53 (**) 
Non US Applicant with US priority 0,32 112,88 (**) 0,23 69,74 (**) 
US Applicant with non US priority -0,26 -65,30 (**) -0,24 -54,76 (**) 
AT Applicant -0,08 -14,68 (**) -0,10 -16,30 (**) 
AU Applicant 0,26 42,92 (**) 0,22 30,10 (**) 
BE Applicant 0,07 13,04 (**) 0,18 28,23 (**) 
CA Applicant 0,14 27,78 (**) 0,22 36,54 (**) 
CH Applicant 0,09 29,20 (**) 0,08 22,68 (**) 
DE Applicant -0,04 -18,50 (**) -0,06 -24,53 (**) 
DK Applicant 0,12 19,73 (**) 0,22 29,71 (**) 
ES Applicant -0,39 -50,74 (**) 0,03 2,78 (**) 
FI Applicant 0,03 5,32 (**) 0,01 1,74 
GB Applicant 0,14 52,12 (**) 0,08 23,52 (**) 
IL Applicant 0,23 32,50 (**) 0,34 40,88 (**) 
IT Applicant -0,03 -10,60 (**) 0,12 28,73 (**) 
JP Applicant -0,05 -23,63 (**) 0,54 209,67 (**) 
KR Applicant 0,01 1,63   0,24 33,10 (**) 
NL Applicant -0,06 -18,28 (**) -0,05 -14,22 (**) 
SE Applicant 0,00 -1,06   0,07 14,71 (**) 
US Applicant 0,33 167,35 (**) 0,41 174,27 (**) 
Applicant from the ROW -0,02 -5,08 (**) 0,06 14,23 (**) 
Filing in a non-EPO (DE/EN/FR) language   -0,41 -159,13 (**) 
H2: Technological complexity 
# Inventors 0,02 33,80 (**) 0,09 128,23 (**) 
# Inventors x JC_01 0,00 -4,47 (**) -0,02 -20,84 (**) 
# Inventors x JC_03 -0,01 -5,93 (**) -0,01 -12,27 (**) 
# Inventors x JC_04 -0,01 -10,86 (**) 0,00 2,68 (**) 
# Inventors x JC_05 0,01 8,32 (**) -0,02 -11,70 (**) 
# Inventors x JC_06 0,02 16,02 (**) -0,01 -5,45 (**) 
# Inventors x JC_07 0,01 8,90 (**) 0,00 -3,35 (**) 
# Inventors x JC_08 0,01 13,96 (**) -0,03 -25,16 (**) 
# Inventors x JC_09 0,01 11,11 (**) -0,01 -6,60 (**) 
# Inventors x JC_10 0,02 21,39 (**) -0,02 -14,50 (**) 
# Inventors x JC_11 0,01 10,20 (**) -0,03 -21,42 (**) 
# Inventors x JC_12 0,01 4,18 (**) -0,03 -20,94 (**) 
# Inventors x JC_13 0,00 -0,89   -0,05 -32,11 (**) 
# Inventors x JC_14 0,03 28,76 (**) -0,01 -8,97 (**) 
# IPC-7 0,03 45,08 (**) 0,10 118,62 (**) 
# IPC-7 x JC_01 0,01 7,04 (**) -0,02 -17,76 (**) 
# IPC-7 x JC_03 -0,01 -5,79 (**) -0,06 -45,93 (**) 
# IPC-7 x JC_04 0,00 3,62 (**) -0,02 -14,53 (**) 
# IPC-7 x JC_05 -0,01 -5,91 (**) -0,04 -16,78 (**) 
# IPC-7 x JC_06 0,00 -1,12   -0,03 -14,13 (**) 
# IPC-7 x JC_07 0,00 0,32   -0,02 -11,57 (**) 
# IPC-7 x JC_08 0,00 0,83   -0,02 -11,27 (**) 
# IPC-7 x JC_09 -0,02 -7,42 (**) -0,06 -22,26 (**) 
# IPC-7 x JC_10 -0,01 -4,59 (**) -0,02 -12,12 (**) 
# IPC-7 x JC_11 0,00 3,70 (**) -0,03 -23,97 (**) 
# IPC-7 x JC_12 0,00 1,78   -0,03 -19,39 (**) 
# IPC-7 x JC_13 0,00 -1,39   -0,04 -22,75 (**) 
# IPC-7 x JC_14 0,00 2,81 (**) -0,03 -16,79 (**) 
Significance levels: (*) p < 5% - (**) p < 1% | 22 Time Dummies included in the model
  
Claims 1982-2004 Pages 1988-2002 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z 
# Backward Patent Citations 0,02 49,13 (**) 0,00 11,20 (**) 
# Backward Patent Citations x JC_01 0,00 -2,01 (*) 0,01 9,74 (**) 
# Backward Patent Citations x JC_03 -0,01 -14,00 (**) 0,00 -2,84 (**) 
# Backward Patent Citations x JC_04 -0,01 -18,17 (**) -0,02 -26,40 (**) 
# Backward Patent Citations x JC_05 0,00 2,90 (**) 0,00 1,69 
# Backward Patent Citations x JC_06 0,01 7,82 (**) 0,00 4,69 (**) 
# Backward Patent Citations x JC_07 0,01 11,67 (**) 0,01 9,35 (**) 
# Backward Patent Citations x JC_08 0,01 7,79 (**) 0,01 15,29 (**) 
# Backward Patent Citations x JC_09 0,00 4,53 (**) -0,01 -7,11 (**) 
# Backward Patent Citations x JC_10 0,01 14,86 (**) 0,01 13,51 (**) 
# Backward Patent Citations x JC_11 0,01 14,28 (**) 0,01 13,84 (**) 
# Backward Patent Citations x JC_12 0,01 10,21 (**) 0,01 18,07 (**) 
# Backward Patent Citations x JC_13 0,01 13,89 (**) 0,01 16,75 (**) 
# Backward Patent Citations x JC_14 0,00 7,71 (**) 0,01 19,37 (**) 
# Non Patent Citations 0,01 18,09 (**) 0,02 28,08 (**) 
# Non Patent Citations x JC_01 -0,01 -9,61 (**) -0,02 -17,46 (**) 
# Non Patent Citations x JC_03 0,00 0,23   -0,01 -7,39 (**) 
# Non Patent Citations x JC_04 0,01 12,79 (**) 0,02 28,20 (**) 
# Non Patent Citations x JC_05 0,01 4,62 (**) 0,02 12,77 (**) 
# Non Patent Citations x JC_06 0,01 8,46 (**) 0,01 4,22 (**) 
# Non Patent Citations x JC_07 0,00 0,06   0,00 -2,52 (*) 
# Non Patent Citations x JC_08 0,01 12,48 (**) -0,01 -4,32 (**) 
# Non Patent Citations x JC_09 0,01 10,02 (**) 0,04 27,67 (**) 
# Non Patent Citations x JC_10 0,01 5,54 (**) 0,00 1,42 
# Non Patent Citations x JC_11 -0,02 -13,50 (**) -0,02 -11,07 (**) 
# Non Patent Citations x JC_12 -0,02 -10,20 (**) -0,02 -8,33 (**) 
# Non Patent Citations x JC_13 -0,01 -7,55 (**) -0,02 -7,54 (**) 
# Non Patent Citations x JC_14 0,00 -0,82   0,00 -0,86 
H3 Emerging sectors (Reference = JC-02 - Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 0,01 2,96 (**) -0,11 -20,23 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,10 20,14 (**) 0,16 28,47 (**) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,18 41,42 (**) 0,35 69,69 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,09 13,44 (**) 0,15 20,11 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,05 8,28 (**) 0,22 29,56 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics -0,05 -10,07 (**) 0,05 8,83 (**) 
JC-08 - Electricity & Elec. Machines -0,07 -15,19 (**) -0,04 -7,96 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,10 15,51 (**) 0,37 50,57 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics -0,06 -12,01 (**) -0,02 -2,99 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing -0,09 -19,71 (**) -0,02 -3,80 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles & Gen. Technology -0,13 -26,09 (**) -0,09 -15,42 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics -0,11 -21,03 (**) -0,03 -5,12 (**) 
JC-14 - Human Necessities -0,06 -13,27 (**) -0,06 -10,40 (**) 
H4: Portfolio construction 
# Priorities 0,11 162,11 (**) 0,15 190,48 (**) 
Application has issued divisionals 0,30 90,39 (**) 0,26 74,32 (**) 
Application is a divisional -0,20 -57,41 (**) 0,34 88,62 (**) 
Cumulative Filings (Coef. x10e3) -0,03 -51,60 (**) -0,01 -16,13 (**) 
Occasional (no filing in 5 prev, yrs) 0,05 38,60 (**) 0,01 9,92 (**) 
Constant 1,98 458,12 (**) 1,59 331,06 (**) 
Model 
F(65/58) 435794 974433 
P > F 0,00 0,00 
# Observations 1.454.552 1.092.164 
Significance levels: (*) p < 5% - (**) p < 1% | 22 Time Dummies included in the model 
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Chapter 4 
A4.1 Figures 
Figure A4.1 – The Provisional Scope-Year Index 
 
Provisional Scope-year index in 10 countries over 10 years 
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Figure A4.6 – Evolution of the search documentation available at the EPO 
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A4.2 Tables 
Table A4.1 – The Scope-Year Index, by JC cluster 
 Year of filing at EPO 
Joint Cluster 1980 1985 1990 1995 95-85 
Industrial Chemistry 47,6 48,7 44,6 40,3 -8,4 
Organic Chemistry 56,5 62,0 59,3 53,2 -8,9 
Polymers 47,8 49,2 44,8 41,3 -7,9 
Biotechnologies 57,4 63,2 60,2 54,9 -8,4 
Telecommunications 45,5 44,4 44,0 34,6 -9,8 
Audio-Video-Media 39,4 39,1 34,1 31,5 -7,6 
Electronics 40,5 39,7 35,5 33,0 -6,7 
Electricity 41,3 40,7 35,1 33,1 -7,7 
Computers 40,8 40,2 34,2 32,4 -7,7 
Measuring Optics 41,7 43,0 37,7 35,1 -7,9 
Handling & Processing 45,9 48,6 42,2 39,2 -9,4 
Vehicles 39,9 40,3 35,7 33,4 -6,8 
Civil Engineering 43,4 44,6 39,8 36,8 -7,9 
Human Necessities 46,1 48,0 42,9 39,7 -8,2 
Overall 46,2 47,3 42,4 38,8 -8,5 
Source: own calculation from EPO data - See Equation 4.1 in main text 
 
 
Table A4.2 – Average patent value indicators by country of applicant 
Country 5-yr Citations Grant rate Opposition Rate SY Index Share of Triadic 
Australia 1.26 47% 4% 30.29 59% 
Austria 1.04 72% 6% 39.62 36% 
Belgium 1.02 67% 4% 34.18 55% 
Canada 1.91 65% 5% 32.30 60% 
Denmark 1.47 71% 10% 39.36 47% 
Finland 1.93 72% 6% 36.22 58% 
France 1.08 72% 5% 31.62 43% 
Germany 1.09 73% 7% 34.54 38% 
Israel 1.47 47% 9% 28.54 45% 
Italy 0.91 63% 5% 29.51 25% 
Japan 1.41 73% 3% 26.44 85% 
Korea 1.07 59% 2% 23.91 72% 
Spain 0.68 50% 3% 27.85 27% 
Sweden 1.46 71% 6% 35.16 68% 
Switzerland 1.22 70% 6% 38.54 51% 
The Netherlands 1.33 68% 8% 32.64 60% 
United Kingdom 1.47 66% 5% 31.98 52% 
United States 1.95 56% 5% 28.82 71% 
Country Average 1.32 65% 6% 32.31 53% 
Applications filed in 1995 
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Table A4.3 – Average patent value indicators by Joint Cluster 
Sector 5-yr Citations Grant rate Opposition Rate SY Index Share of Triadic 
Industrial Chemistry 1.46 69% 7% 32.59 62% 
Organic Chemistry 1.92 62% 8% 42.36 71% 
Polymers 1.68 71% 8% 33.59 69% 
Biotechnology 2.09 54% 7% 41.76 70% 
Telecommunications 2.84 50% 2% 24.46 65% 
Audio/Video/Media 1.89 64% 2% 24.09 77% 
Electronics 1.46 67% 4% 25.91 66% 
Electricity & Electrical Machines 1.21 67% 3% 25.94 64% 
Computers 1.65 58% 3% 23.48 69% 
Measuring Optics 1.37 62% 4% 27.69 67% 
Handling & Processing 0.96 70% 6% 31.18 46% 
Vehicles & General Technology 1.03 72% 5% 27.03 45% 
Civil Eng. / Thermodynamics 0.94 69% 6% 29.17 37% 
Human necessities 1.52 66% 6% 31.44 54% 
JC Average 1.57 64% 5% 30.05 62% 
Applications filed in 1995 
 
 
Table A4.4 – Pearson correlation matrix of patent value indicators (pairwise correlations) 
Indicator 01 02 03 04 05 
01 5-year Forward Citations Received 1.00         
02 ESY Index (10 countries over 10 years) 0.14 1.00       
03 Triadic 0.17 0.18 1.00     
04 Granted and Validated 0.09 0.64 0.23 1.00   
05 Patent has been opposed 0.10 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 1.00 
All coefficients significant at 1% probability level 
Dataset: Applications filed between 1980 and 1995 | Pending applications excluded for "grant" indicator 
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Chapter 5 
A5.1 Figures 
Figure A5.1 – Box plot of the number of forward citations (CITE5) 
 
 
Figure A5.2 – Box plot of the number of countries of validation (EPCFM) 
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Figure A5.3 – Box plot of the composite index (COMPO) 
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Figure A5.5 – Box plot of the share of claims lost in examination (CLMLS) 
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Figure A5.7 – Box plot of the number of equivalents (EQUIV) 
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Figure A5.9 – Box plot of the number of IPC8 classes (IPC8) 
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Figure A5.11 – Box plot of the number of non-patent citations (NPC) 
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Figure A5.13 – Fit of the model – Citations (CITE5) – Within-sample prediction 
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Figure A5.15 – Fit of the model – Triadic (TRIAD) – Within-sample prediction 
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Figure A5.17 – Fit of the model – Oppositions (OPPOS) – Within-sample prediction 
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A5.2 Tables 
Table A5.1 – Codes used to refer to the state of the art on patent value in the tables 
Code Short Reference Code Short Reference Code Short Reference
AANM91 Albert et al. (1991) GVP00 Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000) ODST98 O’Donoghue et al. (1998)
AL98 Allison and Lemley (1998) GVP02 Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2002) P86 Pakes (1986)
ALMT03 Allison et al. (2003) HC03 Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) PS84 Pakes and Schankerman (1984)
ACC04 Arora et al. (2004) H99 Hall (1999) PS89 Pakes and Simpson (1989)
A93 Austin (1993) HH04 Hall and Harhoff (2004) PJW05 Palangkaraya et al. (2005)
B06 Bessen (2006) HMG06 Hall and MacGarvie (2006) P03 Palomeras (2003)
B05 Betran (2005) HJT01 Hall et al. (2001) P96 Putnam (1996)
BCM07 Blind et al. (2007) HGHM03 Hall et al. (2003) R02 Reitzig (2002)
BVR02 Bloom and van Reenen (2002) HJT05 Hall et al. (2005) R03 Reitzig (2003)
BR01 Bosworth and Rogers (2001) HTT07 Hall et al. (2007) R04a Reitzig (2004a)
PATVAL06 Brusoni et al. (2006) HH02 Harhoff and Hall (2002) R04b Reitzig (2004b)
CS04 Calderini and Scellato (2004) HR04 Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) SVP07 Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe (2007) 
CN79 Campbell and Nieves (1979) HNSV99 Harhoff et al. (1999) SVPN06 Sapsalis et al. (2006)
CN83 Carpenter and Narin (1983) HSV02 Harhoff et al. (2002) S98 Schankerman (1998)
CC80 Carpenter et al. (1980) HSV03 Harhoff et al. (2003) SP86 Schankerman and Pakes (1986)
CNW81 Carpenter et al. (1981) HWW05 Hunter et al. (2005) S65 Scherer (1965)
CG88 Cockburn and Griliches (1988) JTF00 Jaffe et al. (2000) SH00 Scherer and Harhoff (2000)
CS99 Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) JW03 Jerak and Wagner (2003) SHK00 Scherer et al. (2000)
C04 Cremers (2004) KT86 Kamien and Tauman (1986) S06 Schneider (2006)
CDK96 Crépon et al. (1996) KVMB02 Kleinknecht et al. (2002) S07 Schneider (2007)
CHO05 Czarnitzki et al. (2005) K90 Klemperer (1990) S99 Scotchmer (1999)
D05 Deng (2005) KL99 Kortum and Lerner (1999) SG90 Scotchmer and Green (1990)
DG61 Dernburg and Gharrity (1961) K98 Kremer (1998) S05 Serrano (2005)
DI97 Duguet and Iung (1997) L93 Lanjouw (1993) S01 Shane (2001)
G92 Gallini(1992) L98 Lanjouw (1998) SK97 Shane and Klock (1997)
G05 Gambardella (2005) LS97 Lanjouw and Schankerman (1997) ST04 Sherry and Teece (2004)
GHV06 Gambardella et al. (2006) LS99 Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) SV04 Silverberg and Verspagen (2004)
GS90 Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) LS01 Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) S94 Sullivan (1994)
GHHM02 Graham et al. (2002) LS04 Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) T86 Teece (1986)
GS95 Greene and Scotchmer (1995) LPP98 Lanjouw et al. (1998) T06 Teece (2006)
GR06 Greenhalgh and Rogers (2006) L94 Lerner (1994) TF94 Tong and Frame (1994)
GR07 Greenhalgh and Rogers (2007) MN90 Merges and Nelson (1990) T90 Trajtenberg (1990)
GJW05 Griffiths et al. (2005) MT05 Meyer and Tang (2005) VBVZ08 van Pottelsberghe and van Zeebroeck (2008) 
G81 Griliches (1981) N04 Nagaoka (2004) VZ07 van Zeebroeck (2007)
G89 Griliches (1989) NNP87 Narin et al. (1987) W04 Wagner (2004)
GPH86 Griliches et al. (1986) NS06 Noel and Schankerman (2006) WPJ07 Webster et al. (2007)
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Table A5.2 – Summary Statistics of classical determinants and control variables 
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Technological complexity (PC) 
INVENT 248856 2,40 1,71 1 32
IPC8 248532 1,93 1,29 1 43
BPC 245961 4,48 2,88 0 99
NPC 245963 0,99 1,79 0 61
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
CUMUL (/1000) 248856 0,41 0,88 0,00 4,83
OCCAS 248856 0,21 0,41 0 1
ACAD 248855 0,02 0,13 0 1
CBOWN 248856 0,10 0,29 0 1
EPO Joint Clusters 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 248856 0,12 0,33 0 1
JC-02 - Organic Chemistry 248856 0,13 0,34 0 1
JC-03 - Polymers 248856 0,11 0,31 0 1
JC-04 - Biotechnology 248856 0,10 0,30 0 1
JC-05 - Telecommunications 248856 0,03 0,18 0 1
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 248856 0,05 0,22 0 1
JC-07 - Electronics 248856 0,08 0,27 0 1
JC-08 - Electricity & Elec. Machines 248856 0,11 0,32 0 1
JC-09 - Computers 248856 0,03 0,18 0 1
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 248856 0,09 0,29 0 1
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 248856 0,14 0,35 0 1
JC-12 - Vehicles & Gen. Technology 248856 0,10 0,30 0 1
JC-13 - Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics 248856 0,09 0,29 0 1
JC-14 - Human Necessities 248856 0,11 0,31 0 1
Country of residence of applicant 
AT Applicant 248856 0,01 0,10 0 1
AU Applicant 248856 0,00 0,07 0 1
BE Applicant 248856 0,01 0,10 0 1
CA Applicant 248856 0,01 0,09 0 1
CH Applicant 248856 0,04 0,19 0 1
DE Applicant 248856 0,20 0,40 0 1
DK Applicant 248856 0,01 0,08 0 1
ES Applicant 248856 0,00 0,06 0 1
FI Applicant 248856 0,01 0,09 0 1
FR Applicant 248856 0,09 0,28 0 1
GB Applicant 248856 0,05 0,22 0 1
IL Applicant 248856 0,00 0,05 0 1
IT Applicant 248856 0,03 0,18 0 1
JP Applicant 248856 0,22 0,41 0 1
KR Applicant 248856 0,00 0,06 0 1
NL Applicant 248856 0,04 0,19 0 1
SE Applicant 248856 0,02 0,14 0 1
US Applicant 248856 0,26 0,44 0 1
Applicant from the ROW 248856 0,02 0,13 0 1
Year of filing 
1990 248856 0,17 0,37 0 1
1991 248856 0,16 0,37 0 1
1992 248856 0,16 0,37 0 1
1993 248856 0,17 0,37 0 1
1994 248856 0,17 0,38 0 1
1995 248856 0,17 0,38 0 1
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Table A5.3 – Spearman rank correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 
00 CLMDEV_MED 1,000 
01 ln(CLMDEV_MEAN) 0,996 1,000 
02 CLMLS 0,242 0,243 1,000 
03 PRIO 0,147 0,145 0,073 1,000 
04 EQUIV 0,128 0,124 0,042 0,050 1,000 
05 HASDIV 0,143 0,140 0,147 0,128 0,114 1,000 
06 ISDIV -0,064 -0,065 -0,019 0,123 -0,055 -0,035 1,000 
07 PCT 0,123 0,119 -0,044 0,005 0,098 0,046 -0,105 1,000 
08 ACCSRC 0,034 0,032 0,020 0,027 0,008 0,026 0,046 -0,047 1,000 
09 CUMUL/1000 -0,054 -0,065 0,008 0,065 0,027 0,006 -0,010 -0,177 0,011 1,000 
10 OCCAS 0,040 0,046 0,007 -0,055 -0,014 -0,001 0,013 0,146 0,009 -0,680 1,000 
11 INVENT 0,086 0,076 0,017 0,182 0,034 0,079 0,064 -0,003 0,011 0,232 -0,209 
12 IPC8 0,109 0,110 0,007 0,061 0,047 0,072 0,026 0,091 0,003 -0,016 0,005 
13 BPC 0,138 0,142 0,116 0,056 0,020 0,062 0,009 0,078 0,016 -0,113 0,085 
14 NPC 0,051 0,038 0,063 0,085 0,024 0,067 0,015 0,024 0,033 0,140 -0,087 
15 CBOWN 0,025 0,024 -0,014 -0,046 0,008 -0,002 -0,005 0,038 -0,009 0,036 -0,031 
16 ACAD 0,056 0,055 -0,002 0,011 0,037 0,035 0,001 0,101 0,002 -0,056 0,004 
17 JC_01 0,021 0,016 0,000 0,007 0,000 -0,023 -0,020 0,026 -0,017 -0,034 -0,001 
18 JC_02 0,003 -0,005 -0,083 0,038 0,042 0,023 -0,010 0,116 -0,019 0,042 -0,053 
19 JC_03 0,029 0,012 -0,013 0,025 0,029 -0,011 -0,008 0,003 -0,006 0,106 -0,073 
20 JC_04 0,041 0,030 -0,043 0,038 0,056 0,058 -0,006 0,162 -0,002 -0,064 0,008 
21 JC_05 -0,010 -0,008 -0,012 -0,022 0,006 0,004 0,002 -0,003 0,019 0,101 -0,048 
22 JC_06 0,005 -0,007 0,032 0,048 0,002 0,032 0,035 -0,047 0,041 0,133 -0,060 
23 JC_07 -0,003 -0,009 0,035 0,007 -0,007 0,015 0,028 -0,058 0,017 0,122 -0,059 
24 JC_08 -0,005 0,002 0,032 -0,003 -0,013 -0,008 -0,005 -0,065 -0,002 0,103 -0,054 
25 JC_09 0,014 -0,005 0,012 -0,019 0,029 0,012 0,007 -0,018 0,039 0,067 -0,020 
26 JC_10 0,017 -0,002 0,024 0,014 0,009 0,007 0,005 -0,002 0,007 0,031 -0,017 
27 JC_11 -0,005 0,011 0,004 -0,031 -0,035 -0,021 -0,011 -0,012 -0,015 -0,167 0,099 
28 JC_12 -0,022 0,010 -0,012 -0,028 -0,033 -0,029 -0,015 -0,025 -0,018 -0,098 0,049 
29 JC_13 -0,019 0,014 0,003 -0,032 -0,028 -0,025 -0,013 -0,008 -0,018 -0,131 0,092 
30 JC_14 0,026 0,010 0,021 -0,007 0,015 0,027 0,028 0,029 0,020 -0,134 0,106 
31 APP_AT -0,025 -0,022 -0,018 -0,012 -0,027 -0,010 -0,007 0,008 -0,008 -0,074 0,039 
32 APP_AU 0,045 0,045 0,012 0,016 -0,012 0,007 0,000 0,081 0,007 -0,065 0,060 
33 APP_BE 0,007 0,006 -0,013 -0,049 -0,016 -0,004 -0,001 -0,008 -0,003 -0,018 0,011 
34 APP_CA 0,037 0,037 -0,003 -0,015 0,029 0,004 -0,002 0,073 -0,005 -0,074 0,057 
35 APP_CH 0,016 0,018 -0,017 -0,055 -0,037 -0,019 -0,015 -0,037 -0,009 -0,057 0,022 
36 APP_DE -0,111 -0,103 -0,069 -0,081 -0,132 -0,067 -0,046 -0,039 -0,020 0,005 -0,007 
37 APP_DK -0,011 -0,011 -0,020 -0,009 -0,012 -0,002 -0,006 0,088 -0,005 -0,051 0,035 
38 APP_ES -0,038 -0,037 -0,005 -0,008 -0,015 -0,010 -0,007 -0,006 -0,003 -0,065 0,059 
39 APP_FI -0,021 -0,021 -0,017 -0,017 -0,018 -0,009 -0,008 0,061 -0,011 -0,048 0,030 
40 APP_FR -0,036 -0,032 -0,073 -0,070 -0,081 -0,046 -0,038 -0,065 -0,030 -0,062 0,020 
41 APP_GB 0,042 0,043 -0,011 0,019 -0,033 0,006 -0,006 0,110 -0,011 -0,066 0,042 
42 APP_IL 0,018 0,017 -0,003 -0,002 -0,002 0,000 -0,002 0,001 0,008 -0,050 0,043 
43 APP_IT -0,047 -0,044 -0,001 -0,068 -0,051 -0,027 -0,018 -0,057 0,003 -0,111 0,069 
44 APP_JP -0,069 -0,074 0,083 0,291 -0,141 0,061 0,082 -0,210 0,057 0,226 -0,166 
45 APP_KR -0,017 -0,018 0,010 0,008 -0,012 -0,002 0,003 -0,006 -0,002 -0,026 0,011 
46 APP_NL -0,029 -0,030 -0,014 -0,025 -0,025 -0,011 -0,008 -0,014 -0,017 0,079 -0,022 
47 APP_SE -0,043 -0,041 -0,021 -0,028 -0,026 -0,013 -0,011 0,127 -0,014 -0,075 0,053 
48 APP_US 0,208 0,199 0,070 -0,067 0,395 0,062 0,017 0,153 0,005 0,062 -0,028 
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
11 INVENT 1,000 
12 IPC8 0,096 1,000 
13 BPC -0,005 0,081 1,000 
14 NPC 0,144 0,055 -0,024 1,000 
15 CBOWN -0,008 0,010 -0,007 -0,013 1,000 
16 ACAD 0,056 0,048 -0,033 0,091 -0,010 1,000 
17 JC_01 0,083 0,129 0,059 0,015 -0,004 0,021 1,000 
18 JC_02 0,184 0,128 -0,084 0,124 0,055 0,089 -0,012 1,000 
19 JC_03 0,123 0,096 0,010 -0,017 0,019 -0,017 -0,022 -0,038 1,000 
20 JC_04 0,129 0,069 -0,100 0,193 0,031 0,165 -0,079 0,434 -0,092 1,000 
21 JC_05 -0,025 -0,011 -0,086 0,078 0,022 -0,018 -0,069 -0,073 -0,065 -0,062 1,000 
22 JC_06 -0,011 -0,016 -0,039 0,094 -0,008 -0,019 -0,075 -0,088 -0,067 -0,074 0,020 
23 JC_07 -0,026 -0,003 -0,008 0,063 -0,020 -0,029 -0,039 -0,112 -0,094 -0,092 0,013 
24 JC_08 0,003 -0,010 -0,026 0,046 -0,016 -0,025 0,006 -0,134 -0,095 -0,108 -0,041 
25 JC_09 -0,008 -0,022 -0,075 0,073 -0,001 -0,014 -0,068 -0,072 -0,063 -0,059 0,014 
26 JC_10 0,015 -0,018 0,014 0,079 -0,017 0,016 -0,081 -0,106 0,024 0,170 -0,044 
27 JC_11 -0,114 0,023 0,091 -0,135 -0,002 -0,037 -0,065 -0,145 -0,076 -0,121 -0,074 
28 JC_12 -0,103 0,006 0,063 -0,139 -0,017 -0,033 -0,101 -0,132 -0,098 -0,109 -0,058 
29 JC_13 -0,101 0,056 0,071 -0,124 -0,016 -0,015 -0,058 -0,119 -0,101 -0,100 -0,056 
30 JC_14 -0,072 -0,062 0,093 -0,140 -0,006 -0,011 -0,096 -0,103 0,021 -0,070 -0,064 
31 APP_AT -0,037 -0,006 -0,001 -0,033 0,014 -0,009 0,008 -0,011 -0,016 -0,005 -0,016 
32 APP_AU -0,020 0,014 0,058 0,027 0,003 0,038 0,007 -0,001 -0,011 0,014 -0,006 
33 APP_BE -0,002 0,003 -0,002 -0,005 0,043 0,005 0,008 0,007 0,033 0,003 -0,013 
34 APP_CA -0,012 0,007 -0,004 0,006 0,035 0,042 0,018 0,005 -0,011 0,021 0,017 
35 APP_CH -0,063 0,001 0,008 -0,043 0,148 -0,019 -0,020 0,033 -0,002 0,001 -0,025 
36 APP_DE -0,024 -0,014 -0,013 -0,115 -0,034 -0,054 0,004 -0,020 -0,028 -0,055 -0,031 
37 APP_DK -0,025 0,003 -0,009 -0,018 0,016 -0,004 0,003 0,021 -0,004 0,033 -0,012 
38 APP_ES -0,026 -0,006 0,001 -0,015 0,005 0,005 -0,010 0,004 -0,013 0,009 -0,007 
39 APP_FI -0,026 -0,001 -0,014 -0,026 -0,004 -0,011 0,004 -0,018 -0,010 -0,006 0,074 
40 APP_FR -0,052 -0,010 -0,010 -0,039 0,012 0,043 0,006 -0,008 -0,054 -0,001 0,013 
41 APP_GB -0,052 0,012 -0,005 -0,015 0,116 0,011 -0,003 0,047 -0,027 0,033 0,007 
42 APP_IL -0,009 0,004 0,002 0,008 0,003 0,034 -0,002 0,014 -0,007 0,029 0,001 
43 APP_IT -0,058 -0,020 -0,010 -0,033 -0,028 -0,008 -0,017 -0,001 -0,021 -0,003 -0,018 
44 APP_JP 0,193 -0,021 0,002 0,185 -0,128 -0,046 -0,004 -0,056 0,041 -0,052 0,003 
45 APP_KR -0,009 -0,002 -0,004 0,011 -0,001 0,025 -0,005 -0,005 -0,011 -0,006 -0,001 
46 APP_NL -0,036 -0,004 -0,015 -0,001 0,207 -0,014 -0,013 0,019 -0,014 -0,003 0,021 
47 APP_SE -0,058 -0,004 -0,030 -0,050 0,012 -0,016 -0,004 -0,020 -0,016 -0,002 0,031 
48 APP_US 0,031 0,045 0,027 0,030 0,024 0,063 0,011 0,048 0,065 0,071 0,014 
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22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 
22 JC_06 1,000 
23 JC_07 -0,004 1,000 
24 JC_08 -0,050 0,007 1,000 
25 JC_09 0,006 0,036 -0,054 1,000 
26 JC_10 -0,013 -0,040 -0,044 -0,033 1,000 
27 JC_11 -0,090 -0,097 -0,108 -0,067 -0,092 1,000 
28 JC_12 -0,073 -0,073 -0,083 -0,058 -0,080 -0,023 1,000 
29 JC_13 -0,072 -0,068 -0,084 -0,053 -0,080 -0,075 -0,007 1,000 
30 JC_14 -0,057 -0,082 -0,103 -0,046 -0,073 -0,076 -0,081 -0,087 1,000 
31 APP_AT -0,020 -0,016 -0,011 -0,014 -0,012 0,022 0,013 0,038 0,014 1,000 
32 APP_AU -0,007 -0,011 -0,014 -0,006 -0,002 0,000 0,002 0,018 0,015 -0,007 1,000 
33 APP_BE -0,004 -0,018 0,001 -0,012 -0,002 -0,001 -0,017 -0,001 0,018 -0,009 -0,009 1,000 
34 APP_CA -0,007 -0,009 -0,012 -0,008 0,000 0,002 -0,011 0,004 0,001 -0,010 -0,010 -0,009 
35 APP_CH -0,036 -0,032 -0,024 -0,025 0,005 0,065 -0,010 0,016 0,015 0,006 0,006 -0,018 
36 APP_DE -0,071 -0,049 -0,015 -0,048 -0,029 0,061 0,082 0,078 -0,016 -0,047 -0,047 -0,043 
37 APP_DK -0,012 -0,019 -0,020 -0,012 -0,010 0,002 -0,007 0,018 0,016 -0,009 -0,009 -0,008 
38 APP_ES -0,011 -0,013 -0,009 0,000 -0,011 0,009 0,018 0,009 0,010 -0,006 -0,006 -0,005 
39 APP_FI -0,011 0,000 -0,015 -0,006 -0,008 0,022 -0,012 0,007 -0,011 -0,010 -0,010 -0,009 
40 APP_FR -0,022 -0,008 0,009 -0,006 -0,008 -0,011 0,057 0,028 -0,003 -0,032 -0,032 -0,022 
41 APP_GB -0,010 -0,021 -0,030 0,001 0,006 -0,011 0,022 0,012 -0,009 -0,024 -0,024 -0,021 
42 APP_IL 0,001 -0,005 -0,010 -0,002 0,006 -0,001 -0,006 -0,008 0,014 -0,006 -0,006 -0,004 
43 APP_IT -0,027 -0,009 -0,010 -0,017 -0,025 0,062 0,014 0,016 0,001 -0,019 -0,019 -0,013 
44 APP_JP 0,130 0,106 0,063 0,017 0,038 -0,062 -0,058 -0,072 -0,054 -0,055 -0,055 -0,051 
45 APP_KR 0,054 0,022 0,007 0,003 -0,012 -0,013 -0,006 -0,002 -0,012 -0,004 -0,004 -0,006 
46 APP_NL 0,030 0,027 0,019 -0,006 -0,015 -0,016 -0,030 -0,015 0,002 -0,020 -0,020 -0,014 
47 APP_SE -0,019 -0,017 -0,016 -0,008 -0,015 0,026 0,013 0,024 0,030 -0,015 -0,015 -0,013 
48 APP_US -0,003 -0,010 -0,009 0,067 0,026 -0,057 -0,060 -0,065 0,029 -0,062 -0,062 -0,056 
49 APP_OT -0,023 -0,009 -0,012 -0,013 -0,011 0,009 0,013 0,020 0,021 -0,014 -0,014 -0,013 
 
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 
34 APP_CA 1,000 
35 APP_CH -0,019 1,000 
36 APP_DE -0,048 -0,090 1,000 
37 APP_DK -0,008 -0,008 -0,041 1,000 
38 APP_ES -0,005 -0,012 -0,026 -0,003 1,000 
39 APP_FI -0,009 -0,018 -0,048 -0,007 -0,004 1,000 
40 APP_FR -0,026 -0,058 -0,146 -0,024 -0,016 -0,029 1,000 
41 APP_GB -0,020 -0,044 -0,101 -0,019 -0,008 -0,022 -0,054 1,000 
42 APP_IL -0,005 -0,010 -0,025 -0,004 -0,003 -0,005 -0,016 -0,011 1,000 
43 APP_IT -0,017 -0,032 -0,090 -0,015 -0,011 -0,017 -0,054 -0,041 -0,010 1,000 
44 APP_JP -0,049 -0,102 -0,264 -0,044 -0,031 -0,050 -0,161 -0,121 -0,028 -0,095 1,000 
45 APP_KR -0,005 -0,011 -0,029 -0,005 -0,003 -0,006 -0,018 -0,012 -0,003 -0,011 -0,030 1,000 
46 APP_NL -0,018 -0,036 -0,068 -0,016 -0,011 -0,018 -0,041 0,055 -0,009 -0,034 -0,101 -0,011 1,000 
47 APP_SE -0,013 -0,027 -0,068 -0,009 -0,008 -0,012 -0,043 -0,031 -0,005 -0,026 -0,074 -0,008 -0,019 
48 APP_US -0,052 -0,114 -0,297 -0,048 -0,034 -0,056 -0,177 -0,123 -0,027 -0,106 -0,310 -0,035 -0,111 
49 APP_OT -0,013 -0,026 -0,067 -0,011 -0,008 -0,013 -0,041 -0,031 -0,007 -0,024 -0,070 -0,008 -0,026 
 
47 48 49 
47 APP_SE 1,000 
48 APP_US -0,083 1,000 
49 APP_OT -0,019 -0,079 1,000 
 
  
Table A5.4 – Industry dependencies in the main model 
5yrs Citations EPC Family Triadic Survived 10yr Opposed Composite Total 
Variable / - + / - + / - + / - + / - + / - + / - + TOT
ln(CLMDEV) 0 0 14 2 0 12 0 0 14 1 0 13 8 1 5 0 0 14 11 1 72 84 
ln(1+CLMLS) 1 13 0 1 13 0 3 11 0 7 7 0 9 2 3 1 13 0 22 59 3 84 
ln(1+PRIO) 0 0 14 5 0 9 0 0 14 8 0 6 10 2 2 0 0 14 23 2 59 84 
ln(1+EQUIV) 12 0 2 10 0 4 0 0 14 8 0 6 10 0 4 3 0 11 43 0 41 84 
HASDIV 1 0 13 0 0 14 3 0 11 0 0 14 2 0 12 0 0 14 6 0 78 84 
ISDIV 5 9 0 6 1 7 0 0 14 1 0 13 10 0 4 5 0 9 27 10 47 84 
PCT 4 0 10 0 0 14 0 0 14 4 1 9 11 2 1 1 0 13 20 3 61 84 
ACCSRC 9 1 4 10 1 3 12 0 2 8 0 6 11 0 3 9 0 5 59 2 23 84 
ln(1+CUMUL) 6 1 7 1 13 0 0 0 14 1 3 10 2 12 0 4 9 1 14 38 32 84 
OCCAS 9 2 3 2 8 4 3 11 0 6 8 0 13 1 0 4 9 1 37 39 8 84 
ACAD 9 0 5 8 4 2 11 3 0 8 5 1 11 3 0 11 2 1 58 17 9 84 
ln(INVENT) 0 0 14 5 1 8 3 0 11 2 0 12 5 0 9 1 0 13 16 1 67 84 
ln(IPC8) 0 0 14 3 1 10 6 0 8 8 0 6 10 2 2 0 0 14 27 3 54 84 
ln(1+BPC) 1 0 13 8 4 2 3 10 1 6 1 7 0 0 14 4 2 8 22 17 45 84 
ln(1+NPC) 2 1 11 3 7 4 2 0 12 3 0 11 4 1 9 3 2 9 17 11 56 84 
CBOWN 11 0 3 2 3 9 6 8 0 7 3 4 8 0 6 5 2 7 39 16 29 84 
APP_AT 11 1 2 4 3 7 5 9 0 6 3 5 12 0 2 6 2 6 44 18 22 84 
APP_AU 12 0 2 7 6 1 7 1 6 3 0 11 9 4 0 6 4 4 44 15 24 83 
APP_BE 13 0 1 6 2 6 7 1 6 4 0 10 9 2 2 4 2 8 43 7 33 83 
APP_CA 9 0 5 4 10 0 5 0 9 4 0 10 11 3 0 11 2 1 44 15 25 84 
APP_CH 9 1 4 1 1 12 4 0 10 2 0 12 11 1 2 2 0 12 29 3 52 84 
APP_DE 7 4 3 0 4 10 1 13 0 3 0 11 6 0 8 2 4 8 19 25 40 84 
APP_DK 11 0 3 10 1 3 9 4 1 3 0 11 9 0 5 8 1 5 50 6 28 84 
APP_ES 12 2 0 9 0 5 12 2 0 7 0 7 12 1 0 12 2 0 64 7 12 83 
APP_FI 10 0 4 9 3 2 8 2 4 2 0 12 12 0 1 5 1 8 46 6 31 83 
APP_GB 9 0 5 2 12 0 5 0 9 4 0 10 13 1 0 8 4 2 41 17 26 84 
APP_IL 6 0 8 9 4 1 9 0 5 8 0 6 12 0 1 12 0 2 56 4 23 83 
APP_IT 12 2 0 5 3 6 5 7 2 0 0 14 9 4 1 8 5 1 39 21 24 84 
APP_JP 4 2 8 0 14 0 0 0 14 1 0 13 3 11 0 5 6 3 13 33 38 84 
APP_KR 13 0 1 0 14 0 2 0 12 6 0 8 13 0 0 6 8 0 40 22 21 83 
APP_NL 10 1 3 3 5 6 5 3 6 0 0 14 7 2 5 3 1 10 28 12 44 84 
APP_SE 10 0 4 3 5 6 0 0 14 1 0 13 10 0 3 0 0 14 24 5 54 83 
APP_US 0 0 14 0 14 0 0 0 14 0 0 14 6 8 0 6 2 6 12 24 48 84 
APP_OT 13 0 1 6 4 4 6 1 7 5 1 8 7 7 0 6 3 5 43 16 25 84 
FY_1991 12 0 2 1 13 0 12 2 0 11 1 2 13 0 1 5 9 0 54 25 5 84 
FY_1992 5 0 9 4 8 2 10 2 2 9 0 5 12 1 1 1 13 0 41 24 19 84 
FY_1993 1 0 13 1 11 2 8 6 0 11 1 2 9 5 0 1 13 0 31 36 17 84 
FY_1994 0 0 14 2 10 2 6 7 1 7 3 4 6 7 1 0 14 0 21 41 22 84 
FY_1995 0 0 14 1 12 1 8 5 1 10 3 1 7 7 0 0 14 0 26 41 17 84 
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Table A5.5 – Country dependencies in the main model 
5yrs Citations EPC Family Triadic Survived 10yr Opposed Composite Total 
Variable / - + / - + / - + / - + / - + / - + / - + TOT
ln(CLMDEV) 2 0 16 5 1 12 4 0 14 9 0 9 13 2 3 3 0 15 36 3 69 108
ln(1+CLMLS) 8 10 0 5 13 0 9 9 0 15 3 0 13 1 4 7 11 0 57 47 4 108
ln(1+PRIO) 7 0 11 8 0 10 3 0 15 15 0 3 14 0 4 2 0 16 49 0 59 108
ln(1+EQUIV) 16 0 2 11 1 6 5 0 13 14 0 4 7 1 8 7 0 11 60 2 44 106
HASDIV 7 0 11 3 0 15 8 0 10 5 0 13 5 0 12 4 0 14 32 0 75 107
ISDIV 15 3 0 9 2 7 5 0 13 8 0 10 13 1 2 9 1 8 59 7 40 106
PCT 11 1 6 4 1 13 1 1 16 9 2 7 15 2 1 5 0 13 45 7 56 108
ACCSRC 16 0 2 11 1 6 16 0 2 15 0 3 12 0 4 14 0 4 84 1 21 106
ln(1+CUMUL) 11 1 6 4 11 3 3 0 15 10 3 5 9 9 0 9 7 2 46 31 31 108
OCCAS 16 1 1 8 9 1 12 6 0 9 8 1 15 3 0 5 12 1 65 39 4 108
ACAD 15 1 2 12 4 2 13 5 0 11 3 3 12 2 0 15 1 2 78 16 9 103
ln(INVENT) 5 0 13 6 0 12 7 0 11 7 0 11 13 0 5 4 0 14 42 0 66 108
ln(IPC8) 3 0 15 7 0 11 12 0 6 13 1 4 15 3 0 5 0 13 55 4 49 108
ln(1+BPC) 4 0 14 11 6 1 10 8 0 13 0 5 4 0 14 12 0 6 54 14 40 108
ln(1+NPC) 6 1 11 7 4 7 11 1 6 9 0 9 8 0 10 9 0 9 50 6 52 108
CBOWN 12 0 6 6 4 8 12 4 2 8 4 6 15 1 2 11 2 5 64 15 29 108
JC_02 8 0 10 0 0 18 9 1 8 5 0 13 14 1 3 1 0 17 37 2 69 108
JC_03 7 0 11 6 3 9 9 1 8 11 1 6 8 0 10 9 0 9 50 5 53 108
JC_04 3 0 15 2 0 16 8 1 9 2 0 16 13 3 2 3 0 15 31 4 73 108
JC_05 6 0 12 8 6 4 10 5 3 7 0 11 12 5 0 10 0 8 53 16 38 107
JC_06 10 0 8 8 10 0 10 1 7 9 0 9 8 6 1 11 5 2 56 22 27 105
JC_07 14 3 1 6 12 0 12 1 5 11 0 7 13 4 0 11 6 1 67 26 14 107
JC_08 12 6 0 5 12 1 9 7 2 10 6 2 12 6 0 9 9 0 57 46 5 108
JC_09 12 1 5 9 8 1 15 2 1 9 1 8 13 5 0 14 3 1 72 20 16 108
JC_10 11 7 0 1 16 1 14 1 3 13 4 1 7 10 0 6 12 0 52 50 5 107
JC_11 7 11 0 9 6 3 10 7 1 12 6 0 13 0 5 7 8 3 58 38 12 108
JC_12 8 10 0 3 15 0 6 11 1 14 4 0 12 5 0 4 14 0 47 59 1 107
JC_13 7 11 0 6 12 0 6 12 0 8 10 0 14 4 0 6 12 0 47 61 0 108
JC_14 11 1 6 9 7 2 14 4 0 9 7 2 14 2 2 9 6 3 66 27 15 108
FY_1991 17 0 1 10 8 0 14 2 2 14 2 2 15 2 1 13 5 0 83 19 6 108
FY_1992 11 1 6 11 6 1 12 3 3 14 0 4 15 3 0 12 6 0 75 19 14 108
FY_1993 11 0 7 9 6 3 10 6 2 12 2 4 15 3 0 8 10 0 65 27 16 108
FY_1994 9 1 8 11 6 1 12 5 1 14 2 2 10 7 1 7 11 0 63 32 13 108
FY_1995 9 2 7 9 9 0 10 5 3 13 3 2 11 7 0 6 12 0 58 38 12 108
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Table A5.6 – Estimates with applicant profiles interactions 
5yrs Citations EPC Family Triadic Survived 10yrs Opposed Composite 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
ln(CLMDEV_MEAN) 0,31 19,47 (**) 0,03 6,80 (**) 0,08 6,67 (**) 0,07 7,02 (**) 0,00 0,12 0,10 16,66 (**) 
ln(1+CUMUL) x ln(CLMDEV_MEAN) 0,00 -1,57 0,00 -0,20 0,01 3,44 (**) 0,00 -0,28 0,01 1,76 0,00 -1,31 
OCCAS x ln(CLMDEV_MEAN) 0,03 1,60 0,00 -0,21 0,05 3,61 (**) 0,02 1,36 -0,01 -0,44 0,02 3,04 (**) 
ACAD x ln(CLMDEV_MEAN) 0,11 2,64 (**) 0,02 1,36 -0,05 -1,25 0,08 2,15 (*) 0,20 3,43 (**) 0,02 1,11 
ln(1+CLMLS) -0,10 -4,36 (**) -0,06 -8,16 (**) -0,10 -4,75 (**) -0,05 -2,85 (**) 0,07 2,60 (**) -0,08 -8,21 (**) 
ln(1+CUMUL) x ln(1+CLMLS) -0,01 -1,61 0,00 -0,58 0,00 -0,39 0,00 1,14 -0,01 -1,22 0,00 0,45 
OCCAS x ln(1+CLMLS) -0,01 -0,44 0,02 2,04 (*) 0,02 0,90 0,02 0,84 -0,08 -2,47 (*) 0,01 0,67 
ACAD x ln(1+CLMLS) -0,12 -2,21 (*) -0,01 -0,84 0,06 1,07 -0,01 -0,30 -0,21 -3,03 (**) -0,01 -0,24 
ln(1+PRIO) 0,38 10,90 (**) 0,00 -0,16 0,65 20,23 (**) -0,09 -3,55 (**) 0,08 1,94 0,14 9,53 (**) 
ln(1+CUMUL) x ln(1+PRIO) 0,00 -0,32 0,01 4,55 (**) -0,01 -1,66 0,03 6,70 (**) -0,02 -1,88 0,00 0,95 
OCCAS x ln(1+PRIO) -0,06 -1,41 0,05 3,79 (**) 0,02 0,47 0,15 4,45 (**) 0,01 0,17 0,10 5,51 (**) 
ACAD x ln(1+PRIO) -0,06 -0,57 0,01 0,40 -0,07 -0,67 0,06 0,66 0,06 0,46 -0,02 -0,35 
ln(1+EQUIV) -0,02 -0,58 0,02 1,42 0,19 5,66 (**) 0,22 7,82 (**) 0,01 0,30 0,07 4,56 (**) 
ln(1+CUMUL) x ln(1+EQUIV) 0,00 -0,07 0,00 -1,58 0,00 -0,46 -0,04 -7,08 (**) 0,02 1,98 (*) -0,01 -2,89 (**) 
OCCAS x ln(1+EQUIV) 0,20 4,75 (**) 0,01 0,63 0,08 2,14 (*) -0,04 -1,23 0,02 0,44 0,04 2,09 (*) 
ACAD x ln(1+EQUIV) 0,05 0,73 0,09 3,66 (**) -0,05 -0,59 0,01 0,17 0,03 0,35 0,03 1,04 
HASDIV 0,22 5,15 (**) 0,12 8,13 (**) 0,29 6,39 (**) 0,32 8,55 (**) 0,26 5,39 (**) 0,23 11,97 (**) 
ln(1+CUMUL) x HASDIV 0,01 1,21 0,00 -0,20 -0,02 -1,91 0,00 -0,33 0,00 -0,09 -0,01 -1,72 
OCCAS x HASDIV -0,02 -0,32 0,03 1,89 -0,05 -1,05 0,11 2,47 (*) 0,13 2,25 (*) 0,04 1,81 
ACAD x HASDIV -0,17 -2,08 (*) 0,06 2,07 (*) -0,01 -0,13 0,27 3,02 (**) 0,33 3,54 (**) -0,01 -0,32 
ISDIV -0,14 -2,01 (*) -0,06 -3,10 (**) 0,40 6,82 (**) 0,48 10,24 (**) 0,14 1,94 0,13 5,05 (**) 
ln(1+CUMUL) x ISDIV -0,06 -3,81 (**) 0,02 3,86 (**) 0,00 -0,09 -0,02 -1,57 -0,01 -0,62 -0,02 -3,41 (**) 
OCCAS x ISDIV 0,21 2,62 (**) 0,11 4,92 (**) 0,21 3,26 (**) 0,08 1,38 -0,04 -0,52 0,15 4,87 (**) 
ACAD x ISDIV 0,31 1,68 0,20 3,43 (**) 0,44 2,07 (*) 0,52 2,90 (**) -0,01 -0,06 0,22 2,86 (**) 
PCT 0,09 9,57 (**) 0,09 32,22 (**) 0,30 41,54 (**) 0,08 11,84 (**) 0,00 -0,39 0,13 36,13 (**) 
ACCSRC 0,24 3,45 (**) -0,05 -2,21 (*) 0,04 0,59 -0,05 -0,99 0,19 2,39 (*) 0,01 0,33 
ln(1+CUMUL) x ACCSRC -0,04 -3,15 (**) 0,02 3,68 (**) 0,03 2,13 (*) 0,05 5,36 (**) -0,04 -2,14 (*) 0,01 1,58 
OCCAS x ACCSRC -0,14 -1,64 0,09 3,45 (**) -0,12 -1,57 0,07 1,01 0,06 0,60 0,05 1,40 






5yrs Citations EPC Family Triadic Survived 10yrs Opposed Composite 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Technical complexity (PC) 
INVENT 0,18 28,04 (**) 0,02 11,96 (**) 0,11 20,51 (**) 0,07 14,72 (**) 0,07 8,89 (**) 0,08 29,66 (**) 
IPC8 0,31 44,16 (**) 0,03 14,61 (**) 0,06 10,69 (**) 0,03 6,59 (**) -0,01 -0,96 0,08 29,52 (**) 
BPC 0,21 26,56 (**) -0,01 -5,04 (**) -0,07 -11,50 (**) 0,02 4,17 (**) 0,25 27,41 (**) 0,03 9,50 (**) 
NPC 0,06 10,06 (**) -0,01 -3,70 (**) 0,08 14,99 (**) 0,08 16,41 (**) 0,08 11,38 (**) 0,03 11,06 (**) 
Applicant profiles (PO)
ln(1+CUMUL) 0,02 3,08 (**) -0,04 -19,43 (**) 0,11 20,98 (**) -0,01 -1,58 -0,04 -5,46 (**) -0,01 -3,27 (**) 
OCCAS 0,03 0,77 -0,08 -7,45 (**) -0,11 -3,87 (**) -0,18 -7,12 (**) -0,05 -1,22 -0,16 -10,73 (**) 
ACAD 0,13 1,55 -0,04 -1,42 -0,05 -0,64 -0,11 -1,55 -0,21 -2,03 (*) -0,02 -0,52 
CBOWN 0,06 4,37 (**) 0,04 10,02 (**) -0,08 -8,21 (**) 0,01 0,72 0,11 7,82 (**) 0,03 6,06 (**) 
Model 
# Observations 242048 239528 242048 239536 242048 242048 
Pseudo R² 0,05 0,06 0,21 0,05 0,05 0,04
Log likelihood -229149 -566537 -122940 -157394 -52256 -539111 
LR Test of alpha=0 (P>chibar²) 41000 (0,00) 69833,55 (0,00) 64.469 (0,00) 17.257 (0,00) 4.945 (0,00) 51000 (0,00) 
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Table A5.7 – Instrumental regressions (OLS Estimates) 
# Claims CLMDEV 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies 
RFREP (# Legal representatives) 1,76 26,07 (**) 0,14 26,94 (**) 
PRIO 1,69 73,31 (**) 0,13 74,21 (**) 
HASDIV 5,85 64,32 (**) 0,44 62,52 (**) 
ISDIV -3,86 -34,17 (**) -0,30 -34,22 (**) 
PCT 1,42 32,55 (**) 0,10 30,86 (**) 
US1ST (US 1st Filings – Non-US Applicant) 3,86 31,70 (**) 0,29 31,21 (**) 
XUS1ST (Non-US 1st Filing – US Applicant) -3,16 -22,67 (**) -0,24 -22,80 (**) 
Technical complexity (PC) 
INVENT 0,47 41,45 (**) 0,04 40,45 (**) 
IPC8 0,60 41,88 (**) 0,04 38,97 (**) 
BPC 0,34 52,16 (**) 0,03 55,58 (**) 
NPC 0,27 24,82 (**) 0,02 20,76 (**) 
EPO Joint Clusters 
JC-02 - Organic Chemistry -0,80 -12,04 (**) -0,09 -17,45 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,22 3,62 (**) -0,01 -2,25 (*) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 1,75 24,31 (**) 0,02 3,70 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,21 1,98 (*) 0,06 7,46 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 1,27 14,66 (**) 0,04 6,66 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,08 1,19 0,04 6,63 (**) 
JC-08 - Electricity -0,11 -1,76 0,04 8,73 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 1,12 10,82 (**) 0,02 2,96 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,37 5,59 (**) -0,01 -1,23 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing -0,18 -3,03 (**) 0,04 9,76 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles -0,66 -10,04 (**) 0,06 11,69 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering -0,53 -7,57 (**) 0,05 9,48 (**) 
JC-14 - Human Necessities 0,72 11,48 (**) 0,02 3,81 (**) 
Country of residence of applicants 
AT -0,28 -1,56 -0,02 -1,78 
AU 3,33 12,68 (**) 0,26 12,81 (**) 
BE 1,09 5,63 (**) 0,09 5,93 (**) 
CA 1,35 6,43 (**) 0,11 6,94 (**) 
CH 1,68 15,22 (**) 0,13 15,08 (**) 
DE -0,16 -2,23 (*) 0,00 -0,87 
DK 0,50 2,18 (*) 0,03 1,53 
ES -2,94 -9,57 (**) -0,23 -9,80 (**) 
FI -1,48 -7,47 (**) -0,11 -7,50 (**) 
GB 0,84 8,78 (**) 0,07 9,45 (**) 
IL 1,89 5,47 (**) 0,14 5,40 (**) 
IT -0,46 -4,02 (**) -0,04 -4,01 (**) 
JP -1,12 -15,51 (**) -0,08 -15,17 (**) 
KR -1,58 -5,06 (**) -0,12 -5,10 (**) 
NL -0,86 -8,14 (**) -0,07 -8,27 (**) 
SE -1,41 -9,86 (**) -0,11 -9,95 (**) 
US 3,43 49,47 (**) 0,27 50,07 (**) 
RoW -0,37 -2,50 (*) -0,02 -2,17 (*) 
Time dummies 
FY_1991 0,05 0,80 -0,02 -5,09 (**) 
FY_1992 0,04 0,72 -0,04 -7,80 (**) 
FY_1993 0,24 3,87 (**) -0,06 -12,29 (**) 
FY_1994 0,43 6,98 (**) -0,06 -13,10 (**) 
FY_1995 0,50 8,02 (**) -0,09 -17,83 (**) 
Intercept 3,43 31,50 (**) 0,33 39,01 (**) 
Model 
# Observations 245635 245635 
Adj. R-squared 0,16 0,15 
F-Stat 1017,33 887,44 
Prob > F 0,00 0,00 
Root MSE 8,81 0,68 
  
Table A5.8 – Estimates of the composite index with instrumental variables 
Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
ln(CLMDEV_MEAN_est) 0,09 5,46 (**) 0,10 5,53 (**) 0,09 5,12 (**)
CLMDEV_RECEST -0,02 -0,98
ln(1+CLMLS) -0,04 -11,17 (**) -0,04 -10,95 (**)
CLMDEV_EST_CLMLS -0,09 -7,66 (**) 
ln(CLMDEV_EST)_CLMLS_ABS 0,00 -4,64 (**)
ln(1+PRIO) 0,17 20,27 (**) 0,21 25,41 (**) 0,18 20,66 (**) 0,17 20,44 (**)
ln(1+EQUIV) 0,05 7,37 (**) 0,05 7,97 (**) 0,05 7,38 (**) 0,05 7,47 (**)
HASDIV 0,20 21,39 (**) 0,24 25,88 (**) 0,21 21,55 (**) 0,20 20,94 (**)
ISDIV 0,10 8,37 (**) 0,06 5,42 (**) 0,10 8,29 (**) 0,10 8,35 (**)
PCT 0,13 31,86 (**) 0,14 34,86 (**) 0,13 32,46 (**) 0,13 32,45 (**)
ACCSRC 0,08 6,54 (**) 0,08 6,65 (**) 0,08 6,57 (**) 0,08 6,56 (**)
Technical complexity (PC) 
ln(INVENT) 0,08 25,27 (**) 0,09 28,88 (**) 0,08 25,74 (**) 0,08 25,66 (**)
ln(IPC8) 0,09 25,77 (**) 0,10 29,23 (**) 0,09 26,14 (**) 0,09 26,13 (**)
ln(1+BPC) 0,03 7,16 (**) 0,04 11,40 (**) 0,03 7,04 (**) 0,03 6,96 (**)
ln(1+NPC) 0,03 9,55 (**) 0,03 11,75 (**) 0,03 9,32 (**) 0,03 9,28 (**)
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
ln(1+CUMUL) -0,01 -8,34 (**) -0,01 -9,24 (**) -0,01 -8,43 (**) -0,01 -8,45 (**)
OCCAS -0,07 -14,77 (**) -0,07 -14,87 (**) -0,07 -14,93 (**) -0,07 -14,89 (**)
ACAD -0,01 -0,74 -0,01 -0,86 -0,01 -0,83 -0,01 -0,79
CBOWN 0,04 6,89 (**) 0,04 6,96 (**) 0,04 6,97 (**) 0,04 6,96 (**)
EPO Joint Clusters 
JC-02 - Organic Chemistry 0,25 45,99 (**) 0,24 44,26 (**) 0,26 46,52 (**) 0,26 46,46 (**)
JC-03 - Polymers 0,15 28,70 (**) 0,14 28,34 (**) 0,15 28,96 (**) 0,15 28,95 (**)
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,28 49,67 (**) 0,29 50,13 (**) 0,28 49,90 (**) 0,28 49,96 (**)
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,12 13,97 (**) 0,13 14,78 (**) 0,13 14,16 (**) 0,13 14,14 (**)
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media -0,04 -4,63 (**) -0,03 -3,90 (**) -0,04 -4,64 (**) -0,04 -4,68 (**)
JC-07 - Electronics -0,07 -11,74 (**) -0,07 -11,05 (**) -0,07 -11,79 (**) -0,07 -11,83 (**)
JC-08 - Electricity -0,14 -25,26 (**) -0,14 -24,43 (**) -0,14 -25,34 (**) -0,14 -25,37 (**)
JC-09 - Computers -0,10 -10,51 (**) -0,09 -10,04 (**) -0,10 -10,47 (**) -0,10 -10,48 (**)
JC-10 - Measuring Optics -0,16 -28,64 (**) -0,17 -28,85 (**) -0,17 -28,77 (**) -0,17 -28,80 (**)
JC-11 - Handling & Processing -0,06 -11,92 (**) -0,06 -10,86 (**) -0,06 -11,86 (**) -0,06 -11,86 (**)
JC-12 - Vehicles -0,25 -41,35 (**) -0,24 -40,30 (**) -0,25 -41,21 (**) -0,25 -41,25 (**)
JC-13 - Civil Engineering -0,21 -32,74 (**) -0,20 -31,76 (**) -0,21 -32,70 (**) -0,21 -32,74 (**)
JC-14 - Human Necessities 0,01 2,12 (*) 0,01 2,70 (**) 0,01 2,07 (*) 0,01 2,01 (*)
Country of residence of applicants 
AT 0,03 1,89 0,02 1,60 0,03 1,82 0,03 1,80
AU 0,00 0,05 0,03 1,21 0,00 0,06 0,00 0,07
BE 0,11 6,68 (**) 0,12 7,27 (**) 0,11 6,65 (**) 0,11 6,66 (**)
CA -0,02 -1,15 0,01 0,46 -0,02 -1,21 -0,02 -1,19
CH 0,26 27,36 (**) 0,27 28,99 (**) 0,26 27,27 (**) 0,26 27,30 (**)
DE 0,04 6,74 (**) 0,03 5,60 (**) 0,04 6,37 (**) 0,04 6,41 (**)
DK 0,08 4,49 (**) 0,09 4,69 (**) 0,08 4,47 (**) 0,08 4,49 (**)
ES -0,05 -1,79 -0,08 -3,03 (**) -0,05 -1,92 -0,05 -1,93
FI 0,20 12,08 (**) 0,19 11,36 (**) 0,20 11,95 (**) 0,20 11,94 (**)
GB -0,02 -2,30 (*) -0,01 -1,14 -0,02 -2,44 (*) -0,02 -2,38 (*)
IL 0,04 1,43 0,06 2,17 (*) 0,04 1,40 0,04 1,40
IT -0,06 -5,50 (**) -0,06 -5,93 (**) -0,06 -5,84 (**) -0,06 -5,78 (**)
JP -0,12 -18,86 (**) -0,13 -19,97 (**) -0,13 -19,75 (**) -0,13 -19,67 (**)
KR -0,22 -7,49 (**) -0,23 -7,91 (**) -0,22 -7,76 (**) -0,22 -7,71 (**)
NL 0,11 12,46 (**) 0,11 11,80 (**) 0,11 12,22 (**) 0,11 12,27 (**)
SE 0,16 13,04 (**) 0,14 12,00 (**) 0,15 12,69 (**) 0,15 12,73 (**)
US 0,05 6,58 (**) 0,08 10,53 (**) 0,05 6,34 (**) 0,05 6,33 (**)
RoW 0,00 -0,06 0,00 0,14 0,00 -0,25 0,00 -0,22
Model 
# Observations 242048 242048 242048 242065 
Pseudo R² 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 
Log likelihood -540053 -540067 -540086 -540145 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 39433,87 (0,00) 39405,04 (0,00) 39367,82 (0,00) 39334,14 (0,00) 
LR Test of alpha=0 (P>chibar²) 52000 (0,00) 52000 (0,00) 52000 (0,00) 52000 (0,00) 
  
Table A5.9 – Empirical evidence on patent value determinants in the literature 
Determinants (Independent variables) 
Paper INDICATOR MKT DIS FAM CIT REN INV IPC BPC NPC CBO PCT ASR AEX CLM CUM OCC ACA SPR SOB SDB SCL MOP COA DIA IAP APS APP GAP LEP ICH 
A93 FV + + + 
AANM91 TST + 
ACC04 R&D + 
AL98 LIT / / 
ALMT03 LIT + + + - + 
B05 LIT + 
B06 FV + 
B06 LIT + + a + 
BCM07 CIT + + / / / 
BCM07 OPP + + / + / - 
BVR02 FV + 
C04 LIT + + + / + - / 
CC80 PV + 
CHO05 FV + 
CNW81 TST + 
CS04 OPP / / / / - - 
DI97 LIT / / 
G05 PV - 
GHHM02 OPP + + + - + + / 
GHHM02 ORV / - / - / a + - 
GHHM02 OAM / + / / + + - - 
GHV06 PV + + + + / - / a a 
GJW05 FV + 
GPH86 FV + 
GVP00 GRT - - + + 
GVP02 GRT - - + + 
HC03 FV + 
HH02 OPP + + + / / + + / + 
HJT05 FV + 
HNSV99 CIT + + 
HR04 OPP + + - + / / + - 
HSV02 PV + + + / + a 
HSV03 PV a 
HTT07 FV + a 
JTF00 CIT + + 
JW03 OPP + + + - + + 
L93 PV + + 
L94 CIT + 
L94 LIT + 
  
 
Determinants (Independent variables) 
Paper INDICATOR MKT DIS FAM CIT REN INV IPC BPC NPC CBO PCT ASR AEX CLM CUM OCC ACA SPR SOB SDB SCL MOP COA DIA IAP APS APP GAP LEP ICH 
L94 FV + 
L98 PV + + 
LPP98 PV + + 
LS01 LIT + a / + / 
LS04 FV a + a + 
LS97 LIT + a / + / 
LS99 LIT + + + + 
LS99 LIT + + / / 
N04 CIT + 
NNP87 FV + + 
P03 NSL / - + - + 
P86 PV + 
P96 FV + + 
PJW05 GRT a a - 
PS84 PV + 
PS89 PV + 
R02 PV / 
R03 PV + + a 
R04a OPP + / / + / + / + + / 
R04b OPP + + a + - / + / 
R04b ORJ / + + / / / / / 
S01 SC + + / + 
S05 TSF + + 
S06 GRT a + / - a / + a 
S07 CIT + + + 
S94 PV + 
S98 PV + 
SK97 FV + 
SP86 PV + 
ST04 PV + 
SVP07 CIT a - + a + 
SVPN06 CIT / a + a + 
T90 FV + 
TF94 R&D + 
W04 OPP a / + + / / / 
WPJ07 GRT a a - 
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Table A5.10 – Acronyms used in the appendix tables 
Code Indicator  Code Indicator 
ACA Academic/Public research centres  LEP Link with end product 
AEX Request for accelerated examination  LIT Litigation 
APP Applicant Profile  MKT Market value 
APS Applicant Size  MOP Multiple opponents 
ASR Request for accelerated search  MOT Patenting motives 
BPC Backward patent citations  NPC Backward non-patent citations 
CBO Cross-border ownership  NSL Activity (patent non sleeping) 
CIT Forward citations  OAM Patent amended in opposition 
CLM Number of claims  OCC Inexperienced patentees 
CLS Share of claims lost in examination  OPP Opposition 
COA Multiple applicants  ORJ Opposition rejected (patent maintained) 
CUM Cumulative portfolio size of applicant  ORV Patent revoked in opposition 
DIA Difficulty to invent around  PV Patent value (usually according to surveys) 
DIS Legal disputes  PCT PCT filing 
EQV Number of EP filings with common priority  PRI Number of priorities 
FAM Family size  R&D R&D Performance 
FV Firm market value  REN Renewals 
GAP Grant announced in press  SC Startup Creation 
GRT Granted  SCL Collaborative patenting strategy 
HSD Parent of divisionals  SDB Defensing blocking patenting strategy 
IAP Importance in applicant's patent portfolio  SOB Offensive blocking patenting strategy 
ICH Invention context and characteristics  SPR Knowledge protection patenting strategy 
INV Number of inventors  TSF Patent transfered 
IPC Number of IPC classes (Scope)  TST Firm technological strength 




Table A5.11 – Estimates for the 6 indicators of patent value: Control Variables 
5yrs Citations EPC Family Triadic Survived 10yrs Opposed Composite 
Variables Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Industrial Chemistry) 
JC-02 - Organic Chem. 0,17 0,08 12,82 (**) 0,28 1,62 67,73 (**) 0,19 0,06 16,01 (**) 0,14 0,05 13,99 (**) 0,04 0,00 2,93 (**) 0,25 0,93 51,55 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,23 0,11 17,97 (**) 0,08 0,45 21,32 (**) 0,10 0,03 9,47 (**) 0,11 0,04 12,24 (**) 0,20 0,02 14,38 (**) 0,14 0,51 29,55 (**) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,48 0,27 34,64 (**) 0,27 1,52 58,68 (**) 0,08 0,03 6,75 (**) 0,32 0,13 29,30 (**) 0,04 0,00 2,48 (*) 0,28 1,07 54,99 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecoms 0,58 0,36 28,13 (**) -0,01 -0,05 -1,44  -0,13 -0,05 -7,54 (**) 0,30 0,12 18,66 (**) -0,26 -0,02 -8,25 (**) 0,13 0,46 16,04 (**) 
JC-06 - Multimedia 0,18 0,09 9,43 (**) -0,15 -0,72 -28,16 (**) 0,18 0,06 10,99 (**) 0,25 0,10 18,99 (**) -0,22 -0,02 -8,78 (**) -0,04 -0,12 -5,64 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics -0,05 -0,02 -2,88 (**) -0,13 -0,63 -28,29 (**) 0,07 0,03 6,14 (**) 0,14 0,06 13,20 (**) -0,17 -0,02 -8,82 (**) -0,07 -0,24 -12,79 (**) 
JC-08 - Electricity -0,17 -0,07 -11,68 (**) -0,13 -0,65 -32,85 (**) -0,03 -0,01 -2,84 (**) -0,06 -0,03 -6,94 (**) -0,14 -0,01 -8,51 (**) -0,14 -0,44 -25,92 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,15 0,07 6,52 (**) -0,16 -0,78 -23,39 (**) -0,06 -0,02 -3,23 (**) 0,16 0,06 10,06 (**) -0,14 -0,01 -4,83 (**) -0,10 -0,32 -11,71 (**) 
JC-10 - Optics -0,25 -0,11 -17,07 (**) -0,19 -0,92 -45,05 (**) 0,06 0,02 5,68 (**) -0,03 -0,01 -3,28 (**) -0,25 -0,02 -14,31 (**) -0,17 -0,53 -31,00 (**) 
JC-11 – Handl.&Proc. -0,33 -0,14 -23,73 (**) 0,00 0,01 0,41  -0,08 -0,03 -8,20 (**) -0,07 -0,03 -7,71 (**) 0,02 0,00 1,45  -0,06 -0,19 -10,58 (**) 
JC-12 – Vehicles -0,25 -0,11 -15,67 (**) -0,15 -0,74 -35,31 (**) -0,16 -0,06 -15,36 (**) -0,06 -0,02 -6,15 (**) -0,13 -0,01 -7,92 (**) -0,24 -0,74 -37,27 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Eng. -0,36 -0,14 -20,97 (**) -0,07 -0,33 -14,23 (**) -0,34 -0,12 -31,15 (**) -0,17 -0,07 -16,21 (**) -0,05 -0,01 -3,30 (**) -0,20 -0,62 -28,48 (**) 
JC-14 - Human Nec. 0,14 0,07 10,13 (**) -0,01 -0,05 -2,28 (*) -0,08 -0,03 -7,49 (**) 0,04 0,02 4,10 (**) 0,00 0,00 -0,34  0,01 0,04 1,95
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT -0,04 -0,02 -0,90  0,05 0,24 4,26 (**) -0,28 -0,10 -10,24 (**) 0,05 0,02 1,72  0,08 0,01 2,04 (*) 0,04 0,13 2,21 (*) 
AU 0,15 0,08 2,92 (**) -0,08 -0,41 -4,27 (**) 0,33 0,10 7,79 (**) 0,51 0,19 12,66 (**) -0,31 -0,03 -4,85 (**) 0,00 0,00 -0,02
BE 0,14 0,07 3,23 (**) 0,00 0,00 -0,06  0,21 0,07 7,35 (**) 0,30 0,12 10,75 (**) 0,00 0,00 -0,11  0,10 0,37 6,35 (**) 
CA 0,30 0,16 7,37 (**) -0,16 -0,77 -11,18 (**) 0,30 0,10 9,80 (**) 0,39 0,15 12,91 (**) -0,17 -0,02 -3,62 (**) -0,02 -0,05 -0,90
CH 0,11 0,06 4,56 (**) 0,11 0,59 16,30 (**) 0,34 0,11 20,34 (**) 0,35 0,14 21,31 (**) 0,03 0,00 1,28  0,26 0,99 27,82 (**) 
DE 0,02 0,01 1,43  0,04 0,19 8,23 (**) -0,24 -0,09 -23,33 (**) 0,16 0,06 15,51 (**) 0,16 0,02 10,07 (**) 0,05 0,16 7,15 (**) 
DK 0,22 0,11 4,53 (**) 0,02 0,09 1,22  -0,08 -0,03 -2,29 (*) 0,40 0,15 11,79 (**) 0,21 0,03 4,69 (**) 0,09 0,32 4,48 (**) 
ES -0,27 -0,11 -3,29 (**) 0,06 0,31 2,58 (*) -0,14 -0,05 -2,98 (**) 0,37 0,15 8,05 (**) -0,18 -0,02 -2,32 (*) -0,03 -0,10 -0,84
FI 0,34 0,19 7,90 (**) 0,00 0,01 0,21  0,15 0,05 5,15 (**) 0,61 0,23 20,65 (**) 0,16 0,02 3,73 (**) 0,20 0,75 12,25 (**) 
GB 0,21 0,11 9,99 (**) -0,08 -0,40 -12,67 (**) 0,09 0,03 6,26 (**) 0,20 0,08 13,75 (**) 0,04 0,00 2,08 (*) -0,02 -0,07 -2,49 (*) 
IL 0,39 0,22 5,56 (**) -0,06 -0,32 -2,59 (*) 0,27 0,09 5,18 (**) 0,31 0,12 5,96 (**) -0,04 0,00 -0,55  0,04 0,15 1,41
IT -0,02 -0,01 -0,72  0,01 0,06 1,42  -0,14 -0,05 -8,04 (**) 0,47 0,18 27,92 (**) -0,05 0,00 -1,77  -0,05 -0,16 -4,11 (**) 
JP 0,15 0,07 9,15 (**) -0,45 -2,04 -95,18 (**) 1,04 0,29 85,47 (**) 0,44 0,17 40,15 (**) -0,24 -0,02 -13,25 (**) -0,11 -0,36 -16,86 (**) 
KR -0,09 -0,04 -1,23  -0,41 -1,74 -20,56 (**) 0,63 0,17 12,64 (**) 0,53 0,20 11,54 (**) -0,24 -0,02 -2,71 (**) -0,20 -0,61 -7,71 (**) 
NL 0,07 0,03 2,68 (**) 0,02 0,08 2,17 (*) 0,13 0,04 7,97 (**) 0,41 0,16 25,56 (**) 0,22 0,03 9,64 (**) 0,11 0,41 12,64 (**) 
SE 0,18 0,09 5,72 (**) -0,03 -0,15 -3,20 (**) 0,53 0,15 23,92 (**) 0,52 0,20 24,40 (**) 0,13 0,01 4,03 (**) 0,16 0,59 13,65 (**) 
US 0,40 0,21 25,33 (**) -0,16 -0,78 -33,48 (**) 0,55 0,17 49,93 (**) 0,45 0,18 42,48 (**) -0,09 -0,01 -5,62 (**) 0,05 0,18 8,39 (**) 
RoW 0,06 0,03 1,61  -0,01 -0,06 -1,12  0,18 0,06 7,96 (**) 0,21 0,08 9,16 (**) -0,24 -0,02 -6,51 (**) 0,01 0,03 0,59
Time dummies (Reference = 1990) 
1991 0,04 0,02 2,78 (**) -0,03 -0,16 -8,24 (**) -0,02 -0,01 -2,09 (*) 0,02 0,01 1,93  0,01 0,00 0,37  -0,03 -0,12 -6,72 (**) 
1992 0,09 0,04 6,52 (**) -0,02 -0,11 -5,74 (**) -0,02 -0,01 -1,65 0,04 0,02 4,34 (**) -0,02 0,00 -1,58  -0,06 -0,19 -10,92 (**) 
1993 0,15 0,07 10,70 (**) -0,03 -0,14 -7,04 (**) -0,06 -0,02 -6,33 (**) 0,01 0,00 1,36  -0,07 -0,01 -4,53 (**) -0,09 -0,29 -17,08 (**) 
1994 0,20 0,10 14,65 (**) -0,04 -0,20 -9,87 (**) -0,08 -0,03 -7,61 (**) 0,00 0,00 -0,13  -0,08 -0,01 -5,85 (**) -0,10 -0,32 -19,02 (**) 
1995 0,21 0,10 14,87 (**) -0,07 -0,35 -17,60 (**) -0,08 -0,03 -7,94 (**) -0,02 -0,01 -2,31 (*) -0,13 -0,01 -8,96 (**) -0,13 -0,43 -25,39 (**) 
 
  
Table A5.12 – Sample size dependencies in the model 
5yrs Citations EPC Family Triadic Survived 10yr Opposed Composite Total 
Variable / - + / - + / - + / - + / - + / - + / - + TOT 
ln(CLMDEV_MED) 0 0 32 4 0 28 0 0 32 3 0 29 30 0 2 0 0 32 37 0 155 192 
ln(1+CLMLS) 4 28 0 1 31 0 14 18 0 29 3 0 32 0 0 2 30 0 82 110 0 192 
ln(1+PRIO) 0 0 32 15 0 17 0 0 32 25 1 6 29 0 3 0 0 32 69 1 122 192 
ln(1+EQUIV) 30 0 2 27 1 4 6 0 26 22 0 10 29 0 3 21 0 11 135 1 56 192 
HASDIV 13 0 19 0 0 32 13 0 19 0 0 32 10 0 22 0 0 32 36 0 156 192 
ISDIV 20 12 0 26 1 5 0 0 32 0 0 32 26 1 5 18 0 14 90 14 88 192 
PCT 22 0 10 0 0 32 0 0 32 18 0 14 29 1 2 0 0 32 69 1 122 192 
ACCSRC 27 0 5 28 0 4 29 1 2 23 0 9 27 0 5 28 0 4 162 1 29 192 
ln(1+CUMUL) 26 0 6 0 32 0 0 0 32 14 0 18 0 32 0 25 7 0 65 71 56 192 
OCCAS 31 1 0 13 19 0 18 14 0 22 10 0 30 2 0 9 23 0 123 69 0 192 
ACAD 29 0 3 27 3 2 27 5 0 28 3 1 30 2 0 29 1 2 170 14 8 192 
CBOWN 30 1 1 15 0 17 26 6 0 31 0 1 22 0 10 27 0 5 151 7 34 192 
ln(INVENT) 0 0 32 9 0 23 2 0 30 10 0 22 28 0 4 0 0 32 49 0 143 192 
ln(IPC8) 0 0 32 8 0 24 16 0 16 24 0 8 32 0 0 0 0 32 80 0 112 192 
ln(1+BPC) 0 0 32 26 5 1 21 11 0 24 0 8 0 0 32 18 0 14 89 16 87 192 
ln(1+NPC) 24 0 8 25 6 1 9 0 23 7 0 25 16 0 16 18 0 14 99 6 87 192 
 32 random sample (3%) regressions per value indicator - Patents filed 1990-1995  
 
Table A5.13 – Contributions to the R² of the composite regression (OLS) 
Set of variables Acronym R² 
Time dummies TD 0,001 
Country of applicant CT 0,021 
Technology Joint Clusters JC 0,122 
Applicant profiles PO 0,009 
Technical Complexity PC 0,039 
Patent Filing Strategies FS 0,057 
Control variables only TD+CT+JC 0,136 
 + Patent Ownership TD+CT+JC+PO 0,137 
 + Technical complexity TD+CT+JC+PO+PC 0,155 
 + Patent Filing Strategies TD+CT+JC+PO+PC+FS 0,184 
OLS Regressions of the composite index with robust Standard Errors
  
Table A5.14 – Estimates for the 6 indicators with raw discrete variables 
 5yrs Citations EPC Family Triadic Survived 10yrs Opposed Composite 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
ln(CLMDEV_MEAN) 0,29 42,92 (**) 0,03 15,11 (**) 0,10 20,65 (**) 0,07 17,27 (**) 0,03 4,43 (**) 0,10 40,30 (**) 
CLMLS -0,02 -6,38 (**) -0,01 -7,68 (**) -0,03 -8,82 (**) -0,01 -2,22 (*) 0,01 1,71   -0,01 -9,03 (**) 
PRIO 0,10 18,81 (**) 0,01 5,29 (**) 0,20 25,36 (**) 0,03 6,96 (**) 0,00 0,88   0,03 17,50 (**) 
EQUIV 0,01 1,10   0,01 2,23 (*) 0,12 15,21 (**) 0,04 6,17 (**) 0,04 5,49 (**) 0,02 8,13 (**) 
HASDIV 0,23 12,49 (**) 0,12 20,45 (**) 0,20 11,10 (**) 0,33 22,97 (**) 0,30 15,67 (**) 0,20 32,49 (**) 
ISDIV -0,28 -9,33 (**) 0,03 4,32 (**) 0,45 18,75 (**) 0,44 23,61 (**) 0,11 3,76 (**) 0,12 12,70 (**) 
PCT 0,09 9,19 (**) 0,10 32,89 (**) 0,28 37,99 (**) 0,07 11,42 (**) 0,01 0,69   0,14 37,84 (**) 
ACCSRC 0,07 2,42 (*) 0,04 4,23 (**) 0,07 3,00 (**) 0,17 8,06 (**) 0,12 3,66 (**) 0,06 5,83 (**) 
Technical Complexity (PC) 
INVENT 0,06 25,15 (**) 0,01 10,72 (**) 0,05 21,43 (**) 0,02 13,08 (**) 0,01 5,01 (**) 0,02 29,53 (**) 
IPC8 0,12 39,83 (**) 0,01 16,08 (**) 0,03 12,87 (**) 0,02 7,10 (**) -0,01 -3,06 (**) 0,03 30,82 (**) 
BPC 0,03 23,90 (**) 0,00 -3,77 (**) -0,01 -11,18 (**) 0,00 3,90 (**) 0,04 24,63 (**) 0,01 11,16 (**) 
NPC 0,01 6,04 (**) 0,00 0,89   0,03 12,95 (**) 0,03 15,43 (**) 0,03 11,82 (**) 0,01 12,51 (**) 
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
CUMUL 0,01 1,20   -0,04 -30,62 (**) 0,13 34,90 (**) 0,02 6,68 (**) -0,11 -16,43 (**) -0,02 -9,45 (**) 
OCCAS -0,06 -5,42 (**) 0,04 13,67 (**) -0,39 -53,80 (**) -0,13 -18,73 (**) 0,08 7,80 (**) -0,07 -15,00 (**) 
ACAD 0,08 3,44 (**) 0,01 0,72   -0,13 -5,49 (**) -0,05 -2,38 (*) -0,11 -3,44 (**) -0,01 -1,37  
CBOWN 0,06 4,34 (**) 0,03 7,73 (**) -0,05 -5,32 (**) 0,01 1,27   0,10 6,83 (**) 0,03 5,89 (**) 
Model                   
# Observations 242048 239528 242048 239536 242048 242048 
Pseudo R² 0,05 0,06 0,20 0,05 0,04 0,04 
Log likelihood -229590 -567294 -124665 -157567 -52387 -539708 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 24455,99 (0,00) 107790,22 (0,00) 45 416 (0,00) 15 983 (0,00) 4 036 (0,00) 55326,77 (0,00) 




 5yrs Citations EPC Family Triadic Survived 10yrs Opposed Composite 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Industrial Chemistry)
JC-02 - Organic Chemistry 0,18 13,77 (**) 0,28 66,43 (**) 0,22 19,07 (**) 0,15 14,77 (**) 0,04 2,49 (*) 0,26 52,55 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,26 20,55 (**) 0,08 20,54 (**) 0,14 12,72 (**) 0,12 13,48 (**) 0,19 14,33 (**) 0,15 31,84 (**) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,49 35,44 (**) 0,27 60,87 (**) 0,07 5,68 (**) 0,31 28,95 (**) 0,03 1,87 0,29 56,62 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,58 28,43 (**) -0,02 -2,51 (*) -0,10 -5,67 (**) 0,31 19,19 (**) -0,28 -8,70 (**) 0,13 15,98 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,21 10,74 (**) -0,16 -29,51 (**) 0,21 13,38 (**) 0,26 19,71 (**) -0,23 -9,15 (**) -0,03 -4,89 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics -0,03 -2,16 (*) -0,14 -29,57 (**) 0,09 7,70 (**) 0,14 13,79 (**) -0,17 -8,79 (**) -0,07 -12,90 (**) 
JC-08 - Electricity -0,16 -10,93 (**) -0,14 -33,25 (**) -0,03 -2,50 (*) -0,06 -6,73 (**) -0,14 -8,34 (**) -0,14 -25,72 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,16 6,81 (**) -0,16 -23,13 (**) -0,04 -2,16 (*) 0,16 10,54 (**) -0,15 -5,13 (**) -0,09 -11,11 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics -0,24 -15,85 (**) -0,20 -45,17 (**) 0,07 6,16 (**) -0,03 -2,69 (**) -0,24 -13,62 (**) -0,16 -30,26 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing -0,34 -24,34 (**) 0,01 2,52 (*) -0,12 -12,36 (**) -0,08 -9,06 (**) 0,03 2,27 (*) -0,06 -11,21 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles -0,27 -16,70 (**) -0,15 -34,60 (**) -0,17 -17,23 (**) -0,07 -7,28 (**) -0,13 -8,05 (**) -0,25 -38,29 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering -0,38 -21,99 (**) -0,06 -12,86 (**) -0,37 -34,53 (**) -0,18 -17,57 (**) -0,05 -2,83 (**) -0,21 -29,51 (**) 
JC-14 - Human Necessities 0,12 9,11 (**) 0,00 -0,05 -0,11 -11,41 (**) 0,03 2,94 (**) 0,00 0,32 0,01 1,48  
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France)
AT -0,06 -1,32 0,06 5,39 (**) -0,33 -12,32 (**) 0,03 1,20 0,10 2,50 (*) 0,04 2,26 (*) 
AU 0,15 2,87 (**) -0,08 -3,99 (**) 0,31 7,35 (**) 0,50 12,50 (**) -0,30 -4,67 (**) 0,00 0,04  
BE 0,12 2,78 (**) -0,01 -0,51 0,18 6,52 (**) 0,30 10,81 (**) -0,02 -0,45 0,09 5,61 (**) 
CA 0,28 6,99 (**) -0,15 -10,54 (**) 0,26 8,37 (**) 0,38 12,69 (**) -0,16 -3,27 (**) -0,02 -0,87  
CH 0,10 3,82 (**) 0,11 15,92 (**) 0,31 18,47 (**) 0,34 20,95 (**) 0,03 1,17 0,25 26,91 (**) 
DE 0,02 1,30 0,04 8,24 (**) -0,25 -24,23 (**) 0,16 15,20 (**) 0,17 11,04 (**) 0,05 7,21 (**) 
DK 0,22 4,41 (**) 0,02 1,52 -0,11 -3,17 (**) 0,39 11,60 (**) 0,22 4,77 (**) 0,09 4,45 (**) 
ES -0,30 -3,68 (**) 0,07 3,29 (**) -0,23 -4,78 (**) 0,35 7,62 (**) -0,14 -1,89 -0,03 -0,91  
FI 0,33 7,66 (**) 0,01 0,64 0,13 4,39 (**) 0,60 20,38 (**) 0,16 3,79 (**) 0,20 12,15 (**) 
GB 0,22 10,20 (**) -0,08 -12,79 (**) 0,10 6,53 (**) 0,20 13,73 (**) 0,04 1,86 -0,02 -2,19 (*) 
IL 0,39 5,54 (**) -0,05 -1,98 (*) 0,21 4,04 (**) 0,30 5,76 (**) -0,02 -0,32 0,05 1,55  
IT -0,05 -1,77 0,02 2,21 (*) -0,19 -11,25 (**) 0,46 27,30 (**) -0,03 -1,25 -0,06 -4,72 (**) 
JP 0,17 10,02 (**) -0,46 -98,71 (**) 1,07 88,56 (**) 0,44 41,04 (**) -0,24 -13,63 (**) -0,10 -15,96 (**) 
KR -0,11 -1,47 -0,41 -20,28 (**) 0,57 11,41 (**) 0,51 11,22 (**) -0,21 -2,47 (*) -0,20 -7,81 (**) 
NL 0,08 3,39 (**) 0,01 0,75 0,17 10,16 (**) 0,42 25,97 (**) 0,22 9,41 (**) 0,12 12,75 (**) 
SE 0,16 5,10 (**) -0,03 -3,26 (**) 0,51 23,05 (**) 0,51 24,03 (**) 0,12 3,75 (**) 0,16 13,09 (**) 
US 0,40 25,64 (**) -0,17 -36,75 (**) 0,58 53,46 (**) 0,46 43,79 (**) -0,10 -6,61 (**) 0,05 8,05 (**) 
RoW 0,02 0,60 0,00 -0,25 0,10 4,59 (**) 0,19 8,42 (**) -0,22 -5,99 (**) 0,00 0,08  
Time dummies (Reference = 1990) 
1991 0,04 3,01 (**) -0,03 -8,23 (**) -0,02 -1,92 0,02 1,99 (*) 0,01 0,51 -0,03 -6,61 (**) 
1992 0,09 6,57 (**) -0,02 -5,66 (**) -0,02 -1,85 0,04 4,32 (**) -0,02 -1,25 -0,06 -10,87 (**) 
1993 0,15 10,89 (**) -0,03 -7,23 (**) -0,06 -6,34 (**) 0,01 1,39 -0,06 -4,11 (**) -0,09 -17,12 (**) 
1994 0,21 15,00 (**) -0,04 -10,05 (**) -0,08 -7,51 (**) 0,00 0,00 -0,08 -5,41 (**) -0,10 -18,91 (**) 
1995 0,22 15,34 (**) -0,07 -17,84 (**) -0,07 -7,15 (**) -0,02 -1,91 -0,13 -8,92 (**) -0,13 -25,16 (**) 
  
Table A5.15 – Estimates for the 6 indicators – Occasional patentees only 
5yrs Citations EPC Family Triadic Survived 10yrs Opposed Composite 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
ln(CLMDEV_MED) 0,32 20,75 (**) 0,03 7,13 (**) 0,11 10,86 (**) 0,07 7,25 (**) 0,01 0,63 0,11 17,42 (**) 
ln(1+CLMLS) (as a % of claims at grant) -0,12 -5,01 (**) -0,05 -6,69 (**) -0,08 -4,70 (**) -0,03 -2,04 (*) -0,01 -0,58 -0,07 -7,24 (**) 
ln(1+PRIO) 0,34 9,63 (**) 0,06 5,58 (**) 0,63 22,91 (**) 0,06 2,43 (*) 0,09 2,59 (*) 0,24 15,17 (**) 
ln(1+EQUIV) 0,13 3,81 (**) 0,04 3,28 (**) 0,24 8,46 (**) 0,08 2,97 (**) 0,11 3,07 (**) 0,10 7,18 (**) 
HASDIV 0,19 4,50 (**) 0,16 11,59 (**) 0,23 6,73 (**) 0,41 13,10 (**) 0,38 9,98 (**) 0,26 16,73 (**) 
ISDIV -0,01 -0,10 0,06 3,53 (**) 0,67 15,37 (**) 0,51 13,24 (**) 0,04 0,75 0,26 12,71 (**) 
PCT 0,09 4,70 (**) 0,08 13,65 (**) 0,42 30,61 (**) 0,08 5,75 (**) -0,10 -4,97 (**) 0,17 19,64 (**) 
ACCSRC 0,06 1,05 0,05 2,36 (*) -0,04 -0,85 0,04 0,91 0,21 3,73 (**) 0,07 2,62 (**) 
Technical Complexity (PC) 
ln(INVENT) 0,18 11,07 (**) 0,00 -0,16 0,17 14,20 (**) 0,11 10,01 (**) 0,12 7,69 (**) 0,09 12,46 (**) 
ln(IPC8) 0,32 19,21 (**) 0,04 7,35 (**) 0,09 7,66 (**) 0,05 4,25 (**) 0,02 1,25 0,10 14,14 (**) 
ln(1+BPC) 0,18 9,95 (**) -0,01 -1,57 -0,04 -3,28 (**) 0,04 2,75 (**) 0,22 11,39 (**) 0,04 4,80 (**) 
ln(1+NPC) 0,12 7,39 (**) 0,00 0,04 0,08 6,21 (**) 0,09 8,10 (**) 0,19 11,76 (**) 0,05 8,05 (**) 
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
ACAD 0,10 1,98 (*) 0,04 2,02 (*) -0,01 -0,23 0,01 0,30 -0,24 -3,25 (**) 0,02 0,71 
CBOWN 0,11 3,61 (**) 0,06 6,07 (**) 0,12 5,00 (**) 0,10 4,42 (**) 0,15 5,09 (**) 0,12 9,04 (**) 
Model 
# Observations 51056 50034 51056 50036 51056 51056 
Pseudo R² 0,07 0,02 0,18 0,07 0,05 0,03 
Log likelihood -44462 -127603 -28955 -31892 -13060 -115637 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 6392,34 (0,00) 7983,86 (0,00) 10.212 (0,00) 4.444 (0,00) 1.232 (0,00) 8601,61 (0,00) 
LR Test of alpha=0 (P>chibar²) 42000 (0,00) 35000 (0,00) 51000 (0,00) 
14 JC Dummies, 19 Country Dummies and 6 Time dummies included as well 
 
  
Table A5.16 – Estimates for the 6 indicators – Academic patentees only 
5yrs Citations EPC Family Triadic Survived 10yrs Opposed Composite 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
ln(CLMDEV_MED) 0,35 8,69 (**) 0,01 0,79 0,07 1,67 0,16 3,97 (**) 0,20 3,37 (**) 0,10 5,50 (**) 
ln(1+CLMLS) (as a % of claims at grant) -0,26 -5,42 (**) -0,08 -4,24 (**) -0,05 -0,92 -0,08 -1,58 -0,19 -2,40 (*) -0,09 -4,56 (**) 
ln(1+PRIO) 0,40 4,45 (**) 0,04 0,97 0,54 4,46 (**) 0,05 0,47 0,07 0,46 0,17 4,34 (**) 
ln(1+EQUIV) -0,06 -0,93 0,02 0,72 0,17 2,11 (*) -0,02 -0,23 0,12 1,19 0,03 0,99 
HASDIV 0,06 0,84 0,15 5,53 (**) 0,24 2,41 (*) 0,53 5,93 (**) 0,60 6,42 (**) 0,19 6,92 (**) 
ISDIV -0,06 -0,33 0,12 2,07 (*) 0,88 3,82 (**) 1,03 5,95 (**) 0,01 0,04 0,25 4,34 (**) 
PCT 0,12 1,97 (*) 0,06 2,80 (**) 0,26 4,46 (**) 0,21 3,86 (**) -0,11 -1,24 0,11 4,09 (**) 
ACCSRC 0,45 3,16 (**) 0,10 1,83 0,32 1,55 0,09 0,51 0,24 1,22 0,21 3,61 (**) 
Technical Complexity (PC) 
ln(INVENT) 0,16 4,01 (**) 0,02 1,14 0,06 1,58 0,00 -0,02 0,03 0,62 0,03 1,84 
ln(IPC8) 0,28 7,03 (**) 0,07 4,30 (**) 0,13 3,04 (**) 0,05 1,17 0,03 0,44 0,12 6,60 (**) 
ln(1+BPC) 0,11 3,04 (**) 0,00 -0,32 0,05 1,12 -0,02 -0,54 0,26 4,60 (**) 0,02 1,13 
ln(1+NPC) 0,02 0,64 0,01 0,44 0,03 0,71 0,11 3,35 (**) 0,19 3,96 (**) 0,02 1,21 
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
ln(1+CUMUL) 0,03 1,65 -0,01 -1,37 0,07 3,61 (**) 0,01 0,51 -0,02 -0,64 0,01 1,14 
OCCAS 0,13 1,92 0,01 0,38 0,02 0,35 0,03 0,51 -0,09 -0,93 0,01 0,38 
CBOWN -0,34 -3,72 (**) 0,02 0,61 0,14 1,51 0,02 0,17 -0,01 -0,07 -0,03 -0,88 
Model 
# Observations 4093 3998 4093 3996 4040 4093 
Pseudo R² 0,08 0,06 0,15 0,16 0,09 0,06 
Log likelihood -5285 -10547 -2061 -2277 -822 -9971 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 1891,81 (0,00) 2060,45 (0,00) 599 (0,00) 787 (0,00) 175 (0,00) 1835,15 (0,00) 
LR Test of alpha=0 (P>chibar²) 42000 (0,00) 35000 (0,00) 51000 (0,00) 
14 JC Dummies, 19 Country Dummies and 6 Time dummies included as well 
 
  
Table A5.17 – Estimates for the 6 indicators – Occasional and academic patentees excluded 
5yrs Citations EPC Family Triadic Survived 10yrs Opposed Composite 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
ln(CLMDEV_MED) 0,29 38,13 (**) 0,03 14,62 (**) 0,12 20,69 (**) 0,08 16,24 (**) 0,02 2,48 (*) 0,10 36,62 (**) 
ln(1+CLMLS) (as a % of claims at grant) -0,14 -11,61 (**) -0,06 -17,98 (**) -0,10 -10,77 (**) -0,03 -4,05 (**) 0,04 3,25 (**) -0,08 -18,98 (**) 
ln(1+PRIO) 0,37 20,95 (**) 0,04 7,73 (**) 0,63 35,22 (**) 0,08 6,17 (**) 0,01 0,67 0,16 25,48 (**) 
ln(1+EQUIV) -0,01 -0,46 0,00 -0,10 0,18 11,59 (**) 0,06 4,91 (**) 0,06 3,09 (**) 0,03 5,41 (**) 
HASDIV 0,27 12,97 (**) 0,12 18,07 (**) 0,21 10,05 (**) 0,31 19,12 (**) 0,25 11,11 (**) 0,20 29,14 (**) 
ISDIV -0,38 -10,87 (**) 0,01 0,87 0,39 13,90 (**) 0,42 19,57 (**) 0,10 3,05 (**) 0,05 5,03 (**) 
PCT 0,08 7,10 (**) 0,09 26,55 (**) 0,25 27,96 (**) 0,07 9,54 (**) 0,04 3,34 (**) 0,12 30,34 (**) 
ACCSRC 0,04 1,35 0,03 2,58 (*) 0,15 4,92 (**) 0,21 8,79 (**) 0,04 1,04 0,05 4,60 (**) 
Technical Complexity (PC) 
ln(INVENT) 0,18 23,33 (**) 0,03 12,60 (**) 0,10 16,04 (**) 0,06 11,60 (**) 0,05 5,48 (**) 0,08 28,13 (**) 
ln(IPC8) 0,30 36,08 (**) 0,03 11,09 (**) 0,05 7,66 (**) 0,03 5,13 (**) -0,02 -1,93 0,08 26,53 (**) 
ln(1+BPC) 0,21 22,78 (**) -0,01 -5,01 (**) -0,09 -12,02 (**) 0,02 3,62 (**) 0,27 23,77 (**) 0,03 8,36 (**) 
ln(1+NPC) 0,05 6,85 (**) -0,01 -2,94 (**) 0,08 13,45 (**) 0,07 13,03 (**) 0,05 5,42 (**) 0,02 9,48 (**) 
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
ln(1+CUMUL) 0,02 7,17 (**) -0,03 -41,28 (**) 0,09 54,86 (**) 0,02 12,26 (**) -0,05 -18,69 (**) -0,01 -6,20 (**) 
CBOWN 0,05 3,14 (**) 0,04 8,34 (**) -0,14 -12,24 (**) -0,02 -1,44 0,10 5,79 (**) 0,01 2,26 (*) 
Model 
# Observations 187817 186390 187817 186396 187817 187817 
Pseudo R² 0,05 0,07 0,19 0,04 0,05 0,04 
Log likelihood -180363 -429345 -92214 -123551 -38329 -413506 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 17993,69 (0,00) 98927,25 (0,00) 32.440 (0,00) 10.494 (0,00) 3.148 (0,00) 47711,84 (0,00) 
LR Test of alpha=0 (P>chibar²) 42000 (0,00) 35000 (0,00) 51000 (0,00) 







Table A5.18 – Estimates of the composite index – Robust regression 
Variables Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
ln(CLMDEV_MED) 0.35 42.34 (**) 
ln(1+CLMLS) (as a % of claims at grant) -0.30 -22.64 (**) 
ln(1+PRIO) 0.58 28.06 (**) 
ln(1+EQUIV) 0.20 9.40 (**) 
HASDIV 0.96 36.27 (**) 
ISDIV 0.35 9.99 (**) 
PCT 0.46 36.44 (**) 
ACCSRC 0.19 4.82 (**) 
Technical Complexity (PC) 
ln(INVENT) 0.26 28.60 (**) 
ln(IPC8) 0.32 32.34 (**) 
ln(1+BPC) 0.08 7.26 (**) 
ln(1+NPC) 0.13 14.65 (**) 
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
ln(1+CUMUL) -0.01 -3.40 (**) 
OCCAS -0.29 -17.92 (**) 
ACAD 0.07 1.67 
CBOWN 0.12 6.26 (**) 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Industrial Chemistry) 
JC-02 - Organic Chemistry 1.24 65.15 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0.46 26.19 (**) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 1.52 73.62 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0.40 13.32 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media -0.08 -3.10 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics -0.21 -10.41 (**) 
JC-08 - Electricity -0.40 -22.37 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers -0.32 -10.78 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics -0.63 -33.41 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing -0.26 -15.12 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles -0.67 -36.40 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering -0.65 -32.67 (**) 
JC-14 - Human Necessities -0.02 -1.38 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT 0.26 5.10 (**) 
AU -0.04 -0.47 
BE 0.42 7.66 (**) 
CA -0.04 -0.73 
CH 1.06 33.57 (**) 
DE 0.18 9.26 (**) 
DK 0.34 5.25 (**) 
ES -0.11 -1.21 
FI 0.74 13.05 (**) 
GB -0.05 -1.91 
IL 0.12 1.19 
IT -0.10 -3.20 (**) 
JP -0.22 -10.62 (**) 
KR -0.40 -4.46 (**) 
NL 0.41 13.34 (**) 
SE 0.70 17.27 (**) 
US 0.24 12.01 (**) 
RoW 0.04 0.96 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990) 
1991 -0.11 -6.27 (**) 
1992 -0.16 -9.39 (**) 
1993 -0.25 -14.26 (**) 
1994 -0.27 -15.51 (**) 
1995 -0.38 -21.27 (**) 
Model 
# Observations 242048 
F(52) 1134.28 
P>F 0.00 
Robust Regression with Iteratively Weighted Least Squares 
 
  
Table A5.19 – Estimates for the 6 indicators – CLMDEV based on mean 
5yrs Citations EPC Family Triadic Survived 10yrs Opposed Composite 
Variables Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z Coef. ε (1) z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
ln(CLMDEV_MEAN) 0,30 0,14 44,10 (**) 0,03 0,16 16,15 (**) 0,12 0,04 23,86 (**) 0,08 0,03 18,47 (**) 0,02 0,00 2,90 (**) 0,10 0,34 41,08 (**) 
ln(1+CLMLS) -0,14 -0,06 -13,23 (**) -0,06 -0,31 -19,60 (**) -0,09 -0,03 -11,69 (**) -0,03 -0,01 -4,59 (**) 0,02 0,00 1,88 -0,08 -0,26 -20,65 (**) 
ln(1+PRIO) 0,36 0,17 23,04 (**) 0,05 0,24 9,99 (**) 0,62 0,21 41,61 (**) 0,06 0,03 5,87 (**) 0,03 0,00 1,71 0,17 0,57 29,37 (**) 
ln(1+EQUIV) 0,02 0,01 1,43 0,01 0,04 1,66 0,19 0,07 14,25 (**) 0,07 0,03 5,72 (**) 0,08 0,01 4,54 (**) 0,05 0,16 8,33 (**) 
HASDIV 0,25 0,13 13,94 (**) 0,13 0,70 22,42 (**) 0,21 0,07 11,92 (**) 0,34 0,13 23,95 (**) 0,30 0,04 16,08 (**) 0,21 0,79 34,58 (**) 
ISDIV -0,27 -0,11 -9,11 (**) 0,03 0,13 3,19 (**) 0,47 0,14 19,89 (**) 0,45 0,17 24,28 (**) 0,10 0,01 3,42 (**) 0,11 0,38 11,82 (**) 
PCT 0,09 0,04 9,09 (**) 0,09 0,46 30,34 (**) 0,29 0,10 40,09 (**) 0,08 0,03 12,00 (**) 0,00 0,00 -0,43 0,13 0,46 36,54 (**) 
ACCSRC 0,07 0,03 2,51 (*) 0,03 0,18 3,82 (**) 0,10 0,03 3,82 (**) 0,17 0,07 8,28 (**) 0,11 0,01 3,38 (**) 0,06 0,21 5,85 (**) 
Technical Complexity (PC) 
ln(INVENT) 0,18 0,08 26,59 (**) 0,02 0,12 11,74 (**) 0,11 0,04 20,51 (**) 0,07 0,03 14,66 (**) 0,07 0,01 8,82 (**) 0,08 0,27 31,13 (**) 
ln(IPC8) 0,31 0,14 41,54 (**) 0,03 0,16 14,15 (**) 0,06 0,02 10,65 (**) 0,03 0,01 6,58 (**) -0,01 0,00 -0,84 0,09 0,29 30,93 (**) 
ln(1+BPC) 0,21 0,10 25,39 (**) -0,01 -0,06 -4,90 (**) -0,07 -0,03 -11,30 (**) 0,02 0,01 4,27 (**) 0,25 0,03 26,10 (**) 0,03 0,10 10,11 (**) 
ln(1+NPC) 0,06 0,03 9,66 (**) -0,01 -0,04 -3,52 (**) 0,08 0,03 14,94 (**) 0,08 0,03 16,68 (**) 0,09 0,01 11,18 (**) 0,03 0,10 12,24 (**) 
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
ln(1+CUMUL) 0,01 0,01 6,61 (**) -0,03 -0,14 -44,00 (**) 0,10 0,03 58,46 (**) 0,02 0,01 11,86 (**) -0,05 -0,01 -21,14 (**) -0,01 -0,02 -7,92 (**) 
OCCAS 0,00 0,00 0,18 -0,03 -0,17 -8,68 (**) -0,10 -0,04 -11,41 (**) -0,07 -0,03 -8,53 (**) -0,05 0,00 -3,54 (**) -0,07 -0,24 -14,30 (**) 
ACAD 0,09 0,04 3,51 (**) 0,00 -0,02 -0,48 -0,09 -0,03 -4,02 (**) -0,04 -0,02 -1,86 -0,11 -0,01 -3,47 (**) -0,02 -0,06 -1,78 
CBOWN 0,06 0,03 4,23 (**) 0,04 0,20 9,35 (**) -0,08 -0,03 -7,87 (**) 0,01 0,00 0,73 0,11 0,01 7,86 (**) 0,03 0,11 6,23 (**) 
Model 
# Observations 242048 239528 242048 239536 242048 242048 
Pseudo R² 0,05 0,06 0,21 0,05 0,04 0,04 
Log likelihood -229225 -566606 -122987 -157500 -52296 -539250 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 25300 (0,00) 111635,87 (0,00) 47.748 (0,00) 16.290 (0,00) 4.252 (0,00) 57066 (0,00) 
LR Test of alpha=0 (P>chibar²) 42000 (0,00) 35000 (0,00) 51000 (0,00) 
14 JC Dummies, 19 Country Dummies and 6 Time dummies included as well 
 
  
Table A5.20 – Estimates for the 6 indicators – Nominal claim count 
5yrs Citations EPC Family Triadic Survived 10yrs Opposed Composite 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
ln(CLMSNR) 0,02 39,53 (**) 0,00 17,37 (**) 0,01 17,97 (**) 0,01 17,28 (**) 0,00 3,20 (**) 0,01 36,71 (**) 
ln(1+CLMLS) -0,13 -12,33 (**) -0,06 -20,14 (**) -0,09 -10,75 (**) -0,03 -4,82 (**) 0,02 1,81 -0,07 -19,85 (**) 
ln(1+PRIO) 0,38 23,93 (**) 0,05 9,76 (**) 0,62 42,01 (**) 0,06 5,71 (**) 0,03 1,71 0,17 30,03 (**) 
ln(1+EQUIV) 0,02 1,05 0,01 1,44 0,19 14,16 (**) 0,06 5,47 (**) 0,08 4,50 (**) 0,04 7,90 (**) 
HASDIV 0,24 13,04 (**) 0,12 21,48 (**) 0,21 11,44 (**) 0,33 23,14 (**) 0,30 15,88 (**) 0,20 33,04 (**) 
ISDIV -0,32 -10,94 (**) 0,02 2,77 (**) 0,45 19,11 (**) 0,44 23,77 (**) 0,09 3,34 (**) 0,09 9,93 (**) 
PCT 0,08 8,49 (**) 0,09 29,83 (**) 0,29 39,77 (**) 0,08 11,50 (**) -0,01 -0,50 0,13 35,85 (**) 
ACCSRC 0,07 2,54 (*) 0,03 3,69 (**) 0,10 3,84 (**) 0,17 8,18 (**) 0,11 3,36 (**) 0,06 5,85 (**) 
Technical Complexity (PC) 
ln(INVENT) 0,18 26,65 (**) 0,02 11,43 (**) 0,11 20,66 (**) 0,07 14,44 (**) 0,07 8,77 (**) 0,08 31,10 (**) 
ln(IPC8) 0,31 41,85 (**) 0,03 13,92 (**) 0,06 10,85 (**) 0,03 6,42 (**) -0,01 -0,87 0,09 31,14 (**) 
ln(1+BPC) 0,22 26,46 (**) -0,01 -4,79 (**) -0,07 -10,70 (**) 0,03 4,44 (**) 0,25 26,19 (**) 0,03 11,13 (**) 
ln(1+NPC) 0,06 9,37 (**) -0,01 -3,79 (**) 0,08 14,78 (**) 0,08 16,42 (**) 0,08 11,13 (**) 0,03 11,90 (**) 
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
ln(1+CUMUL) 0,01 6,41 (**) -0,03 -43,97 (**) 0,10 58,18 (**) 0,02 11,91 (**) -0,05 -21,16 (**) -0,01 -8,16 (**) 
OCCAS 0,00 0,14 -0,03 -8,73 (**) -0,10 -11,52 (**) -0,07 -8,59 (**) -0,05 -3,56 (**) -0,07 -14,36 (**) 
ACAD 0,09 3,61 (**) -0,01 -0,55 -0,09 -3,98 (**) -0,04 -1,93 -0,11 -3,47 (**) -0,02 -1,74 
CBOWN 0,06 4,50 (**) 0,04 9,44 (**) -0,08 -7,69 (**) 0,01 0,83 0,11 7,88 (**) 0,04 6,54 (**) 
Model 
# Observations 242048 239528 242048 239536 242048 242048 
Pseudo R² 0,05 0,06 0,21 0,05 0,04 0,04 
Log likelihood -229470 -566572 -123076 -157480 -52295 -539415 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 25028,48 (0,00) 111775,62 (0,00) 47.504 (0,00) 16.119 (0,00) 4.257 (0,00) 56442,42 (0,00) 
LR Test of alpha=0 (P>chibar²) 42000 (0,00) 35000 (0,00) 51000 (0,00) 




Table A5.21 – Estimates for the composite index – By set of variables 
Main 2 3 4 5 6 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies 
ln(CLMDEV_MEAN) 0,10 41,08 (**) 0,12 48,10 (**) 0,09 36,72 (**) 0,15 60,79 (**) 
ln(1+CLMLS) -0,08 -20,65 (**) -0,08 -19,96 (**) -0,04 -10,99 (**) -0,06 -16,36 (**) 
ln(1+PRIO) 0,17 29,37 (**) 0,20 33,00 (**) 0,20 33,44 (**) 0,20 33,78 (**) 0,17 27,65 (**) 
ln(1+EQUIV) 0,05 8,33 (**) 0,06 8,98 (**) 0,04 7,23 (**) 0,05 7,92 (**) 0,04 6,94 (**) 
HASDIV 0,21 34,58 (**) 0,24 32,99 (**) 0,20 28,30 (**) 0,23 31,57 (**) 0,18 24,62 (**) 
ISDIV 0,11 11,82 (**) 0,14 13,76 (**) 0,00 -0,31 0,07 6,57 (**) 0,03 3,46 (**) 
PCT 0,13 36,54 (**) 0,14 39,17 (**) 0,14 38,20 (**) 0,14 37,99 (**) 0,13 36,81 (**) 
ACCSRC 0,06 5,85 (**) 0,07 5,67 (**) 0,07 6,18 (**) 0,08 6,63 (**) 0,06 4,90 (**) 
Technical complexity (PC) 
ln(INVENT) 0,08 31,13 (**) 0,09 32,19 (**) 0,09 32,57 (**) 0,08 29,43 (**) 
ln(IPC8) 0,09 30,93 (**) 0,09 32,72 (**) 0,09 32,96 (**) 0,09 29,78 (**) 
ln(1+BPC) 0,03 10,11 (**) 0,04 12,63 (**) 0,04 13,32 (**) 0,03 8,78 (**) 
ln(1+NPC) 0,03 12,24 (**) 0,03 10,00 (**) 0,03 12,12 (**) 0,02 8,63 (**) 
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
ln(1+CUMUL) -0,01 -7,92 (**) 0,00 -5,16 (**) -0,01 -8,34 (**) -0,01 -9,19 (**) -0,01 -6,91 (**) 
OCCAS -0,07 -14,30 (**) -0,08 -17,06 (**) -0,07 -15,30 (**) -0,07 -14,86 (**) -0,08 -15,71 (**) 
ACAD -0,02 -1,78 0,01 0,73 -0,03 -2,32 (*) -0,01 -0,83 -0,03 -3,07 (**) 
CBOWN 0,03 6,23 (**) 0,04 6,68 (**) 0,04 6,95 (**) 0,03 6,11 (**) 
Model 
# Observations 242048 245185 245642 242048 245634 245186 
Pseudo R² 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,04 0,03 
Log likelihood -539250 -547872 -547812 -540068 -547117 -550269 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 57.066 (0,00) 38.916 (0,00) 38.610 (0,00) 39.404 (0,00) 39.956 (0,00) 34.128 (0,00) 
LR Test of alpha=0 (P>chibar²) 51.000 (0,00) 54.000 (0,00) 54.000 (0,00) 52.000 (0,00) 53.000 (0,00) 58.000 (0,00) 
14 JC Dummies, 19 Country Dummies and 6 Time dummies included as well 
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Table A5.22 – Quantiles of discrete and continuous variables included in the dataset 
Centiles 
Variable 1,0% 2,5% 5,0% 10,0% 25,0% 50,0% 75,0% 90,0% 95,0% 97,5% 99,0% 
CITE5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00 
EPCFM 1,00 1,00 2,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 7,00 11,00 13,00 15,00 15,00 
COMPO 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 3,00 5,00 8,00 9,00 10,00 11,00 
CLMDEV_MED 0,17 0,20 0,30 0,40 0,70 1,00 1,50 2,20 2,80 3,50 4,55 
CLMDEV_MEAN 0,13 0,17 0,25 0,35 0,55 0,81 1,22 1,78 2,26 2,82 3,66 
CLMLS -0,56 -0,43 -0,22 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,25 0,86 1,50 2,33 4,00 
PRIO 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 2,00 2,00 3,00 5,00 
EQUIV 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 2,00 
CUMUL_NOM 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,00 28,00 246,00 1656,00 2521,00 3565,00 4038,00 
INVENT 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 2,00 3,00 5,00 6,00 7,00 8,00 
IPC8 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 2,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00 6,00 
BPC 0,00 1,00 1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 9,00 11,00 14,00 




Table A5.23 – Wald Test of pairwise equality of JC coefficients in citations (CITE5) regression 
JC_02 JC_03 JC_04 JC_05 JC_06 JC_07 JC_08 JC_09 JC_10 JC_11 JC_12 JC_13 JC_14 
JC_02 1,00* 
JC_03 12,02* 1,00* 
JC_04 198,11* 222,07* 1,00* 
JC_05 331,84* 253,48* 17,92* 1,00* 
JC_06 0,19 5,35° 178,56* 219,87* 1,00* 
JC_07 133,27* 224,54* 674,74* 624,68* 92,88* 1,00* 
JC_08 392,61* 559,07* 1.201,55* 1.045,37* 253,07* 37,27* 1,00* 
JC_09 0,68 10,22* 164,85* 212,00* 1,07 51,58* 159,92* 1,00* 
JC_10 646,02* 630,43* 1.068,50* 1.186,16* 341,98* 103,24* 19,70* 234,31* 1,00* 
JC_11 914,63* 1.121,81* 1.915,35* 1.581,67* 553,03* 223,53* 88,96* 364,40* 18,06* 1,00* 
JC_12 520,97* 691,56* 1.311,00* 1.176,13* 347,05* 98,35* 19,81* 233,21* 0,00 18,15* 1,00* 
JC_13 749,24* 949,33* 1.608,18* 1.421,71* 509,60* 211,11* 92,50* 354,59* 25,49* 1,98 24,97* 1,00* 
JC_14 4,04° 29,00* 341,91* 375,79* 3,88° 90,69* 308,17* 0,27 443,75* 773,59* 440,79* 669,01* 1,00* 
Robust Neg Bin Regression, full model reported in T5.7 | Chi²(1) reported in table | *:P(>Chi²)<1% | °:P(>Chi²)<5% 
 
  
Table A5.24 – Estimates of the 6 value indicators with trend interactions 
5yrs Citations EPC Family Triadic Survived 10yrs Opposed Composite 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
ln(CLMDEV_MED) 0,29 23,71 (**) 0,03 8,96 (**) 0,13 15,55 (**) 0,08 10,31 (**) 0,00 -0,21 0,10 22,24 (**) 
ln(CLMDEV_MED) * TREND 0,00 1,12 0,00 0,99 -0,01 -2,43 (*) 0,00 0,35 0,01 2,50 (*) 0,00 1,64 
ln(1+CLMLS) -0,14 -7,76 (**) -0,08 -16,30 (**) -0,14 -9,84 (**) -0,04 -3,40 (**) 0,07 3,83 (**) -0,09 -14,39 (**) 
ln(1+CLMLS) * TREND 0,00 0,28 0,01 4,81 (**) 0,02 3,44 (**) 0,00 0,59 -0,02 -3,52 (**) 0,01 2,85 (**) 
ln(1+PRIO) 0,35 13,61 (**) 0,06 7,92 (**) 0,75 31,48 (**) 0,12 6,84 (**) 0,10 3,67 (**) 0,22 22,86 (**) 
ln(1+PRIO) * TREND 0,00 0,38 0,00 -1,94 -0,06 -7,61 (**) -0,02 -4,08 (**) -0,03 -3,21 (**) -0,02 -6,28 (**) 
ln(1+EQUIV) -0,03 -0,94 0,02 1,90 0,22 8,84 (**) 0,06 2,70 (**) 0,06 1,86 0,05 4,77 (**) 
ln(1+EQUIV) * TREND 0,02 1,92 0,00 -0,99 -0,01 -1,32 0,00 0,50 0,01 0,83 0,00 -0,18 
HASDIV 0,32 9,10 (**) 0,13 12,23 (**) 0,25 6,93 (**) 0,44 15,62 (**) 0,33 9,31 (**) 0,22 18,66 (**) 
HASDIV * TREND -0,02 -2,25 (*) 0,00 0,09 -0,01 -1,10 -0,03 -3,83 (**) -0,01 -0,71 0,00 -1,28 
ISDIV -0,28 -5,05 (**) -0,02 -1,44 0,50 11,02 (**) 0,57 16,42 (**) 0,02 0,47 0,08 4,63 (**) 
ISDIV * TREND 0,00 0,21 0,02 3,90 (**) -0,01 -0,68 -0,04 -3,98 (**) 0,03 1,85 0,01 2,34 (*) 
PCT 0,07 3,59 (**) 0,03 6,05 (**) 0,27 18,46 (**) 0,10 8,31 (**) -0,02 -0,79 0,10 14,52 (**) 
PCT * TREND 0,01 1,63 0,02 11,50 (**) 0,01 2,56 (*) -0,01 -2,34 (*) 0,01 0,86 0,01 6,02 (**) 
ACCSRC -0,02 -0,31 0,01 0,79 0,12 2,56 (*) 0,26 7,00 (**) 0,10 1,66 0,04 2,09 (*) 
ACCSRC * TREND 0,03 2,06 (*) 0,01 1,74 -0,01 -0,52 -0,03 -2,90 (**) 0,00 0,15 0,01 1,64 
Technical Complexity (PC) 
ln(INVENT) 0,17 13,74 (**) 0,03 8,21 (**) 0,11 11,56 (**) 0,06 6,66 (**) 0,10 7,43 (**) 0,08 17,29 (**) 
ln(INVENT) * TREND 0,00 0,90 0,00 -1,61 0,00 -0,19 0,01 1,91 -0,01 -3,06 (**) 0,00 -0,01 
ln(IPC8) 0,33 23,86 (**) 0,04 9,39 (**) 0,05 4,53 (**) 0,04 4,17 (**) 0,01 0,73 0,09 17,44 (**) 
ln(IPC8) * TREND -0,01 -1,75 0,00 -1,21 0,00 1,46 0,00 -0,57 -0,01 -1,38 0,00 -0,45 
ln(1+BPC) 0,17 12,33 (**) 0,01 1,47 -0,09 -8,60 (**) 0,00 0,49 0,19 12,18 (**) 0,04 7,23 (**) 
ln(1+BPC) * TREND 0,01 3,37 (**) -0,01 -5,49 (**) 0,01 2,29 (*) 0,01 2,56 (*) 0,02 5,21 (**) 0,00 -1,76 
ln(1+NPC) 0,06 4,86 (**) -0,01 -3,61 (**) 0,08 8,13 (**) 0,09 10,47 (**) 0,05 3,88 (**) 0,02 5,19 (**) 
ln(1+NPC) * TREND 0,00 0,34 0,00 2,08 (*) 0,00 -0,04 -0,01 -1,91 0,01 2,56 (*) 0,00 1,89 
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
ln(1+CUMUL) 0,01 1,55 -0,03 -25,85 (**) 0,09 32,84 (**) 0,01 5,26 (**) -0,06 -14,97 (**) -0,01 -6,37 (**) 
ln(1+CUMUL) * TREND 0,00 2,80 (**) 0,00 -1,47 0,00 1,86 0,00 2,00 (*) 0,00 3,17 (**) 0,00 2,32 (*) 
OCCAS 0,02 0,73 -0,04 -6,09 (**) -0,09 -5,63 (**) -0,05 -3,61 (**) -0,03 -1,28 -0,05 -5,19 (**) 
OCCAS * TREND -0,01 -0,69 0,00 1,13 -0,01 -0,99 -0,01 -1,56 -0,01 -0,89 -0,01 -3,50 (**) 
ACAD 0,10 2,26 (*) 0,02 1,14 -0,06 -1,33 -0,02 -0,60 -0,06 -1,06 0,01 0,75 
ACAD * TREND -0,01 -0,39 -0,01 -1,59 -0,02 -1,16 -0,01 -0,55 -0,02 -1,04 -0,01 -2,10 (*) 
CBOWN 0,05 2,11 (*) 0,05 7,00 (**) -0,08 -4,35 (**) 0,00 0,18 0,10 3,72 (**) 0,05 5,27 (**) 
CBOWN * TREND 0,00 0,08 0,00 -1,84 0,00 0,12 0,00 0,26 0,01 0,60 -0,01 -2,32 (*) 
Model 
# Observations 242048 239528 242048 239536 242048 242048 
Pseudo R² 0,05 0,06 0,21 0,05 0,05 0,04 
Log likelihood -229136 -566426 -122823 -157378 -52218 -539135 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 25496,57 (0,00) 112858,09 (0,00) 47.872 (0,00) 16.488 (0,00) 4.435 (0,00) 57392,55 (0,00) 





5yrs Citations EPC Family Triadic Survived 10yrs Opposed Composite 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Industrial Chemistry) 
JC-02 - Organic Chemistry 0,13 5,57 (**) 0,27 39,50 (**) 0,18 8,80 (**) 0,12 6,99 (**) 0,00 -0,05 0,27 31,83 (**) 
JC-02 - Organic Chemistry * TREND 0,01 1,83 0,00 1,93 0,00 0,16 0,01 1,12 0,02 2,10 (*) -0,01 -2,77 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,26 11,44 (**) 0,07 11,04 (**) 0,09 4,70 (**) 0,15 9,26 (**) 0,13 5,38 (**) 0,15 17,30 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers * TREND -0,01 -1,94 0,00 1,70 0,00 0,61 -0,02 -2,96 (**) 0,02 3,19 (**) 0,00 -0,96 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,50 20,21 (**) 0,24 32,75 (**) -0,01 -0,24 0,21 10,99 (**) 0,07 2,49 (*) 0,28 31,06 (**) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology * TREND -0,01 -1,01 0,01 3,36 (**) 0,04 4,87 (**) 0,04 7,08 (**) -0,01 -1,26 0,00 0,55 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,44 11,93 (**) 0,07 6,11 (**) -0,10 -3,14 (**) 0,34 11,93 (**) -0,18 -3,37 (**) 0,21 14,98 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications * TREND 0,05 4,33 (**) -0,03 -8,25 (**) -0,01 -1,29 -0,02 -1,73 -0,03 -1,82 -0,03 -7,42 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,15 4,46 (**) -0,15 -15,97 (**) 0,11 4,06 (**) 0,23 10,00 (**) -0,16 -3,61 (**) -0,05 -3,97 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media * TREND 0,01 0,98 0,00 -0,24 0,02 2,57 (*) 0,01 0,87 -0,03 -1,91 0,00 1,08 
JC-07 - Electronics -0,12 -4,14 (**) -0,12 -15,30 (**) 0,08 3,90 (**) 0,14 7,56 (**) -0,20 -5,72 (**) -0,06 -5,80 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics * TREND 0,03 3,10 (**) 0,00 -1,57 0,00 -0,45 0,00 -0,07 0,01 0,95 -0,01 -1,70 
JC-08 - Electricity -0,20 -7,49 (**) -0,13 -18,61 (**) -0,02 -1,16 -0,03 -1,56 -0,08 -2,97 (**) -0,11 -12,15 (**) 
JC-08 - Electricity * TREND 0,01 1,41 0,00 -0,88 0,00 -0,52 -0,02 -2,94 (**) -0,02 -2,55 (*) -0,01 -3,16 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,14 3,23 (**) -0,19 -15,85 (**) -0,06 -1,91 0,14 4,90 (**) -0,12 -2,32 (*) -0,10 -7,04 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers * TREND 0,01 0,41 0,01 2,26 (*) 0,00 0,09 0,01 0,94 -0,01 -0,57 0,00 0,53 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics -0,28 -10,42 (**) -0,18 -25,03 (**) 0,06 3,27 (**) -0,06 -3,70 (**) -0,24 -8,03 (**) -0,17 -18,20 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics * TREND 0,01 1,04 0,00 -1,65 0,00 0,01 0,01 2,23 (*) 0,00 -0,39 0,00 0,95 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing -0,34 -13,13 (**) 0,00 0,04 -0,04 -2,44 (*) -0,09 -5,98 (**) 0,05 2,19 (*) -0,03 -3,49 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing * TREND 0,00 0,44 0,00 0,14 -0,01 -2,56 (*) 0,01 2,03 (*) -0,01 -1,77 -0,01 -3,00 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles -0,39 -13,13 (**) -0,15 -20,68 (**) -0,12 -6,74 (**) -0,10 -5,63 (**) -0,14 -4,84 (**) -0,26 -22,12 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles * TREND 0,05 5,56 (**) 0,00 0,19 -0,01 -2,24 (*) 0,01 2,60 (**) 0,00 0,37 0,01 1,63 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering -0,42 -13,07 (**) -0,05 -6,56 (**) -0,30 -15,31 (**) -0,18 -9,88 (**) -0,06 -1,97 (*) -0,17 -13,78 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering * TREND 0,02 2,26 (*) -0,01 -1,92 -0,02 -2,59 (*) 0,01 0,97 0,00 0,07 -0,01 -2,40 (*) 
JC-14 - Human Necessities 0,15 6,18 (**) -0,02 -2,02 (*) -0,09 -4,90 (**) -0,02 -1,43 0,03 1,16 0,01 0,72 





5yrs Citations EPC Family Triadic Survived 10yrs Opposed Composite 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT -0,10 -1,18 -0,01 -0,63 -0,30 -6,20 (**) -0,07 -1,42 0,18 2,69 (**) -0,02 -0,77 
AT * TREND 0,02 0,73 0,02 3,41 (**) 0,01 0,66 0,04 2,81 (**) -0,04 -1,78 0,02 2,36 (*) 
AU 0,18 1,91 -0,10 -2,83 (**) 0,16 2,16 (*) 0,48 6,63 (**) -0,16 -1,42 -0,01 -0,15 
AU * TREND -0,01 -0,37 0,01 0,59 0,07 2,74 (**) 0,01 0,53 -0,06 -1,51 0,00 0,19 
BE 0,40 5,03 (**) -0,02 -0,79 0,12 2,30 (*) 0,40 7,57 (**) 0,20 2,65 (**) 0,15 4,69 (**) 
BE * TREND -0,10 -3,82 (**) 0,01 0,81 0,03 1,84 -0,04 -2,26 (*) -0,08 -3,42 (**) -0,02 -1,80 
CA 0,35 4,27 (**) -0,17 -6,61 (**) 0,31 5,37 (**) 0,43 7,68 (**) -0,02 -0,19 -0,01 -0,44 
CA * TREND -0,02 -0,73 0,00 0,27 0,00 -0,07 -0,01 -0,86 -0,06 -2,14 (*) 0,00 -0,10 
CH 0,06 1,43 0,10 8,95 (**) 0,32 10,72 (**) 0,32 11,15 (**) 0,24 5,67 (**) 0,26 16,18 (**) 
CH * TREND 0,02 1,37 0,00 0,66 0,01 0,96 0,01 1,32 -0,08 -5,93 (**) 0,00 -0,41 
DE 0,03 0,88 0,04 5,35 (**) -0,26 -14,54 (**) 0,17 9,90 (**) 0,26 9,96 (**) 0,06 4,94 (**) 
DE * TREND 0,00 -0,10 0,00 -0,50 0,01 1,42 -0,01 -0,92 -0,04 -5,09 (**) 0,00 -1,01 
DK 0,21 2,13 (*) 0,00 -0,18 -0,03 -0,39 0,39 5,98 (**) 0,28 3,24 (**) 0,09 2,26 (*) 
DK * TREND 0,00 0,14 0,01 1,00 -0,02 -0,88 0,00 0,12 -0,03 -0,95 0,00 0,08 
ES 0,00 -0,03 0,03 0,72 -0,05 -0,51 0,38 4,23 (**) 0,09 0,68 0,04 0,59 
ES * TREND -0,09 -1,94 0,01 0,75 -0,03 -1,17 0,00 -0,11 -0,10 -2,44 (*) -0,02 -1,19 
FI 0,20 2,12 (*) 0,00 0,18 -0,11 -1,95 0,73 12,35 (**) 0,36 4,51 (**) 0,18 5,68 (**) 
FI * TREND 0,04 1,57 0,00 0,06 0,09 5,22 (**) -0,04 -2,38 (*) -0,07 -3,02 (**) 0,01 0,57 
GB 0,27 7,17 (**) -0,09 -8,80 (**) 0,09 3,46 (**) 0,24 9,81 (**) 0,20 5,69 (**) 0,02 1,09 
GB * TREND -0,02 -1,88 0,00 1,33 0,00 0,17 -0,02 -2,30 (*) -0,06 -5,39 (**) -0,02 -3,25 (**) 
IL 0,44 3,51 (**) -0,08 -1,87 0,30 3,08 (**) 0,40 4,28 (**) 0,06 0,39 0,09 1,65 
IL * TREND -0,02 -0,41 0,00 0,25 -0,01 -0,36 -0,04 -1,18 -0,04 -0,84 -0,02 -1,09 
IT -0,01 -0,23 0,01 1,08 -0,10 -3,45 (**) 0,43 14,63 (**) -0,02 -0,42 0,00 -0,13 
IT * TREND 0,00 -0,19 0,00 -0,29 -0,01 -1,45 0,02 1,63 -0,01 -0,69 -0,02 -2,83 (**) 
JP 0,17 5,82 (**) -0,45 -56,40 (**) 0,96 46,27 (**) 0,45 24,04 (**) -0,12 -3,75 (**) -0,13 -11,42 (**) 
JP * TREND -0,01 -0,79 0,00 0,05 0,03 4,89 (**) -0,01 -0,86 -0,05 -4,65 (**) 0,01 2,41 (*) 
KR -0,10 -0,52 -0,36 -7,17 (**) 0,52 4,55 (**) 0,46 4,16 (**) 0,00 -0,01 -0,25 -3,78 (**) 
KR * TREND 0,00 0,03 -0,02 -1,14 0,03 1,05 0,02 0,69 -0,08 -1,55 0,02 0,83 
NL 0,12 2,84 (**) 0,04 3,86 (**) 0,14 5,01 (**) 0,48 17,02 (**) 0,34 8,38 (**) 0,15 9,83 (**) 
NL * TREND -0,02 -1,59 -0,01 -3,32 (**) -0,01 -0,53 -0,03 -2,74 (**) -0,04 -3,32 (**) -0,02 -3,40 (**) 
SE 0,25 4,06 (**) -0,02 -1,22 0,45 11,03 (**) 0,62 15,35 (**) 0,25 4,30 (**) 0,19 8,49 (**) 
SE * TREND -0,02 -1,30 0,00 -0,65 0,03 2,05 (*) -0,04 -2,88 (**) -0,05 -2,63 (**) -0,01 -1,85 
US 0,43 15,55 (**) -0,15 -18,85 (**) 0,62 32,43 (**) 0,49 27,28 (**) 0,03 0,99 0,09 8,72 (**) 
US * TREND -0,01 -1,19 0,00 -1,55 -0,03 -4,54 (**) -0,02 -2,98 (**) -0,05 -5,23 (**) -0,02 -4,87 (**) 
RoW 0,04 0,59 -0,03 -1,66 0,21 5,00 (**) 0,18 4,34 (**) -0,09 -1,36 0,04 1,50 
RoW * TREND 0,01 0,29 0,01 1,09 -0,01 -0,80 0,01 0,73 -0,06 -2,72 (**) -0,01 -1,52 
  
Table A5.25 – Clustered Regressions by Joint Cluster – Forward citations (CITE5) 
JC01 JC02 JC03 JC04 JC05 JC06 JC07 JC08 JC09 JC10 JC11 JC12 JC13 JC14 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
ln(CLMDEV_MED) 0,30 16,29 (**) 0,32 20,12 (**) 0,28 16,08(**) 0,35 20,83(**) 0,31 10,36(**) 0,30 11,57(**) 0,33 14,49(**) 0,29 14,47(**) 0,26 8,05(**) 0,34 16,11(**) 0,31 15,73(**) 0,29 12,76(**) 0,29 11,26(**) 0,31 15,75(**)
ln(1+CLMLS) -0,17 -6,08 (**) -0,20 -9,94 (**) -0,18 -6,61(**) -0,17 -8,51(**) -0,08 -1,91 -0,20 -5,84(**) -0,12 -3,66(**) -0,11 -3,64(**) -0,12 -2,65(**) -0,12 -4,02(**) -0,15 -4,85(**) -0,15 -3,85(**) -0,11 -2,62(**) -0,10 -3,54(**)
ln(1+PRIO) 0,45 11,44 (**) 0,46 13,37 (**) 0,28 7,66(**) 0,42 10,93(**) 0,17 2,13 (*) 0,26 4,77(**) 0,28 5,48(**) 0,41 9,15(**) 0,27 3,26(**) 0,29 6,12(**) 0,35 7,73(**) 0,23 3,92(**) 0,32 5,18(**) 0,28 6,85(**)
ln(1+EQUIV) 0,04 0,89 0,05 1,49 -0,01 -0,41 0,08 2,36 (*) -0,02 -0,33 0,01 0,14 -0,08 -1,34 0,09 1,73 -0,04 -0,57 0,07 1,48 0,08 1,70 0,01 0,21 -0,06 -0,94 0,12 3,14(**)
HASDIV 0,26 4,73 (**) 0,28 7,53 (**) 0,45 9,22(**) 0,19 5,36(**) 0,23 2,82(**) 0,31 5,22(**) 0,20 3,58(**) 0,25 4,51(**) 0,15 1,81 0,19 3,53(**) 0,12 2,16 (*) 0,18 2,41 (*) 0,16 1,99 (*) 0,22 5,09(**)
ISDIV -0,21 -2,37 (*) -0,36 -4,77 (**) -0,18 -2,33 (*) -0,41 -4,88(**) -0,38 -2,65(**) -0,43 -4,78(**) -0,47 -5,75(**) -0,39 -4,17(**) -0,43 -3,02(**) -0,13 -1,51 -0,12 -1,45 0,01 0,07 -0,22 -1,90 -0,11 -1,79
PCT 0,07 2,70 (**) 0,15 7,54 (**) 0,06 2,31 (*) 0,14 6,19(**) 0,07 1,58 0,10 2,21 (*) 0,05 1,27 0,04 1,39 0,02 0,43 0,23 7,65(**) 0,09 3,26(**) 0,09 2,76(**) 0,08 2,32 (*) 0,13 5,16(**)
ACCSRC 0,15 1,57 0,11 1,35 0,20 2,63(**) 0,20 2,68(**) -0,07 -0,64 -0,20 -2,40 (*) 0,05 0,59 -0,01 -0,16 -0,03 -0,30 0,04 0,43 0,26 2,80(**) 0,30 2,53 (*) -0,05 -0,33 0,11 1,61
Technical Complexity (PC) 
ln(INVENT) 0,17 9,31 (**) 0,22 13,90 (**) 0,18 10,29(**) 0,19 11,53(**) 0,15 4,95(**) 0,19 7,04(**) 0,16 7,13(**) 0,13 6,36(**) 0,12 3,68(**) 0,20 9,42(**) 0,18 8,65(**) 0,17 6,66(**) 0,14 5,21(**) 0,24 12,12(**)
ln(IPC8) 0,30 16,05 (**) 0,23 16,02 (**) 0,20 11,63(**) 0,25 14,42(**) 0,35 9,52(**) 0,48 15,28(**) 0,37 14,21(**) 0,27 11,25(**) 0,54 13,25(**) 0,40 16,32(**) 0,28 13,34(**) 0,28 10,68(**) 0,36 13,26(**) 0,17 7,58(**)
ln(1+BPC) 0,31 13,41 (**) 0,17 10,92 (**) 0,20 9,47(**) 0,14 8,47(**) 0,01 0,22 0,17 5,19(**) 0,21 7,12(**) 0,16 5,83(**) 0,14 3,80(**) 0,12 4,50(**) 0,24 8,82(**) 0,31 9,00(**) 0,23 6,34(**) 0,24 9,32(**)
ln(1+NPC) 0,05 2,60 (**) 0,05 4,04 (**) -0,14 -7,35(**) 0,10 7,55(**) 0,11 3,55(**) 0,11 4,57(**) -0,01 -0,63 0,08 4,08(**) 0,09 2,56 (*) 0,13 6,43(**) 0,09 3,86(**) 0,17 5,46(**) 0,04 1,25 0,07 2,95(**)
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
ln(1+CUMUL) 0,02 4,10 (**) -0,01 -0,97 -0,03 -5,09(**) 0,03 4,28(**) 0,00 -0,01 0,03 2,91(**) -0,01 -1,26 0,01 1,99 (*) -0,02 -1,39 0,00 -0,30 0,03 3,63(**) 0,03 3,16(**) 0,05 5,19(**) 0,01 0,99
OCCAS -0,03 -0,85 0,00 0,12 -0,08 -2,05 (*) 0,01 0,29 0,21 2,95(**) 0,20 3,05(**) 0,07 1,36 0,03 0,58 0,23 3,21(**) 0,00 -0,03 -0,03 -0,75 -0,03 -0,67 -0,01 -0,17 -0,09 -2,84(**)
ACAD 0,16 2,51 (*) 0,05 1,23 0,21 2,46 (*) 0,01 0,21 -0,31 -1,16 -0,06 -0,35 0,04 0,23 0,22 1,89 0,13 0,63 0,24 3,33(**) 0,05 0,37 0,09 0,50 0,37 3,15(**) 0,31 3,73(**)
CBOWN 0,05 1,30 0,05 1,54 0,02 0,59 0,01 0,37 0,04 0,66 0,05 0,84 0,00 0,03 0,00 -0,10 0,04 0,56 0,06 1,20 0,11 2,74(**) 0,03 0,66 0,14 2,51 (*) 0,13 3,35(**)
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT -0,08 -0,74 0,23 2,37 (*) -0,08 -0,56 0,08 0,75 0,15 0,36 -0,96 -1,71 0,00 -0,01 0,34 2,35 (*) 0,19 0,52 0,03 0,17 -0,15 -1,47 -0,11 -0,85 -0,12 -1,00 -0,34 -2,80(**)
AU -0,05 -0,34 0,22 1,74 0,27 1,43 0,16 1,48 0,29 0,86 0,28 1,05 0,47 1,94 0,50 2,14 (*) 0,30 0,81 0,24 1,37 0,03 0,17 0,10 0,52 -0,05 -0,31 0,27 2,20 (*)
BE -0,01 -0,11 0,00 -0,04 0,00 0,00 0,06 0,60 0,49 1,38 0,04 0,20 0,43 1,87 0,53 4,44(**) 0,09 0,24 0,19 1,34 -0,19 -1,39 -0,26 -1,09 0,09 0,57 0,19 1,85
CA 0,18 1,80 0,41 4,85 (**) -0,16 -1,10 0,34 4,16(**) 0,67 4,90(**) 0,01 0,03 0,46 2,75(**) 0,20 1,22 0,27 0,95 0,23 1,69 0,39 3,52(**) 0,07 0,38 0,18 1,23 0,15 1,24
CH 0,22 2,92 (**) -0,01 -0,11 0,10 1,37 0,23 3,91(**) 0,04 0,23 -0,07 -0,35 0,12 0,99 0,22 2,42 (*) -0,54 -2,24 (*) 0,12 1,48 -0,08 -1,34 0,16 1,79 0,14 1,63 0,19 2,79(**)
DE 0,12 2,62 (**) -0,01 -0,20 0,18 3,40(**) 0,04 0,94 -0,17 -2,16 (*) -0,13 -1,49 -0,04 -0,69 0,03 0,60 -0,21 -1,98 (*) 0,04 0,64 -0,15 -3,19(**) 0,10 2,21 (*) 0,02 0,43 -0,12 -2,37 (*)
DK -0,20 -1,33 0,47 5,67 (**) 0,46 3,62(**) 0,23 2,82(**) -0,08 -0,17 0,19 0,61 0,39 1,15 0,34 1,30 0,05 0,10 0,13 0,66 -0,20 -1,24 -0,20 -0,84 0,10 0,67 0,09 0,75
ES -0,07 -0,25 -0,50 -2,83 (**) 0,06 0,21 -0,37 -2,17 (*) -0,08 -0,13 0,17 0,31 -17,63 -0,01 -0,52 -1,32 0,02 0,06 -0,90 -1,64 -0,27 -1,30 -0,21 -0,98 -0,11 -0,42 -0,04 -0,19
FI -0,09 -0,75 -0,06 -0,44 -0,03 -0,21 0,05 0,37 0,85 8,65(**) -0,42 -1,42 0,44 3,03(**) 0,24 1,29 0,46 1,76 0,51 3,39(**) 0,29 2,96(**) -0,05 -0,26 0,06 0,36 -0,02 -0,11
GB 0,21 3,62 (**) 0,31 7,45 (**) -0,03 -0,38 0,28 6,11(**) 0,45 5,12(**) 0,07 0,73 0,07 0,80 0,15 1,88 0,05 0,43 0,13 1,91 0,08 1,20 0,05 0,79 0,04 0,57 0,14 2,08 (*)
IL 0,36 1,76 0,48 3,89 (**) 0,62 2,72(**) 0,44 4,02(**) 0,74 2,48 (*) 0,22 0,78 0,43 1,51 0,61 2,02 (*) 1,22 3,63(**) 0,19 0,96 0,28 1,27 -0,09 -0,24 0,70 2,06 (*) 0,52 3,32(**)
IT -0,12 -1,38 -0,03 -0,55 -0,05 -0,57 0,04 0,62 -0,10 -0,60 -0,06 -0,34 -0,34 -2,93(**) 0,16 1,78 -0,09 -0,47 -0,29 -2,30 (*) -0,10 -1,54 0,05 0,63 0,17 1,90 -0,04 -0,45
JP 0,29 6,43 (**) -0,12 -3,25 (**) 0,15 2,95(**) -0,09 -2,25 (*) 0,11 1,43 -0,06 -0,79 0,15 2,68(**) 0,27 5,41(**) -0,05 -0,58 0,22 3,88(**) 0,05 0,96 0,29 5,27(**) 0,22 3,38(**) 0,21 4,06(**)
KR -0,22 -0,88 -0,36 -1,84 -0,16 -0,58 -0,26 -1,11 -0,01 -0,02 -0,10 -0,70 -0,28 -1,58 -0,10 -0,47 -0,39 -1,10 -0,68 -1,34 -0,46 -1,34 -0,35 -1,02 -0,03 -0,10 0,79 2,90(**)
NL 0,09 1,20 0,00 -0,06 0,03 0,40 0,13 2,13 (*) 0,05 0,47 0,02 0,17 0,11 1,36 0,21 2,96(**) 0,12 0,87 0,22 2,43 (*) -0,08 -1,05 -0,09 -0,74 -0,04 -0,39 -0,21 -2,73(**)
SE 0,16 1,73 0,19 2,31 (*) 0,12 1,14 0,27 3,55(**) 0,75 7,45(**) 0,11 0,60 0,13 0,91 0,07 0,54 0,00 0,02 0,22 1,83 -0,05 -0,58 0,09 0,84 0,10 0,96 0,20 2,60(**)
US 0,47 10,95 (**) 0,35 10,36 (**) 0,35 6,91(**) 0,38 10,67(**) 0,50 7,27(**) 0,21 2,95(**) 0,25 4,34(**) 0,50 10,11(**) 0,42 4,99(**) 0,41 7,69(**) 0,22 4,59(**) 0,37 7,22(**) 0,35 6,05(**) 0,56 12,23(**)
RoW -0,05 -0,48 0,02 0,33 0,07 0,59 0,06 0,81 0,30 1,18 0,03 0,11 0,07 0,49 0,22 1,90 0,22 0,95 -0,08 -0,59 -0,10 -1,06 -0,05 -0,45 0,08 0,71 0,26 3,11(**)
Time dummies (Reference = 1990)
1991 0,02 0,61 0,04 1,25 0,08 2,28 (*) 0,03 0,89 0,15 2,28 (*) -0,04 -0,62 0,01 0,20 0,07 1,58 0,03 0,40 0,07 1,53 0,06 1,40 0,03 0,62 0,00 0,06 0,07 1,66
1992 0,05 1,37 0,12 3,73 (**) 0,12 3,42(**) 0,10 2,97(**) 0,15 2,29 (*) -0,09 -1,55 0,14 2,82(**) 0,12 2,87(**) 0,09 1,25 0,04 0,95 0,05 1,10 0,23 4,57(**) 0,11 2,12 (*) 0,11 2,81(**)
1993 0,08 2,17 (*) 0,12 3,82 (**) 0,15 4,17(**) 0,10 3,08(**) 0,25 3,91(**) 0,14 2,51 (*) 0,20 4,17(**) 0,23 5,46(**) 0,18 2,52 (*) 0,10 2,22 (*) 0,07 1,78 0,27 5,39(**) 0,18 3,45(**) 0,18 4,48(**)
1994 0,14 3,90 (**) 0,19 6,09 (**) 0,16 4,42(**) 0,17 4,96(**) 0,42 6,51(**) 0,13 2,31 (*) 0,31 6,48(**) 0,26 6,26(**) 0,21 2,93(**) 0,18 4,04(**) 0,19 4,61(**) 0,41 8,46(**) 0,23 4,44(**) 0,13 3,37(**)




Table A5.26 – Clustered Regressions by Joint Cluster – EPC Families (EPCFM) 
JC01 JC02 JC03 JC04 JC05 JC06 JC07 JC08 JC09 JC10 JC11 JC12 JC13 JC14 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
ln(CLMDEV_MED) 0,05 10,79(**) 0,04 11,68(**) 0,05 11,10(**) 0,02 6,05(**) 0,02 1,95 0,03 4,12(**) 0,04 6,51(**) 0,02 3,89(**) 0,02 1,91 0,05 10,21(**) 0,02 3,96(**) 0,03 5,22(**) 0,03 6,14(**) 0,02 3,82(**)
ln(1+CLMLS) -0,07 -9,51(**) -0,13 -26,71(**) -0,08-10,36(**) -0,15-28,07(**) -0,09 -6,41(**) -0,04 -3,86(**) -0,04 -4,62(**) -0,05 -5,93(**) -0,06 -4,29(**) -0,09-10,54(**) -0,03 -4,24(**) -0,01 -1,35 -0,05 -5,30(**) -0,02 -3,04(**)
ln(1+PRIO) 0,04 4,07(**) 0,04 4,39(**) 0,03 3,20(**) 0,07 6,83(**) 0,02 0,90 0,00 -0,08 0,03 1,89 0,07 5,86(**) -0,04 -1,77 0,03 2,14 (*) 0,05 5,34(**) 0,05 3,81(**) 0,05 3,59(**) 0,00 -0,29
ln(1+EQUIV) 0,02 2,16 (*) 0,02 2,49 (*) 0,02 1,88 0,01 1,66 0,07 3,18(**) 0,01 0,43 -0,01 -0,86 -0,02 -1,21 0,01 0,64 0,01 0,73 0,01 0,60 -0,03 -1,70 0,02 1,01 0,05 4,68(**)
HASDIV 0,09 5,86(**) 0,19 22,70(**) 0,13 9,15(**) 0,19 21,74(**) 0,12 4,48(**) 0,15 7,78(**) 0,09 5,32(**) 0,07 4,30(**) 0,08 2,89(**) 0,15 9,85(**) 0,10 7,16(**) 0,12 6,21(**) 0,08 4,15(**) 0,11 9,23(**)
ISDIV -0,04 -1,69 0,04 2,77(**) 0,04 2,10 (*) 0,06 3,36(**) 0,32 8,61(**) 0,06 2,67(**) 0,01 0,66 -0,02 -1,12 -0,09 -2,20 (*) 0,06 2,64(**) -0,02 -1,00 -0,03 -1,46 -0,01 -0,44 0,06 3,76(**)
PCT 0,08 14,09(**) 0,07 16,19(**) 0,10 16,99(**) 0,08 14,59(**) 0,22 16,80(**) 0,11 8,77(**) 0,09 9,63(**) 0,07 8,84(**) 0,06 4,05(**) 0,12 15,78(**) 0,10 18,51(**) 0,04 5,05(**) 0,06 7,59(**) 0,16 25,12(**)
ACCSRC 0,02 0,75 -0,02 -0,78 0,04 2,06 (*) -0,05 -2,51 (*) 0,24 7,74(**) 0,03 1,34 -0,01 -0,53 0,03 1,36 -0,01 -0,30 0,03 1,14 0,09 4,22(**) 0,03 0,96 0,00 0,16 0,00 -0,02
Technical Complexity (PC) 
ln(INVENT) 0,02 5,26(**) 0,07 21,32(**) 0,04 7,87(**) 0,10 26,00(**) -0,03 -3,50(**) 0,03 3,20(**) 0,00 -0,71 0,00 0,62 0,01 0,66 0,04 7,37(**) 0,01 2,00 (*) 0,00 0,71 0,01 1,04 0,04 8,52(**)
ln(IPC8) 0,02 3,81(**) -0,02 -5,67(**) 0,03 5,55(**) 0,01 1,34 0,01 1,00 0,04 4,31(**) 0,03 4,27(**) 0,02 2,61(**) 0,08 6,64(**) 0,05 7,18(**) 0,02 4,36(**) 0,05 8,72(**) -0,01 -1,77 0,02 3,93(**)
ln(1+BPC) 0,01 1,50 -0,06 -18,10(**) 0,01 1,34 -0,08-21,08(**) -0,01 -0,85 0,00 0,27 0,03 3,83(**) 0,00 -0,33 0,07 6,32(**) -0,06 -8,36(**) 0,01 1,82 -0,02 -2,80(**) 0,00 0,10 0,01 1,57
ln(1+NPC) -0,01 -1,71 0,05 15,90(**) -0,03 -5,54(**) 0,03 8,91(**) 0,03 3,29(**) -0,01 -1,22 -0,05 -7,75(**) -0,03 -6,66(**) -0,02 -2,23 (*) 0,05 9,51(**) -0,03 -5,21(**) -0,01 -0,66 -0,05 -6,38(**) -0,05 -7,66(**)
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
ln(1+CUMUL) -0,02 -17,16(**) -0,03 -22,68(**) -0,03-21,04(**) 0,00 -0,12 -0,01 -4,12(**) -0,02 -9,17(**) -0,02-11,51(**) -0,02-15,15(**) -0,03-10,93(**) -0,03-18,28(**) -0,02-14,75(**) -0,05-24,95(**) -0,07-32,74(**) -0,02 -9,52(**)
OCCAS -0,04 -4,99(**) -0,13 -18,96(**) -0,08 -8,66(**) -0,09-12,73(**) 0,02 1,04 0,11 5,82(**) 0,05 4,03(**) 0,03 3,31(**) 0,07 3,44(**) -0,05 -5,41(**) -0,04 -5,32(**) -0,03 -3,45(**) -0,09-10,86(**) 0,00 -0,52
ACAD -0,06 -3,54(**) -0,04 -3,73(**) -0,01 -0,57 -0,03 -3,65(**) -0,10 -1,41 0,08 1,63 0,06 1,19 0,05 1,61 0,08 1,30 0,10 5,27(**) -0,12 -3,67(**) 0,03 0,77 0,02 0,64 0,08 3,83(**)
CBOWN 0,06 7,35(**) 0,05 7,56(**) 0,07 8,35(**) 0,04 5,37(**) -0,05 -2,72(**) -0,05 -2,66(**) 0,04 2,51 (*) 0,02 1,41 -0,05 -2,19 (*) 0,00 0,17 0,14 17,06(**) 0,05 4,87(**) 0,02 2,18 (*) 0,07 7,60(**)
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT -0,04 -1,98 (*) 0,09 4,29(**) 0,04 1,37 0,09 4,15(**) -0,08 -0,84 0,25 3,06(**) 0,30 7,34(**) 0,19 6,66(**) 0,11 1,28 0,14 4,23(**) -0,05 -2,59 (*) 0,10 4,19(**) 0,01 0,36 -0,06 -2,78(**)
AU -0,16 -5,06(**) -0,20 -6,35(**) -0,35 -6,71(**) -0,12 -4,15(**) -0,29 -2,92(**) 0,13 1,67 -0,03 -0,42 0,11 1,97 (*) -0,18 -1,71 0,00 -0,06 -0,10 -3,03(**) 0,07 1,86 -0,03 -1,08 -0,05 -1,54
BE 0,01 0,34 -0,02 -1,00 -0,34-15,33(**) 0,08 3,48(**) 0,35 4,48(**) 0,12 2,39 (*) 0,29 5,75(**) -0,01 -0,49 0,30 3,78(**) 0,06 1,90 0,00 0,08 0,22 5,87(**) 0,02 0,73 -0,18 -7,22(**)
CA -0,24 -10,46(**) -0,11 -5,64(**) -0,27 -8,05(**) -0,08 -4,08(**) -0,58-12,10(**) -0,06 -1,06 -0,26 -5,39(**) -0,13 -3,32(**) -0,14 -1,79 -0,06 -1,67 -0,02 -0,91 -0,12 -3,02(**) -0,15 -4,79(**) -0,08 -2,68(**)
CH 0,06 3,63(**) 0,04 4,21(**) -0,10 -5,91(**) 0,10 7,85(**) 0,02 0,46 0,20 4,26(**) 0,18 6,93(**) 0,18 9,49(**) 0,27 5,93(**) 0,16 8,96(**) 0,03 2,94(**) 0,20 12,17(**) 0,13 8,42(**) 0,17 11,96(**)
DE -0,03 -3,46(**) -0,07 -8,82(**) -0,03 -2,97(**) 0,02 2,49 (*) 0,09 4,86(**) 0,07 3,29(**) 0,11 7,68(**) 0,08 7,66(**) 0,21 9,06(**) 0,08 6,58(**) -0,04 -4,77(**) 0,07 7,30(**) 0,07 7,24(**) 0,07 7,14(**)
DK -0,05 -1,76 -0,01 -0,79 -0,21 -6,56(**) -0,01 -0,75 0,00 -0,03 0,12 1,57 0,20 2,67(**) 0,20 3,74(**) 0,17 1,57 0,04 0,80 0,05 1,91 0,06 1,44 0,09 3,38(**) 0,03 1,00
ES 0,03 0,50 0,03 1,00 -0,06 -0,91 0,02 0,70 0,38 3,46(**) 0,09 0,67 0,01 0,11 0,19 3,38(**) 0,26 3,49(**) 0,38 5,38(**) 0,00 0,06 0,08 2,34 (*) 0,06 1,60 0,00 0,06
FI -0,18 -6,94(**) 0,01 0,28 -0,23 -7,23(**) -0,08 -2,88(**) 0,00 0,11 0,15 2,45 (*) 0,11 3,11(**) 0,04 1,06 -0,02 -0,26 0,06 1,51 -0,01 -0,61 0,06 1,52 0,01 0,26 -0,06 -1,88
GB -0,08 -6,42(**) -0,05 -5,33(**) -0,14 -8,94(**) -0,03 -3,22(**) -0,21 -8,51(**) -0,10 -3,68(**) -0,05 -2,49 (*) -0,04 -2,06 (*) -0,07 -2,36 (*) -0,02 -1,12 -0,09 -6,85(**) -0,15-10,02(**) -0,16-10,37(**) -0,01 -0,89
IL -0,11 -2,38 (*) -0,11 -3,75(**) -0,06 -0,95 -0,04 -1,49 -0,10 -1,09 -0,30 -3,44(**) -0,12 -1,55 -0,07 -0,93 0,20 2,11 (*) -0,11 -2,10 (*) 0,00 0,08 0,02 0,27 0,12 1,57 0,04 0,93
IT 0,09 5,50(**) 0,01 1,10 0,07 3,77(**) 0,05 3,58(**) -0,12 -2,76(**) 0,23 5,73(**) -0,12 -4,59(**) -0,04 -1,89 -0,06 -1,23 0,12 5,06(**) -0,05 -4,47(**) 0,06 3,76(**) 0,00 -0,06 0,03 1,55
JP -0,60 -57,66(**) -0,44 -50,90(**) -0,76-61,72(**) -0,38-37,47(**) -0,55-25,97(**) -0,27-13,86(**) -0,34-23,69(**) -0,41-35,28(**) -0,35-14,52(**) -0,38-28,28(**) -0,52-46,94(**) -0,38-30,30(**) -0,37-25,67(**) -0,38-30,05(**)
KR -0,62 -10,03(**) -0,49 -10,44(**) -0,54 -7,59(**) -0,47 -8,12(**) -0,39 -3,50(**) -0,26 -6,23(**) -0,40 -8,34(**) -0,44 -8,67(**) -0,54 -5,32(**) -0,28 -2,65(**) -0,47 -6,52(**) -0,29 -4,13(**) -0,41 -5,99(**) -0,34 -4,07(**)
NL 0,01 0,75 -0,12 -10,07(**) -0,10 -5,66(**) -0,04 -2,68(**) 0,01 0,57 -0,01 -0,40 -0,06 -3,01(**) -0,14 -8,47(**) 0,09 2,43 (*) 0,09 4,18(**) 0,07 5,05(**) 0,22 10,73(**) 0,14 7,82(**) 0,06 3,54(**)
SE -0,07 -3,43(**) 0,06 3,82(**) -0,06 -2,70(**) 0,07 3,94(**) -0,14 -4,76(**) 0,19 4,09(**) 0,14 4,72(**) -0,03 -1,09 0,10 2,23 (*) 0,04 1,48 -0,13 -8,04(**) -0,03 -1,21 -0,07 -3,34(**) 0,04 2,46 (*)
US -0,22 -23,68(**) -0,10 -14,06(**) -0,28-24,84(**) -0,05 -5,47(**) -0,37-19,50(**) -0,15 -7,74(**) -0,22-14,96(**) -0,22-19,35(**) -0,23-10,62(**) -0,12 -9,32(**) -0,13-13,31(**) -0,09 -7,46(**) -0,21-16,60(**) -0,07 -6,56(**)
RoW -0,09 -4,84(**) -0,12 -7,64(**) -0,19 -6,92(**) 0,00 0,03 -0,01 -0,12 0,08 1,32 -0,13 -3,90(**) 0,02 0,97 0,03 0,49 0,19 6,97(**) -0,03 -1,59 0,13 6,18(**) 0,05 2,65(**) 0,05 2,54 (*)
Time dummies (Reference = 1990)
1991 -0,06 -6,95(**) -0,02 -2,58 (*) -0,03 -3,78(**) -0,03 -3,55(**) -0,07 -3,91(**) -0,06 -3,71(**) -0,06 -4,46(**) -0,01 -0,63 -0,04 -2,16 (*) -0,03 -2,93(**) -0,04 -4,37(**) -0,02 -2,27 (*) -0,03 -3,28(**) -0,03 -2,64(**)
1992 -0,07 -7,72(**) 0,02 2,26 (*) -0,03 -3,54(**) 0,03 3,91(**) -0,10 -5,83(**) -0,03 -2,09 (*) -0,06 -4,60(**) -0,01 -0,76 -0,03 -1,43 -0,04 -4,07(**) -0,03 -3,90(**) 0,00 -0,25 -0,02 -1,88 -0,03 -2,96(**)
1993 -0,07 -8,08(**) 0,04 5,93(**) -0,03 -2,85(**) 0,07 8,21(**) -0,10 -5,56(**) -0,04 -2,69(**) -0,06 -5,20(**) -0,06 -5,45(**) 0,01 0,63 -0,03 -2,51 (*) -0,04 -4,73(**) -0,04 -3,55(**) -0,06 -5,75(**) -0,03 -2,93(**)
1994 -0,08 -8,96(**) 0,04 5,56(**) -0,04 -4,10(**) 0,07 9,14(**) -0,19-10,24(**) -0,06 -3,42(**) -0,07 -5,91(**) -0,05 -4,71(**) -0,03 -1,43 -0,05 -4,33(**) -0,05 -5,80(**) -0,02 -1,95 -0,07 -6,39(**) -0,04 -3,85(**)




Table A5.27 – Clustered Regressions by Joint Cluster – Triadic (TRIAD) 
JC01 JC02 JC03 JC04 JC05 JC06 JC07 JC08 JC09 JC10 JC11 JC12 JC13 JC14 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
ln(CLMDEV_MED) 0,11 7,69(**) 0,12 8,44(**) 0,13 8,21(**) 0,11 6,68(**) 0,17 6,22(**) 0,12 4,84(**) 0,14 7,64(**) 0,14 9,23(**) 0,17 6,12(**) 0,11 6,20(**) 0,10 8,06(**) 0,09 6,38(**) 0,09 5,42(**) 0,13 8,59(**)
ln(1+CLMLS) -0,14 -5,95(**) -0,18 -8,54(**) -0,10 -3,90(**) -0,17 -7,71(**) -0,14 -3,04(**) -0,12 -3,19(**) -0,05 -1,61 -0,05 -2,06 (*) -0,08 -1,87 -0,13 -4,84(**) -0,13 -5,89(**) -0,03 -1,23 -0,08 -2,84(**) -0,08 -3,32(**)
ln(1+PRIO) 0,69 19,10(**) 0,65 17,25(**) 0,68 17,02(**) 0,63 14,02(**) 0,56 6,76(**) 0,59 8,95(**) 0,49 10,00(**) 0,61 15,36(**) 0,46 5,89(**) 0,64 14,30(**) 0,74 21,50(**) 0,70 16,08(**) 0,53 12,12(**) 0,53 14,09(**)
ln(1+EQUIV) 0,19 5,07(**) 0,21 5,91(**) 0,14 3,70(**) 0,21 5,47(**) 0,19 2,73(**) 0,30 4,29(**) 0,24 4,58(**) 0,18 4,01(**) 0,12 2,02 (*) 0,29 6,27(**) 0,22 5,74(**) 0,20 4,45(**) 0,22 4,70(**) 0,24 6,67(**)
HASDIV 0,19 3,35(**) 0,29 6,37(**) 0,34 5,61(**) 0,22 4,95(**) 0,00 0,01 0,21 2,70(**) 0,14 2,17 (*) 0,08 1,35 0,24 2,71(**) 0,28 4,62(**) 0,25 5,29(**) 0,13 2,20 (*) 0,10 1,61 0,26 5,92(**)
ISDIV 0,30 4,04(**) 0,49 6,30(**) 0,54 6,53(**) 0,37 4,48(**) 0,49 3,10(**) 0,47 4,56(**) 0,42 5,57(**) 0,29 4,00(**) 0,78 5,19(**) 0,53 6,28(**) 0,47 8,09(**) 0,49 6,90(**) 0,40 5,23(**) 0,57 10,33(**)
PCT 0,24 12,55(**) 0,07 3,89(**) 0,12 5,55(**) 0,13 5,73(**) 0,26 6,07(**) 0,10 2,43 (*) 0,26 9,03(**) 0,32 13,76(**) 0,12 2,78(**) 0,26 10,94(**) 0,38 20,81(**) 0,62 28,88(**) 0,57 25,15(**) 0,41 19,99(**)
ACCSRC 0,17 2,17 (*) 0,03 0,38 0,39 4,41(**) -0,03 -0,36 0,09 0,80 0,15 1,52 0,04 0,55 0,10 1,33 -0,02 -0,18 0,05 0,61 -0,02 -0,22 -0,11 -1,32 0,09 0,87 0,09 1,46
Technical Complexity (PC) 
ln(INVENT) 0,12 8,35(**) 0,17 11,21(**) 0,13 7,63(**) 0,21 12,28(**) 0,04 1,22 0,11 3,93(**) 0,01 0,53 0,13 8,29(**) 0,02 0,71 0,05 2,97(**) 0,09 5,93(**) 0,14 8,56(**) 0,07 3,56(**) 0,13 7,93(**)
ln(IPC8) 0,08 5,37(**) 0,09 5,99(**) 0,06 3,43(**) 0,09 4,93(**) 0,07 1,94 0,01 0,39 0,02 0,75 0,05 2,72(**) 0,05 1,48 0,03 1,53 0,04 2,78(**) 0,02 1,09 0,10 5,69(**) 0,05 2,62(**)
ln(1+BPC) -0,08 -4,22(**) -0,16 -10,68(**) -0,03 -1,57 -0,07 -4,01(**) -0,11 -3,25(**) -0,07 -2,27 (*) -0,07 -2,76(**) -0,12 -5,85(**) -0,19 -5,83(**) -0,04 -1,61 -0,06 -3,27(**) 0,04 1,98 (*) -0,02 -0,76 -0,09 -4,29(**)
ln(1+NPC) 0,08 5,30(**) 0,07 5,57(**) 0,05 3,10(**) 0,06 4,09(**) 0,09 3,19(**) 0,02 0,95 0,09 4,65(**) 0,19 12,05(**) 0,01 0,31 0,09 5,34(**) 0,05 3,03(**) 0,05 2,43 (*) 0,08 3,33(**) 0,15 7,10(**)
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
ln(1+CUMUL) 0,08 16,94(**) 0,07 14,50(**) 0,10 20,67(**) 0,07 11,30(**) 0,08 8,76(**) 0,09 10,20(**) 0,08 13,40(**) 0,09 19,50(**) 0,10 10,43(**) 0,09 17,27(**) 0,09 18,10(**) 0,06 10,76(**) 0,14 23,92(**) 0,12 20,16(**)
OCCAS -0,10 -4,09(**) -0,17 -5,94(**) -0,09 -2,88(**) -0,16 -5,35(**) -0,14 -2,19 (*) -0,08 -1,40 -0,15 -3,91(**) -0,09 -3,12(**) -0,09 -1,53 -0,09 -2,73(**) -0,15 -7,06(**) -0,18 -6,89(**) 0,02 0,68 -0,12 -4,98(**)
ACAD -0,03 -0,66 -0,11 -2,66(**) -0,06 -0,80 -0,14 -3,52(**) -0,05 -0,21 -0,19 -1,18 -0,24 -1,66 -0,15 -1,53 0,07 0,35 -0,06 -0,94 -0,08 -0,81 -0,33 -2,63(**) -0,09 -1,08 -0,07 -0,97
CBOWN 0,02 0,77 -0,07 -2,72(**) -0,06 -2,11 (*) 0,04 1,13 0,00 0,06 -0,14 -2,56 (*) 0,00 -0,07 -0,08 -2,57 (*) 0,03 0,45 -0,17 -4,78(**) -0,04 -1,48 -0,11 -3,45(**) -0,15 -4,27(**) -0,09 -2,90(**)
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT -0,37 -5,32(**) -0,31 -3,48(**) -0,09 -0,80 -0,23 -2,45 (*) -0,54 -1,60 -0,14 -0,53 -0,75 -5,20(**) -0,65 -6,17(**) -0,76 -2,33 (*) -0,20 -1,87 -0,33 -5,32(**) -0,49 -6,15(**) -0,17 -2,46 (*) -0,06 -0,85
AU 0,03 0,28 -0,30 -2,62(**) 0,44 2,40 (*) -0,06 -0,55 0,19 0,65 0,50 1,76 -0,02 -0,09 0,34 1,92 -0,10 -0,33 0,33 2,39 (*) 0,26 2,50 (*) 0,58 4,84(**) 0,55 5,53(**) 0,57 5,91(**)
BE -0,03 -0,46 0,08 1,01 0,29 4,06(**) 0,09 0,88 0,79 2,44 (*) 0,82 4,84(**) 0,19 1,14 0,50 5,85(**) 0,07 0,26 0,59 5,84(**) -0,01 -0,11 0,10 0,78 -0,35 -3,07(**) 0,36 4,89(**)
CA 0,10 1,36 0,01 0,12 0,34 3,00(**) 0,00 0,00 0,40 3,27(**) 0,34 2,01 (*) 0,22 1,74 0,36 3,23(**) 0,06 0,26 0,31 3,06(**) 0,31 3,98(**) 0,33 3,00(**) 0,55 5,97(**) 0,49 5,35(**)
CH 0,16 2,93(**) 0,21 4,59(**) 0,18 3,08(**) 0,20 3,39(**) -0,16 -1,10 0,15 1,04 0,09 1,19 0,33 5,73(**) 0,10 0,67 0,57 10,63(**) 0,42 11,23(**) 0,30 5,72(**) 0,26 5,19(**) 0,40 8,55(**)
DE -0,31 -10,61(**) -0,27 -8,24(**) -0,23 -5,58(**) -0,24 -6,52(**) -0,71-11,70(**) -0,58 -9,55(**) -0,44-10,79(**) -0,30 -9,74(**) -0,66 -9,31(**) -0,08 -2,16 (*) -0,20 -7,02(**) -0,18 -6,56(**) -0,30 -9,25(**) -0,02 -0,64
DK -0,26 -2,90(**) -0,26 -3,24(**) -0,10 -0,94 -0,08 -1,00 0,01 0,02 0,93 3,39(**) -0,25 -0,99 0,14 0,81 0,15 0,43 0,23 1,63 -0,05 -0,58 -0,76 -5,55(**) -0,21 -2,33 (*) 0,02 0,18
ES -0,55 -3,11(**) -0,15 -1,24 -0,11 -0,50 -0,17 -1,39 -0,62 -1,35 -0,82 -1,78 -0,70 -1,90 -0,98 -3,69(**) -0,11 -0,42 -0,34 -1,30 -0,21 -1,87 0,08 0,70 -0,16 -1,12 0,06 0,52
FI 0,10 1,25 -0,24 -2,20 (*) 0,09 0,82 0,02 0,18 0,31 3,67(**) 0,07 0,40 0,17 1,62 0,15 1,35 -0,15 -0,74 0,36 3,22(**) 0,05 0,78 -0,26 -2,22 (*) 0,35 3,96(**) 0,37 3,52(**)
GB 0,05 1,28 -0,07 -1,95 0,17 3,04(**) 0,06 1,35 0,47 6,01(**) 0,32 4,11(**) 0,14 2,32 (*) 0,18 3,50(**) 0,20 2,38 (*) 0,38 7,85(**) -0,07 -1,63 -0,02 -0,46 0,09 1,98 (*) 0,25 5,33(**)
IL -0,06 -0,41 0,01 0,05 0,00 -0,01 0,26 2,24 (*) -0,01 -0,02 0,41 1,77 -0,05 -0,25 0,26 1,19 0,06 0,20 0,34 2,29 (*) 0,81 5,39(**) 0,12 0,59 0,71 2,84(**) 0,29 2,40 (*)
IT -0,43 -7,72(**) -0,31 -6,39(**) 0,12 1,82 -0,24 -4,27(**) 0,04 0,32 -0,24 -1,98 (*) 0,29 4,28(**) 0,13 2,41 (*) 0,15 1,19 -0,13 -1,87 -0,22 -5,63(**) -0,45 -8,61(**) -0,17 -3,04(**) 0,03 0,62
JP 0,81 24,19(**) 0,40 10,98(**) 0,73 17,36(**) 0,53 12,81(**) 1,37 19,64(**) 1,05 18,22(**) 1,24 29,49(**) 1,19 35,11(**) 1,10 15,73(**) 1,37 33,08(**) 1,05 31,14(**) 1,24 34,94(**) 1,39 32,20(**) 1,35 32,96(**)
KR 0,45 2,87(**) 0,46 2,52 (*) 0,18 0,88 0,65 2,89(**) 0,62 2,14 (*) 0,47 4,42(**) 0,76 6,21(**) 0,92 6,96(**) 0,27 1,21 0,86 3,05(**) 0,85 4,16(**) 0,96 5,17(**) 0,86 4,78(**) 0,96 4,37(**)
NL -0,12 -2,42 (*) -0,60 -13,69(**) -0,02 -0,37 -0,33 -5,86(**) 0,91 10,96(**) 0,86 10,79(**) 0,70 12,09(**) 0,84 16,66(**) 0,64 5,81(**) 0,61 9,35(**) -0,06 -1,30 0,11 1,78 -0,10 -1,58 -0,08 -1,55
SE 0,39 5,94(**) 0,31 3,68(**) 0,45 5,34(**) 0,44 5,41(**) 0,62 6,72(**) 0,70 4,19(**) 0,32 3,36(**) 0,35 4,72(**) 0,42 3,00(**) 0,72 8,13(**) 0,52 10,30(**) 0,36 6,15(**) 0,51 8,64(**) 0,74 13,59(**)
US 0,41 13,27(**) 0,10 3,28(**) 0,40 9,83(**) 0,33 9,45(**) 0,74 12,85(**) 0,80 13,96(**) 0,69 16,74(**) 0,84 25,28(**) 0,58 9,50(**) 0,80 21,89(**) 0,49 15,81(**) 0,61 18,89(**) 0,52 14,17(**) 0,72 21,92(**)
RoW -0,11 -1,81 -0,14 -2,30 (*) 0,01 0,14 -0,06 -0,93 0,24 1,11 0,26 1,40 0,43 4,68(**) 0,32 4,20(**) -0,06 -0,36 0,19 2,28 (*) 0,19 3,38(**) 0,13 2,14 (*) 0,19 2,93(**) 0,43 7,35(**)
Time dummies (Reference = 1990)
1991 -0,06 -2,03 (*) -0,04 -1,47 -0,06 -2,00 (*) 0,00 0,01 -0,02 -0,34 0,03 0,56 -0,03 -0,77 -0,03 -0,83 0,06 1,01 0,04 1,13 -0,02 -0,58 -0,02 -0,50 -0,02 -0,53 0,00 0,04
1992 -0,06 -2,09 (*) 0,06 1,93 -0,04 -1,19 0,07 2,21 (*) 0,13 2,10 (*) -0,05 -0,86 -0,03 -0,65 -0,02 -0,77 0,00 -0,06 -0,07 -1,96 -0,04 -1,43 -0,05 -1,58 -0,04 -1,17 -0,04 -1,19
1993 -0,07 -2,39 (*) 0,02 0,71 -0,09 -2,96(**) 0,05 1,51 -0,11 -1,96 0,07 1,35 -0,04 -1,14 -0,09 -2,88(**) 0,00 -0,06 -0,05 -1,47 -0,09 -3,43(**) -0,20 -6,36(**) -0,11 -3,35(**) -0,02 -0,74
1994 -0,09 -3,32(**) 0,04 1,22 -0,07 -2,13 (*) 0,08 2,43 (*) -0,05 -0,85 0,01 0,15 -0,04 -1,06 -0,08 -2,45 (*) -0,04 -0,74 -0,03 -0,92 -0,13 -4,92(**) -0,17 -5,56(**) -0,15 -4,59(**) -0,10 -3,20(**)




Table A5.28 – Clustered Regressions by Joint Cluster – 10-year Survival (SRV10) 
JC01 JC02 JC03 JC04 JC05 JC06 JC07 JC08 JC09 JC10 JC11 JC12 JC13 JC14 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
ln(CLMDEV_MED) 0,09 6,91(**) 0,12 9,18(**) 0,12 8,63(**) 0,16 10,82(**) 0,09 3,77(**) 0,06 3,37(**) 0,08 5,05(**) 0,10 7,94(**) 0,03 1,47 0,14 9,87(**) 0,06 5,13(**) 0,03 2,09 (*) 0,05 3,50(**) 0,12 8,67(**)
ln(1+CLMLS) -0,04 -1,85 -0,08 -4,38(**) -0,04 -2,02 (*) -0,10 -5,16(**) -0,08 -2,09 (*) -0,06 -2,24 (*) -0,03 -1,31 0,00 -0,21 -0,05 -1,57 -0,03 -1,28 -0,07 -3,68(**) 0,01 0,34 -0,06 -2,35 (*) 0,00 0,11
ln(1+PRIO) 0,06 1,92 0,04 1,23 0,10 3,18(**) 0,11 3,02(**) -0,05 -0,72 0,04 0,92 0,02 0,45 0,12 3,81(**) 0,01 0,23 -0,01 -0,15 0,08 2,59 (*) 0,14 3,72(**) 0,06 1,52 0,08 2,42 (*)
ln(1+EQUIV) 0,06 1,88 0,07 2,51 (*) 0,05 1,47 0,02 0,61 0,21 3,46(**) 0,13 2,76(**) 0,05 1,11 0,02 0,53 0,08 1,45 0,03 0,82 0,08 2,31 (*) 0,04 1,05 0,12 2,83(**) 0,07 2,08 (*)
HASDIV 0,31 6,80(**) 0,55 13,95(**) 0,46 9,66(**) 0,53 12,74(**) 0,31 3,77(**) 0,29 5,54(**) 0,25 5,40(**) 0,20 4,68(**) 0,32 4,50(**) 0,36 8,01(**) 0,27 6,55(**) 0,20 3,67(**) 0,15 2,63(**) 0,41 10,63(**)
ISDIV 0,43 6,85(**) 0,64 10,24(**) 0,64 10,15(**) 0,49 6,67(**) 0,50 4,13(**) 0,39 6,03(**) 0,22 4,32(**) 0,45 8,18(**) 0,18 1,88 0,50 8,44(**) 0,46 9,00(**) 0,29 4,72(**) 0,33 5,01(**) 0,56 11,72(**)
PCT 0,11 6,30(**) 0,14 8,17(**) 0,07 3,56(**) 0,12 5,82(**) 0,05 1,23 0,06 1,74 -0,01 -0,57 0,07 3,29(**) -0,12 -3,21(**) 0,12 5,50(**) 0,01 0,66 0,06 2,91(**) 0,15 6,95(**) 0,15 7,82(**)
ACCSRC 0,07 0,94 -0,04 -0,50 0,03 0,50 0,09 1,23 0,41 4,17(**) 0,11 1,74 0,28 4,40(**) 0,15 2,36 (*) 0,20 2,74(**) 0,16 2,53 (*) 0,12 1,94 0,10 1,21 0,08 0,84 0,21 3,78(**)
Technical Complexity (PC) 
ln(INVENT) 0,07 5,08(**) 0,06 4,74(**) 0,11 8,10(**) 0,09 5,74(**) 0,01 0,35 -0,02 -0,74 0,04 2,28 (*) 0,04 2,80(**) 0,05 2,20 (*) 0,07 4,55(**) 0,09 6,40(**) 0,10 6,51(**) 0,10 6,14(**) 0,15 9,99(**)
ln(IPC8) 0,09 6,27(**) 0,01 0,65 0,03 2,20 (*) 0,06 3,61(**) 0,03 0,98 0,03 1,10 0,08 4,47(**) 0,05 2,98(**) 0,03 1,11 0,02 0,96 0,04 2,78(**) 0,00 0,10 0,01 0,71 0,01 0,88
ln(1+BPC) 0,04 2,64(**) 0,01 0,49 0,13 7,42(**) -0,03 -1,62 -0,04 -1,33 0,01 0,24 -0,05 -2,52 (*) 0,03 1,79 0,05 2,00 (*) -0,01 -0,44 0,08 4,44(**) 0,07 3,20(**) 0,05 2,30 (*) 0,08 4,31(**)
ln(1+NPC) 0,05 3,82(**) 0,10 9,09(**) 0,04 2,67(**) 0,12 9,90(**) 0,09 3,43(**) 0,05 2,74(**) 0,01 0,76 0,11 8,11(**) 0,04 1,72 0,10 6,83(**) 0,04 2,68(**) 0,05 2,21 (*) -0,03 -1,51 0,07 3,83(**)
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
ln(1+CUMUL) 0,01 3,21(**) -0,02 -5,80(**) -0,01 -2,47 (*) -0,01 -0,93 0,03 3,23(**) 0,05 7,13(**) 0,02 3,63(**) 0,01 2,14 (*) -0,02 -2,28 (*) 0,01 3,12(**) 0,02 3,81(**) 0,01 2,27 (*) 0,04 7,50(**) 0,02 5,08(**)
OCCAS -0,04 -1,66 -0,12 -4,66(**) -0,09 -2,98(**) -0,11 -3,98(**) -0,09 -1,50 -0,03 -0,63 -0,05 -1,43 -0,04 -1,49 -0,22 -4,04(**) -0,03 -1,09 -0,09 -4,21(**) -0,08 -3,09(**) -0,07 -2,63(**) -0,09 -3,72(**)
ACAD -0,19 -3,74(**) 0,02 0,43 -0,29 -3,91(**) -0,01 -0,17 0,00 -0,01 0,19 1,30 0,07 0,48 0,17 1,99 (*) -0,10 -0,62 0,02 0,32 -0,28 -2,78(**) -0,27 -2,26 (*) -0,30 -3,32(**) 0,05 0,63
CBOWN -0,01 -0,46 0,06 2,55 (*) 0,04 1,43 0,07 2,31 (*) 0,11 2,31 (*) -0,03 -0,62 -0,11 -3,04(**) -0,03 -1,13 -0,03 -0,57 -0,17 -5,01(**) 0,11 4,17(**) 0,03 0,98 -0,08 -2,45 (*) -0,01 -0,21
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT -0,02 -0,24 0,18 2,10 (*) -0,10 -0,99 0,22 2,34 (*) 0,25 0,81 -0,76 -2,48 (*) 0,06 0,44 0,45 4,91(**) -0,69 -2,17 (*) 0,24 2,25 (*) -0,10 -1,55 0,11 1,43 0,21 3,28(**) -0,26 -3,28(**)
AU 0,30 3,00(**) 0,31 2,52 (*) 0,34 2,06 (*) 0,42 3,62(**) 0,22 0,73 0,66 2,46 (*) 0,55 2,65(**) 0,19 1,07 -0,03 -0,11 0,79 5,65(**) 0,56 5,36(**) 0,84 7,21(**) 0,69 7,05(**) 0,60 6,24(**)
BE 0,34 4,67(**) 0,21 2,94(**) 0,06 0,87 0,38 4,00(**) -0,02 -0,07 0,75 4,98(**) 0,84 4,90(**) 0,27 3,26(**) 0,02 0,08 0,37 3,83(**) 0,23 2,98(**) 0,41 3,30(**) 0,12 1,23 0,27 3,81(**)
CA 0,34 4,82(**) 0,44 5,22(**) 0,20 1,93 0,28 3,48(**) 0,06 0,52 -0,01 -0,05 0,39 3,13(**) 0,67 6,26(**) 0,21 0,98 0,43 4,44(**) 0,29 3,73(**) 0,47 4,23(**) 0,56 6,11(**) 0,45 5,00(**)
CH 0,30 5,73(**) 0,23 5,59(**) 0,36 6,57(**) 0,22 4,06(**) -0,19 -1,36 0,42 2,96(**) 0,19 2,39 (*) 0,50 8,91(**) 0,28 1,93 0,53 10,03(**) 0,27 7,15(**) 0,38 7,26(**) 0,21 4,04(**) 0,54 11,56(**)
DE 0,05 1,77 0,01 0,42 0,03 0,85 0,11 3,12(**) 0,13 2,17 (*) 0,12 2,02 (*) 0,36 8,93(**) 0,29 9,46(**) 0,16 2,39 (*) 0,35 9,55(**) 0,06 2,14 (*) 0,28 10,22(**) 0,20 6,19(**) 0,20 6,01(**)
DK 0,32 3,59(**) 0,34 4,51(**) 0,29 2,69(**) 0,28 3,59(**) 0,97 2,20 (*) 0,06 0,27 -0,07 -0,26 0,67 3,85(**) 0,23 0,67 0,48 3,42(**) 0,45 5,13(**) 0,31 2,60(**) 0,39 4,39(**) 0,48 5,77(**)
ES 0,71 4,22(**) 0,24 2,04 (*) 0,37 1,62 0,02 0,17 -0,24 -0,59 0,21 0,52 0,48 1,47 0,68 3,86(**) -0,44 -1,68 0,57 2,38 (*) 0,18 1,68 0,49 4,69(**) 0,68 5,41(**) 0,34 2,92(**)
FI 0,39 4,96(**) 0,29 2,61(**) -0,03 -0,31 0,51 4,56(**) 0,57 6,59(**) 0,65 3,50(**) 0,84 7,93(**) 0,69 6,09(**) 0,39 1,92 1,03 8,86(**) 0,78 12,25(**) 0,63 5,81(**) 0,43 4,87(**) 0,67 6,40(**)
GB 0,15 3,57(**) 0,08 2,38 (*) 0,06 1,16 0,06 1,45 0,14 1,92 0,00 -0,02 0,21 3,54(**) 0,26 5,04(**) 0,33 4,12(**) 0,22 4,73(**) 0,15 3,68(**) 0,32 8,01(**) 0,20 4,42(**) 0,26 5,53(**)
IL -0,09 -0,60 0,40 3,38(**) 0,13 0,61 0,26 2,41 (*) 0,29 1,07 -0,05 -0,23 -0,06 -0,26 0,41 1,82 0,74 2,25 (*) 0,05 0,36 0,55 3,86(**) 0,31 1,59 0,59 2,45 (*) 0,43 3,50(**)
IT 0,40 7,47(**) 0,14 2,97(**) 0,31 4,88(**) 0,16 2,81(**) 0,41 3,18(**) 0,67 5,52(**) 0,88 12,86(**) 1,07 19,33(**) 0,65 5,03(**) 0,58 8,19(**) 0,38 10,18(**) 0,55 11,80(**) 0,49 9,62(**) 0,42 8,05(**)
JP 0,42 13,64(**) 0,15 4,86(**) 0,07 1,92 0,24 6,76(**) 0,25 4,41(**) 0,46 9,08(**) 0,57 15,33(**) 0,58 18,79(**) 0,46 7,46(**) 0,61 16,69(**) 0,40 12,45(**) 0,51 15,75(**) 0,48 12,30(**) 0,70 19,00(**)
KR 0,22 1,50 0,29 1,95 0,40 2,03 (*) 0,22 1,25 0,94 2,89(**) 0,60 5,80(**) 0,65 5,89(**) 0,58 4,99(**) 0,41 1,85 0,35 1,38 0,47 2,67(**) 0,42 2,42 (*) 0,54 3,21(**) 0,10 0,46
NL 0,37 7,47(**) 0,18 4,37(**) 0,18 3,08(**) 0,16 3,02(**) 0,56 7,22(**) 0,34 5,25(**) 0,53 10,22(**) 0,63 14,17(**) 0,84 8,27(**) 0,67 11,14(**) 0,36 7,67(**) 0,55 8,75(**) 0,35 5,82(**) 0,51 10,33(**)
SE 0,50 8,09(**) 0,56 7,35(**) 0,02 0,28 0,53 7,05(**) 0,31 3,55(**) 0,48 3,42(**) 0,66 7,02(**) 0,69 9,40(**) 0,49 3,61(**) 0,63 7,56(**) 0,57 11,38(**) 0,65 11,10(**) 0,67 11,22(**) 0,49 9,29(**)
US 0,39 13,04(**) 0,27 9,58(**) 0,37 9,76(**) 0,35 11,00(**) 0,29 5,28(**) 0,29 5,59(**) 0,35 8,99(**) 0,45 14,21(**) 0,38 6,57(**) 0,57 16,11(**) 0,50 16,07(**) 0,63 19,79(**) 0,45 12,17(**) 0,69 20,92(**)
RoW 0,16 2,71(**) 0,00 -0,08 0,19 2,08 (*) 0,04 0,66 0,27 1,26 0,09 0,51 -0,24 -2,50 (*) 0,40 5,32(**) 0,05 0,29 0,33 3,92(**) 0,25 4,33(**) 0,36 5,68(**) 0,30 4,64(**) 0,34 5,69(**)
Time dummies (Reference = 1990)
1991 -0,08 -2,99(**) 0,02 0,86 -0,02 -0,90 0,04 1,43 0,14 2,74(**) 0,00 0,01 0,13 4,08(**) 0,03 0,96 0,09 1,73 0,06 1,96 0,02 0,78 -0,01 -0,43 -0,02 -0,68 0,01 0,27
1992 -0,03 -1,22 0,04 1,78 -0,03 -1,15 0,10 3,39(**) 0,04 0,81 0,01 0,21 0,11 3,54(**) 0,00 0,09 0,05 0,95 0,07 2,29 (*) 0,06 2,25 (*) 0,06 2,24 (*) 0,02 0,53 0,04 1,26
1993 -0,03 -1,01 0,01 0,22 -0,10 -3,60(**) 0,12 4,10(**) 0,05 1,07 0,00 -0,05 0,05 1,42 -0,02 -0,58 0,04 0,80 0,10 3,42(**) 0,03 1,10 0,03 0,91 -0,01 -0,37 0,00 0,12
1994 -0,06 -2,40 (*) 0,04 1,73 -0,11 -4,15(**) 0,13 4,17(**) -0,08 -1,63 -0,03 -0,81 0,03 1,04 -0,10 -3,57(**) 0,14 2,76(**) 0,07 2,22 (*) 0,01 0,33 0,04 1,55 -0,04 -1,25 0,06 2,13 (*)




Table A5.29 – Clustered Regressions by Joint Cluster – Oppositions (OPPOS) 
JC01 JC02 JC03 JC04 JC05 JC06 JC07 JC08 JC09 JC10 JC11 JC12 JC13 JC14 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
ln(CLMDEV_MED) 0,00 -0,10 0,10 5,21(**) 0,05 2,68(**) 0,14 6,36(**) 0,07 1,37 0,00 0,13 -0,01 -0,41 -0,05 -2,27 (*) -0,05 -1,11 0,08 2,84(**) 0,01 0,79 -0,04 -1,84 0,00 0,10 0,06 3,01(**)
ln(1+CLMLS) 0,02 0,71 0,01 0,27 0,02 0,74 -0,10 -3,76(**) -0,05 -0,64 -0,14 -2,37 (*) -0,02 -0,37 0,02 0,46 -0,05 -0,72 -0,05 -1,29 0,08 2,95(**) 0,21 5,47(**) 0,10 2,67(**) -0,03 -1,06
ln(1+PRIO) 0,07 1,63 -0,09 -2,13 (*) 0,05 1,11 0,06 1,09 -0,31 -2,18 (*) -0,11 -1,22 0,14 2,08 (*) 0,13 2,40 (*) 0,21 1,87 0,09 1,53 0,03 0,79 0,02 0,35 0,06 0,99 0,02 0,51
ln(1+EQUIV) 0,03 0,56 0,08 2,19 (*) 0,02 0,57 0,15 3,57(**) 0,02 0,14 0,00 0,05 0,12 1,61 0,12 1,84 0,02 0,20 0,00 -0,05 0,06 1,25 -0,07 -0,86 0,15 2,31 (*) 0,24 5,78(**)
HASDIV 0,36 6,54(**) 0,41 9,45(**) 0,27 4,91(**) 0,51 12,05(**) 0,36 2,76(**) 0,31 3,49(**) 0,25 3,26(**) 0,18 2,65(**) 0,12 0,99 0,18 2,58 (*) 0,30 5,63(**) 0,03 0,36 0,27 3,56(**) 0,28 6,06(**)
ISDIV 0,14 1,71 0,07 0,80 0,12 1,48 0,32 3,51(**) -0,11 -0,42 0,29 2,65(**) 0,15 1,63 -0,13 -1,26 0,07 0,40 0,14 1,45 0,19 2,71(**) -0,07 -0,69 -0,16 -1,34 0,21 3,24(**)
PCT 0,00 -0,15 -0,02 -0,90 0,08 2,99(**) 0,01 0,22 -0,02 -0,30 0,04 0,63 0,03 0,73 -0,02 -0,65 -0,17 -2,29 (*) 0,01 0,37 0,02 0,69 0,02 0,70 -0,15 -4,19(**) 0,03 0,94
ACCSRC 0,18 1,89 0,22 2,36 (*) 0,00 -0,01 0,25 2,79(**) 0,16 0,93 0,05 0,39 0,21 1,91 -0,09 -0,76 -0,11 -0,76 0,35 3,78(**) 0,14 1,56 0,13 1,07 0,24 1,95 -0,11 -1,36
Technical Complexity (PC) 
ln(INVENT) 0,06 3,36(**) -0,02 -1,22 0,13 6,44(**) -0,01 -0,65 0,11 2,06 (*) -0,02 -0,56 0,09 2,79(**) 0,14 5,48(**) 0,06 1,24 -0,01 -0,24 0,12 6,03(**) 0,09 3,70(**) 0,06 2,12 (*) 0,08 3,87(**)
ln(IPC8) -0,02 -0,80 -0,10 -5,49(**) -0,05 -2,30 (*) 0,02 0,67 0,03 0,47 0,07 1,37 0,05 1,42 0,04 1,49 0,22 3,83(**) 0,09 2,95(**) 0,00 0,13 0,03 0,99 -0,05 -1,84 -0,05 -1,88
ln(1+BPC) 0,24 9,75(**) 0,33 16,04(**) 0,32 12,42(**) 0,20 8,66(**) 0,34 5,02(**) 0,23 4,59(**) 0,22 5,33(**) 0,18 5,61(**) 0,45 7,18(**) 0,17 4,96(**) 0,16 6,39(**) 0,14 4,14(**) 0,18 5,21(**) 0,22 7,96(**)
ln(1+NPC) 0,08 4,21(**) 0,03 2,11 (*) -0,03 -1,63 0,13 7,63(**) 0,12 2,21 (*) 0,06 1,59 0,00 0,04 0,02 0,75 -0,20 -3,81(**) 0,13 5,36(**) 0,17 7,86(**) 0,20 6,58(**) 0,24 7,89(**) 0,13 5,05(**)
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
ln(1+CUMUL) -0,04 -5,77(**) -0,03 -5,33(**) -0,08 -12,27(**) -0,02 -2,72(**) -0,13 -7,66(**) -0,04 -2,64(**) -0,08 -8,51(**) -0,05 -7,09(**) -0,09 -5,50(**) -0,06 -7,48(**) -0,03 -3,76(**) -0,05 -5,93(**) -0,02 -1,80 -0,01 -1,59
OCCAS -0,03 -1,01 0,02 0,51 -0,08 -1,92 0,01 0,22 -0,07 -0,68 0,01 0,15 -0,02 -0,28 0,08 1,73 -0,12 -1,30 -0,04 -0,85 -0,01 -0,38 0,00 0,06 0,00 0,05 -0,07 -2,16 (*)
ACAD -0,29 -3,48(**) -0,17 -2,89(**) -0,20 -1,88 -0,10 -1,90 0,04 0,10 -0,02 -0,09 -0,06 -0,27 -0,08 -0,50 -0,11 -0,32 -0,02 -0,15 -0,21 -1,36 -0,27 -1,19 -0,43 -2,38 (*) -0,07 -0,67
CBOWN 0,10 2,75(**) 0,18 5,34(**) 0,15 3,92(**) 0,13 3,20(**) -0,17 -1,39 -0,04 -0,45 0,12 1,67 0,00 -0,07 0,28 2,92(**) 0,05 0,93 0,06 1,49 0,09 1,74 0,02 0,32 0,15 3,87(**)
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT 0,02 0,22 -0,14 -1,12 -0,11 -0,77 -0,21 -1,49 0,41 0,96 0,55 1,61 0,30 1,63 0,30 2,28 (*) -0,11 -0,25 0,04 0,23 0,28 3,53(**) 0,04 0,35 0,10 1,04 -0,07 -0,62
AU -0,55 -3,24(**) -0,20 -1,22 -0,50 -2,07 (*) -0,20 -1,36 -0,28 -0,58 0,00 0,00(**) -0,12 -0,38 -0,25 -0,79 0,30 0,75 0,22 1,17 -0,26 -1,55 -0,74 -2,66(**) -0,31 -1,79 -0,43 -2,62(**)
BE -0,05 -0,50 0,18 1,85 -0,32 -3,04(**) 0,31 2,85(**) 0,00 0,00(**) 0,47 2,15 (*) 0,13 0,55 0,01 0,04 0,50 1,45 0,20 1,23 0,17 1,61 -0,23 -0,99 -0,43 -2,34 (*) -0,20 -1,74
CA -0,10 -1,02 -0,13 -1,15 -0,11 -0,79 -0,35 -2,88(**) -0,16 -0,57 -0,09 -0,28 -0,61 -2,03 (*) -0,87 -2,27 (*) 0,30 0,93 -0,21 -1,10 0,08 0,74 -0,06 -0,35 -0,33 -1,87 -0,22 -1,54
CH 0,00 0,02 -0,08 -1,31 -0,22 -2,74(**) 0,00 -0,07 -0,23 -0,79 0,23 0,99 0,28 2,45 (*) 0,35 4,09(**) 0,19 0,92 0,15 1,69 0,06 1,10 0,15 1,94 -0,04 -0,51 -0,13 -1,84
DE 0,07 1,60 0,07 1,69 0,04 0,72 0,01 0,28 0,42 3,69(**) 0,28 2,44 (*) 0,24 3,53(**) 0,23 4,36(**) 0,13 1,06 0,32 5,07(**) 0,18 4,41(**) 0,16 3,80(**) 0,16 3,49(**) 0,08 1,64
DK 0,30 2,71(**) 0,22 2,25 (*) -0,23 -1,52 -0,05 -0,45 0,75 1,87 0,21 0,58 0,06 0,15 0,11 0,43 0,02 0,03 0,43 2,21 (*) 0,28 2,38 (*) 0,17 0,94 0,34 2,84(**) 0,15 1,36
ES 0,16 0,76 -0,30 -1,48 -0,08 -0,27 -0,60 -2,32 (*) 0,48 0,86 0,32 0,57 0,00 0,00(**) -0,21 -0,65 -0,13 -0,33 0,21 0,58 -0,19 -1,06 -0,22 -1,21 -0,12 -0,60 -0,01 -0,06
FI 0,15 1,44 -0,07 -0,41 0,22 1,76 -0,18 -1,11 0,09 0,53 0,00 0,00(**) -0,34 -1,53 0,02 0,12 0,22 0,68 -0,09 -0,41 0,41 5,00(**) 0,14 0,86 0,23 1,85 -0,02 -0,10
GB 0,07 1,25 0,05 1,08 -0,06 -0,85 -0,17 -2,96(**) 0,11 0,76 -0,02 -0,16 0,06 0,58 0,12 1,47 0,01 0,04 -0,04 -0,44 0,04 0,68 -0,12 -1,77 -0,02 -0,35 -0,08 -1,14
IL -0,48 -1,80 -0,21 -1,18 0,00 0,01 -0,07 -0,46 -0,31 -0,60 -0,19 -0,41 -0,19 -0,54 -0,28 -0,63 0,06 0,13 -0,21 -0,80 0,55 3,29(**) 0,00 0,00(**) -0,36 -0,80 -0,11 -0,59
IT -0,18 -2,22 (*) -0,36 -4,31(**) -0,23 -2,51 (*) -0,45 -4,43(**) 0,05 0,20 0,76 4,73(**) -0,21 -1,52 0,12 1,35 -0,17 -0,67 -0,09 -0,70 0,11 1,96 0,06 0,88 -0,05 -0,68 -0,02 -0,28
JP -0,26 -5,70(**) -0,24 -4,90(**) -0,40 -7,35(**) -0,43 -7,39(**) 0,00 0,00 -0,25 -2,28 (*) -0,28 -3,93(**) -0,11 -2,04 (*) -0,23 -1,95 -0,11 -1,59 -0,21 -4,36(**) -0,13 -2,35 (*) -0,36 -5,73(**) -0,35 -6,19(**)
KR -0,06 -0,26 -0,48 -1,56 -0,27 -0,99 -0,24 -0,77 0,54 1,44 0,12 0,63 -0,28 -1,25 -0,14 -0,61 -0,23 -0,53 0,00 0,00(**) 0,02 0,09 -0,52 -1,28 -0,65 -1,56 -0,46 -1,07
NL 0,17 2,50 (*) 0,55 10,61(**) 0,01 0,07 0,44 6,59(**) -0,17 -0,86 -0,58 -2,93(**) -0,22 -1,96 -0,18 -1,94 -0,08 -0,40 0,17 1,63 0,21 3,16(**) 0,05 0,53 0,07 0,78 0,39 6,24(**)
SE 0,16 1,90 0,22 2,48 (*) 0,37 4,11(**) 0,03 0,30 -0,05 -0,27 0,00 0,00(**) 0,04 0,23 0,10 0,82 -0,40 -1,25 0,04 0,27 0,10 1,37 0,00 0,02 -0,03 -0,27 0,35 5,01(**)
US -0,11 -2,49 (*) -0,02 -0,43 -0,09 -1,72 -0,23 -4,94(**) -0,25 -2,07 (*) 0,08 0,79 -0,29 -4,03(**) -0,10 -1,81 -0,03 -0,32 -0,04 -0,63 -0,14 -2,89(**) -0,18 -3,21(**) -0,23 -4,05(**) -0,14 -2,98(**)
RoW -0,41 -4,03(**) -0,16 -1,86 -0,91 -5,12(**) -0,22 -2,37 (*) -0,07 -0,19 0,26 0,90 -0,37 -2,18 (*) 0,01 0,07 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,03 -0,15 -1,66 -0,36 -3,02(**) -0,44 -3,59(**) -0,26 -2,71(**)
Time dummies (Reference = 1990)
1991 -0,04 -1,16 0,03 0,82 0,09 2,20 (*) -0,01 -0,17 0,04 0,37 0,14 1,65 -0,05 -0,81 -0,01 -0,20 0,01 0,12 0,04 0,69 -0,03 -0,74 0,03 0,74 -0,04 -0,92 -0,01 -0,36
1992 -0,08 -2,21 (*) 0,05 1,31 0,09 2,13 (*) -0,01 -0,19 -0,07 -0,62 0,07 0,79 -0,10 -1,60 -0,04 -0,91 -0,05 -0,49 0,02 0,42 -0,06 -1,74 -0,01 -0,26 -0,04 -0,81 -0,02 -0,38
1993 -0,10 -2,67(**) 0,04 1,09 0,05 1,30 -0,10 -2,30 (*) -0,16 -1,47 0,02 0,21 -0,13 -2,10 (*) -0,06 -1,22 -0,08 -0,77 -0,08 -1,49 -0,12 -3,27(**) -0,07 -1,42 -0,08 -1,81 -0,11 -2,59 (*)
1994 -0,14 -3,72(**) -0,06 -1,64 0,08 1,98 (*) -0,17 -3,67(**) -0,10 -0,98 -0,12 -1,32 -0,15 -2,43 (*) -0,08 -1,65 -0,22 -2,17 (*) -0,16 -2,70(**) -0,09 -2,56 (*) -0,01 -0,21 -0,04 -0,80 -0,12 -3,01(**)




Table A5.30 – Clustered Regressions by Joint Cluster – Composite Index (COMPO) 
JC01 JC02 JC03 JC04 JC05 JC06 JC07 JC08 JC09 JC10 JC11 JC12 JC13 JC14 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Patent Filing Strategies (FS) 
ln(CLMDEV_MED) 0,11 15,27(**) 0,09 15,49 (**) 0,10 15,03(**) 0,09 13,56(**) 0,09 7,27(**) 0,0910,85(**) 0,1214,91(**) 0,1114,64(**) 0,10 8,26(**) 0,13 16,28(**) 0,09 11,38(**) 0,10 10,09(**) 0,12 11,01(**) 0,10 11,84(**)
ln(1+CLMLS) -0,09 -7,48(**) -0,14 -17,44 (**) -0,08 -7,19(**) -0,15-17,44(**) -0,10 -5,16(**) -0,10 -8,09(**) -0,07 -5,79(**) -0,07 -5,75(**) -0,08 -4,72(**) -0,11 -8,61(**) -0,07 -4,86(**) -0,02 -1,00 -0,07 -3,62(**) -0,04 -3,22(**)
ln(1+PRIO) 0,20 11,39(**) 0,14 10,23 (**) 0,15 9,69(**) 0,17 10,18(**) 0,09 2,70(**) 0,11 5,93(**) 0,12 6,29(**) 0,2112,31(**) 0,11 3,50(**) 0,14 7,25(**) 0,22 10,93(**) 0,23 8,45(**) 0,19 6,79(**) 0,10 4,95(**)
ln(1+EQUIV) 0,06 3,06(**) 0,04 3,37 (**) 0,02 1,59 0,05 3,30(**) 0,06 2,23 (*) 0,04 2,41 (*) 0,05 2,28 (*) 0,06 2,82(**) 0,02 0,97 0,05 2,82(**) 0,07 2,98(**) 0,03 0,97 0,09 2,93(**) 0,12 6,32(**)
HASDIV 0,20 8,25(**) 0,24 16,58 (**) 0,23 11,48(**) 0,22 14,72(**) 0,18 4,92(**) 0,2210,48(**) 0,16 7,65(**) 0,15 6,65(**) 0,17 5,30(**) 0,20 9,14(**) 0,23 8,61(**) 0,20 5,52(**) 0,19 4,64(**) 0,21 9,75(**)
ISDIV 0,06 1,65 0,09 3,66 (**) 0,10 3,58(**) 0,10 3,34(**) 0,18 3,47(**) 0,04 1,62 0,00 0,09 0,01 0,47 -0,04 -0,88 0,12 3,80(**) 0,18 5,32(**) 0,16 3,60(**) 0,11 2,16 (*) 0,19 7,11(**)
PCT 0,11 10,84(**) 0,09 12,15 (**) 0,10 11,01(**) 0,10 10,60(**) 0,20 10,53(**) 0,11 7,18(**) 0,10 7,88(**) 0,1210,59(**) 0,01 0,47 0,17 14,59(**) 0,19 16,26(**) 0,20 13,82(**) 0,18 11,48(**) 0,21 18,25(**)
ACCSRC 0,08 2,05 (*) 0,02 0,56 0,10 3,02(**) 0,02 0,48 0,15 3,48(**) 0,02 0,54 0,02 0,50 0,02 0,49 0,00 0,04 0,07 2,05 (*) 0,09 2,09 (*) 0,04 0,67 0,10 1,52 0,03 0,84
Technical Complexity (PC) 
ln(INVENT) 0,08 10,41(**) 0,10 16,98 (**) 0,09 12,89(**) 0,12 17,94(**) 0,01 0,41 0,07 7,83(**) 0,04 5,11(**) 0,07 8,96(**) 0,03 2,76(**) 0,07 8,59(**) 0,07 8,16(**) 0,10 8,88(**) 0,06 5,17(**) 0,11 12,71(**)
ln(IPC8) 0,08 10,11(**) 0,02 3,81 (**) 0,06 9,23(**) 0,05 6,95(**) 0,09 6,17(**) 0,1412,58(**) 0,1212,59(**) 0,08 8,82(**) 0,1811,70(**) 0,11 11,33(**) 0,07 7,57(**) 0,11 9,68(**) 0,05 4,35(**) 0,05 5,10(**)
ln(1+BPC) 0,06 6,43(**) -0,02 -3,77 (**) 0,09 10,14(**) -0,04 -6,17(**) -0,03 -1,94 0,02 1,95 0,05 4,60(**) 0,02 1,82 0,07 4,59(**) -0,02 -1,85 0,06 4,76(**) 0,05 3,37(**) 0,04 2,68(**) 0,05 4,49(**)
ln(1+NPC) 0,02 2,49 (*) 0,06 11,49 (**) -0,04 -5,45(**) 0,06 10,41(**) 0,08 6,26(**) 0,03 3,64(**) -0,03 -3,21(**) 0,03 3,45(**) 0,01 0,64 0,08 10,84(**) 0,03 2,58 (*) 0,05 3,15(**) 0,01 0,54 0,02 1,46
Applicant Profiles (PO) 
ln(1+CUMUL) -0,01 -2,36 (*) -0,02 -9,87 (**) -0,02 -9,08(**) 0,00 1,55 0,00 0,25 0,00 -0,29 -0,01 -4,70(**) -0,01 -3,61(**) -0,02 -4,52(**) -0,01 -5,11(**) 0,00 0,19 -0,03 -8,20(**) -0,02 -5,42(**) 0,01 3,18(**)
OCCAS -0,08 -5,89(**) -0,14 -12,18 (**) -0,11 -7,69(**) -0,12 -9,02(**) -0,01 -0,42 0,06 2,52 (*) 0,00 -0,27 0,00 -0,06 0,03 1,28 -0,08 -4,97(**) -0,09 -6,75(**) -0,10 -5,44(**) -0,10 -5,34(**) -0,09 -6,13(**)
ACAD -0,06 -2,05 (*) -0,03 -1,80 -0,02 -0,58 -0,04 -2,93(**) -0,03 -0,27 0,05 0,89 0,04 0,63 0,03 0,57 0,05 0,58 0,08 2,72(**) -0,11 -1,69 -0,14 -1,66 -0,01 -0,15 0,08 1,87
CBOWN 0,08 5,15(**) 0,04 3,66 (**) 0,07 5,02(**) 0,05 3,46(**) -0,03 -1,28 -0,05 -2,16 (*) 0,03 1,41 0,02 1,06 0,01 0,30 -0,04 -2,19 (*) 0,13 7,95(**) 0,06 2,50 (*) -0,01 -0,36 0,07 4,16(**)
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT -0,02 -0,63 0,10 2,70 (**) -0,02 -0,42 0,09 2,25 (*) 0,10 0,69 0,11 0,92 0,31 4,89(**) 0,24 4,79(**) -0,09 -0,63 0,04 0,71 -0,10 -2,48 (*) 0,11 2,13 (*) 0,12 2,59 (*) -0,12 -2,54 (*)
AU -0,21 -3,67(**) -0,17 -3,33 (**) -0,26 -3,31(**) -0,10 -2,15 (*) -0,22 -1,49 0,20 2,09 (*) -0,03 -0,33 0,12 1,26 -0,23 -1,45 0,15 2,16 (*) -0,04 -0,51 0,19 2,40 (*) 0,10 1,48 0,12 1,99 (*)
BE 0,04 1,01 0,05 1,45 -0,25 -7,43(**) 0,11 2,68(**) 0,54 4,46(**) 0,39 6,45(**) 0,51 7,04(**) 0,21 4,55(**) 0,41 3,36(**) 0,26 4,98(**) 0,06 1,12 0,31 3,65(**) 0,02 0,23 -0,10 -2,23 (*)
CA -0,16 -4,06(**) -0,02 -0,73 -0,22 -4,24(**) -0,04 -1,11 -0,11 -1,78 0,04 0,60 -0,11 -1,61 0,04 0,65 0,12 1,09 0,04 0,75 0,14 2,77(**) 0,06 0,75 0,07 1,11 0,03 0,53
CH 0,16 5,70(**) 0,10 5,36 (**) 0,02 0,70 0,14 5,97(**) 0,02 0,32 0,31 5,24(**) 0,31 7,98(**) 0,3912,85(**) 0,32 4,61(**) 0,32 11,11(**) 0,21 8,45(**) 0,46 12,85(**) 0,35 9,73(**) 0,36 12,60(**)
DE -0,03 -2,07 (*) -0,04 -2,70 (**) -0,03 -1,31 0,04 2,31 (*) 0,00 0,15 -0,08 -2,79(**) 0,07 3,20(**) 0,07 4,16(**) 0,11 3,09(**) 0,14 6,63(**) -0,05 -2,61(**) 0,13 6,82(**) 0,13 5,75(**) 0,12 5,75(**)
DK -0,04 -0,83 0,06 1,77 -0,17 -3,19(**) 0,01 0,36 -0,11 -0,61 0,34 3,60(**) 0,28 2,38 (*) 0,25 2,70(**) 0,14 0,84 0,12 1,58 0,14 2,46 (*) -0,04 -0,41 0,23 3,55(**) 0,07 1,35
ES -0,03 -0,30 0,02 0,39 -0,15 -1,36 -0,04 -0,71 0,20 1,05 -0,44 -1,88 -0,54 -2,52 (*) -0,06 -0,59 -0,03 -0,22 0,20 1,51 -0,16 -2,09 (*) 0,10 1,35 0,11 1,17 -0,14 -1,73
FI -0,08 -1,75 0,04 0,85 -0,14 -2,72(**) -0,01 -0,19 0,32 8,13(**) 0,24 3,09(**) 0,32 6,55(**) 0,24 3,82(**) 0,09 0,85 0,30 4,98(**) 0,22 5,15(**) 0,23 2,98(**) 0,27 4,28(**) 0,07 1,03
GB -0,04 -1,78 -0,01 -0,91 -0,11 -4,34(**) 0,00 -0,08 0,01 0,20 0,02 0,75 -0,02 -0,61 0,06 2,09 (*) 0,02 0,43 0,12 4,40(**) -0,11 -3,87(**) -0,14 -4,92(**) -0,13 -3,92(**) 0,05 1,76
IL -0,16 -1,80 -0,03 -0,64 -0,08 -0,86 0,03 0,60 0,05 0,35 -0,08 -0,74 -0,13 -1,16 0,03 0,27 0,50 3,87(**) -0,02 -0,24 0,35 3,81(**) -0,05 -0,35 0,31 1,78 0,02 0,21
IT -0,07 -2,33 (*) -0,09 -4,17 (**) 0,00 -0,14 -0,06 -2,16 (*) -0,06 -0,97 0,21 3,89(**) -0,08 -2,27 (*) 0,06 1,89 -0,12 -1,71 -0,01 -0,30 -0,10 -3,86(**) -0,02 -0,52 -0,07 -1,73 -0,01 -0,27
JP -0,28 -15,98(**) -0,30 -21,23 (**) -0,48-25,23(**) -0,24-14,29(**) -0,14 -4,68(**) 0,02 0,91 0,04 2,02 (*) 0,01 0,39 -0,05 -1,52 0,03 1,32 -0,17 -7,80(**) 0,12 5,27(**) 0,09 3,10(**) 0,02 0,86
KR -0,43 -4,51(**) -0,38 -5,34 (**) -0,50 -4,65(**) -0,25 -2,88(**) -0,16 -1,07 0,03 0,64 -0,23 -3,59(**) -0,19 -2,58 (*) -0,41 -2,99(**) -0,17 -1,08 -0,34 -2,55 (*) -0,12 -0,91 -0,12 -0,88 -0,07 -0,51
NL 0,04 1,36 -0,12 -6,45 (**) -0,05 -1,86 -0,02 -0,90 0,23 6,56(**) 0,17 5,71(**) 0,15 5,51(**) 0,13 5,28(**) 0,25 5,17(**) 0,28 8,60(**) 0,12 3,76(**) 0,34 7,73(**) 0,24 5,48(**) 0,17 5,58(**)
SE 0,11 3,17(**) 0,15 5,06 (**) 0,08 2,27 (*) 0,15 4,93(**) 0,16 3,77(**) 0,34 5,89(**) 0,27 6,07(**) 0,11 2,60(**) 0,22 3,31(**) 0,24 5,37(**) 0,08 2,26 (*) 0,19 4,49(**) 0,15 3,54(**) 0,33 10,17(**)
US -0,05 -2,82(**) -0,01 -1,20 -0,12 -6,75(**) 0,05 3,12(**) -0,03 -1,25 0,11 4,34(**) 0,00 0,22 0,09 5,17(**) 0,05 1,70 0,17 8,75(**) 0,03 1,56 0,21 9,10(**) 0,03 1,03 0,21 10,54(**)
RoW -0,12 -3,56(**) -0,15 -5,36 (**) -0,28 -6,10(**) -0,05 -1,64 0,04 0,43 0,14 1,67 -0,09 -1,89 0,10 2,45 (*) -0,01 -0,08 0,18 3,83(**) 0,01 0,30 0,17 3,87(**) 0,11 2,28 (*) 0,10 2,78(**)
Time dummies (Reference = 1990)
1991 -0,07 -5,10(**) -0,03 -2,46 (*) -0,03 -2,07 (*) -0,04 -2,58 (*) -0,03 -1,30 -0,06 -3,06(**) -0,05 -3,11(**) -0,01 -0,62 -0,03 -1,01 -0,02 -1,06 -0,05 -2,88(**) -0,04 -1,97 (*) -0,06 -2,43 (*) -0,03 -1,46
1992 -0,11 -7,48(**) -0,04 -3,88 (**) -0,06 -4,15(**) -0,04 -2,95(**) -0,07 -2,87(**) -0,07 -3,90(**) -0,06 -3,76(**) -0,04 -2,70(**) -0,06 -2,08 (*) -0,06 -3,83(**) -0,09 -5,19(**) -0,03 -1,43 -0,06 -2,87(**) -0,06 -3,44(**)
1993 -0,13 -8,66(**) -0,07 -6,36 (**) -0,09 -6,35(**) -0,06 -4,55(**) -0,12 -5,04(**) -0,05 -2,48 (*) -0,07 -4,52(**) -0,09 -5,89(**) 0,00 0,17 -0,06 -3,72(**) -0,13 -7,84(**) -0,09 -4,52(**) -0,15 -6,43(**) -0,09 -5,22(**)
1994 -0,14 -9,62(**) -0,07 -5,85 (**) -0,09 -6,39(**) -0,05 -3,77(**) -0,18 -6,98(**) -0,06 -3,35(**) -0,09 -5,29(**) -0,09 -6,05(**) -0,06 -2,18 (*) -0,07 -4,22(**) -0,14 -8,64(**) -0,05 -2,53 (*) -0,15 -6,58(**) -0,10 -5,74(**)
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Figure A6.5 – Complexity of EPO patent applications 
 
 
Figure A6.6 – Estimates of the survival and hazard functions (time to decision) 
Kaplan-Meier Estimate of the Survival Function K-M Estimate of the Survival Function by Status (*)
  
Smoothed Estimate of the Hazard Function
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Discrete variables made categorical by their quartiles 
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Figure A6.8 – Estimates of the survival and hazard functions (maintenance period) 
Kaplan-Meier Estimate of the Survival Function K-M Estimate of the Survival Function by Status (*)
  
Smoothed Estimate of the Hazard Function
  
(*) Legend: 0=Granted but not opposed, 1=Revoked in opposition, 2=Amended in opposition 
3=Maintained in opposition, 4=Opposition pending 
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Discrete variables made categorical by their quartiles 
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Figure A6.11 – Characteristics of opposition cases at the EPO 
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Figure A6.12 – Box plot of the number of claims (DRF_CLAIMS) 
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Figure A6.14 – Box plot of the number of equivalents (DRF_EQUIV) 
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Figure A6.16 – Box plot of the number of inventors (CMP_INV) 
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Figure A6.18 – Box plot of the number of backward patent citations (CMP_BPC) 
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A6.2 Tables 
Table A6.1 – Summary statistics of control variables 
Variable Type Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry)     
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry Y/N 1189058 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
JC-02 - Organic Chemistry Y/N 1189058 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
JC-03 - Polymers Y/N 1189058 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
JC-04 - Biotechnology Y/N 1189058 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
JC-05 - Telecommunications Y/N 1189058 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media Y/N 1189058 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
JC-07 - Electronics Y/N 1189058 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
JC-08 - Electricity Y/N 1189058 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
JC-09 - Computers Y/N 1189058 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics Y/N 1189058 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing Y/N 1189058 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
JC-12 - Vehicles Y/N 1189058 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering Y/N 1189058 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
JC-14 - Human Necessities Y/N 1189058 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Country of residence of applicants      
AT Y/N 1189058 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
AU Y/N 1189058 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 
BE Y/N 1189058 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
CA Y/N 1189058 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
CH Y/N 1189058 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
DE Y/N 1189058 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
DK Y/N 1189058 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 
ES Y/N 1189058 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 
FI Y/N 1189058 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
FR Y/N 1189058 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
GB Y/N 1189058 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
IL Y/N 1189058 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
IT Y/N 1189058 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
JP Y/N 1189058 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
KR Y/N 1189058 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 
NL Y/N 1189058 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
SE Y/N 1189058 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
US Y/N 1189058 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
RoW Y/N 1189058 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Time dummies (Year of filing at EPO)      
1980 Y/N 1189058 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
1981 Y/N 1189058 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
1982 Y/N 1189058 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
1983 Y/N 1189058 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
1984 Y/N 1189058 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
1985 Y/N 1189058 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
1986 Y/N 1189058 0.04 0.18 0.00 1.00 
1987 Y/N 1189058 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
1988 Y/N 1189058 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
1989 Y/N 1189058 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
1990 Y/N 1189058 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 
1991 Y/N 1189058 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
1992 Y/N 1189058 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
1993 Y/N 1189058 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
1994 Y/N 1189058 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
1995 Y/N 1189058 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 
1996 Y/N 1189058 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
1997 Y/N 1189058 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
1998 Y/N 1189058 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 
1999 Y/N 1189058 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
2000 Y/N 1189058 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
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Table A6.2 – Survival Analysis of Patent Applications Entire Life with TVC 
No TVC No TVC Random TVC Stratified 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Filing routes                   
RTE_ACCSRC 0,91 -9,99 (**) 0,95 -1,65   0,95 -1,70 
RTE_PCT 0,79 -72,92 (**) 0,80 -21,85 (**) 0,01 -34,96 (**) 
RTE_PCT * ln(_t)     1,73 33,59 (**) 
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 0,99 -43,76 (**) 0,99 -14,64 (**) 0,95 -10,92 (**) 
DRF_CLAIMS * ln(_t)     1,01 9,83 (**) 
DRF_PRIO 1,00 -1,54   0,99 -1,95   0,86 -2,60 (**) 
DRF_PRIO * ln(_t)     1,02 2,43 (*) 
DRF_EQUIV 0,93 -21,52 (**) 0,93 -9,38 (**) 1,25 2,55 (*) 
DRF_EQUIV * ln(_t)     0,96 -3,30 (**) 
DRF_HASDIV 0,67 -44,13 (**) 0,69 -13,37 (**) 0,08 -5,45 (**) 
DRF_HASDIV * ln(_t)     1,30 4,58 (**) 
DRF_ISDIV 0,29 -124,38 (**) 0,28 -39,17 (**) 0,00 -18,90 (**) 
DRF_ISDIV * ln(_t)     3,53 17,13 (**) 
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 0,77 -97,34 (**) 0,77 -31,39 (**) 0,07 -28,25 (**) 
IMP_TRIADIC * ln(_t)     1,38 25,61 (**) 
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,92 -61,36 (**) 0,92 -19,00 (**) 0,91 -20,69 (**) 
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 0,99 -17,04 (**) 0,99 -5,57 (**) 0,99 -5,64 (**) 
CMP_NPC 0,97 -33,77 (**) 0,97 -11,36 (**) 0,74 -10,06 (**) 
CMP_NPC * ln(_t)     1,04 9,18 (**) 
CMP_INV 0,99 -16,07 (**) 0,98 -6,54 (**) 0,98 -6,20 (**) 
CMP_IPC4 0,99 -6,20 (**) 0,99 -1,51   0,97 -0,61 
CMP_IPC4 * ln(_t)     1,00 0,47 
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE 1,00 0,79   1,01 0,62   1,02 1,16 
APP_CUMUL 1,00 21,34 (**) 1,00 6,99 (**) 1,00 7,03 (**) 
APP_OCCAS 1,01 4,04 (**) 1,03 3,01 (**) 1,01 1,38 
APP_CBOWN 0,95 -12,20 (**) 0,97 -2,19 (*) 0,50 -4,70 (**) 
APP_CBOWN * ln(_t)     1,09 4,48 (**) 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 1,07 17,52 (**) 1,05 4,20 (**) 1,05 3,81 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,96 -9,16 (**) 0,98 -1,79   0,97 -2,04 (*) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,86 -33,71 (**) 0,84 -12,15 (**) 0,85 -11,67 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,69 -58,91 (**) 0,69 -17,90 (**) 0,68 -18,22 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,83 -29,26 (**) 0,82 -9,86 (**) 0,82 -9,97 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,90 -22,06 (**) 0,90 -6,85 (**) 0,90 -7,31 (**) 
JC-08 - Electricity 0,93 -17,03 (**) 0,93 -5,39 (**) 0,93 -5,35 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,75 -44,08 (**) 0,75 -13,56 (**) 0,75 -13,75 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,95 -11,80 (**) 0,94 -4,38 (**) 0,93 -5,04 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 1,08 18,55 (**) 1,08 6,40 (**) 1,08 5,87 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles 1,05 10,34 (**) 1,07 4,79 (**) 1,07 4,57 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 1,04 7,45 (**) 1,04 2,46 (*) 1,03 1,93 
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No TVC Random Sample TVC Stratified 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France)   
AT 1,04 2,71 (**) 1,04 0,94   1,02 0,59 
AU 0,83 -13,03 (**) 0,88 -2,78 (**) 0,88 -2,67 (**) 
BE 0,99 -0,47   0,99 -0,22   0,99 -0,38 
CA 1,02 1,52   0,99 -0,15   1,01 0,22 
CH 1,03 3,38 (**) 1,05 2,10 (*) 1,04 1,78 
DE 1,00 -0,07   1,02 1,00   1,01 0,92 
DK 0,89 -6,65 (**) 0,83 -3,35 (**) 0,83 -3,38 (**) 
ES 1,04 1,99 (*) 1,00 -0,06   0,96 -0,83 
FI 0,79 -17,28 (**) 0,76 -5,70 (**) 0,75 -5,84 (**) 
GB 1,05 7,50 (**) 1,07 3,44 (**) 1,05 2,65 (**) 
IL 1,05 2,45 (*) 1,00 0,01   1,04 0,68 
IT 1,04 4,64 (**) 1,03 1,49   1,00 -0,02 
JP 0,82 -38,66 (**) 0,83 -11,64 (**) 0,82 -12,12 (**) 
KR 0,93 -3,51 (**) 0,94 -0,98   0,93 -1,04 
NL 1,06 7,36 (**) 1,05 2,36 (*) 1,07 2,80 (**) 
SE 1,04 4,55 (**) 0,97 -1,09   0,96 -1,32 
US 0,86 -15,07 (**) 0,85 -5,00 (**) 0,85 -4,99 (**) 
RoW 0,93 -14,09 (**) 0,95 -3,63 (**) 0,95 -3,33 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990) 
1980 1,24 22,60 (**) 1,19 6,09 (**) 1,23 7,47 (**) 
1981 1,19 19,45 (**) 1,17 6,11 (**) 1,21 7,30 (**) 
1982 1,16 17,29 (**) 1,13 5,04 (**) 1,17 6,16 (**) 
1983 1,10 11,91 (**) 1,08 3,32 (**) 1,11 4,44 (**) 
1984 1,08 9,69 (**) 1,03 1,39   1,05 2,30 (*) 
1985 1,04 5,26 (**) 1,02 1,04   1,04 1,69 
1986 0,91 -11,90 (**) 0,91 -3,87 (**) 0,92 -3,42 (**) 
1987 0,96 -4,86 (**) 0,96 -1,88   0,96 -1,56 
1988 0,96 -4,88 (**) 0,96 -1,65   0,97 -1,35 
1989 0,98 -3,07 (**) 0,95 -2,46 (*) 0,95 -2,14 (*) 
1991 0,99 -1,71   0,96 -1,89   0,96 -1,99 (*) 
1992 0,97 -4,07 (**) 0,95 -2,13 (*) 0,96 -1,94 
1993 0,90 -12,88 (**) 0,88 -5,53 (**) 0,89 -5,22 (**) 
1994 0,81 -25,96 (**) 0,80 -9,79 (**) 0,81 -9,08 (**) 
1995 0,72 -42,20 (**) 0,72 -13,93 (**) 0,74 -13,03 (**) 
1996 0,66 -54,50 (**) 0,65 -18,23 (**) 0,67 -16,85 (**) 
1997 0,67 -56,47 (**) 0,66 -17,72 (**) 0,69 -15,88 (**) 
1998 0,77 -37,16 (**) 0,77 -11,38 (**) 0,81 -9,16 (**) 
1999 1,07 9,39 (**) 1,05 2,17 (*) 1,12 5,01 (**) 
2000 1,69 74,08 (**) 1,67 22,39 (**) 1,77 24,93 (**) 
Model 
# Subjects 1134860 113566 113566 
# Failures 739924 74179 74179 
Log likelihood -8536509 -685214 -683742 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 125.250 (0,00) 14.259 (0,00) 17.202 (0,00) 
 
Cox Regression Model with Time-varying Covariates (TVC) - Breslow method for ties 
Stratified by reason for lapse unless otherwise specified (EPO Filings 1980-2000) – 10% Random Sample 
  
Table A6.3 – Survival Analysis of Patent Applications Entire Life (Robustness estimates) 
OLS Cens. Norm. Reg. Unstratified Stratified Random Sample 1980-1987 Instrumental Var Log 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Filing routes                                                 
RTE_ACCSRC 0,19 6,79 (**) 0,45 10,56 (**) 0,90 -10,38 (**) 0,91 -9,99 (**) 0,95 -1,65  0,76 -8,43 (**) 0,89 -11,64 (**) 0,91 -10,30 (**) 
RTE_PCT 0,67 67,30 (**) 1,02 69,37 (**) 0,81 -62,78 (**) 0,79 -72,92 (**) 0,80 -21,85 (**) 0,78 -23,37 (**) 0,78 -53,77 (**) 0,79 -71,44 (**) 
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 0,01 21,81 (**) 0,02 29,72 (**) 1,00 -28,07 (**) 0,99 -43,76 (**) 0,99 -14,64 (**) 0,99 -18,46 (**)  0,92 -43,61 (**) 
DRF_CLAIMS fitted         1,00 0,21  
DRF_PRIO 0,03 5,64 (**) 0,04 5,14 (**) 0,99 -3,93 (**) 1,00 -1,54   0,99 -1,95  1,00 -0,57  0,97 -9,70 (**) 1,01 2,94 (**) 
DRF_EQUIV -0,03 -4,16 (**) -0,02 -1,86  1,00 -0,86  0,93 -21,52 (**) 0,93 -9,38 (**) 0,87 -31,32 (**) 0,93 -31,92 (**) 0,86 -31,84 (**) 
DRF_HASDIV 1,55 65,62 (**) 2,64 71,00 (**) 0,60 -57,45 (**) 0,67 -44,13 (**) 0,69 -13,37 (**) 0,74 -17,33 (**) 0,64 -41,30 (**) 0,66 -46,14 (**) 
DRF_ISDIV 1,94 76,58 (**) 3,55 87,64 (**) 0,50 -70,32 (**) 0,29 -124,38 (**) 0,28 -39,17 (**) 0,37 -28,70 (**) 0,29 -117,55 (**) 0,28 -123,13 (**) 
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 1,85 218,16 (**) 2,59 211,83 (**) 0,61 -187,45 (**) 0,77 -97,34 (**) 0,77 -31,39 (**) 0,78 -51,08 (**)  0,77 -99,18 (**) 
IMP_TRIADIC fitted         1,18 5,87 (**)
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,27 74,31 (**) 0,49 86,10 (**) 0,89 -80,84 (**) 0,92 -61,36 (**) 0,92 -19,00 (**) 0,91 -32,45 (**)  0,82 -67,04 (**) 
IMP_FWDCIT5 fitted     0,85 -15,39 (**)
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 0,01 6,23 (**) 0,01 6,90 (**) 1,00 -6,35 (**) 0,99 -17,04 (**) 0,99 -5,57 (**) 1,00 -4,27 (**) 0,99 -14,33 (**) 0,97 -14,02 (**) 
CMP_NPC 0,01 4,87 (**) 0,00 1,21  1,00 2,95 (**) 0,97 -33,77 (**) 0,97 -11,36 (**) 0,97 -13,62 (**) 0,97 -34,29 (**) 0,93 -33,49 (**) 
CMP_INV 0,04 15,26 (**) 0,06 17,39 (**) 0,99 -17,63 (**) 0,99 -16,07 (**) 0,98 -6,54 (**) 0,98 -9,35 (**) 0,98 -15,69 (**) 0,96 -21,21 (**) 
CMP_IPC4 -0,03 -6,46 (**) -0,06 -8,54 (**) 1,01 8,79 (**) 0,99 -6,20 (**) 0,99 -1,51  0,99 -4,57 (**) 0,99 -5,55 (**) 0,98 -6,10 (**) 
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE 0,04 2,37 (*) 0,02 0,70  1,01 1,73  1,00 0,79   1,01 0,62  1,00 -0,44  1,02 2,95 (**) 1,00 0,14 
APP_CUMUL 0,00 -26,98 (**) 0,00 -23,79 (**) 1,00 26,41 (**) 1,00 21,34 (**) 1,00 6,99 (**) 1,00 23,97 (**) 1,00 8,73 (**) 1,02 28,83 (**) 
APP_OCCAS -0,48 -43,51 (**) -0,72 -45,90 (**) 1,16 46,06 (**) 1,01 4,04 (**) 1,03 3,01 (**) 1,00 0,07  1,07 12,42 (**) 1,06 15,67 (**) 
APP_CBOWN 0,39 28,02 (**) 0,51 25,51 (**) 0,90 -25,17 (**) 0,95 -12,20 (**) 0,97 -2,19 (*) 0,94 -7,55 (**) 0,95 -12,26 (**) 0,94 -13,01 (**) 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry -0,01 -1,16   -0,01 -0,80  1,00 1,07  1,07 17,52 (**) 1,05 4,20 (**) 1,05 6,95 (**) 1,07 16,62 (**) 1,08 19,78 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,12 8,41 (**) 0,11 5,78 (**) 0,98 -3,62 (**) 0,96 -9,16 (**) 0,98 -1,79  0,95 -6,91 (**) 0,95 -10,98 (**) 0,96 -9,07 (**) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology -0,08 -5,65 (**) -0,23 -11,24 (**) 1,06 13,67 (**) 0,86 -33,71 (**) 0,84 -12,15 (**) 0,92 -10,36 (**) 0,87 -25,34 (**) 0,86 -34,33 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,50 24,62 (**) 0,56 18,51 (**) 0,92 -13,04 (**) 0,69 -58,91 (**) 0,69 -17,90 (**) 0,91 -6,53 (**) 0,73 -42,55 (**) 0,69 -55,90 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,40 20,59 (**) 0,78 27,25 (**) 0,85 -24,93 (**) 0,83 -29,26 (**) 0,82 -9,86 (**) 0,86 -11,76 (**) 0,82 -29,34 (**) 0,83 -28,51 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,22 14,45 (**) 0,30 13,65 (**) 0,95 -10,71 (**) 0,90 -22,06 (**) 0,90 -6,85 (**) 0,90 -12,00 (**) 0,90 -22,00 (**) 0,90 -21,84 (**) 
JC-08 - Electricity 0,10 7,21 (**) 0,16 8,63 (**) 0,97 -7,78 (**) 0,93 -17,03 (**) 0,93 -5,39 (**) 0,93 -10,33 (**) 0,93 -18,15 (**) 0,93 -17,27 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,37 17,88 (**) 0,66 21,72 (**) 0,88 -19,40 (**) 0,75 -44,08 (**) 0,75 -13,56 (**) 0,76 -21,13 (**) 0,77 -37,47 (**) 0,75 -42,72 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,15 10,70 (**) 0,25 12,64 (**) 0,95 -11,11 (**) 0,95 -11,80 (**) 0,94 -4,38 (**) 0,99 -1,24  0,93 -14,71 (**) 0,96 -10,49 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 0,06 4,89 (**) 0,13 7,22 (**) 0,97 -8,52 (**) 1,08 18,55 (**) 1,08 6,40 (**) 1,02 3,55 (**) 1,09 20,31 (**) 1,08 20,02 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles 0,27 18,87 (**) 0,46 22,18 (**) 0,90 -22,88 (**) 1,05 10,34 (**) 1,07 4,79 (**) 1,06 7,29 (**) 1,08 15,45 (**) 1,05 10,55 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 0,20 13,46 (**) 0,27 12,58 (**) 0,94 -12,81 (**) 1,04 7,45 (**) 1,04 2,46 (*) 1,04 5,03 (**) 1,09 14,67 (**) 1,04 8,34 (**) 
JC-14 - Human Necessities 0,13 9,28 (**) 0,25 12,77 (**) 0,95 -12,91 (**) 0,99 -2,98 (**) 0,99 -0,46  1,00 -0,53  1,01 1,93  0,99 -1,94 
  
  
OLS Cens. Norm. Reg. Unstratified Stratified Random Sample 1980-1987 Instrumental Var Log 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT -0,09 -2,28 (*) -0,04 -0,75 1,00 0,31 1,04 2,71 (**) 1,04 0,94 1,08 3,50 (**) 1,09 6,85 (**) 1,03 2,75 (**) 
AU -1,03 -21,01 (**) -1,39 -19,76 (**) 1,35 19,96 (**) 0,83 -13,03 (**) 0,88 -2,78 (**) 0,96 -1,53 0,78 -16,01 (**) 0,84 -11,93 (**) 
BE -0,23 -5,73 (**) -0,39 -6,73 (**) 1,09 7,01 (**) 0,99 -0,47   0,99 -0,22 0,97 -1,41 0,99 -0,84 1,00 -0,28 
CA -0,76 -19,51 (**) -1,17 -20,69 (**) 1,27 19,96 (**) 1,02 1,52   0,99 -0,15 1,01 0,53 0,96 -3,03 (**) 1,03 2,72 (**) 
CH -0,31 -13,03 (**) -0,44 -13,03 (**) 1,10 13,32 (**) 1,03 3,38 (**) 1,05 2,10 (*) 1,01 0,46 0,99 -1,96 1,03 3,45 (**) 
DE 0,01 0,49   0,00 0,21 0,99 -1,93 1,00 -0,07   1,02 1,00 0,97 -4,02 (**) 1,04 6,92 (**) 1,00 -0,22 
DK 0,13 2,41 (*) 0,15 1,91 0,97 -1,74 0,89 -6,65 (**) 0,83 -3,35 (**) 0,85 -4,16 (**) 0,89 -6,96 (**) 0,89 -6,87 (**) 
ES -0,88 -14,77 (**) -1,35 -16,14 (**) 1,39 18,85 (**) 1,04 1,99 (*) 1,00 -0,06 1,00 -0,07 1,09 4,61 (**) 1,03 1,55 
FI 0,24 5,41 (**) 0,45 6,69 (**) 0,90 -6,58 (**) 0,79 -17,28 (**) 0,76 -5,70 (**) 0,83 -3,93 (**) 0,80 -14,33 (**) 0,79 -15,53 (**) 
GB -0,98 -48,36 (**) -1,35 -46,99 (**) 1,31 45,44 (**) 1,05 7,50 (**) 1,07 3,44 (**) 0,98 -2,07 (*) 1,03 5,22 (**) 1,05 8,48 (**) 
IL -1,17 -19,03 (**) -1,85 -21,01 (**) 1,53 22,75 (**) 1,05 2,45 (*) 1,00 0,01 1,05 1,01 0,99 -0,35 1,06 3,26 (**) 
IT -0,49 -20,05 (**) -0,69 -20,13 (**) 1,17 21,32 (**) 1,04 4,64 (**) 1,03 1,49 1,01 0,51 1,08 9,57 (**) 1,04 5,49 (**) 
JP 0,35 21,55 (**) 0,42 17,50 (**) 0,95 -9,68 (**) 0,82 -38,66 (**) 0,83 -11,64 (**) 0,78 -27,73 (**) 0,73 -29,33 (**) 0,81 -41,51 (**) 
KR -0,67 -11,34 (**) -0,89 -9,92 (**) 1,21 9,03 (**) 0,93 -3,51 (**) 0,94 -0,98 1,21 1,10 0,85 -7,36 (**) 0,93 -3,45 (**) 
NL -0,38 -16,26 (**) -0,68 -20,01 (**) 1,16 20,71 (**) 1,06 7,36 (**) 1,05 2,36 (*) 1,04 3,10 (**) 1,02 2,75 (**) 1,05 6,65 (**) 
SE -0,97 -32,45 (**) -1,41 -33,01 (**) 1,38 35,72 (**) 1,04 4,55 (**) 0,97 -1,09 1,09 4,96 (**) 1,03 3,43 (**) 1,05 5,14 (**) 
US -0,13 -4,25 (**) -0,09 -1,97 (*) 1,00 -0,40 0,86 -15,07 (**) 0,85 -5,00 (**) 0,86 -7,74 (**) 0,80 -19,57 (**) 0,86 -14,93 (**) 
RoW -0,96 -63,20 (**) -1,53 -70,40 (**) 1,35 64,88 (**) 0,93 -14,09 (**) 0,95 -3,63 (**) 0,95 -6,20 (**) 0,84 -19,71 (**) 0,94 -13,70 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990)
1980 0,77 22,39 (**) 0,22 4,82 (**) 1,02 1,84 1,24 22,60 (**) 1,19 6,09 (**) 1,28 26,70 (**) 1,23 22,94 (**) 1,22 22,29 (**) 
1981 0,73 23,20 (**) 0,17 4,07 (**) 1,02 2,78 (**) 1,19 19,45 (**) 1,17 6,11 (**) 1,24 25,05 (**) 1,19 20,83 (**) 1,17 19,39 (**) 
1982 0,76 25,63 (**) 0,19 4,66 (**) 1,02 2,47 (*) 1,16 17,29 (**) 1,13 5,04 (**) 1,21 22,82 (**) 1,16 18,94 (**) 1,15 17,13 (**) 
1983 0,79 27,50 (**) 0,21 5,46 (**) 1,01 1,74 1,10 11,91 (**) 1,08 3,32 (**) 1,15 17,84 (**) 1,11 13,86 (**) 1,09 11,72 (**) 
1984 0,72 26,16 (**) 0,10 2,79 (**) 1,04 5,21 (**) 1,08 9,69 (**) 1,03 1,39 1,12 14,57 (**) 1,07 9,62 (**) 1,07 9,27 (**) 
1985 0,76 28,02 (**) 0,10 2,72 (**) 1,05 6,17 (**) 1,04 5,26 (**) 1,02 1,04 1,09 10,80 (**) 1,04 4,90 (**) 1,04 5,00 (**) 
1986 0,68 25,90 (**) 0,29 8,02 (**) 0,93 -10,32 (**) 0,91 -11,90 (**) 0,91 -3,87 (**) 0,94 -7,64 (**) 0,90 -13,61 (**) 0,90 -13,71 (**) 
1987 0,45 17,55 (**) 0,13 3,58 (**) 1,02 3,15 (**) 0,96 -4,86 (**) 0,96 -1,88 0,96 -5,82 (**) 0,96 -5,54 (**) 
1988 0,30 12,24 (**) 0,05 1,42 1,03 4,19 (**) 0,96 -4,88 (**) 0,96 -1,65 0,96 -5,90 (**) 0,96 -5,46 (**) 
1989 0,05 2,17 (*) -0,10 -3,17 (**) 1,04 5,81 (**) 0,98 -3,07 (**) 0,95 -2,46 (*) 0,97 -4,18 (**) 0,98 -3,40 (**) 
1991 -0,11 -4,54 (**) 0,06 1,78 0,97 -5,06 (**) 0,99 -1,71   0,96 -1,89 0,99 -1,55 0,99 -1,74 
1992 -0,45 -19,06 (**) -0,11 -3,41 (**) 0,97 -4,88 (**) 0,97 -4,07 (**) 0,95 -2,13 (*) 0,97 -4,02 (**) 0,97 -4,05 (**) 
1993 -0,70 -29,81 (**) -0,14 -4,32 (**) 0,94 -8,10 (**) 0,90 -12,88 (**) 0,88 -5,53 (**) 0,91 -12,66 (**) 0,91 -13,73 (**) 
1994 -1,04 -44,69 (**) -0,22 -6,55 (**) 0,93 -10,34 (**) 0,81 -25,96 (**) 0,80 -9,79 (**) 0,82 -26,49 (**) 0,82 -27,80 (**) 
1995 -1,46 -63,45 (**) -0,38 -11,44 (**) 0,93 -9,73 (**) 0,72 -42,20 (**) 0,72 -13,93 (**) 0,73 -42,61 (**) 0,72 -44,90 (**) 
1996 -1,96 -86,37 (**) -0,60 -18,24 (**) 0,95 -6,60 (**) 0,66 -54,50 (**) 0,65 -18,23 (**) 0,67 -52,10 (**) 0,66 -55,75 (**) 
1997 -2,56 -115,51 (**) -0,99 -30,74 (**) 1,03 3,66 (**) 0,67 -56,47 (**) 0,66 -17,72 (**) 0,68 -50,67 (**) 0,66 -55,75 (**) 
1998 -3,20 -147,64 (**) -1,46 -46,31 (**) 1,15 19,96 (**) 0,77 -37,16 (**) 0,77 -11,38 (**) 0,79 -30,00 (**) 0,77 -35,92 (**) 
1999 -3,87 -180,37 (**) -1,87 -59,83 (**) 1,29 36,46 (**) 1,07 9,39 (**) 1,05 2,17 (*) 1,09 10,46 (**) 1,06 8,30 (**) 
2000 -4,44 -209,02 (**) -2,04 -65,59 (**) 1,43 50,32 (**) 1,69 74,08 (**) 1,67 22,39 (**) 1,77 58,54 (**) 1,68 71,73 (**) 
Model 
# Subjects 1134860 1134271 1134860 1134860 113566 244782 1134980 1134271 
# Failures 0,22 739351 739924 739924 74179 234074 739993 739351 
Log likelihood -2574738 -9664628 -8536509 -685214 -2440249 -8545890 -8529077 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 4.575 (0,00) 130.917 (0,00) 106.896 (0,00) 125.250 (0,00) 14.259 (0,00) 22.449 (0,00) 123.521 (0,00) 141.014 (0,00) 
Cox Regression Model - Breslow method for ties - Stratified by reason for lapse unless otherwise specified (EPO Filings 1980-2000)
  
Table A6.4 – Instrumental variables regressions 
Pages (Poisson) Claims (Poisson) Triadic (Probit) FwdCit5 (NegBin) 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Instruments 
RTE_LEGREP -0,06 -62,82 (**) 0,14 129,57 (**)   
RTE_PCT 0,66 1339,12 (**) 0,15 244,99 (**) 0,22 73,15 (**) 
RTE_US1ST 0,29 234,34 (**) 0,28 186,68 (**)   
RTE_XUS1ST -0,29 -180,70 (**) -0,29 -143,07 (**)   
DRF_PAGES (estimated)     0,42 81,13 (**) 
DRF_PRIO 0,69 1061,93 (**) 0,42 468,38 (**)   
DRF_EQUIV 0,05 80,58 (**) 0,00 -2,72 (**)   
DRF_HASDIV 0,35 374,88 (**) 0,35 281,83 (**)   
DRF_ISDIV 0,37 290,26 (**) -0,15 -88,16 (**)   
IMP_DSTATES_B10     0,02 35,70 (**) 
CMP_BPC       0,24 64,23 (**) 
CMP_NPC       0,09 27,95 (**) 
CMP_INV       0,37 80,34 (**) 
CMP_IPC4       0,55 77,37 (**) 
APP_MULTIPLE     -0,04 -8,23 (**) 
APP_CUMUL     0,08 123,79 (**) 
APP_OCCAS     -0,24 -58,45 (**) 
APP_CBOWN     -0,05 -10,50 (**) 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry)   
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry -0,22 -302,28 (**) 0,04 50,13 (**) 0,04 9,80 (**) 0,02 3,42 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers -0,05 -61,82 (**) 0,05 54,23 (**) 0,11 24,57 (**) 0,22 34,90 (**) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,34 517,80 (**) 0,15 171,81 (**) 0,03 6,60 (**) 0,35 51,06 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications -0,03 -29,33 (**) 0,07 52,13 (**) -0,24 -37,62 (**) 0,48 53,60 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,05 55,69 (**) 0,11 92,07 (**) 0,10 15,94 (**) 0,06 6,25 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics -0,07 -77,92 (**) -0,01 -9,14 (**) 0,03 6,48 (**) -0,02 -2,16 (*) 
JC-08 - Electricity -0,23 -285,46 (**) -0,01 -8,52 (**) 0,01 2,33 (*) -0,08 -11,96 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,21 223,60 (**) 0,11 89,24 (**) -0,15 -23,38 (**) 0,05 4,81 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics -0,17 -234,35 (**) 0,02 23,16 (**) 0,07 14,78 (**) -0,19 -28,01 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing -0,23 -292,69 (**) -0,01 -7,20 (**) -0,12 -29,86 (**) -0,29 -41,18 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles -0,28 -313,93 (**) -0,07 -70,01 (**) -0,14 -31,16 (**) -0,20 -24,28 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering -0,25 -273,00 (**) -0,04 -36,02 (**) -0,32 -65,68 (**) -0,26 -30,92 (**) 
JC-14 - Human Necessities -0,21 -276,55 (**) 0,04 44,50 (**) -0,12 -27,70 (**) 0,06 9,55 (**) 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT -0,12 -45,52 (**) -0,07 -25,45 (**) -0,28 -21,09 (**) -0,03 -1,41 
AU 0,21 91,04 (**) 0,28 98,99 (**) 0,25 16,32 (**) 0,00 -0,13 
BE 0,15 62,76 (**) 0,13 47,05 (**) 0,01 0,58   0,09 4,23 (**) 
CA 0,23 113,52 (**) 0,14 57,69 (**) 0,30 24,78 (**) 0,20 10,99 (**) 
CH 0,11 77,32 (**) 0,14 88,44 (**) 0,19 25,28 (**) 0,15 12,48 (**) 
DE -0,03 -31,94 (**) -0,02 -15,46 (**) -0,22 -46,06 (**) 0,06 7,39 (**) 
DK 0,15 61,33 (**) 0,11 33,91 (**) 0,01 0,72   0,18 7,20 (**) 
ES -0,30 -67,39 (**) -0,37 -74,02 (**) -0,27 -13,05 (**) -0,21 -5,68 (**) 
FI -0,15 -54,92 (**) -0,05 -16,15 (**) -0,01 -0,43   0,46 22,28 (**) 
GB 0,08 70,38 (**) 0,10 78,23 (**) 0,03 5,26 (**) 0,21 20,18 (**) 
IL 0,34 117,06 (**) 0,26 73,92 (**) 0,21 11,14 (**) 0,16 5,51 (**) 
IT -0,06 -36,65 (**) -0,05 -29,58 (**) -0,27 -32,96 (**) 0,01 0,86 
JP 0,42 442,53 (**) -0,03 -26,65 (**) 0,99 183,81 (**) 0,11 12,71 (**) 
KR 0,18 55,30 (**) -0,07 -18,42 (**) 0,70 37,50 (**) -0,24 -7,52 (**) 
NL -0,14 -95,22 (**) -0,09 -56,50 (**) 0,19 25,67 (**) 0,19 16,26 (**) 
SE 0,03 16,60 (**) 0,00 0,17   0,06 6,31 (**) -0,01 -0,92 
US -0,11 -59,78 (**) -0,08 -37,61 (**) 0,45 48,80 (**) 0,23 14,95 (**) 
RoW 0,47 519,99 (**) 0,32 312,55 (**) 0,58 124,14 (**) 0,29 36,17 (**) 
Intercept 1,88 1137,01 (**) 1,87 987,28 (**) -0,45 -52,40 (**) -3,47 -191,89 (**) 
Model 
# Observations 1181840 1188907 1189049 1134978 
Pseudo R² 0,33 0,13 0,14 0,05 
Log likelihood -8550825 -5474077 -699143 -982327 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 8407565,05 (0,00) 1571418,79 (0,00) 234845,56 (0,00) 107262,77 (0,00) 
LR Test of alpha=0 (P>chibar²) 190000 (0,00) 
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Table A6.5 – Life table of EPO applications time to decision 
Interval Beg. Total Deaths Lost Survival St.Dev. [95% Conf. Int.]
0 1 1189058 5127 0 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
1 2 1183931 68824 0 0.94 0.00 0.94 0.94
2 3 1115107 216899 0 0.76 0.00 0.75 0.76
3 4 898208 275836 0 0.52 0.00 0.52 0.52
4 5 622372 228159 0 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.33
5 6 394213 145820 34951 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.20
6 7 213442 76250 28223 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.13
7 8 108969 36654 17534 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.08
8 9 54781 16700 9796 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.05
9 10 28285 7973 4998 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.04
10 11 15314 3906 2675 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03
11 12 8733 1951 1354 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02
12 13 5428 1003 758 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02
13 14 3667 510 601 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
14 15 2556 274 307 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
15 16 1975 130 277 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
16 17 1568 81 550 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
17 18 937 43 334 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
18 19 560 11 166 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
19 20 383 16 79 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
20 21 288 7 281 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
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Table A6.6 – Life table of EPO patents maintenance period 
 
Interval Beg. Total Deaths Lost Survival St.Dev. [95% Conf. Int.] 
0 1 671353 2590 3 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
1 2 668760 26461 1130 0.96 0.00 0.96 0.96 
2 3 641169 37271 25651 0.90 0.00 0.90 0.90 
3 4 578247 39300 45197 0.84 0.00 0.84 0.84 
4 5 493750 38660 41090 0.77 0.00 0.77 0.77 
5 6 414000 35461 33031 0.70 0.00 0.70 0.70 
6 7 345508 32694 15271 0.63 0.00 0.63 0.63 
7 8 297543 28211 23242 0.57 0.00 0.57 0.57 
8 9 246090 23719 22412 0.51 0.00 0.51 0.51 
9 10 199959 20078 18722 0.46 0.00 0.46 0.46 
10 11 161159 16820 19184 0.41 0.00 0.41 0.41 
11 12 125155 13591 17219 0.36 0.00 0.36 0.36 
12 13 94345 10797 14687 0.32 0.00 0.31 0.32 
13 14 68861 9035 11422 0.27 0.00 0.27 0.27 
14 15 48404 8200 7170 0.22 0.00 0.22 0.22 
15 16 33034 7433 4769 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.17 
16 17 20832 7220 3042 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.11 
17 18 10570 6210 1366 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.04 
18 19 2994 2410 382 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
19 20 202 190 10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20 21 2 1 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table A6.7 – Test for trend in survival function over time to decision 
Filing Year Events observed Events expected 
1980 19090 7500.65 
1981 24204 10816.25 
1982 27626 14239.42 
1983 30711 18466.37 
1984 35903 24112.54 
1985 38103 28336.26 
1986 41855 31459.51 
1987 45461 36296.42 
1988 51920 42254.04 
1989 57224 47598.14 
1990 63625 49578.45 
1991 59064 47153.75 
1992 60022 50120.48 
1993 59390 53286.09 
1994 60725 60341.74 
1995 62730 71887.89 
1996 66577 85777.38 
1997 71180 99708.03 
1998 73821 107729.59 
1999 70763 104041.77 
2000 66176 95465.23 
Total 1086170 1086170.00 
  Chi2(20) 131275.80 
  P>Chi² 0.00 
 
Test for trend of survivor functions
 Chi²(1) 116549.38 
 P>Chi² 0.00 
 
APPENDICES 
N. VAN ZEEBROECK - ESSAYS ON THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PATENT SYSTEMS 340 
Table A6.8 – Test for trend in survival function over maintenance period 
Filing Year Events observed Events expected 
1980 13754 12500.39 
1981 17182 15429.51 
1982 19686 17123.89 
1983 21635 18229.79 
1984 24922 20376.24 
1985 26417 20964.45 
1986 23874 22902.15 
1987 23414 22098.40 
1988 24546 23732.03 
1989 24419 24101.54 
1990 25528 26490.90 
1991 21917 23585.49 
1992 20316 22364.46 
1993 18157 20524.36 
1994 15583 18457.34 
1995 12807 15724.79 
1996 10177 12951.70 
1997 7312 10016.44 
1998 5228 7463.03 
1999 4021 5329.64 
2000 2867 3395.47 
Total 363762 363762.00 
  Chi2(20) 10401.02 
  P>Chi² 0.00 
Test for trend of survivor functions
 Chi²(1) 8819.03 




Table A6.9 – Survival Analysis of Patent Applications Time to Decision (competing risks) 
Stratified Deemed Withdr. Withdrawn Refused Granted
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z
Filing routes   
RTE_ACCSRC 0,94 -7,62 (**) 0,88 -8,42 (**) 0,91 -2,80 (**) 0,93 -1,92 0,97 -3,11 (**)
RTE_PCT 0,82 -75,19 (**) 0,64 -82,49 (**) 0,75 -27,21 (**) 0,80 -15,32 (**) 0,89 -36,10 (**)
Drafting
DRF_CLAIMS 0,99 -65,60 (**) 1,00 -22,23 (**) 1,00 -11,08 (**) 0,99 -11,73 (**) 0,99 -63,45 (**)
DRF_PRIO 1,00 0,11 0,99 -3,82 (**) 1,01 2,50 (*) 1,02 2,07 (*) 1,00 2,32 (*)
DRF_EQUIV 0,90 -33,33 (**) 0,91 -25,58 (**) 0,95 -7,69 (**) 0,87 -12,99 (**) 0,90 -39,02 (**)
DRF_HASDIV 0,64 -68,58 (**) 0,55 -23,52 (**) 0,44 -16,89 (**) 0,55 -15,80 (**) 0,66 -64,68 (**)
DRF_ISDIV 0,22 -212,41 (**) 0,21 -92,00 (**) 0,23 -40,87 (**) 0,21 -32,03 (**) 0,21 -163,47 (**)
Importance
IMP_TRIADIC 0,85 -63,78 (**) 0,66 -85,40 (**) 0,64 -52,58 (**) 0,80 -18,11 (**) 0,96 -14,85 (**)
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,96 -42,89 (**) 0,95 -19,47 (**) 0,94 -12,46 (**) 0,93 -12,51 (**) 0,96 -36,61 (**)
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 0,98 -49,46 (**) 0,99 -7,75 (**) 0,99 -9,87 (**) 0,98 -10,27 (**) 0,98 -53,74 (**)
CMP_NPC 0,96 -61,22 (**) 0,97 -21,29 (**) 0,97 -12,53 (**) 0,94 -16,29 (**) 0,95 -58,88 (**)
CMP_INV 0,99 -19,72 (**) 0,98 -12,26 (**) 0,99 -3,85 (**) 0,98 -5,03 (**) 0,99 -16,62 (**)
CMP_IPC4 0,98 -15,18 (**) 0,97 -11,85 (**) 0,99 -2,16 (*) 0,96 -5,57 (**) 0,98 -11,85 (**)
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE 1,04 7,43 (**) 0,98 -1,77 0,96 -2,28 (*) 1,05 1,83 1,06 10,41 (**)
APP_CUMUL 1,00 7,10 (**) 1,00 1,46 1,00 10,92 (**) 1,00 -1,36 1,00 4,08 (**)
APP_OCCAS 0,89 -36,66 (**) 0,99 -2,67 (**) 0,94 -4,60 (**) 0,91 -6,05 (**) 0,84 -46,91 (**)
APP_CBOWN 0,94 -16,33 (**) 0,94 -8,82 (**) 0,90 -7,26 (**) 0,94 -3,28 (**) 0,94 -14,32 (**)
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry)
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 1,12 29,70 (**) 1,09 11,50 (**) 1,08 5,63 (**) 1,09 5,13 (**) 1,14 31,80 (**)
JC-03 - Polymers 0,91 -24,35 (**) 0,91 -11,32 (**) 0,93 -5,63 (**) 0,89 -5,95 (**) 0,90 -23,96 (**)
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,76 -67,39 (**) 0,82 -25,30 (**) 0,89 -7,79 (**) 0,80 -11,02 (**) 0,72 -67,97 (**)
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,58 -98,91 (**) 0,63 -41,31 (**) 0,62 -24,42 (**) 0,61 -14,92 (**) 0,55 -82,53 (**)
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,76 -52,53 (**) 0,88 -11,31 (**) 0,83 -9,33 (**) 0,78 -9,04 (**) 0,72 -50,81 (**)
JC-07 - Electronics 0,80 -54,41 (**) 0,89 -13,66 (**) 0,86 -9,48 (**) 0,86 -7,32 (**) 0,77 -53,85 (**)
JC-08 - Electricity 0,88 -33,81 (**) 0,91 -12,34 (**) 0,86 -11,20 (**) 0,91 -5,05 (**) 0,86 -34,40 (**)
JC-09 - Computers 0,65 -76,39 (**) 0,71 -31,53 (**) 0,67 -20,02 (**) 0,62 -16,43 (**) 0,61 -67,88 (**)
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,91 -23,84 (**) 0,92 -11,38 (**) 0,88 -8,99 (**) 0,91 -4,62 (**) 0,92 -19,63 (**)
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 1,19 46,71 (**) 1,17 23,21 (**) 1,14 9,66 (**) 1,28 13,76 (**) 1,20 46,67 (**)
JC-12 - Vehicles 1,21 46,31 (**) 1,18 21,10 (**) 1,15 8,95 (**) 1,33 13,82 (**) 1,22 45,28 (**)
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 1,11 22,98 (**) 1,08 9,57 (**) 1,08 4,99 (**) 1,27 11,07 (**) 1,12 24,44 (**)
JC-14 - Human Necessities 1,03 6,55 (**) 1,08 11,49 (**) 1,07 4,85 (**) 1,03 1,31 1,00 1,02
Cox Regression Model  - Breslow method for ties - Stratified by grant decision unless otherwise specified (EPO Filings 1980-2000) 
  
  
Stratified Deemed Withdr. Withdrawn Refused Granted 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT 0,99 -0,86   1,08 3,88 (**) 0,96 -0,60   0,81 -3,50 (**) 0,97 -2,20 (*) 
AU 0,54 -50,35 (**) 0,81 -9,48 (**) 0,98 -0,34   0,57 -8,26 (**) 0,44 -44,60 (**) 
BE 0,84 -14,02 (**) 1,09 4,22 (**) 0,84 -3,46 (**) 0,75 -4,24 (**) 0,77 -20,60 (**) 
CA 0,80 -20,58 (**) 1,00 0,08   1,05 1,05   0,81 -3,91 (**) 0,72 -25,08 (**) 
CH 0,90 -14,43 (**) 1,08 6,08 (**) 1,25 7,74 (**) 0,87 -4,05 (**) 0,82 -26,70 (**) 
DE 0,93 -14,67 (**) 0,98 -1,91   1,05 3,07 (**) 0,85 -7,05 (**) 0,91 -19,02 (**) 
DK 0,76 -17,66 (**) 0,90 -3,60 (**) 0,84 -2,73 (**) 0,78 -2,96 (**) 0,72 -20,26 (**) 
ES 0,80 -14,02 (**) 1,00 0,14   0,82 -3,94 (**) 0,69 -4,34 (**) 0,74 -14,14 (**) 
FI 0,64 -41,99 (**) 0,76 -10,77 (**) 0,87 -2,53 (*) 0,60 -6,83 (**) 0,59 -36,68 (**) 
GB 0,83 -30,84 (**) 1,07 6,07 (**) 1,17 6,97 (**) 0,82 -7,18 (**) 0,73 -48,23 (**) 
IL 0,74 -16,89 (**) 1,04 1,38   1,23 3,15 (**) 0,83 -2,02 (*) 0,59 -21,65 (**) 
IT 0,81 -30,15 (**) 1,02 1,69   1,03 1,02   0,74 -7,72 (**) 0,73 -40,46 (**) 
JP 0,60 -103,37 (**) 0,82 -20,34 (**) 0,92 -4,28 (**) 0,60 -20,22 (**) 0,53 -124,63 (**) 
KR 0,68 -25,21 (**) 0,97 -0,93   1,11 1,59   0,62 -4,80 (**) 0,58 -25,21 (**) 
NL 0,85 -22,75 (**) 0,99 -0,41   1,08 3,00 (**) 0,78 -7,49 (**) 0,80 -29,78 (**) 
SE 0,75 -33,22 (**) 0,98 -1,75   1,03 1,04   0,75 -6,58 (**) 0,67 -40,34 (**) 
US 0,69 -44,57 (**) 0,92 -4,80 (**) 1,01 0,29   0,66 -8,80 (**) 0,61 -50,71 (**) 
RoW 0,66 -89,86 (**) 0,92 -9,66 (**) 1,06 3,47 (**) 0,70 -16,59 (**) 0,56 -119,12 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990) 
1980 1,82 44,85 (**) 1,42 16,34 (**) 1,56 13,66 (**) 1,53 10,85 (**) 2,00 68,58 (**) 
1981 1,56 39,61 (**) 1,24 11,57 (**) 1,25 7,30 (**) 1,37 8,64 (**) 1,71 57,61 (**) 
1982 1,34 30,47 (**) 1,13 6,94 (**) 1,11 3,43 (**) 1,16 4,08 (**) 1,44 41,01 (**) 
1983 1,12 12,94 (**) 0,98 -1,37   0,89 -4,06 (**) 1,05 1,27   1,19 20,69 (**) 
1984 0,99 -0,84   0,88 -8,14 (**) 0,82 -7,02 (**) 0,94 -1,81   1,05 5,60 (**) 
1985 0,90 -14,74 (**) 0,81 -14,16 (**) 0,72 -11,87 (**) 0,82 -5,25 (**) 0,94 -7,19 (**) 
1986 0,90 -14,21 (**) 0,83 -12,88 (**) 0,72 -11,98 (**) 0,77 -7,63 (**) 0,96 -5,80 (**) 
1987 0,87 -20,14 (**) 0,83 -13,33 (**) 0,73 -12,59 (**) 0,78 -7,52 (**) 0,91 -12,34 (**) 
1988 0,89 -18,40 (**) 0,86 -11,48 (**) 0,80 -9,60 (**) 0,87 -4,62 (**) 0,91 -12,50 (**) 
1989 0,91 -14,72 (**) 0,93 -5,70 (**) 0,90 -4,79 (**) 0,89 -4,08 (**) 0,91 -12,98 (**) 
1991 1,03 4,14 (**) 1,02 1,14   1,02 0,88   0,95 -1,66   1,04 5,38 (**) 
1992 1,03 4,27 (**) 0,98 -1,21   1,02 0,90   1,00 0,06   1,05 6,51 (**) 
1993 0,96 -6,63 (**) 0,88 -10,28 (**) 0,98 -1,07   0,96 -1,58   0,99 -1,98 (*) 
1994 0,86 -22,76 (**) 0,76 -21,14 (**) 0,86 -6,34 (**) 0,90 -3,64 (**) 0,90 -15,75 (**) 
1995 0,75 -44,33 (**) 0,65 -34,20 (**) 0,80 -9,64 (**) 0,80 -7,37 (**) 0,79 -34,28 (**) 
1996 0,68 -64,29 (**) 0,61 -40,40 (**) 0,69 -16,34 (**) 0,83 -6,49 (**) 0,70 -51,54 (**) 
1997 0,66 -71,39 (**) 0,63 -38,70 (**) 0,64 -20,19 (**) 0,92 -2,55 (*) 0,66 -58,93 (**) 
1998 0,74 -54,13 (**) 0,73 -27,82 (**) 0,69 -17,43 (**) 1,11 3,02 (**) 0,73 -44,79 (**) 
1999 0,94 -11,12 (**) 0,94 -5,62 (**) 0,84 -8,21 (**) 1,47 10,08 (**) 0,93 -10,10 (**) 
2000 1,29 44,29 (**) 1,29 21,86 (**) 1,03 1,58   1,85 13,62 (**) 1,29 34,82 (**) 
Model 
# Subjects / Observations 1134856 238412 68663 35441 697102 
# Failures / R² 1039618 238412 68663 35441 697102 
Log likelihood -12279390 -2676170 -688149 -330926 -8574342 
F (P>F) / LR chi² (P>chi²) 206.417 (0,00) 75.297 (0,00) 15.881 (0,00) 9.859 (0,00) 216.668 (0,00) 
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Table A6.10 – Test of the P.H. Assumption in the Time to Decision Model 
  rho chi2 df Prob>chi2 
Filing routes     
RTE_ACCSRC -0.02 46.96 1.00 0.00 
RTE_PCT 0.06 340.52 1.00 0.00 
Drafting     
DRF_CLAIMS 0.04 227.80 1.00 0.00 
DRF_PRIO 0.00 1.19 1.00 0.28 
DRF_EQUIV -0.01 24.42 1.00 0.00 
DRF_HASDIV 0.02 55.75 1.00 0.00 
DRF_ISDIV 0.09 810.07 1.00 0.00 
Importance     
IMP_TRIADIC 0.02 56.91 1.00 0.00 
IMP_FWDCIT5 0.03 73.27 1.00 0.00 
Technical Complexity     
CMP_BPC 0.02 67.14 1.00 0.00 
CMP_NPC 0.01 23.27 1.00 0.00 
CMP_INV 0.01 6.91 1.00 0.01 
CMP_IPC4 -0.01 7.07 1.00 0.01 
Applicant Profiles     
APP_MULTIPLE 0.00 0.29 1.00 0.59 
APP_CUMUL 0.01 2.82 1.00 0.09 
APP_OCCAS 0.00 0.02 1.00 0.89 
APP_CBOWN 0.01 3.15 1.00 0.08 
Global Test  6611.21 68.00 0.00 
Cox Regression Model - Breslow method for ties 
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Table A6.11 – Survival Analysis of Applications Time to Decision with TVC 
No TVC Random Sample TVC Stratified 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Filing routes                   
RTE_ACCSRC 0,94 -7,62 (**) 0,97 -1,37   0,97 -1,39 
RTE_PCT 0,82 -75,19 (**) 0,82 -24,41 (**) 0,33 -38,50 (**) 
RTE_PCT * ln(_t)     1,91 33,50 (**) 
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 0,99 -65,60 (**) 0,99 -21,89 (**) 0,97 -20,99 (**) 
DRF_CLAIMS * ln(_t)     1,01 15,62 (**) 
DRF_PRIO 1,00 0,11   1,00 -0,15   1,00 -0,31 
DRF_EQUIV 0,90 -33,33 (**) 0,91 -14,71 (**) 1,00 0,10 
DRF_EQUIV * ln(_t)     0,95 -4,03 (**) 
DRF_HASDIV 0,64 -68,58 (**) 0,65 -22,10 (**) 0,30 -13,56 (**) 
DRF_HASDIV * ln(_t)     1,62 9,10 (**) 
DRF_ISDIV 0,22 -212,41 (**) 0,22 -62,04 (**) 0,01 -29,58 (**) 
DRF_ISDIV * ln(_t)     5,44 21,44 (**) 
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 0,85 -63,78 (**) 0,85 -22,41 (**) 0,57 -24,68 (**) 
IMP_TRIADIC * ln(_t)     1,37 19,05 (**) 
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,96 -42,89 (**) 0,95 -15,62 (**) 0,88 -10,60 (**) 
IMP_FWDCIT5 * ln(_t)     1,05 6,23 (**) 
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 0,98 -49,46 (**) 0,98 -17,80 (**) 0,96 -10,69 (**) 
CMP_BPC * ln(_t)     1,01 5,54 (**) 
CMP_NPC 0,96 -61,22 (**) 0,96 -20,76 (**) 0,93 -10,60 (**) 
CMP_NPC * ln(_t)     1,02 4,38 (**) 
CMP_INV 0,99 -19,72 (**) 0,99 -6,85 (**) 0,95 -6,87 (**) 
CMP_INV * ln(_t)     1,02 5,25 (**) 
CMP_IPC4 0,98 -15,18 (**) 0,98 -4,64 (**) 0,98 -4,91 (**) 
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE 1,04 7,43 (**) 1,02 1,45   1,02 1,46 
APP_CUMUL 1,00 7,10 (**) 1,00 1,58   1,00 2,31 (*) 
APP_OCCAS 0,89 -36,66 (**) 0,90 -12,23 (**) 0,89 -12,89 (**) 
APP_CBOWN 0,94 -16,33 (**) 0,93 -6,38 (**) 0,93 -5,95 (**) 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 1,12 29,70 (**) 1,13 11,80 (**) 1,14 12,22 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,91 -24,35 (**) 0,91 -8,18 (**) 0,92 -6,97 (**) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,76 -67,39 (**) 0,77 -21,61 (**) 0,76 -22,52 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,58 -98,91 (**) 0,58 -29,90 (**) 0,59 -29,00 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,76 -52,53 (**) 0,75 -16,87 (**) 0,76 -16,30 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,80 -54,41 (**) 0,81 -16,66 (**) 0,82 -16,14 (**) 
JC-08 - Electricity 0,88 -33,81 (**) 0,88 -11,62 (**) 0,89 -10,96 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,65 -76,39 (**) 0,65 -24,55 (**) 0,66 -22,98 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,91 -23,84 (**) 0,89 -9,68 (**) 0,90 -9,00 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 1,19 46,71 (**) 1,19 16,41 (**) 1,17 15,40 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles 1,21 46,31 (**) 1,19 14,86 (**) 1,17 13,48 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 1,11 22,98 (**) 1,09 7,05 (**) 1,08 6,27 (**) 
JC-14 - Human Necessities 1,03 6,55 (**) 1,02 1,45   1,01 0,76 
  
APPENDICES 
N. VAN ZEEBROECK - ESSAYS ON THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PATENT SYSTEMS 345 
No TVC Random Sample TVC Stratified 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT 0,99 -0,86   1,02 0,49   1,00 0,09 
AU 0,54 -50,35 (**) 0,54 -14,88 (**) 0,54 -14,80 (**) 
BE 0,84 -14,02 (**) 0,84 -5,12 (**) 0,85 -4,74 (**) 
CA 0,80 -20,58 (**) 0,80 -6,83 (**) 0,83 -5,93 (**) 
CH 0,90 -14,43 (**) 0,91 -5,12 (**) 0,91 -4,84 (**) 
DE 0,93 -14,67 (**) 0,92 -6,20 (**) 0,93 -5,82 (**) 
DK 0,76 -17,66 (**) 0,72 -7,25 (**) 0,73 -7,03 (**) 
ES 0,80 -14,02 (**) 0,81 -4,40 (**) 0,80 -4,62 (**) 
FI 0,64 -41,99 (**) 0,66 -10,72 (**) 0,67 -10,36 (**) 
GB 0,83 -30,84 (**) 0,83 -11,47 (**) 0,84 -10,37 (**) 
IL 0,74 -16,89 (**) 0,68 -7,25 (**) 0,72 -6,15 (**) 
IT 0,81 -30,15 (**) 0,79 -11,70 (**) 0,79 -11,81 (**) 
JP 0,60 -103,37 (**) 0,60 -37,11 (**) 0,61 -35,54 (**) 
KR 0,68 -25,21 (**) 0,67 -7,63 (**) 0,69 -7,17 (**) 
NL 0,85 -22,75 (**) 0,85 -8,10 (**) 0,86 -7,55 (**) 
SE 0,75 -33,22 (**) 0,74 -12,34 (**) 0,75 -11,41 (**) 
US 0,69 -44,57 (**) 0,69 -14,55 (**) 0,70 -13,97 (**) 
RoW 0,66 -89,86 (**) 0,65 -33,92 (**) 0,66 -32,82 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990) 
1980 1,82 44,85 (**) 1,89 23,08 (**) 1,85 22,27 (**) 
1981 1,56 39,61 (**) 1,52 16,90 (**) 1,52 16,77 (**) 
1982 1,34 30,47 (**) 1,36 13,16 (**) 1,35 12,74 (**) 
1983 1,12 12,94 (**) 1,17 6,76 (**) 1,17 6,87 (**) 
1984 0,99 -0,84   1,00 0,05   1,01 0,25 
1985 0,90 -14,74 (**) 0,91 -4,26 (**) 0,92 -3,88 (**) 
1986 0,90 -14,21 (**) 0,90 -5,21 (**) 0,90 -4,80 (**) 
1987 0,87 -20,14 (**) 0,90 -5,44 (**) 0,90 -5,29 (**) 
1988 0,89 -18,40 (**) 0,90 -5,29 (**) 0,90 -5,22 (**) 
1989 0,91 -14,72 (**) 0,93 -3,60 (**) 0,93 -3,77 (**) 
1991 1,03 4,14 (**) 1,04 2,09 (*) 1,04 2,28 (*) 
1992 1,03 4,27 (**) 1,02 1,04   1,03 1,78 
1993 0,96 -6,63 (**) 0,97 -1,81   0,98 -1,05 
1994 0,86 -22,76 (**) 0,86 -7,90 (**) 0,88 -7,04 (**) 
1995 0,75 -44,33 (**) 0,77 -13,92 (**) 0,79 -13,04 (**) 
1996 0,68 -64,29 (**) 0,68 -20,98 (**) 0,70 -19,57 (**) 
1997 0,66 -71,39 (**) 0,67 -22,65 (**) 0,69 -20,84 (**) 
1998 0,74 -54,13 (**) 0,75 -15,91 (**) 0,78 -13,62 (**) 
1999 0,94 -11,12 (**) 0,95 -2,96 (**) 0,99 -0,32 
2000 1,29 44,29 (**) 1,29 13,82 (**) 1,37 16,92 (**) 
Model 
# Subjects 1134856 113481 113481 
# Failures 1039618 103894 103894 
Log likelihood -12279390 -987697 -986152 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 206.417 (0,00) 29.738 (0,00) 32.828 (0,00) 
 
Cox Regression Model with Time-varying Covariates (TVC) - Breslow method for ties 
Stratified by decision unless otherwise specified (EPO Filings 1980-2000) – 10% Random Sample 
 
  
Table A6.12 – Survival Analysis of Applications Time to Decision (Robustness estimates) 
OLS Cens. Norm. Reg. Unstratified 1 Stratified 1 Stratified 2 Full Stratified Random Sample Instrumental Var Log 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Filing routes             
RTE_ACCSRC -0,03 -2,81 (**) -0,05 -3,66 (**) 0,94 -8,65 (**) 0,94 -7,62 (**) 0,94 -8,27 (**) 0,94 -7,62 (**) 0,97 -1,37 0,93 -9,73 (**) 0,94 -7,69 (**) 
RTE_PCT 0,46 116,55 (**) 0,47 110,95 (**) 0,80 -85,22 (**) 0,82 -75,19 (**) 0,84 -66,48 (**) 0,82 -75,19 (**) 0,82 -24,41 (**) 0,73 -84,58 (**) 0,82 -79,04 (**) 
RTE_LEGREP   1,01 2,31 (*)
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 0,01 86,50 (**) 0,02 98,67 (**) 0,99 -88,02 (**) 0,99 -65,60 (**) 0,99 -58,50 (**) 0,99 -65,60 (**) 0,99 -21,89 (**) 1,02 21,58 (**) 0,89 -76,13 (**) 
DRF_PAGES_DESC   1,00 -23,62 (**)
DRF_PAGES_DRAW   0,91 -29,88 (**)
DRF_PRIO 0,00 0,21   0,00 2,14 (*) 1,01 3,97 (**) 1,00 0,11 1,00 3,45 (**) 1,00 0,11 1,00 -0,15 0,94 -27,30 (**) 1,06 16,86 (**) 
DRF_EQUIV 0,07 27,65 (**) 0,08 29,31 (**) 0,90 -50,71 (**) 0,90 -33,33 (**) 0,91 -48,79 (**) 0,90 -33,33 (**) 0,91 -14,71 (**) 0,90 -51,29 (**) 0,80 -56,42 (**) 
DRF_HASDIV 0,80 84,77 (**) 0,72 71,50 (**) 0,72 -54,17 (**) 0,64 -68,58 (**) 0,64 -72,32 (**) 0,64 -68,58 (**) 0,65 -22,10 (**) 0,55 -76,21 (**) 0,65 -71,32 (**) 
DRF_ISDIV 3,58 353,00 (**) 4,13 352,58 (**) 0,20 -209,15 (**) 0,22 -212,41 (**) 0,22 -192,19 (**) 0,22 -212,41 (**) 0,22 -62,04 (**) 0,23 -179,98 (**) 0,22 -190,88 (**) 
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 0,40 116,48 (**) 0,40 110,04 (**) 0,81 -92,35 (**) 0,85 -63,78 (**) 0,85 -70,77 (**) 0,85 -63,78 (**) 0,85 -22,41 (**) 2,31 35,45 (**) 0,84 -73,85 (**) 
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,09 65,72 (**) 0,10 65,10 (**) 0,95 -51,62 (**) 0,96 -42,89 (**) 0,96 -42,11 (**) 0,96 -42,89 (**) 0,95 -15,62 (**) 0,94 -7,60 (**) 0,88 -52,33 (**) 
IMP_DSTATES   1,00 -4,38 (**)
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 0,03 57,71 (**) 0,03 57,70 (**) 0,98 -55,40 (**) 0,98 -49,46 (**) 0,98 -52,58 (**) 0,98 -49,46 (**) 0,98 -17,80 (**) 0,98 -51,64 (**) 0,91 -45,30 (**) 
CMP_NPC 0,07 78,13 (**) 0,08 79,06 (**) 0,96 -62,31 (**) 0,96 -61,22 (**) 0,96 -62,24 (**) 0,96 -61,22 (**) 0,96 -20,76 (**) 0,95 -67,54 (**) 0,87 -75,92 (**) 
CMP_INV 0,02 22,45 (**) 0,02 21,81 (**) 0,99 -22,71 (**) 0,99 -19,72 (**) 0,99 -18,52 (**) 0,99 -19,72 (**) 0,99 -6,85 (**) 0,98 -25,01 (**) 0,96 -24,28 (**) 
CMP_IPC4 0,03 14,13 (**) 0,03 13,63 (**) 0,98 -15,22 (**) 0,98 -15,18 (**) 0,98 -17,09 (**) 0,98 -15,18 (**) 0,98 -4,64 (**) 0,97 -19,21 (**) 0,96 -15,95 (**) 
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE -0,02 -2,55 (*) -0,01 -1,75 1,02 3,66 (**) 1,04 7,43 (**) 1,04 8,70 (**) 1,04 7,43 (**) 1,02 1,45 1,05 12,07 (**) 1,04 8,70 (**) 
APP_CUMUL 0,00 -11,28 (**) 0,00 -12,73 (**) 1,00 13,48 (**) 1,00 7,10 (**) 1,00 6,94 (**) 1,00 7,10 (**) 1,00 1,58 1,00 -17,49 (**) 1,02 40,83 (**) 
APP_OCCAS 0,11 25,29 (**) 0,11 22,75 (**) 0,92 -28,05 (**) 0,89 -36,66 (**) 0,89 -39,93 (**) 0,89 -36,66 (**) 0,90 -12,23 (**) 1,03 6,26 (**) 0,94 -17,34 (**) 
APP_CBOWN 0,09 16,19 (**) 0,08 13,61 (**) 0,94 -17,91 (**) 0,94 -16,33 (**) 0,93 -18,98 (**) 0,94 -16,33 (**) 0,93 -6,38 (**) 0,94 -17,19 (**) 0,93 -18,92 (**) 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry -0,19 -37,70 (**) -0,20 -37,05 (**) 1,11 32,74 (**) 1,12 29,70 (**) 1,12 32,99 (**) 1,12 29,70 (**) 1,13 11,80 (**) 1,10 28,54 (**) 1,13 36,91 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,06 10,01 (**) 0,05 7,92 (**) 0,94 -18,33 (**) 0,91 -24,35 (**) 0,89 -33,16 (**) 0,91 -24,35 (**) 0,91 -8,18 (**) 0,86 -38,84 (**) 0,91 -26,01 (**) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,47 81,20 (**) 0,51 82,21 (**) 0,75 -72,88 (**) 0,76 -67,39 (**) 0,76 -70,23 (**) 0,76 -67,39 (**) 0,77 -21,61 (**) 0,71 -70,06 (**) 0,78 -65,64 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,95 116,63 (**) 1,08 120,83 (**) 0,54 -107,54 (**) 0,58 -98,91 (**) 0,59 -90,99 (**) 0,58 -98,91 (**) 0,58 -29,90 (**) 0,62 -75,61 (**) 0,59 -92,83 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,52 67,43 (**) 0,59 70,05 (**) 0,70 -68,46 (**) 0,76 -52,53 (**) 0,78 -46,52 (**) 0,76 -52,53 (**) 0,75 -16,87 (**) 0,72 -60,77 (**) 0,76 -51,98 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,29 46,82 (**) 0,29 44,50 (**) 0,81 -53,75 (**) 0,80 -54,41 (**) 0,82 -49,08 (**) 0,80 -54,41 (**) 0,81 -16,66 (**) 0,80 -55,54 (**) 0,80 -55,20 (**) 
JC-08 - Electricity 0,21 40,38 (**) 0,25 43,59 (**) 0,82 -55,41 (**) 0,88 -33,81 (**) 0,89 -32,46 (**) 0,88 -33,81 (**) 0,88 -11,62 (**) 0,88 -36,22 (**) 0,88 -36,02 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,67 81,72 (**) 0,77 85,51 (**) 0,61 -87,65 (**) 0,65 -76,39 (**) 0,67 -70,80 (**) 0,65 -76,39 (**) 0,65 -24,55 (**) 0,67 -68,49 (**) 0,65 -77,23 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,16 28,94 (**) 0,18 29,39 (**) 0,88 -33,64 (**) 0,91 -23,84 (**) 0,93 -19,20 (**) 0,91 -23,84 (**) 0,89 -9,68 (**) 0,90 -27,68 (**) 0,92 -21,61 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing -0,26 -49,51 (**) -0,27 -49,77 (**) 1,21 59,33 (**) 1,19 46,71 (**) 1,22 57,39 (**) 1,19 46,71 (**) 1,19 16,41 (**) 1,26 62,27 (**) 1,19 51,42 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles -0,24 -42,57 (**) -0,26 -42,80 (**) 1,22 55,39 (**) 1,21 46,31 (**) 1,23 55,42 (**) 1,21 46,31 (**) 1,19 14,86 (**) 1,32 67,47 (**) 1,22 53,98 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering -0,17 -27,82 (**) -0,19 -28,98 (**) 1,16 38,97 (**) 1,11 22,98 (**) 1,13 30,56 (**) 1,11 22,98 (**) 1,09 7,05 (**) 1,27 48,09 (**) 1,11 27,47 (**) 





OLS Cens. Norm. Reg. Unstratified 1 Stratified 1 Stratified 2 Full Stratified Random Sample Instrumental Var Log 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT -0,01 -0,86   -0,01 -0,77 1,01 0,86 0,99 -0,86 0,99 -1,13 0,99 -0,86 1,02 0,49 1,12 10,81 (**) 0,97 -3,12 (**) 
AU 0,87 44,66 (**) 1,00 47,00 (**) 0,54 -46,09 (**) 0,54 -50,35 (**) 0,54 -46,10 (**) 0,54 -50,35 (**) 0,54 -14,88 (**) 0,45 -57,49 (**) 0,56 -43,96 (**) 
BE 0,15 9,27 (**) 0,15 8,65 (**) 0,86 -14,89 (**) 0,84 -14,02 (**) 0,84 -16,90 (**) 0,84 -14,02 (**) 0,84 -5,12 (**) 0,81 -20,08 (**) 0,84 -16,25 (**) 
CA 0,20 12,99 (**) 0,20 11,92 (**) 0,83 -17,78 (**) 0,80 -20,58 (**) 0,81 -20,97 (**) 0,80 -20,58 (**) 0,80 -6,83 (**) 0,65 -38,54 (**) 0,82 -19,04 (**) 
CH 0,07 7,76 (**) 0,08 7,64 (**) 0,92 -13,77 (**) 0,90 -14,43 (**) 0,90 -17,44 (**) 0,90 -14,43 (**) 0,91 -5,12 (**) 0,80 -34,77 (**) 0,90 -17,53 (**) 
DE 0,03 5,53 (**) 0,03 4,88 (**) 0,95 -12,84 (**) 0,93 -14,67 (**) 0,93 -17,23 (**) 0,93 -14,67 (**) 0,92 -6,20 (**) 1,02 5,32 (**) 0,92 -21,53 (**) 
DK 0,30 14,27 (**) 0,30 13,59 (**) 0,78 -18,15 (**) 0,76 -17,66 (**) 0,77 -19,27 (**) 0,76 -17,66 (**) 0,72 -7,25 (**) 0,73 -22,58 (**) 0,76 -20,00 (**) 
ES 0,14 6,06 (**) 0,14 5,55 (**) 0,88 -8,50 (**) 0,80 -14,02 (**) 0,79 -15,09 (**) 0,80 -14,02 (**) 0,81 -4,40 (**) 0,97 -1,96 0,78 -16,13 (**) 
FI 0,68 38,06 (**) 0,74 38,19 (**) 0,64 -36,79 (**) 0,64 -41,99 (**) 0,64 -37,04 (**) 0,64 -41,99 (**) 0,66 -10,72 (**) 0,65 -35,74 (**) 0,63 -37,69 (**) 
GB 0,10 12,86 (**) 0,10 12,04 (**) 0,86 -27,83 (**) 0,83 -30,84 (**) 0,82 -37,17 (**) 0,83 -30,84 (**) 0,83 -11,47 (**) 0,78 -45,48 (**) 0,83 -35,54 (**) 
IL 0,30 12,35 (**) 0,33 12,45 (**) 0,76 -16,83 (**) 0,74 -16,89 (**) 0,75 -17,56 (**) 0,74 -16,89 (**) 0,68 -7,25 (**) 0,62 -27,92 (**) 0,76 -16,28 (**) 
IT 0,20 20,06 (**) 0,20 19,26 (**) 0,84 -27,43 (**) 0,81 -30,15 (**) 0,81 -34,50 (**) 0,81 -30,15 (**) 0,79 -11,70 (**) 0,90 -15,33 (**) 0,82 -31,91 (**) 
JP 0,73 111,12 (**) 0,78 110,43 (**) 0,61 -116,26 (**) 0,60 -103,37 (**) 0,60 -112,25 (**) 0,60 -103,37 (**) 0,60 -37,11 (**) 0,44 -89,30 (**) 0,59 -121,46 (**) 
KR 0,50 20,88 (**) 0,61 23,39 (**) 0,67 -23,85 (**) 0,68 -25,21 (**) 0,68 -22,78 (**) 0,68 -25,21 (**) 0,67 -7,63 (**) 0,56 -33,43 (**) 0,69 -21,97 (**) 
NL 0,18 18,50 (**) 0,20 19,90 (**) 0,86 -25,03 (**) 0,85 -22,75 (**) 0,85 -26,56 (**) 0,85 -22,75 (**) 0,85 -8,10 (**) 0,79 -36,00 (**) 0,83 -29,70 (**) 
SE 0,28 23,33 (**) 0,29 22,68 (**) 0,79 -30,50 (**) 0,75 -33,22 (**) 0,75 -36,57 (**) 0,75 -33,22 (**) 0,74 -12,34 (**) 0,74 -38,00 (**) 0,77 -33,73 (**) 
US 0,52 42,00 (**) 0,56 42,28 (**) 0,69 -45,77 (**) 0,69 -44,57 (**) 0,69 -45,57 (**) 0,69 -44,57 (**) 0,69 -14,55 (**) 0,59 -56,98 (**) 0,69 -45,61 (**) 
RoW 0,52 86,31 (**) 0,55 84,38 (**) 0,69 -94,18 (**) 0,66 -89,86 (**) 0,66 -103,67 (**) 0,66 -89,86 (**) 0,65 -33,92 (**) 0,47 -98,48 (**) 0,67 -100,09 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990)
1980 -0,70 -51,04 (**) -0,67 -47,37 (**) 1,65 58,46 (**) 1,82 44,85 (**) 1,85 71,69 (**) 1,82 44,85 (**) 1,89 23,08 (**) 1,88 72,57 (**) 1,81 69,46 (**) 
1981 -0,55 -43,50 (**) -0,52 -39,65 (**) 1,45 47,28 (**) 1,56 39,61 (**) 1,58 58,43 (**) 1,56 39,61 (**) 1,52 16,90 (**) 1,62 60,73 (**) 1,53 54,26 (**) 
1982 -0,39 -32,57 (**) -0,36 -29,11 (**) 1,26 30,96 (**) 1,34 30,47 (**) 1,36 41,27 (**) 1,34 30,47 (**) 1,36 13,16 (**) 1,40 44,55 (**) 1,32 36,84 (**) 
1983 -0,20 -16,94 (**) -0,17 -14,32 (**) 1,08 10,86 (**) 1,12 12,94 (**) 1,14 18,10 (**) 1,12 12,94 (**) 1,17 6,76 (**) 1,18 22,22 (**) 1,10 13,53 (**) 
1984 -0,02 -1,85   0,00 0,14 0,97 -4,89 (**) 0,99 -0,84 1,01 1,22 0,99 -0,84 1,00 0,05 1,01 0,88 0,98 -3,68 (**) 
1985 0,12 11,25 (**) 0,14 12,19 (**) 0,89 -16,85 (**) 0,90 -14,74 (**) 0,91 -14,15 (**) 0,90 -14,74 (**) 0,91 -4,26 (**) 0,89 -16,39 (**) 0,88 -18,17 (**) 
1986 0,13 11,91 (**) 0,14 12,76 (**) 0,90 -15,76 (**) 0,90 -14,21 (**) 0,91 -13,93 (**) 0,90 -14,21 (**) 0,90 -5,21 (**) 0,90 -15,69 (**) 0,90 -16,72 (**) 
1987 0,19 18,05 (**) 0,20 18,16 (**) 0,87 -20,89 (**) 0,87 -20,14 (**) 0,88 -20,77 (**) 0,87 -20,14 (**) 0,90 -5,44 (**) 0,87 -21,89 (**) 0,87 -21,69 (**) 
1988 0,18 17,67 (**) 0,19 17,64 (**) 0,89 -19,30 (**) 0,89 -18,40 (**) 0,89 -19,19 (**) 0,89 -18,40 (**) 0,90 -5,29 (**) 0,88 -21,09 (**) 0,89 -19,50 (**) 
1989 0,15 15,52 (**) 0,15 15,10 (**) 0,91 -16,23 (**) 0,91 -14,72 (**) 0,91 -15,43 (**) 0,91 -14,72 (**) 0,93 -3,60 (**) 0,90 -17,40 (**) 0,91 -15,49 (**) 
1991 -0,08 -8,75 (**) -0,09 -8,98 (**) 1,04 7,18 (**) 1,03 4,14 (**) 1,03 4,77 (**) 1,03 4,14 (**) 1,04 2,09 (*) 1,03 4,84 (**) 1,03 4,44 (**) 
1992 -0,08 -8,09 (**) -0,08 -8,43 (**) 1,01 1,93 1,03 4,27 (**) 1,03 5,05 (**) 1,03 4,27 (**) 1,02 1,04 1,02 3,62 (**) 1,03 5,75 (**) 
1993 -0,02 -2,64 (**) -0,04 -3,83 (**) 0,97 -4,94 (**) 0,96 -6,63 (**) 0,96 -7,34 (**) 0,96 -6,63 (**) 0,97 -1,81 0,95 -8,48 (**) 0,96 -6,60 (**) 
1994 0,11 11,88 (**) 0,10 9,91 (**) 0,87 -23,93 (**) 0,86 -22,76 (**) 0,86 -25,52 (**) 0,86 -22,76 (**) 0,86 -7,90 (**) 0,85 -27,29 (**) 0,87 -23,21 (**) 
1995 0,32 34,37 (**) 0,31 31,62 (**) 0,75 -50,52 (**) 0,75 -44,33 (**) 0,75 -48,30 (**) 0,75 -44,33 (**) 0,77 -13,92 (**) 0,74 -50,72 (**) 0,77 -44,15 (**) 
1996 0,54 59,74 (**) 0,56 57,81 (**) 0,63 -79,21 (**) 0,68 -64,29 (**) 0,68 -66,65 (**) 0,68 -64,29 (**) 0,68 -20,98 (**) 0,67 -67,52 (**) 0,71 -60,00 (**) 
1997 0,66 74,55 (**) 0,73 76,56 (**) 0,56 -101,62 (**) 0,66 -71,39 (**) 0,66 -71,77 (**) 0,66 -71,39 (**) 0,67 -22,65 (**) 0,66 -69,97 (**) 0,72 -58,46 (**) 
1998 0,58 66,50 (**) 0,73 77,99 (**) 0,54 -110,52 (**) 0,74 -54,13 (**) 0,74 -53,57 (**) 0,74 -54,13 (**) 0,75 -15,91 (**) 0,75 -47,92 (**) 0,85 -28,66 (**) 
1999 0,30 34,65 (**) 0,57 61,62 (**) 0,54 -107,18 (**) 0,94 -11,12 (**) 0,94 -10,84 (**) 0,94 -11,12 (**) 0,95 -2,96 (**) 0,95 -7,28 (**) 1,19 30,29 (**) 
2000 -0,05 -5,29 (**) 0,42 45,22 (**) 0,57 -98,11 (**) 1,29 44,29 (**) 1,29 44,14 (**) 1,29 44,29 (**) 1,29 13,82 (**) 1,42 44,34 (**) 1,90 107,34 (**) 
Model 
# Subjects 1134860 1134271 1134856 1134856 1130353 1134856 113481 1134976 1134267 
# Failures 0,31 1039047 1039618 1039618 1038298 1039618 103894 1039717 1039043 
Log likelihood -2121659 -13390381 -12279390 -12262008 -12279390 -987697 -12286400 -12042936 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 7.537 (0,00) 439.816 (0,00) 395.406 (0,00) 206.417 (0,00) 298.637 (0,00) 206.417 (0,00) 29.738 (0,00) 286.605 (0,00) 303.043 (0,00) 
Cox Regression Model by group of variables - Breslow method for ties - Stratified by decision unless otherwise specified (EPO Filings 1980-2000) 
  
Table A6.13 – Estimates of the likelihood to be pending for at least 10 years 
OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Instrumental Vars Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Filing routes 
RTE_ACCSRC 0,00 12,53 (**) 0,17 6,13 (**) 0,15 5,40 (**) 0,17 6,49 (**) 0,18 6,69 (**) 0,36 17,50 (**)
RTE_PCT 0,00 7,21 (**) 0,13 10,26 (**) 0,12 9,40 (**) 0,14 11,20 (**) 0,32 18,63 (**) -0,07 -7,42 (**)
RTE_LEGREP   -0,02 -0,98   
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 0,00 33,98 (**) 0,01 17,07 (**) 0,01 17,76 (**) 0,01 22,28 (**) 0,01 3,14 (**) 0,01 32,39 (**)
DRF_PAGES_DESC   0,00 7,49 (**)   
DRF_PAGES_DRAW   0,17 12,79 (**)   
DRF_PRIO 0,00 4,88 (**) 0,02 4,24 (**) 0,02 4,00 (**) 0,02 5,85 (**) 0,01 2,06 (*) 0,03 8,66 (**)
DRF_EQUIV 0,00 38,14 (**) 0,15 19,46 (**) 0,15 29,94 (**) 0,16 31,15 (**) 0,16 30,65 (**) 0,20 42,55 (**)
DRF_HASDIV 0,00 50,82 (**) 0,61 34,51 (**) 0,61 35,75 (**) 0,64 38,33 (**) 0,60 21,66 (**) 0,64 39,40 (**)
DRF_ISDIV 0,00 363,69 (**) 2,09 150,93 (**) 2,06 146,52 (**) 2,10 153,44 (**) 2,06 136,02 (**) 2,08 168,93 (**)
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 0,00 9,24 (**) 0,19 16,08 (**) 0,20 16,88 (**) -2,91 -25,12 (**) 0,32 35,31 (**)
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,00 24,16 (**) 0,04 11,52 (**) 0,04 12,69 (**) 0,07 2,59 (*) 0,04 15,97 (**)
IMP_DSTATES_B10   -0,02 -10,50 (**)   
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 0,00 2,79 (**) 0,01 6,49 (**) 0,01 7,50 (**) 0,01 7,17 (**) 0,01 6,48 (**) 0,02 13,86 (**)
CMP_NPC 0,00 58,81 (**) 0,04 12,24 (**) 0,04 25,33 (**) 0,05 27,85 (**) 0,05 27,03 (**) 0,05 33,27 (**)
CMP_INV 0,00 6,81 (**) 0,01 5,48 (**) 0,01 4,84 (**) 0,02 7,05 (**) 0,02 7,05 (**) 0,06 30,18 (**)
CMP_IPC4 0,00 11,97 (**) 0,05 8,96 (**) 0,05 9,36 (**) 0,06 10,76 (**) 0,06 8,61 (**) 0,11 23,89 (**)
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE 0,00 0,47   -0,02 -1,00 -0,03 -1,42 -0,03 -1,43 -0,08 -3,94 (**) -0,04 -2,77 (**) 
APP_CUMUL 0,00 -8,28 (**) 0,00 -4,61 (**) 0,00 -5,41 (**) 0,00 -3,86 (**) 0,00 13,28 (**) 0,00 -21,20 (**) 
APP_OCCAS 0,00 16,45 (**) 0,20 14,56 (**) 0,21 15,04 (**) 0,18 13,06 (**) -0,30 -12,74 (**) 0,00 -0,41 
APP_CBOWN 0,00 5,69 (**) 0,10 5,88 (**) 0,10 6,17 (**) 0,10 6,08 (**) 0,07 4,19 (**) 0,09 6,60 (**) 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 0,00 -9,87 (**) -0,13 -7,63 (**) -0,14 -8,03 (**) -0,14 -8,04 (**) -0,12 -6,77 (**) -0,12 -8,99 (**) -0,09 -5,74 (**) -0,12 -8,99 (**) -0,20 -13,46 (**) -0,14 -10,43 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,00 -0,20   0,05 3,00 (**) 0,09 5,44 (**) 0,06 3,38 (**) 0,16 8,85 (**) 0,01 0,63 0,07 4,83 (**) -0,01 -0,58 -0,05 -3,63 (**) 0,01 0,86 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,00 46,82 (**) 0,47 32,29 (**) 0,50 33,66 (**) 0,49 34,05 (**) 0,49 27,57 (**) 0,60 54,26 (**) 0,57 45,34 (**) 0,56 51,01 (**) 0,47 39,43 (**) 0,56 51,22 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,00 25,36 (**) 0,49 24,65 (**) 0,44 20,76 (**) 0,50 24,59 (**) 0,23 9,76 (**) 0,38 22,12 (**) 0,46 23,90 (**) 0,38 22,07 (**) 0,40 22,14 (**) 0,42 24,61 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,00 5,95 (**) 0,12 6,01 (**) 0,06 2,97 (**) 0,13 6,36 (**) 0,19 9,16 (**) 0,22 13,96 (**) 0,11 5,72 (**) 0,21 13,56 (**) 0,24 14,47 (**) 0,25 16,04 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,00 -8,03 (**) -0,11 -5,41 (**) -0,16 -8,16 (**) -0,11 -5,80 (**) -0,09 -4,84 (**) -0,04 -2,73 (**) -0,12 -6,58 (**) -0,04 -2,47 (*) -0,04 -2,39 (*) -0,02 -1,54 
JC-08 - Electricity 0,00 4,25 (**) 0,13 7,77 (**) 0,07 3,88 (**) 0,12 7,35 (**) 0,11 6,99 (**) 0,02 1,35 0,07 4,50 (**) 0,03 2,11 (*) 0,05 3,29 (**) 0,04 3,18 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,00 10,56 (**) 0,26 12,38 (**) 0,19 8,81 (**) 0,25 11,89 (**) 0,06 2,60 (**) 0,20 12,03 (**) 0,22 11,20 (**) 0,23 13,53 (**) 0,21 11,81 (**) 0,26 15,21 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,00 -13,62 (**) -0,10 -6,66 (**) -0,17 -10,63 (**) -0,11 -7,48 (**) -0,07 -4,45 (**) -0,15 -12,53 (**) -0,16 -11,45 (**) -0,14 -11,02 (**) -0,10 -7,59 (**) -0,14 -11,69 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 0,00 -10,86 (**) -0,33 -14,49 (**) -0,38 -17,18 (**) -0,35 -16,36 (**) -0,51 -21,98 (**) -0,25 -16,02 (**) -0,29 -15,85 (**) -0,21 -13,69 (**) -0,26 -15,06 (**) -0,27 -17,58 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles 0,00 -6,98 (**) -0,36 -12,47 (**) -0,42 -15,19 (**) -0,38 -13,91 (**) -0,56 -19,62 (**) -0,34 -17,13 (**) -0,34 -14,56 (**) -0,30 -15,11 (**) -0,33 -14,85 (**) -0,37 -18,45 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 0,00 -8,46 (**) -0,35 -11,87 (**) -0,41 -14,52 (**) -0,39 -14,10 (**) -0,75 -23,55 (**) -0,31 -15,48 (**) -0,34 -14,25 (**) -0,25 -12,16 (**) -0,32 -14,01 (**) -0,33 -16,55 (**) 




OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Instrumental Vars Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT 0,00 -0,14   -0,10 -1,36 -0,07 -1,04 -0,11 -1,67 -0,43 -6,25 (**) 0,06 1,27 0,04 0,69 0,09 1,86 -0,02 -0,32 0,04 0,82 
AU 0,00 3,40 (**) 0,27 5,66 (**) 0,26 5,24 (**) 0,28 5,77 (**) 0,52 10,15 (**) 0,52 12,94 (**) 0,37 8,14 (**) 0,47 11,67 (**) 0,47 10,93 (**) 0,49 12,08 (**) 
BE 0,00 1,38   0,15 2,83 (**) 0,14 2,72 (**) 0,15 2,93 (**) 0,13 2,62 (**) 0,31 8,12 (**) 0,22 5,09 (**) 0,32 8,11 (**) 0,28 6,51 (**) 0,29 7,53 (**) 
CA 0,00 -2,55 (*) -0,02 -0,47 -0,04 -0,83 0,01 0,13 0,25 4,77 (**) 0,25 6,41 (**) 0,03 0,60 0,21 5,19 (**) 0,28 6,89 (**) 0,22 5,57 (**) 
CH 0,00 -1,47   -0,01 -0,23 0,01 0,20 0,01 0,37 0,23 6,46 (**) 0,04 1,52 -0,03 -1,03 0,01 0,42 0,10 3,45 (**) 0,02 0,82 
DE 0,00 0,76   -0,03 -1,21 -0,02 -0,89 -0,04 -1,71 -0,28 -10,80 (**) 0,01 0,51 0,04 1,91 0,03 1,51 -0,08 -4,24 (**) 0,05 2,97 (**) 
DK 0,00 3,85 (**) 0,18 3,28 (**) 0,17 2,96 (**) 0,20 3,51 (**) 0,24 4,25 (**) 0,33 7,50 (**) 0,19 3,61 (**) 0,29 6,52 (**) 0,38 7,62 (**) 0,30 6,81 (**) 
ES 0,00 -1,26   -0,27 -2,09 (*) -0,25 -1,97 (*) -0,30 -2,40 (*) -0,61 -4,81 (**) -0,37 -3,63 (**) -0,32 -2,63 (**) -0,31 -2,99 (**) -0,29 -2,63 (**) -0,39 -3,75 (**) 
FI 0,00 -1,90   -0,04 -0,67 -0,04 -0,58 -0,02 -0,31 -0,05 -0,74 -0,01 -0,19 -0,05 -0,80 -0,05 -0,97 0,07 1,27 -0,06 -1,12 
GB 0,00 -3,58 (**) 0,02 0,78 0,03 1,17 0,04 1,35 0,06 2,32 (*) 0,20 9,92 (**) 0,09 3,73 (**) 0,18 8,63 (**) 0,19 8,70 (**) 0,17 8,45 (**) 
IL 0,00 0,47   0,11 1,57 0,10 1,36 0,12 1,70 0,27 3,68 (**) 0,23 3,94 (**) 0,14 2,01 (*) 0,24 3,96 (**) 0,25 3,94 (**) 0,23 3,79 (**) 
IT 0,00 -0,71   -0,07 -1,62 -0,05 -1,32 -0,08 -2,00 (*) -0,40 -9,30 (**) -0,14 -4,20 (**) -0,06 -1,74 -0,09 -2,81 (**) -0,12 -3,33 (**) -0,14 -4,25 (**) 
JP 0,00 -7,37 (**) 0,06 2,78 (**) 0,01 0,25 0,10 4,69 (**) 1,07 23,55 (**) 0,34 20,78 (**) 0,04 2,22 (*) 0,26 15,25 (**) 0,32 17,76 (**) 0,39 22,82 (**) 
KR 0,00 -1,17   0,07 0,78 -0,05 -0,50 0,10 1,12 0,77 8,39 (**) 0,12 1,63 0,06 0,73 0,08 1,09 0,15 1,98 (*) 0,08 1,12 
NL 0,00 -1,46   0,00 -0,03 -0,01 -0,20 0,01 0,39 0,28 8,19 (**) 0,05 2,02 (*) 0,00 -0,04 0,02 0,65 0,08 2,98 (**) 0,08 2,95 (**) 
SE 0,00 -2,36 (*) -0,05 -1,26 -0,06 -1,32 -0,05 -1,09 -0,06 -1,30 0,13 4,00 (**) 0,02 0,39 0,14 4,08 (**) 0,14 3,96 (**) 0,09 2,71 (**) 
US 0,00 2,45 (*) 0,09 2,04 (*) 0,09 2,13 (*) 0,12 2,95 (**) 0,62 13,30 (**) 0,22 6,74 (**) 0,15 4,10 (**) 0,14 4,38 (**) 0,27 7,35 (**) 0,17 5,27 (**) 
RoW 0,00 -1,09   0,11 5,77 (**) 0,10 4,52 (**) 0,16 7,70 (**) 0,76 21,38 (**) 0,40 25,59 (**) 0,12 6,79 (**) 0,31 19,64 (**) 0,40 23,69 (**) 0,41 25,51 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990)
1980 0,00 0,21   -0,24 -4,16 (**) -0,27 -4,84 (**) -0,25 -4,54 (**) -0,19 -3,43 (**) -0,64 -12,66 (**) -0,39 -7,50 (**) -0,63 -12,40 (**) -0,53 -10,16 (**) -0,66 -13,11 (**) 
1981 0,00 2,27 (*) -0,08 -1,95 -0,10 -2,42 (*) -0,09 -2,20 (*) -0,08 -1,84 -0,43 -11,76 (**) -0,22 -5,61 (**) -0,41 -11,33 (**) -0,34 -8,82 (**) -0,45 -12,26 (**) 
1982 0,00 1,10   -0,17 -4,08 (**) -0,20 -4,64 (**) -0,18 -4,19 (**) -0,20 -4,56 (**) -0,47 -13,28 (**) -0,27 -6,89 (**) -0,45 -12,87 (**) -0,42 -10,82 (**) -0,48 -13,72 (**) 
1983 0,00 3,47 (**) 0,01 0,31 -0,01 -0,22 0,00 0,05 -0,03 -0,96 -0,27 -9,68 (**) -0,08 -2,52 (*) -0,25 -9,11 (**) -0,22 -7,24 (**) -0,28 -10,11 (**) 
1984 0,00 3,19 (**) -0,01 -0,46 -0,03 -0,92 -0,02 -0,48 0,03 0,88 -0,27 -10,44 (**) -0,11 -3,66 (**) -0,27 -10,17 (**) -0,20 -7,27 (**) -0,28 -10,77 (**) 
1985 0,00 0,98   -0,08 -2,68 (**) -0,10 -2,94 (**) -0,08 -2,53 (*) 0,00 -0,06 -0,31 -12,08 (**) -0,20 -6,56 (**) -0,32 -12,09 (**) -0,23 -8,35 (**) -0,32 -12,49 (**) 
1986 0,00 0,38   -0,09 -3,03 (**) -0,10 -3,09 (**) -0,09 -2,84 (**) -0,01 -0,31 -0,29 -11,73 (**) -0,19 -6,70 (**) -0,29 -11,75 (**) -0,21 -7,92 (**) -0,30 -12,07 (**) 
1987 0,00 -1,93   -0,10 -3,55 (**) -0,10 -3,52 (**) -0,10 -3,47 (**) -0,04 -1,19 -0,19 -8,40 (**) -0,09 -3,64 (**) -0,18 -8,04 (**) -0,18 -7,41 (**) -0,19 -8,42 (**) 
1988 0,00 -2,01 (*) -0,06 -2,32 (*) -0,06 -2,19 (*) -0,06 -2,25 (*) 0,01 0,24 -0,07 -3,53 (**) 0,02 1,08 -0,06 -2,96 (**) -0,12 -5,22 (**) -0,06 -3,25 (**) 
1989 0,00 1,58   0,06 2,34 (*) 0,06 2,25 (*) 0,05 2,24 (*) 0,10 3,91 (**) 0,10 5,82 (**) 0,17 8,37 (**) 0,11 6,24 (**) 0,02 0,92 0,11 5,94 (**) 
1991 0,00 2,48 (*) 0,07 3,33 (**) 0,07 2,85 (**) 0,07 3,22 (**) 0,07 2,82 (**) 0,07 3,86 (**) 0,04 1,78 0,06 3,53 (**) 0,09 4,91 (**) 0,07 3,80 (**) 
1992 0,00 8,98 (**) 0,21 10,06 (**) 0,20 9,20 (**) 0,22 9,94 (**) 0,23 10,57 (**) 0,22 12,84 (**) 0,17 8,70 (**) 0,20 12,02 (**) 0,23 12,75 (**) 0,21 12,81 (**) 
1993 0,00 2,57 (*) 0,11 5,28 (**) 0,10 4,51 (**) 0,11 5,17 (**) 0,11 4,84 (**) 0,21 12,32 (**) 0,11 5,45 (**) 0,19 11,41 (**) 0,18 9,93 (**) 0,20 12,07 (**) 
1994 0,00 7,08 (**) 0,20 9,65 (**) 0,18 8,21 (**) 0,20 9,58 (**) 0,20 9,31 (**) 0,29 17,49 (**) 0,20 10,42 (**) 0,27 16,38 (**) 0,25 14,40 (**) 0,28 17,04 (**) 
1995 0,00 16,81 (**) 0,34 16,57 (**) 0,31 14,87 (**) 0,34 16,57 (**) 0,34 16,32 (**) 0,42 26,92 (**) 0,35 19,14 (**) 0,40 25,52 (**) 0,36 21,33 (**) 0,41 25,98 (**) 
Model 
# Observations 704758 704758 703723 704762 704781 744435 744414 743856 704787 744426 
Adjusted/Pseudo R² 0,20 0,37 0,36 0,37 0,37 0,12 0,34 0,13 0,15 0,12 
F (P>F) / LR chi² (P>chi²) 2.756 (0,00) 36.914 (0,00) 45.764 (0,00) 47.414 (0,00) 47.618 (0,00) 16.938 (0,00) 48.666 (0,00) 18.291 (0,00) 19.611 (0,00) 17.134 (0,00) 




Table A6.14 – Estimates of the likelihood to be pending for at least 10 years (v. Random sample) 
OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Instrumental Vars Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Filing routes 
RTE_ACCSRC 0,00 1,50   0,24 3,44 (**) 0,24 3,55 (**) 0,25 3,61 (**) 0,25 3,69 (**) 0,49 9,57 (**)
RTE_PCT 0,00 17,26 (**) 0,25 9,08 (**) 0,22 7,61 (**) 0,27 9,89 (**) 0,54 13,88 (**) 0,02 1,03
RTE_LEGREP   0,01 0,31   
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 0,00 10,96 (**) 0,01 10,71 (**) 0,01 9,17 (**) 0,01 12,26 (**) 0,02 2,01 (*) 0,02 19,41 (**)
DRF_PAGES_DESC   0,00 6,91 (**)   
DRF_PAGES_DRAW   0,15 5,03 (**)   
DRF_PRIO 0,00 2,50 (*) 0,00 0,30 0,00 -0,49 0,02 1,76 0,00 0,29   0,03 3,03 (**)
DRF_EQUIV 0,00 29,01 (**) 0,39 24,07 (**) 0,37 22,78 (**) 0,39 24,28 (**) 0,37 22,88 (**) 0,53 33,93 (**)
DRF_HASDIV 0,00 30,55 (**) 0,95 21,82 (**) 0,97 22,13 (**) 0,99 22,87 (**) 0,91 13,81 (**) 0,92 22,13 (**)
DRF_ISDIV 0,00 97,64 (**) 2,56 64,44 (**) 2,56 63,82 (**) 2,57 65,04 (**) 2,51 58,96 (**) 2,50 66,76 (**)
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 0,00 12,73 (**) 0,28 11,21 (**) 0,28 11,42 (**) -4,06 -16,13 (**) 0,49 25,41 (**)
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,00 13,35 (**) 0,08 10,38 (**) 0,08 9,93 (**) 0,06 0,82   0,06 8,80 (**)
IMP_DSTATES_B10   -0,04 -9,88 (**)   
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 0,00 6,86 (**) 0,02 5,86 (**) 0,02 6,26 (**) 0,02 6,08 (**) 0,02 5,65 (**) 0,03 10,47 (**)
CMP_NPC 0,00 15,58 (**) 0,08 15,77 (**) 0,08 14,93 (**) 0,08 16,44 (**) 0,08 16,12 (**) 0,07 16,85 (**)
CMP_INV 0,00 3,79 (**) 0,02 3,15 (**) 0,01 2,16 (*) 0,03 4,70 (**) 0,04 5,01 (**) 0,09 18,38 (**)
CMP_IPC4 0,00 5,54 (**) 0,06 4,79 (**) 0,06 5,02 (**) 0,08 6,14 (**) 0,09 5,71 (**) 0,15 14,54 (**)
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE 0,00 -0,99   -0,03 -0,68 -0,03 -0,74 -0,05 -1,04 -0,10 -2,30 (*) -0,09 -2,60 (**) 
APP_CUMUL 0,00 -2,45 (*) 0,00 -2,47 (*) 0,00 -2,87 (**) 0,00 -1,89 0,00 8,97 (**) 0,00 -14,26 (**) 
APP_OCCAS 0,00 8,26 (**) 0,26 8,73 (**) 0,29 9,59 (**) 0,22 7,47 (**) -0,43 -8,50 (**) -0,05 -2,20 (*) 
APP_CBOWN 0,00 4,16 (**) 0,13 3,53 (**) 0,14 3,74 (**) 0,14 3,67 (**) 0,09 2,46 (*) 0,14 4,80 (**) 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 0,00 -5,99 (**) -0,17 -4,66 (**) -0,16 -4,29 (**) -0,18 -4,97 (**) -0,16 -4,44 (**) -0,15 -5,42 (**) -0,10 -3,18 (**) -0,14 -5,14 (**) -0,27 -8,86 (**) -0,17 -5,97 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,00 3,26 (**) 0,12 3,41 (**) 0,17 4,68 (**) 0,12 3,50 (**) 0,27 7,04 (**) 0,04 1,30 0,15 4,71 (**) 0,02 0,67 -0,06 -1,94 0,04 1,56 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,00 19,70 (**) 0,52 15,52 (**) 0,57 16,56 (**) 0,56 16,73 (**) 0,57 13,34 (**) 0,80 31,89 (**) 0,75 25,70 (**) 0,75 29,47 (**) 0,63 22,41 (**) 0,78 30,73 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,00 17,78 (**) 0,75 15,18 (**) 0,70 13,88 (**) 0,75 15,34 (**) 0,37 6,63 (**) 0,51 12,65 (**) 0,68 14,69 (**) 0,52 12,71 (**) 0,55 12,93 (**) 0,58 14,16 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,00 6,08 (**) 0,22 4,73 (**) 0,15 3,18 (**) 0,22 4,77 (**) 0,31 6,34 (**) 0,35 9,69 (**) 0,18 4,21 (**) 0,34 9,34 (**) 0,39 10,27 (**) 0,39 10,62 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,00 -3,42 (**) -0,15 -3,67 (**) -0,20 -4,96 (**) -0,16 -4,04 (**) -0,14 -3,53 (**) -0,08 -2,45 (*) -0,17 -4,61 (**) -0,07 -2,21 (*) -0,09 -2,71 (**) -0,06 -1,87 
JC-08 - Electricity 0,00 8,65 (**) 0,27 7,83 (**) 0,22 5,95 (**) 0,26 7,50 (**) 0,25 7,22 (**) 0,07 2,38 (*) 0,19 5,74 (**) 0,07 2,49 (*) 0,11 3,58 (**) 0,10 3,67 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,00 9,24 (**) 0,40 8,13 (**) 0,32 6,39 (**) 0,38 7,85 (**) 0,12 2,24 (*) 0,33 8,52 (**) 0,34 7,27 (**) 0,36 9,21 (**) 0,35 8,40 (**) 0,39 10,01 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,00 -1,73   -0,05 -1,38 -0,11 -3,11 (**) -0,07 -2,18 (*) -0,03 -0,91   -0,14 -5,32 (**) -0,15 -4,81 (**) -0,13 -4,63 (**) -0,07 -2,58 (*) -0,13 -4,77 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 0,00 -10,50 (**) -0,40 -9,49 (**) -0,43 -10,04 (**) -0,42 -10,25 (**) -0,66 -14,47 (**) -0,32 -10,44 (**) -0,34 -9,52 (**) -0,28 -8,91 (**) -0,36 -10,58 (**) -0,35 -11,29 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles 0,00 -9,58 (**) -0,43 -8,43 (**) -0,50 -9,49 (**) -0,47 -9,25 (**) -0,73 -13,24 (**) -0,48 -12,73 (**) -0,43 -9,77 (**) -0,42 -11,08 (**) -0,49 -11,53 (**) -0,51 -13,50 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 0,00 -9,78 (**) -0,47 -8,99 (**) -0,52 -9,68 (**) -0,54 -10,41 (**) -1,05 -16,78 (**) -0,46 -12,02 (**) -0,46 -10,20 (**) -0,35 -9,01 (**) -0,49 -11,26 (**) -0,47 -12,26 (**) 
JC-14 - Human Necessities 0,00 -4,46 (**) -0,19 -4,91 (**) -0,22 -5,41 (**) -0,21 -5,42 (**) -0,44 -10,73 (**) -0,02 -0,78 -0,24 -7,09 (**) 0,03 0,92 0,08 2,52 (*) -0,03 -1,10 





OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Instrumental Vars Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT 0,00 -0,01   0,02 0,12 0,05 0,38 0,01 0,05 -0,43 -3,09 (**) 0,18 1,82 0,19 1,74 0,22 2,21 (*) 0,08 0,70 0,18 1,79 
AU 0,00 3,35 (**) 0,37 3,25 (**) 0,38 3,36 (**) 0,40 3,56 (**) 0,72 6,06 (**) 0,65 7,10 (**) 0,54 5,20 (**) 0,61 6,55 (**) 0,72 7,34 (**) 0,67 7,28 (**) 
BE 0,00 2,46 (*) 0,29 2,67 (**) 0,30 2,70 (**) 0,31 2,81 (**) 0,29 2,63 (**) 0,44 5,09 (**) 0,35 3,63 (**) 0,44 5,04 (**) 0,43 4,60 (**) 0,41 4,74 (**) 
CA 0,00 -1,29   -0,17 -1,56 -0,20 -1,85 -0,12 -1,11 0,22 1,96  0,26 3,05 (**) -0,10 -1,01 0,21 2,45 (*) 0,34 3,79 (**) 0,26 3,03 (**) 
CH 0,00 -0,51   0,01 0,08 0,04 0,50 0,04 0,57 0,35 4,71 (**) 0,04 0,66 -0,05 -0,75 -0,02 -0,40 0,13 2,14 (*) -0,01 -0,14 
DE 0,00 -0,68   0,00 -0,10 0,01 0,27 -0,02 -0,35 -0,34 -6,52 (**) 0,03 0,83 0,07 1,77 0,06 1,47 -0,10 -2,47 (*) 0,09 2,46 (*) 
DK 0,00 1,50   0,23 1,72 0,25 1,80 0,28 2,07 (*) 0,33 2,53 (*) 0,44 4,30 (**) 0,30 2,46 (*) 0,41 3,88 (**) 0,52 4,47 (**) 0,45 4,37 (**) 
ES 0,00 -1,43   -0,28 -1,21 -0,21 -0,91 -0,29 -1,23 -0,70 -2,99 (**) -0,55 -2,87 (**) -0,35 -1,59 -0,51 -2,60 (**) -0,38 -1,91 -0,55 -2,86 (**) 
FI 0,00 -0,43   -0,09 -0,64 -0,08 -0,53 -0,06 -0,42 -0,06 -0,45  -0,02 -0,21 -0,14 -1,03 -0,05 -0,44 0,18 1,42 -0,07 -0,65 
GB 0,00 2,35 (*) 0,15 2,58 (*) 0,16 2,75 (**) 0,17 3,08 (**) 0,21 3,62 (**) 0,33 7,61 (**) 0,21 4,19 (**) 0,31 7,01 (**) 0,36 7,48 (**) 0,33 7,32 (**) 
IL 0,00 1,73   0,16 0,91 0,14 0,78 0,18 1,06 0,39 2,24 (*) 0,42 3,04 (**) 0,17 1,05 0,42 2,99 (**) 0,48 3,30 (**) 0,43 3,10 (**) 
IT 0,00 0,24   0,03 0,34 0,04 0,51 0,01 0,07 -0,44 -5,10 (**) -0,13 -2,00 (*) -0,02 -0,23 -0,07 -1,12 -0,11 -1,48 -0,14 -2,15 (*) 
JP 0,00 4,96 (**) 0,18 3,65 (**) 0,08 1,57 0,25 5,35 (**) 1,62 16,43 (**) 0,58 15,75 (**) 0,17 3,87 (**) 0,41 11,05 (**) 0,56 14,06 (**) 0,63 16,92 (**) 
KR 0,00 0,75   0,05 0,23 -0,08 -0,40 0,10 0,53 1,04 5,18 (**) 0,25 1,55 0,03 0,15 0,15 0,91 0,37 2,20 (*) 0,19 1,16 
NL 0,00 -0,69   -0,06 -0,84 -0,05 -0,78 -0,02 -0,26 0,37 5,11 (**) 0,07 1,37 -0,01 -0,19 0,02 0,42 0,11 1,99 (*) 0,10 1,77 
SE 0,00 -1,28   -0,09 -0,96 -0,08 -0,83 -0,09 -0,99 -0,10 -1,07  0,18 2,56 (*) -0,02 -0,22 0,19 2,67 (**) 0,27 3,54 (**) 0,14 1,88 
US 0,00 1,82   0,26 2,78 (**) 0,26 2,82 (**) 0,31 3,36 (**) 0,99 9,72 (**) 0,31 4,45 (**) 0,30 3,73 (**) 0,24 3,44 (**) 0,48 6,06 (**) 0,30 4,22 (**) 
RoW 0,00 2,29 (*) 0,06 1,33 0,03 0,69 0,14 3,15 (**) 1,01 12,63 (**) 0,55 16,02 (**) 0,07 1,77 0,42 12,18 (**) 0,59 15,96 (**) 0,57 16,24 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990)
1980 0,00 -4,25 (**) -0,30 -3,07 (**) -0,37 -3,74 (**) -0,32 -3,32 (**) -0,26 -2,70 (**) -0,99 -11,31 (**) -0,58 -6,17 (**) -0,97 -10,97 (**) -0,80 -8,80 (**) -1,03 -11,74 (**) 
1981 0,00 -2,88 (**) -0,15 -1,78 -0,22 -2,60 (**) -0,16 -2,01 (*) -0,15 -1,81  -0,63 -9,29 (**) -0,37 -4,74 (**) -0,60 -8,76 (**) -0,51 -7,06 (**) -0,67 -9,90 (**) 
1982 0,00 -4,15 (**) -0,27 -3,36 (**) -0,36 -4,35 (**) -0,30 -3,67 (**) -0,34 -4,09 (**) -0,69 -10,52 (**) -0,43 -5,83 (**) -0,66 -10,02 (**) -0,63 -8,86 (**) -0,72 -11,04 (**) 
1983 0,00 -0,69   -0,02 -0,26 -0,08 -1,12 -0,03 -0,44 -0,11 -1,53  -0,35 -6,26 (**) -0,16 -2,40 (*) -0,33 -5,93 (**) -0,29 -4,73 (**) -0,38 -6,75 (**) 
1984 0,00 -1,04   -0,05 -0,70 -0,10 -1,52 -0,05 -0,78 -0,01 -0,19  -0,37 -7,10 (**) -0,20 -3,29 (**) -0,36 -6,83 (**) -0,26 -4,66 (**) -0,40 -7,57 (**) 
1985 0,00 -2,36 (*) -0,11 -1,67 -0,15 -2,25 (*) -0,12 -1,86 -0,04 -0,52  -0,44 -8,51 (**) -0,31 -5,02 (**) -0,43 -8,23 (**) -0,32 -5,62 (**) -0,47 -8,96 (**) 
1986 0,00 -3,42 (**) -0,20 -3,08 (**) -0,23 -3,50 (**) -0,20 -3,05 (**) -0,10 -1,60  -0,46 -9,37 (**) -0,36 -6,04 (**) -0,46 -9,30 (**) -0,33 -6,20 (**) -0,49 -9,88 (**) 
1987 0,00 -2,56 (*) -0,13 -2,08 (*) -0,13 -2,16 (*) -0,13 -2,06 (*) -0,05 -0,81  -0,24 -5,27 (**) -0,10 -1,93 -0,23 -5,06 (**) -0,27 -5,41 (**) -0,25 -5,54 (**) 
1988 0,00 -1,64   -0,06 -1,11 -0,07 -1,22 -0,06 -1,10 0,01 0,24  -0,08 -1,81 0,06 1,14 -0,06 -1,55 -0,19 -3,97 (**) -0,09 -2,10 (*) 
1989 0,00 1,65   0,09 1,77 0,08 1,43 0,09 1,74 0,14 2,58 (*) 0,21 5,35 (**) 0,27 5,94 (**) 0,22 5,67 (**) 0,05 1,24 0,20 5,31 (**) 
1991 0,00 1,97 (*) 0,08 1,54 0,06 1,24 0,08 1,51 0,05 0,95  0,05 1,26 0,04 0,93 0,05 1,38 0,11 2,69 (**) 0,06 1,46 
1992 0,00 8,88 (**) 0,38 7,87 (**) 0,34 6,97 (**) 0,38 7,96 (**) 0,39 7,97 (**) 0,32 8,63 (**) 0,31 6,97 (**) 0,31 8,29 (**) 0,37 9,37 (**) 0,32 8,66 (**) 
1993 0,00 5,61 (**) 0,21 4,37 (**) 0,19 3,86 (**) 0,21 4,35 (**) 0,19 3,88 (**) 0,27 7,21 (**) 0,23 5,20 (**) 0,27 7,22 (**) 0,26 6,63 (**) 0,27 7,20 (**) 
1994 0,00 8,83 (**) 0,34 7,22 (**) 0,31 6,49 (**) 0,34 7,29 (**) 0,34 7,06 (**) 0,34 9,37 (**) 0,36 8,32 (**) 0,35 9,53 (**) 0,33 8,50 (**) 0,35 9,56 (**) 
1995 0,00 15,74 (**) 0,59 12,87 (**) 0,55 11,91 (**) 0,59 12,87 (**) 0,58 12,39 (**) 0,53 15,04 (**) 0,62 15,10 (**) 0,54 15,33 (**) 0,50 13,27 (**) 0,52 14,96 (**) 
Model 
# Observations 26959 26959 26560 26960 26961 29388 29387 29372 26961 29388 
Adjusted/Pseudo R² 0,51 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,19 0,43 0,21 0,24 0,19 




Table A6.15 – Estimates of the number of communications 
OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Instrumental Vars Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Filing routes 
RTE_ACCSRC 0,00 18,90 (**) 0,08 17,88 (**) 0,08 22,02 (**) 0,04 9,95 (**) 0,04 11,27 (**) 0,06 15,10 (**)
RTE_PCT 0,00 14,75 (**) 0,02 15,27 (**) 0,03 20,95 (**) -0,05 -37,35 (**) -0,03 -14,60 (**) -0,04 -29,04 (**)
RTE_LEGREP   0,04 21,08 (**)   
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 0,00 27,94 (**) 0,00 24,05 (**) 0,00 36,24 (**) 0,00 47,43 (**) 0,00 -0,48   0,00 57,59 (**)
DRF_PAGES_DESC   0,00 -7,98 (**)   
DRF_PAGES_DRAW   -0,06 -41,44 (**)   
DRF_PRIO 0,00 14,02 (**) 0,01 5,30 (**) 0,01 13,20 (**) 0,01 13,61 (**) 0,02 20,83 (**) 0,01 19,69 (**)
DRF_EQUIV 0,00 -10,19 (**) -0,01 -8,75 (**) -0,01 -11,22 (**) 0,00 1,12 0,00 3,02 (**) 0,00 1,76
DRF_HASDIV 0,00 119,79 (**) 0,33 122,07 (**) 0,33 131,38 (**) 0,14 52,82 (**) 0,18 45,49 (**) 0,15 58,57 (**)
DRF_ISDIV 0,00 -11,52 (**) -0,05 -10,31 (**) -0,03 -9,16 (**) -0,05 -12,81 (**) -0,05 -12,90 (**) -0,03 -7,01 (**)
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 0,00 176,52 (**) 0,24 170,16 (**) 0,24 210,13 (**) 0,00 -0,16   0,01 8,34 (**)
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,00 61,56 (**) 0,03 35,73 (**) 0,03 66,43 (**) -0,11 -25,36 (**) 0,02 47,55 (**)
IMP_DSTATES_B10   0,00 -14,90 (**)   
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 0,00 33,83 (**) 0,01 31,05 (**) 0,01 38,23 (**) 0,01 39,92 (**) 0,01 51,74 (**) 0,01 50,58 (**)
CMP_NPC 0,00 16,36 (**) 0,00 11,61 (**) 0,01 17,96 (**) 0,01 37,13 (**) 0,01 45,13 (**) 0,01 42,78 (**)
CMP_INV 0,00 21,27 (**) 0,01 19,35 (**) 0,01 22,35 (**) 0,01 15,09 (**) 0,01 30,08 (**) 0,01 21,84 (**)
CMP_IPC4 0,00 11,33 (**) 0,01 10,71 (**) 0,01 11,02 (**) 0,02 22,54 (**) 0,03 35,75 (**) 0,02 27,84 (**)
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE 0,00 -6,40 (**) -0,02 -6,13 (**) -0,02 -6,92 (**) -0,02 -8,32 (**) -0,02 -8,21 (**) -0,01 -6,28 (**) 
APP_CUMUL 0,00 -14,78 (**) 0,00 -15,79 (**) 0,00 -13,91 (**) 0,00 -3,98 (**) 0,00 -4,13 (**) 0,00 -5,23 (**) 
APP_OCCAS 0,00 -12,60 (**) -0,03 -13,56 (**) -0,02 -14,94 (**) 0,03 17,36 (**) 0,03 11,34 (**) 0,02 12,37 (**) 
APP_CBOWN 0,00 20,48 (**) 0,04 20,04 (**) 0,04 22,29 (**) 0,00 1,11 0,00 0,64   0,00 0,28 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 0,00 26,82 (**) 0,05 25,80 (**) 0,05 31,70 (**) 0,01 8,08 (**) 0,01 4,37 (**) 0,03 18,01 (**) 0,03 16,83 (**) 0,03 17,15 (**) 0,01 6,41 (**) 0,03 16,86 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,00 20,54 (**) 0,04 19,75 (**) 0,03 14,22 (**) 0,04 20,06 (**) 0,05 25,17 (**) 0,05 26,14 (**) 0,05 25,10 (**) 0,04 23,54 (**) 0,04 18,77 (**) 0,05 26,39 (**) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,00 1,10   0,00 1,55 0,00 0,67 0,09 43,17 (**) 0,13 51,05 (**) 0,12 61,06 (**) 0,10 50,62 (**) 0,10 51,93 (**) 0,09 44,61 (**) 0,11 57,78 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,00 -46,47 (**) -0,16 -43,92 (**) -0,15 -47,73 (**) -0,09 -26,31 (**) -0,05 -14,54 (**) -0,09 -27,26 (**) -0,09 -27,45 (**) -0,09 -28,87 (**) -0,09 -26,41 (**) -0,08 -26,10 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,00 -24,63 (**) -0,08 -24,91 (**) -0,06 -23,48 (**) -0,05 -18,71 (**) -0,04 -15,03 (**) -0,04 -16,00 (**) -0,05 -18,49 (**) -0,04 -15,91 (**) -0,04 -15,83 (**) -0,04 -14,95 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,00 -22,26 (**) -0,05 -22,41 (**) -0,04 -18,99 (**) -0,04 -19,15 (**) -0,04 -20,38 (**) -0,04 -17,53 (**) -0,04 -17,21 (**) -0,04 -16,62 (**) -0,04 -19,04 (**) -0,04 -16,55 (**) 
JC-08 - Electricity 0,00 -50,96 (**) -0,11 -51,19 (**) -0,09 -50,71 (**) -0,08 -42,68 (**) -0,09 -46,99 (**) -0,08 -43,25 (**) -0,08 -41,69 (**) -0,08 -41,30 (**) -0,08 -42,92 (**) -0,08 -41,95 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,00 -20,40 (**) -0,07 -17,70 (**) -0,05 -18,23 (**) -0,01 -2,18 (*) 0,00 0,60   0,00 -0,83 0,00 -1,13 0,00 -0,34 0,00 -0,66 0,00 -0,05 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,00 -37,50 (**) -0,08 -36,70 (**) -0,07 -33,89 (**) -0,08 -41,18 (**) -0,10 -46,32 (**) -0,08 -40,34 (**) -0,08 -39,76 (**) -0,07 -37,43 (**) -0,08 -40,07 (**) -0,08 -39,79 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 0,00 -25,17 (**) -0,05 -25,69 (**) -0,03 -18,65 (**) -0,08 -41,22 (**) -0,09 -44,44 (**) -0,07 -39,57 (**) -0,07 -39,19 (**) -0,06 -36,52 (**) -0,07 -39,36 (**) -0,07 -40,49 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles 0,00 -19,99 (**) -0,04 -21,17 (**) -0,03 -14,46 (**) -0,09 -45,35 (**) -0,11 -47,79 (**) -0,09 -47,17 (**) -0,09 -44,26 (**) -0,09 -44,27 (**) -0,09 -45,63 (**) -0,09 -47,03 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 0,00 -13,55 (**) -0,03 -13,25 (**) -0,01 -6,26 (**) -0,08 -34,94 (**) -0,09 -33,78 (**) -0,07 -33,23 (**) -0,07 -31,66 (**) -0,06 -30,18 (**) -0,07 -34,23 (**) -0,07 -33,86 (**) 





OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Instrumental Vars Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT 0,00 -2,11 (*) -0,01 -2,06 (*) -0,01 -1,74 0,01 1,18 0,00 0,56   0,00 -0,52 -0,01 -1,09 0,00 -0,84 0,00 0,29 0,00 -0,78 
AU 0,00 -13,36 (**) -0,11 -11,31 (**) -0,11 -15,36 (**) 0,15 18,80 (**) 0,16 18,96 (**) 0,20 25,28 (**) 0,15 19,32 (**) 0,17 22,17 (**) 0,14 18,27 (**) 0,18 22,67 (**) 
BE 0,00 -7,94 (**) -0,05 -7,84 (**) -0,05 -8,78 (**) 0,05 8,52 (**) 0,06 9,84 (**) 0,05 9,23 (**) 0,05 8,60 (**) 0,05 8,86 (**) 0,05 8,33 (**) 0,06 9,55 (**) 
CA 0,00 -7,30 (**) -0,04 -6,76 (**) -0,04 -8,05 (**) 0,08 13,67 (**) 0,11 17,47 (**) 0,10 17,37 (**) 0,07 11,84 (**) 0,08 14,52 (**) 0,08 14,67 (**) 0,09 15,40 (**) 
CH 0,00 -12,56 (**) -0,05 -13,08 (**) -0,04 -12,51 (**) 0,04 12,21 (**) 0,06 15,31 (**) 0,04 13,49 (**) 0,04 11,88 (**) 0,04 12,56 (**) 0,04 13,23 (**) 0,05 13,94 (**) 
DE 0,00 -0,16   0,00 0,53 0,01 5,54 (**) 0,03 12,47 (**) 0,03 11,05 (**) 0,02 8,43 (**) 0,02 9,16 (**) 0,02 7,92 (**) 0,02 8,43 (**) 0,02 10,20 (**) 
DK 0,00 -2,14 (*) -0,02 -2,46 (*) -0,01 -1,82 0,03 3,78 (**) 0,04 5,89 (**) 0,02 2,87 (**) -0,01 -0,91 0,00 0,07 0,02 2,76 (**) 0,00 0,62 
ES 0,00 -8,30 (**) -0,08 -7,50 (**) -0,08 -10,10 (**) 0,08 8,85 (**) 0,06 6,39 (**) 0,07 7,69 (**) 0,08 8,97 (**) 0,07 8,07 (**) 0,08 8,41 (**) 0,07 7,30 (**) 
FI 0,00 1,39   0,01 1,79 0,01 2,14 (*) 0,06 9,57 (**) 0,08 12,16 (**) 0,05 8,19 (**) 0,04 6,07 (**) 0,03 5,44 (**) 0,05 7,49 (**) 0,04 6,27 (**) 
GB 0,00 -18,89 (**) -0,06 -18,52 (**) -0,06 -23,77 (**) 0,08 28,37 (**) 0,10 32,21 (**) 0,09 31,75 (**) 0,07 24,76 (**) 0,08 27,81 (**) 0,08 28,45 (**) 0,08 29,42 (**) 
IL 0,00 -16,54 (**) -0,17 -13,01 (**) -0,17 -18,61 (**) 0,10 9,48 (**) 0,13 11,76 (**) 0,12 11,91 (**) 0,10 9,72 (**) 0,11 11,02 (**) 0,11 10,65 (**) 0,12 11,42 (**) 
IT 0,00 -9,92 (**) -0,04 -10,06 (**) -0,04 -12,23 (**) 0,05 14,92 (**) 0,05 13,75 (**) 0,05 13,15 (**) 0,05 15,59 (**) 0,05 14,75 (**) 0,06 15,50 (**) 0,05 14,24 (**) 
JP 0,00 9,97 (**) 0,02 9,48 (**) 0,01 5,09 (**) 0,11 46,67 (**) 0,11 22,83 (**) 0,12 58,22 (**) 0,11 52,69 (**) 0,12 56,21 (**) 0,11 51,41 (**) 0,14 62,13 (**) 
KR 0,00 -7,54 (**) -0,07 -6,94 (**) -0,08 -9,37 (**) 0,09 9,48 (**) 0,07 7,47 (**) 0,09 9,92 (**) 0,09 9,51 (**) 0,09 9,90 (**) 0,09 9,71 (**) 0,09 10,03 (**) 
NL 0,00 -8,28 (**) -0,03 -7,73 (**) -0,03 -10,03 (**) 0,04 11,66 (**) 0,04 12,33 (**) 0,03 9,83 (**) 0,03 9,73 (**) 0,03 8,53 (**) 0,03 8,52 (**) 0,04 10,95 (**) 
SE 0,00 -19,70 (**) -0,10 -18,71 (**) -0,10 -23,42 (**) 0,06 13,32 (**) 0,06 12,61 (**) 0,07 15,45 (**) 0,06 12,77 (**) 0,06 13,61 (**) 0,06 13,27 (**) 0,06 12,84 (**) 
US 0,00 -10,73 (**) -0,05 -11,81 (**) -0,05 -12,10 (**) 0,04 8,36 (**) 0,04 8,24 (**) 0,01 3,41 (**) 0,00 -0,05 -0,01 -1,37 0,02 4,12 (**) 0,00 -0,30 
RoW 0,00 -40,42 (**) -0,09 -40,01 (**) -0,10 -47,99 (**) 0,11 51,89 (**) 0,15 35,76 (**) 0,13 63,25 (**) 0,10 49,67 (**) 0,11 55,67 (**) 0,12 56,31 (**) 0,13 61,52 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990)
1980 0,00 -52,84 (**) -0,27 -51,15 (**) -0,28 -60,05 (**) -0,39 -77,06 (**) -0,41 -80,79 (**) -0,39 -79,41 (**) -0,38 -76,98 (**) -0,38 -77,45 (**) -0,38 -76,61 (**) -0,38 -78,89 (**) 
1981 0,00 -73,53 (**) -0,37 -71,30 (**) -0,36 -84,65 (**) -0,47 -99,06 (**) -0,49 -102,14 (**) -0,47 -101,31 (**) -0,45 -99,04 (**) -0,46 -99,43 (**) -0,46 -98,42 (**) -0,46 -100,71 (**) 
1982 0,00 -73,69 (**) -0,34 -71,19 (**) -0,34 -84,98 (**) -0,43 -98,63 (**) -0,45 -101,40 (**) -0,43 -100,88 (**) -0,42 -98,57 (**) -0,43 -99,09 (**) -0,43 -98,12 (**) -0,43 -100,27 (**) 
1983 0,00 -61,96 (**) -0,27 -61,30 (**) -0,27 -70,88 (**) -0,34 -83,68 (**) -0,36 -86,19 (**) -0,35 -86,61 (**) -0,34 -84,21 (**) -0,34 -84,80 (**) -0,34 -82,99 (**) -0,34 -85,92 (**) 
1984 0,00 -83,20 (**) -0,36 -84,12 (**) -0,36 -96,66 (**) -0,43 -106,30 (**) -0,44 -108,02 (**) -0,43 -108,93 (**) -0,42 -106,75 (**) -0,42 -107,38 (**) -0,42 -105,46 (**) -0,42 -108,22 (**) 
1985 0,00 -81,57 (**) -0,34 -80,25 (**) -0,34 -94,32 (**) -0,40 -102,53 (**) -0,41 -103,55 (**) -0,40 -106,20 (**) -0,40 -104,62 (**) -0,40 -105,12 (**) -0,40 -101,67 (**) -0,40 -105,77 (**) 
1986 0,00 -74,77 (**) -0,30 -71,16 (**) -0,30 -86,45 (**) -0,35 -93,72 (**) -0,36 -94,46 (**) -0,36 -97,60 (**) -0,35 -95,97 (**) -0,35 -96,66 (**) -0,35 -92,91 (**) -0,35 -97,15 (**) 
1987 0,00 -56,61 (**) -0,21 -51,82 (**) -0,21 -64,79 (**) -0,24 -66,93 (**) -0,24 -67,32 (**) -0,24 -70,01 (**) -0,24 -68,55 (**) -0,24 -68,96 (**) -0,23 -65,64 (**) -0,24 -69,31 (**) 
1988 0,00 -36,10 (**) -0,12 -33,10 (**) -0,12 -40,82 (**) -0,13 -38,95 (**) -0,13 -39,07 (**) -0,13 -41,33 (**) -0,13 -39,83 (**) -0,13 -40,17 (**) -0,12 -37,56 (**) -0,13 -40,38 (**) 
1989 0,00 -12,75 (**) -0,04 -11,83 (**) -0,04 -14,19 (**) -0,03 -8,20 (**) -0,03 -8,62 (**) -0,03 -8,94 (**) -0,02 -7,97 (**) -0,02 -8,06 (**) -0,02 -7,15 (**) -0,03 -8,25 (**) 
1991 0,00 2,33 (*) 0,01 2,15 (*) 0,01 2,32 (*) 0,00 -0,73 0,00 -0,18   0,00 1,21 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,25 -0,01 -1,90 0,00 0,45 
1992 0,00 -2,53 (*) -0,01 -2,64 (**) -0,01 -3,24 (**) -0,01 -3,14 (**) -0,01 -1,85   0,00 0,16 -0,01 -1,73 0,00 -1,21 -0,01 -4,24 (**) 0,00 -0,69 
1993 0,00 -3,67 (**) -0,01 -3,81 (**) -0,01 -4,65 (**) -0,02 -6,78 (**) -0,01 -4,14 (**) -0,01 -1,86 -0,01 -5,01 (**) -0,01 -4,02 (**) -0,02 -8,11 (**) -0,01 -3,25 (**) 
1994 0,00 -7,65 (**) -0,02 -7,92 (**) -0,02 -9,01 (**) -0,03 -9,41 (**) -0,02 -5,47 (**) -0,01 -4,03 (**) -0,02 -8,14 (**) -0,02 -7,09 (**) -0,03 -11,15 (**) -0,02 -5,99 (**) 
1995 0,00 -16,59 (**) -0,05 -16,73 (**) -0,05 -19,10 (**) -0,04 -14,87 (**) -0,03 -10,34 (**) -0,02 -6,94 (**) -0,04 -12,21 (**) -0,03 -10,79 (**) -0,05 -17,46 (**) -0,03 -9,56 (**) 
1996 0,00 -25,00 (**) -0,08 -24,67 (**) -0,08 -28,33 (**) -0,05 -15,74 (**) -0,03 -9,75 (**) -0,03 -8,93 (**) -0,05 -15,44 (**) -0,04 -13,57 (**) -0,05 -18,39 (**) -0,04 -12,14 (**) 
1997 0,00 -42,54 (**) -0,13 -41,33 (**) -0,13 -48,07 (**) -0,07 -22,65 (**) -0,05 -16,66 (**) -0,05 -16,44 (**) -0,07 -23,54 (**) -0,06 -21,20 (**) -0,08 -25,66 (**) -0,06 -20,07 (**) 
1998 0,00 -63,05 (**) -0,20 -60,59 (**) -0,20 -72,20 (**) -0,10 -33,61 (**) -0,09 -28,35 (**) -0,08 -27,74 (**) -0,11 -35,35 (**) -0,10 -32,29 (**) -0,11 -36,69 (**) -0,09 -31,57 (**) 
1999 0,00 -76,09 (**) -0,25 -73,06 (**) -0,25 -88,04 (**) -0,14 -43,72 (**) -0,14 -37,91 (**) -0,12 -38,71 (**) -0,14 -47,04 (**) -0,13 -42,94 (**) -0,15 -47,07 (**) -0,13 -42,91 (**) 
2000 0,00 -84,69 (**) -0,30 -81,29 (**) -0,30 -98,79 (**) -0,19 -57,65 (**) -0,20 -44,85 (**) -0,17 -53,25 (**) -0,20 -61,94 (**) -0,18 -56,54 (**) -0,20 -61,32 (**) -0,18 -57,57 (**) 
Model 
# Observations 1039608 1039608 1038302 697094 697150 719416 719345 719416 697152 719412 
Adjusted/Pseudo R² 0,13 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,04 0,03 0,04 0,03 





Table A6.16 – Estimates of the likelihood to be granted 
OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Instrumental Vars Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Filing routes 
RTE_ACCSRC 0,00 9,45 (**) 0,10 9,19 (**) 0,09 8,94 (**) 0,12 11,56 (**) 0,12 12,07 (**) 0,12 12,49 (**)
RTE_PCT 0,00 54,04 (**) 0,19 53,47 (**) 0,23 61,52 (**) 0,24 68,07 (**) 0,21 42,64 (**) 0,15 49,64 (**)
RTE_LEGREP   0,13 24,45 (**)   
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 0,00 -14,85 (**) 0,00 -14,40 (**) 0,00 -7,88 (**) 0,00 -4,33 (**) 0,00 4,19 (**) 0,00 -2,97 (**)
DRF_PAGES_DESC   0,00 -20,33 (**)   
DRF_PAGES_DRAW   0,02 5,53 (**)   
DRF_PRIO 0,00 1,69   0,00 1,30 0,01 4,66 (**) 0,04 19,33 (**) 0,05 16,23 (**) 0,04 24,55 (**)
DRF_EQUIV 0,00 -16,51 (**) -0,04 -15,95 (**) -0,04 -16,58 (**) -0,02 -8,25 (**) -0,02 -7,14 (**) -0,01 -5,02 (**)
DRF_HASDIV 0,00 79,17 (**) 0,85 75,61 (**) 0,86 80,60 (**) 0,91 86,54 (**) 0,93 72,05 (**) 0,95 92,51 (**)
DRF_ISDIV 0,00 5,52 (**) 0,05 4,26 (**) 0,06 5,57 (**) 0,14 13,21 (**) 0,18 17,05 (**) 0,09 8,59 (**)
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 0,00 223,72 (**) 0,65 214,57 (**) 0,65 217,16 (**) 0,91 29,14 (**) 0,68 240,63 (**)
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,00 49,31 (**) 0,07 36,50 (**) 0,08 53,57 (**) -0,31 -28,57 (**) 0,08 56,16 (**)
IMP_DSTATES_B10   -0,03 -49,24 (**)   
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 0,00 -6,72 (**) 0,00 -6,93 (**) 0,00 -6,69 (**) 0,00 -8,90 (**) 0,00 4,26 (**) 0,00 -4,50 (**)
CMP_NPC 0,00 -30,60 (**) -0,03 -29,43 (**) -0,03 -29,88 (**) -0,02 -26,43 (**) -0,02 -18,67 (**) -0,02 -20,16 (**)
CMP_INV 0,00 12,48 (**) 0,01 13,07 (**) 0,02 18,14 (**) 0,02 26,74 (**) 0,04 35,47 (**) 0,04 48,26 (**)
CMP_IPC4 0,00 -12,21 (**) -0,02 -12,31 (**) -0,02 -8,32 (**) -0,01 -4,57 (**) 0,02 10,74 (**) 0,01 3,41 (**)
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE 0,00 1,90   0,01 2,27 (*) 0,01 1,05 0,00 0,03 0,02 2,75 (**) 0,01 1,80 
APP_CUMUL 0,00 -10,25 (**) 0,00 -9,73 (**) 0,00 -7,03 (**) 0,00 5,20 (**) 0,00 -14,81 (**) 0,00 1,57 
APP_OCCAS 0,00 -50,06 (**) -0,18 -48,28 (**) -0,17 -44,08 (**) -0,27 -73,56 (**) -0,12 -19,79 (**) -0,28 -80,76 (**) 
APP_CBOWN 0,00 27,89 (**) 0,13 27,13 (**) 0,13 27,39 (**) 0,13 26,29 (**) 0,13 27,26 (**) 0,12 25,16 (**) 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 0,00 16,91 (**) 0,08 17,10 (**) 0,07 14,90 (**) 0,07 16,28 (**) 0,04 9,86 (**) 0,06 14,72 (**) 0,07 16,34 (**) 0,07 15,88 (**) 0,05 12,41 (**) 0,07 17,25 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,00 4,98 (**) 0,02 5,09 (**) 0,04 7,62 (**) 0,05 11,11 (**) 0,04 7,97 (**) 0,07 16,06 (**) 0,08 16,91 (**) 0,03 5,46 (**) 0,05 11,31 (**) 0,06 12,69 (**) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,00 -45,58 (**) -0,23 -44,76 (**) -0,18 -34,38 (**) -0,20 -40,42 (**) -0,13 -20,54 (**) -0,19 -41,35 (**) -0,18 -39,86 (**) -0,22 -46,82 (**) -0,17 -34,12 (**) -0,16 -35,66 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,00 -18,68 (**) -0,14 -18,48 (**) -0,17 -22,27 (**) -0,16 -21,70 (**) 0,00 -0,34   -0,15 -22,22 (**) -0,15 -22,08 (**) -0,15 -21,36 (**) -0,14 -19,42 (**) -0,17 -24,85 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,00 -1,59   -0,01 -1,64 -0,05 -7,38 (**) 0,01 1,77 -0,01 -1,53   0,00 0,31 -0,01 -1,07 -0,03 -4,96 (**) 0,02 3,35 (**) 0,00 0,04 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,00 -0,30   0,00 -0,60 -0,04 -7,29 (**) 0,00 0,05 -0,01 -2,48 (*) 0,00 -0,98 -0,01 -1,71 -0,01 -2,66 (**) 0,00 0,91 -0,01 -1,80 
JC-08 - Electricity 0,00 -8,17 (**) -0,04 -8,48 (**) -0,08 -16,77 (**) -0,05 -10,23 (**) -0,07 -14,59 (**) -0,06 -12,83 (**) -0,06 -13,48 (**) -0,06 -12,98 (**) -0,05 -11,97 (**) -0,07 -14,97 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,00 -16,19 (**) -0,11 -15,51 (**) -0,15 -19,87 (**) -0,14 -19,47 (**) -0,08 -10,16 (**) -0,18 -26,07 (**) -0,18 -25,93 (**) -0,16 -22,59 (**) -0,16 -21,77 (**) -0,17 -24,94 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,00 6,80 (**) 0,03 6,82 (**) -0,02 -3,00 (**) 0,03 6,08 (**) -0,03 -5,29 (**) 0,01 1,90 0,01 1,73 0,02 3,28 (**) 0,01 2,08 (*) 0,01 3,12 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 0,00 20,54 (**) 0,09 20,31 (**) 0,07 14,35 (**) 0,04 9,86 (**) 0,05 10,56 (**) 0,01 1,33 0,00 0,67 0,08 17,85 (**) 0,01 2,48 (*) 0,04 8,54 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles 0,00 36,82 (**) 0,18 36,59 (**) 0,14 27,72 (**) 0,13 26,95 (**) 0,16 28,92 (**) 0,10 22,07 (**) 0,10 21,66 (**) 0,17 35,93 (**) 0,10 21,06 (**) 0,12 24,72 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 0,00 27,21 (**) 0,14 26,28 (**) 0,10 19,57 (**) 0,05 9,74 (**) 0,12 18,68 (**) 0,00 0,46 0,00 -0,01 0,11 23,26 (**) 0,00 0,71 0,04 7,83 (**) 





OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Instrumental Vars Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT 0,00 1,33   0,01 0,78 0,03 1,92 -0,05 -3,85 (**) 0,05 3,38 (**) -0,03 -2,01 (*) -0,02 -1,79 0,05 4,09 (**) -0,02 -1,80 -0,03 -2,50 (*) 
AU 0,00 -40,49 (**) -0,69 -39,91 (**) -0,70 -40,33 (**) -0,63 -37,32 (**) -0,73 -41,41 (**) -0,63 -38,54 (**) -0,57 -34,68 (**) -0,63 -37,43 (**) -0,53 -31,83 (**) -0,50 -30,26 (**) 
BE 0,00 -13,30 (**) -0,18 -13,31 (**) -0,16 -11,18 (**) -0,17 -12,14 (**) -0,16 -11,66 (**) -0,14 -10,54 (**) -0,14 -10,68 (**) -0,15 -11,06 (**) -0,15 -10,77 (**) -0,17 -12,77 (**) 
CA 0,00 -26,10 (**) -0,36 -26,06 (**) -0,38 -27,78 (**) -0,29 -21,39 (**) -0,35 -23,95 (**) -0,27 -21,41 (**) -0,26 -20,05 (**) -0,32 -24,93 (**) -0,22 -17,18 (**) -0,23 -18,10 (**) 
CH 0,00 -18,92 (**) -0,15 -18,24 (**) -0,11 -13,33 (**) -0,09 -11,62 (**) -0,15 -16,77 (**) -0,03 -4,34 (**) -0,03 -4,58 (**) -0,09 -11,85 (**) -0,03 -4,41 (**) -0,09 -11,59 (**) 
DE 0,00 0,07   0,00 -0,30 0,04 6,97 (**) -0,05 -9,27 (**) 0,03 5,37 (**) 0,01 1,86 0,01 1,70 0,04 7,03 (**) -0,01 -1,36 -0,03 -6,18 (**) 
DK 0,00 -4,44 (**) -0,08 -4,36 (**) -0,05 -2,75 (**) -0,07 -3,85 (**) -0,05 -2,84 (**) -0,07 -4,41 (**) -0,03 -1,68 -0,02 -1,48 0,03 1,43 -0,01 -0,63 
ES 0,00 -19,59 (**) -0,37 -18,94 (**) -0,36 -18,16 (**) -0,41 -21,35 (**) -0,32 -16,27 (**) -0,48 -26,10 (**) -0,48 -25,74 (**) -0,39 -20,69 (**) -0,47 -24,75 (**) -0,42 -22,37 (**) 
FI 0,00 -6,15 (**) -0,10 -6,05 (**) -0,11 -6,53 (**) -0,08 -4,72 (**) -0,02 -1,46   -0,06 -4,26 (**) -0,02 -1,23 -0,05 -3,02 (**) 0,01 0,66 -0,03 -1,86 
GB 0,00 -57,92 (**) -0,39 -57,37 (**) -0,40 -57,77 (**) -0,37 -54,59 (**) -0,36 -52,05 (**) -0,35 -55,02 (**) -0,34 -53,95 (**) -0,36 -55,22 (**) -0,29 -44,96 (**) -0,35 -53,51 (**) 
IL 0,00 -29,56 (**) -0,62 -28,54 (**) -0,61 -28,27 (**) -0,56 -26,72 (**) -0,61 -27,67 (**) -0,59 -28,59 (**) -0,57 -27,71 (**) -0,61 -29,01 (**) -0,57 -27,13 (**) -0,51 -24,93 (**) 
IT 0,00 -23,37 (**) -0,19 -23,52 (**) -0,19 -22,83 (**) -0,24 -29,53 (**) -0,14 -15,64 (**) -0,25 -31,80 (**) -0,26 -32,79 (**) -0,19 -23,72 (**) -0,27 -33,91 (**) -0,25 -31,25 (**) 
JP 0,00 -25,15 (**) -0,13 -22,65 (**) -0,22 -35,30 (**) 0,08 13,87 (**) -0,20 -16,61 (**) 0,19 36,31 (**) 0,14 25,57 (**) -0,09 -15,59 (**) 0,15 27,09 (**) 0,13 24,03 (**) 
KR 0,00 -19,02 (**) -0,42 -19,25 (**) -0,48 -21,86 (**) -0,27 -12,63 (**) -0,51 -22,63 (**) -0,25 -12,29 (**) -0,27 -13,07 (**) -0,41 -19,25 (**) -0,26 -12,27 (**) -0,25 -12,28 (**) 
NL 0,00 -19,77 (**) -0,17 -19,96 (**) -0,18 -21,31 (**) -0,10 -12,25 (**) -0,16 -18,58 (**) 0,00 -0,56 0,00 -0,24 -0,09 -11,05 (**) -0,01 -1,46 -0,07 -9,04 (**) 
SE 0,00 -38,64 (**) -0,39 -37,98 (**) -0,39 -38,34 (**) -0,38 -37,93 (**) -0,39 -38,68 (**) -0,37 -39,40 (**) -0,34 -36,65 (**) -0,33 -34,49 (**) -0,35 -36,05 (**) -0,32 -33,70 (**) 
US 0,00 -18,52 (**) -0,21 -18,32 (**) -0,21 -18,42 (**) -0,07 -6,57 (**) -0,21 -16,90 (**) -0,07 -6,82 (**) -0,01 -0,81 -0,14 -13,57 (**) 0,04 3,28 (**) -0,01 -1,51 
RoW 0,00 -111,57 (**) -0,58 -109,27 (**) -0,61 -113,52 (**) -0,42 -80,23 (**) -0,58 -57,42 (**) -0,34 -70,27 (**) -0,33 -67,55 (**) -0,53 -106,59 (**) -0,32 -65,44 (**) -0,36 -73,17 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990)
1980 0,00 17,88 (**) 0,21 17,97 (**) 0,22 18,82 (**) 0,21 17,87 (**) 0,15 12,60 (**) 0,22 19,76 (**) 0,20 18,48 (**) 0,23 20,45 (**) 0,17 14,49 (**) 0,22 19,64 (**) 
1981 0,00 16,94 (**) 0,18 17,37 (**) 0,20 18,58 (**) 0,17 16,22 (**) 0,13 12,66 (**) 0,19 18,45 (**) 0,17 17,05 (**) 0,20 19,78 (**) 0,13 12,68 (**) 0,18 18,01 (**) 
1982 0,00 18,72 (**) 0,20 19,23 (**) 0,21 20,12 (**) 0,18 17,60 (**) 0,16 15,35 (**) 0,19 20,05 (**) 0,18 18,63 (**) 0,21 21,73 (**) 0,14 14,55 (**) 0,19 19,24 (**) 
1983 0,00 18,24 (**) 0,18 18,70 (**) 0,20 19,74 (**) 0,16 16,99 (**) 0,16 15,89 (**) 0,18 19,28 (**) 0,16 17,79 (**) 0,20 21,11 (**) 0,13 13,71 (**) 0,17 18,22 (**) 
1984 0,00 13,69 (**) 0,13 14,03 (**) 0,14 15,39 (**) 0,13 14,47 (**) 0,11 11,56 (**) 0,15 16,62 (**) 0,13 14,97 (**) 0,14 15,78 (**) 0,10 11,00 (**) 0,14 15,49 (**) 
1985 0,00 11,60 (**) 0,11 11,78 (**) 0,12 13,13 (**) 0,12 13,40 (**) 0,09 9,61 (**) 0,14 15,77 (**) 0,12 14,51 (**) 0,12 13,81 (**) 0,09 10,36 (**) 0,13 15,04 (**) 
1986 0,00 7,83 (**) 0,07 7,93 (**) 0,08 8,80 (**) 0,08 9,67 (**) 0,06 6,27 (**) 0,11 12,99 (**) 0,10 11,93 (**) 0,09 10,70 (**) 0,06 6,67 (**) 0,10 12,21 (**) 
1987 0,00 0,88   0,01 0,85 0,01 1,56 0,02 2,47 (*) 0,00 0,00   0,05 5,66 (**) 0,04 4,62 (**) 0,03 3,58 (**) 0,00 -0,06 0,04 5,10 (**) 
1988 0,00 -4,50 (**) -0,04 -4,65 (**) -0,04 -4,33 (**) -0,02 -2,73 (**) -0,04 -5,28 (**) 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,26 -0,02 -2,09 (*) -0,04 -4,43 (**) 0,00 -0,04 
1989 0,00 -8,78 (**) -0,07 -8,89 (**) -0,07 -8,74 (**) -0,06 -7,55 (**) -0,08 -9,53 (**) -0,04 -5,76 (**) -0,05 -6,21 (**) -0,06 -7,36 (**) -0,07 -8,90 (**) -0,05 -6,01 (**) 
1991 0,00 6,95 (**) 0,06 7,18 (**) 0,05 6,47 (**) 0,05 6,93 (**) 0,06 7,71 (**) 0,03 4,43 (**) 0,04 5,10 (**) 0,04 5,17 (**) 0,07 9,17 (**) 0,04 5,27 (**) 
1992 0,00 3,61 (**) 0,03 3,77 (**) 0,02 2,54 (*) 0,03 3,74 (**) 0,03 3,99 (**) 0,05 6,69 (**) 0,05 7,14 (**) 0,05 6,48 (**) 0,06 7,27 (**) 0,06 7,74 (**) 
1993 0,00 5,49 (**) 0,04 5,53 (**) 0,03 3,86 (**) 0,04 4,82 (**) 0,05 6,92 (**) 0,10 13,79 (**) 0,11 14,55 (**) 0,11 14,63 (**) 0,08 10,23 (**) 0,12 15,78 (**) 
1994 0,00 2,78 (**) 0,02 2,85 (**) 0,01 0,99 0,02 2,59 (*) 0,04 5,37 (**) 0,09 12,40 (**) 0,10 13,93 (**) 0,10 13,53 (**) 0,07 9,21 (**) 0,11 15,33 (**) 
1995 0,00 -2,44 (*) -0,02 -2,46 (*) -0,04 -4,84 (**) -0,02 -2,46 (*) 0,00 0,41   0,06 7,70 (**) 0,07 9,98 (**) 0,07 8,93 (**) 0,04 5,66 (**) 0,08 11,19 (**) 
1996 0,00 -9,77 (**) -0,08 -9,74 (**) -0,09 -12,17 (**) -0,08 -10,48 (**) -0,04 -5,22 (**) 0,00 0,17 0,03 3,53 (**) 0,02 3,16 (**) 0,00 -0,42 0,03 4,78 (**) 
1997 0,00 -19,20 (**) -0,14 -18,99 (**) -0,16 -21,38 (**) -0,16 -21,40 (**) -0,11 -14,23 (**) -0,08 -11,56 (**) -0,05 -7,39 (**) -0,05 -6,31 (**) -0,08 -11,23 (**) -0,05 -6,64 (**) 
1998 0,00 -28,14 (**) -0,21 -27,49 (**) -0,22 -29,76 (**) -0,24 -32,95 (**) -0,19 -23,60 (**) -0,16 -22,53 (**) -0,13 -17,91 (**) -0,10 -13,65 (**) -0,16 -21,93 (**) -0,12 -17,43 (**) 
1999 0,00 -31,29 (**) -0,23 -30,39 (**) -0,24 -31,24 (**) -0,29 -38,45 (**) -0,24 -27,84 (**) -0,20 -28,41 (**) -0,16 -23,05 (**) -0,12 -16,29 (**) -0,20 -26,76 (**) -0,16 -22,95 (**) 
2000 0,00 -27,12 (**) -0,20 -25,87 (**) -0,19 -24,85 (**) -0,32 -42,45 (**) -0,22 -21,14 (**) -0,25 -33,82 (**) -0,20 -28,31 (**) -0,09 -12,35 (**) -0,23 -30,81 (**) -0,21 -28,87 (**) 
Model 
# Observations 1039622 1039622 1038302 1039630 1039721 1086174 1086049 1085017 1039727 1086165 
Adjusted/Pseudo R² 0,10 0,08 0,09 0,05 0,05 0,03 0,04 0,07 0,03 0,03 
F (P>F) / LR chi² (P>chi²) 1.729 (0,00) 99.175 (0,00) 114.789 (0,00) 59.402 (0,00) 61.107 (0,00) 40.709 (0,00) 49.769 (0,00) 103.254 (0,00) 38.208 (0,00) 45.798 (0,00) 
Probit Regressions, Pending applications excluded 
 
  
Table A6.17 – Survival Analysis of Patents Maintenance Periods (competing risks) 
Stratified Non Opposed Revoked Amended Maintained Opp. Pending 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Filing routes                                     
RTE_ACCSRC 0,93 -4,58 (**) 0,92 -4,93 (**) 1,02 0,22   1,10 0,66   1,05 0,35   1,08 0,34 
RTE_PCT 1,03 6,49 (**) 1,03 5,83 (**) 1,05 1,44   1,14 2,67 (**) 0,94 -1,24   1,03 0,35 
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 1,00 -12,62 (**) 1,00 -11,88 (**) 1,00 -1,11   1,00 0,39   1,00 0,04   1,00 -0,57 
DRF_CLMLS           
DRF_PRIO 1,00 -0,36   1,00 -0,32   1,00 -0,27   1,02 1,09   0,99 -0,29   0,94 -1,27 
DRF_EQUIV 0,99 -2,48 (*) 0,99 -2,53 (*) 1,00 0,01   0,97 -0,96   1,05 2,32 (*) 1,07 1,77 
DRF_HASDIV 0,80 -21,04 (**) 0,80 -17,36 (**) 0,77 -4,78 (**) 0,90 -1,35   0,72 -3,90 (**) 0,64 -2,85 (**) 
DRF_ISDIV 0,94 -3,83 (**) 0,93 -3,93 (**) 0,98 -0,22   1,18 1,23   1,32 1,68   1,09 0,36 
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 0,85 -42,08 (**) 0,86 -38,07 (**) 0,82 -8,63 (**) 0,81 -6,64 (**) 0,79 -8,61 (**) 0,83 -3,07 (**) 
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,89 -55,65 (**) 0,89 -51,21 (**) 0,95 -6,70 (**) 0,93 -6,35 (**) 0,91 -6,90 (**) 0,93 -2,78 (**) 
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 1,00 -0,06   1,00 0,07   1,00 0,64   1,00 -0,51   1,00 0,41   0,99 -0,85 
CMP_NPC 1,00 3,06 (**) 1,01 3,73 (**) 0,98 -2,46 (*) 0,99 -1,11   1,01 0,68   1,00 0,02 
CMP_INV 0,99 -7,23 (**) 0,99 -6,09 (**) 0,98 -2,94 (**) 0,98 -1,86   0,98 -1,81   0,99 -0,40 
CMP_IPC4 1,02 8,07 (**) 1,02 8,05 (**) 1,00 0,32   1,00 -0,11   1,00 0,23   0,98 -0,41 
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE 1,02 2,32 (*) 1,02 2,64 (**) 0,98 -0,44   0,92 -1,17   1,08 1,30   0,96 -0,31 
APP_CUMUL 1,00 16,75 (**) 1,00 15,84 (**) 1,00 0,85   1,00 1,35   1,00 1,01   1,00 -0,79 
APP_OCCAS 1,11 21,10 (**) 1,12 22,01 (**) 0,94 -2,06 (*) 0,91 -2,38 (*) 1,04 1,17   1,12 1,49 
APP_CBOWN 0,97 -5,01 (**) 0,97 -4,57 (**) 0,95 -1,40   1,00 0,00   1,02 0,32   0,99 -0,06 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 1,02 3,03 (**) 1,01 2,31 (*) 1,05 1,59   0,98 -0,46   1,08 1,91   0,90 -1,23 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,99 -0,90   0,99 -0,85   1,00 0,09   0,98 -0,46   0,96 -0,99   0,96 -0,43 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 1,02 2,99 (**) 1,03 4,24 (**) 0,81 -5,04 (**) 0,93 -1,24   0,90 -1,78   1,07 0,58 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,93 -6,73 (**) 0,93 -5,94 (**) 0,78 -2,98 (**) 1,01 0,11   1,10 0,89   1,24 0,76 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,90 -12,44 (**) 0,89 -11,84 (**) 1,01 0,09   0,98 -0,23   1,09 0,87   0,99 -0,04 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,99 -0,91   0,98 -2,14 (*) 1,05 0,94   1,32 4,54 (**) 1,13 2,28 (*) 1,05 0,36 
JC-08 - Electricity 1,01 1,12   1,00 0,07   1,05 1,42   1,08 1,50   1,03 0,72   1,28 2,41 (*) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,96 -3,87 (**) 0,96 -3,55 (**) 0,83 -2,59 (*) 1,11 0,94   1,01 0,05   0,91 -0,39 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 1,00 -0,52   0,99 -2,07 (*) 1,16 3,42 (**) 1,15 2,46 (*) 1,15 2,48 (*) 1,25 1,88 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 0,97 -5,83 (**) 0,96 -6,73 (**) 1,13 3,87 (**) 0,98 -0,50   1,00 0,12   1,05 0,61 
JC-12 - Vehicles 0,91 -15,25 (**) 0,90 -15,38 (**) 1,07 1,80   0,99 -0,12   0,93 -1,57   1,05 0,48 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 0,94 -9,62 (**) 0,93 -10,02 (**) 1,12 2,79 (**) 0,99 -0,12   0,95 -1,20   0,95 -0,50 
JC-14 - Human Necessities 0,92 -13,78 (**) 0,92 -13,45 (**) 0,97 -0,81   0,91 -1,93   1,01 0,13   1,19 1,81 
Cox Regression Model - Breslow method for ties - Stratified by reason for lapse unless otherwise specified (EPO Grants filed 1980-2000) 
  
  
Stratified Non Opposed Revoked Amended Maintained Opp. Pending 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT 1,06 3,52 (**) 1,05 2,81 (**) 1,08 0,93   1,19 1,33   1,27 2,42 (*) 0,98 -0,06 
AU 1,17 6,19 (**) 1,16 5,57 (**) 1,34 1,41   1,40 1,46   1,28 1,11   0,98 -0,02 
BE 1,04 2,08 (*) 1,06 2,83 (**) 0,77 -2,29 (*) 1,04 0,25   0,82 -1,55   0,90 -0,39 
CA 1,17 8,28 (**) 1,17 7,89 (**) 1,01 0,05   1,33 1,48   0,96 -0,24   2,49 3,20 (**) 
CH 1,04 4,31 (**) 1,04 3,62 (**) 1,05 0,75   1,27 3,10 (**) 0,96 -0,54   1,39 2,24 (*) 
DE 1,02 3,42 (**) 1,02 2,85 (**) 1,03 0,77   1,13 2,33 (*) 0,99 -0,14   1,13 1,23 
DK 0,92 -3,14 (**) 0,91 -3,22 (**) 0,94 -0,51   1,06 0,35   0,78 -1,57   1,54 1,47 
ES 1,24 6,86 (**) 1,24 6,64 (**) 1,56 1,95   1,00 0,00   1,41 1,48   2,64 2,11 (*) 
FI 0,91 -3,62 (**) 0,91 -3,48 (**) 0,74 -2,31 (*) 1,16 0,73   1,05 0,26   2,02 2,45 (*) 
GB 1,12 12,99 (**) 1,13 13,68 (**) 0,95 -1,12   1,00 0,01   1,07 1,07   1,32 2,08 (*) 
IL 1,37 8,74 (**) 1,37 8,30 (**) 0,92 -0,30   1,49 1,41   1,49 1,18   2,72 2,35 (*) 
IT 1,14 12,33 (**) 1,14 11,91 (**) 0,96 -0,61   1,20 1,93   1,03 0,39   1,13 0,67 
JP 0,97 -4,30 (**) 0,97 -3,94 (**) 0,91 -2,05 (*) 1,14 2,25 (*) 1,01 0,26   1,06 0,47 
KR 1,01 0,28   1,01 0,27   0,83 -0,61   1,45 0,64   2,28 1,64   0,90 -0,10 
NL 1,17 16,63 (**) 1,20 17,78 (**) 0,91 -1,68   1,05 0,59   0,93 -1,01   1,00 0,02 
SE 1,28 16,96 (**) 1,29 16,89 (**) 0,99 -0,07   1,17 1,14   1,13 0,94   2,27 3,38 (**) 
US 0,92 -6,16 (**) 0,92 -5,48 (**) 0,90 -1,24   0,94 -0,55   0,87 -1,29   1,01 0,05 
RoW 1,14 21,38 (**) 1,15 20,55 (**) 0,98 -0,49   1,24 3,83 (**) 1,08 1,43   1,32 2,49 (*) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990) 
1980 1,11 11,12 (**) 1,10 8,56 (**) 1,13 1,88   1,38 3,43 (**) 1,33 3,79 (**) 1,95 2,66 (**) 
1981 1,15 15,10 (**) 1,14 12,15 (**) 1,15 2,22 (*) 1,54 5,14 (**) 1,38 4,48 (**) 1,81 2,36 (*) 
1982 1,20 20,31 (**) 1,19 16,60 (**) 1,18 2,74 (**) 1,55 5,58 (**) 1,46 5,31 (**) 2,30 3,28 (**) 
1983 1,24 24,32 (**) 1,23 20,94 (**) 1,06 0,91   1,62 6,24 (**) 1,43 5,02 (**) 1,94 2,47 (*) 
1984 1,29 30,20 (**) 1,29 26,63 (**) 1,08 1,30   1,66 6,72 (**) 1,44 5,31 (**) 2,04 2,35 (*) 
1985 1,35 36,03 (**) 1,35 31,41 (**) 1,12 1,92   1,74 7,45 (**) 1,65 7,33 (**) 3,80 4,37 (**) 
1986 1,11 11,08 (**) 1,11 10,97 (**) 1,13 2,01 (*) 1,08 1,00   1,17 2,16 (*) 1,60 1,44 
1987 1,10 10,47 (**) 1,11 10,60 (**) 1,18 2,80 (**) 0,98 -0,22   1,05 0,69   1,00 0,00 
1988 1,08 8,46 (**) 1,08 8,45 (**) 1,03 0,55   1,06 0,75   1,08 1,04   0,92 -0,24 
1989 1,05 5,59 (**) 1,05 5,43 (**) 1,04 0,68   0,95 -0,58   1,12 1,54   1,34 0,93 
1991 0,96 -4,85 (**) 0,96 -4,74 (**) 0,98 -0,34   1,02 0,22   1,00 -0,05   0,62 -1,44 
1992 0,93 -7,78 (**) 0,93 -7,70 (**) 1,05 0,80   1,05 0,54   0,86 -1,76   0,38 -2,69 (**) 
1993 0,90 -10,73 (**) 0,90 -10,90 (**) 1,08 1,36   0,98 -0,19   0,96 -0,45   0,70 -1,19 
1994 0,86 -14,79 (**) 0,85 -14,90 (**) 1,14 2,15 (*) 0,92 -0,66   0,74 -2,81 (**) 0,67 -1,37 
1995 0,83 -17,50 (**) 0,82 -17,91 (**) 1,31 4,29 (**) 0,79 -1,60   0,74 -2,54 (*) 0,61 -1,69 
1996 0,80 -19,14 (**) 0,79 -19,57 (**) 1,45 5,53 (**) 0,78 -1,33   0,53 -3,87 (**) 0,65 -1,52 
1997 0,74 -22,77 (**) 0,72 -23,44 (**) 1,82 7,88 (**) 0,63 -1,56   0,37 -3,85 (**) 0,74 -1,11 
1998 0,69 -23,53 (**) 0,68 -24,33 (**) 2,13 8,15 (**) 0,40 -1,56   0,52 -2,03 (*) 1,04 0,14 
1999 0,73 -17,67 (**) 0,72 -18,70 (**) 2,22 6,85 (**) 0,35 -1,05   0,43 -1,69   1,48 1,47 
2000 0,80 -11,04 (**) 0,77 -12,40 (**) 2,82 6,58 (**)   0,38 -0,97   2,12 2,81 (**) 
Model 
# Subjects / Observations 647426 605245 9632 11210 12000 9339 
# Failures / R² 347552 324722 9632 5470 6438 1290 
Log likelihood -4208305 -4019583 -79925 -44911 -53699 -9271 
F (P>F) / LR chi² (P>chi²) 20.615 (0,00) 18.703 (0,00) 815 (0,00) 532 (0,00) 612 (0,00) 394 (0,00) 
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Table A6.18 – Test of the P.H. Assumption in the Maintenance Duration Model 
  rho chi2 df Prob>chi2 
Filing routes     
RTE_ACCSRC 0.00 0.27 1.00 0.60 
RTE_PCT 0.00 0.36 1.00 0.55 
Drafting     
DRF_CLAIMS 0.01 15.15 1.00 0.00 
DRF_PRIO 0.00 0.07 1.00 0.79 
DRF_EQUIV 0.01 3.18 1.00 0.07 
DRF_HASDIV 0.02 30.83 1.00 0.00 
DRF_ISDIV 0.00 0.38 1.00 0.54 
Importance     
IMP_TRIADIC 0.02 31.05 1.00 0.00 
IMP_FWDCIT5 0.04 99.69 1.00 0.00 
Technical Complexity     
CMP_BPC 0.00 0.13 1.00 0.72 
CMP_NPC 0.00 0.76 1.00 0.38 
CMP_INV 0.00 0.57 1.00 0.45 
CMP_IPC4 -0.01 1.90 1.00 0.17 
Applicant Profiles     
APP_MULTIPLE 0.00 0.81 1.00 0.37 
APP_CUMUL -0.01 5.85 1.00 0.02 
APP_OCCAS -0.02 43.05 1.00 0.00 
APP_CBOWN 0.01 9.54 1.00 0.00 
Global Test  2151.00 68.00 0.00 
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Table A6.19 – Survival Analysis of Patents Maintenance Periods with TVC 
No TVC No TVC Random TVC Stratified 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Filing routes 
RTE_ACCSRC 0,93 -4,58 (**) 0,96 -1,24   0,91 -2,52 (*) 
RTE_PCT 1,03 6,49 (**) 1,03 2,12 (*) 1,03 2,21 (*) 
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 1,00 -12,62 (**) 1,00 -5,52 (**) 1,00 -0,58 
DRF_CLAIMS * ln(_t)     1,00 -2,21 (*) 
DRF_PRIO 1,00 -0,36   1,00 0,50   0,99 -0,98 
DRF_EQUIV 0,99 -2,48 (*) 0,98 -1,98 (*) 0,99 -0,61 
DRF_HASDIV 0,80 -21,04 (**) 0,79 -8,61 (**) 0,69 -5,52 (**) 
DRF_HASDIV * ln(_t)     1,13 3,17 (**) 
DRF_ISDIV 0,94 -3,83 (**) 0,95 -1,28   0,91 -2,36 (*) 
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 0,85 -42,08 (**) 0,85 -18,49 (**) 0,75 -14,93 (**) 
IMP_TRIADIC * ln(_t)     1,10 8,74 (**) 
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,89 -55,65 (**) 0,89 -23,35 (**) 0,85 -13,39 (**) 
IMP_FWDCIT5 * ln(_t)     1,03 4,05 (**) 
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 1,00 -0,06   1,00 -1,64   1,00 -0,52 
CMP_NPC 1,00 3,06 (**) 1,00 1,05   1,00 -0,49 
CMP_INV 0,99 -7,23 (**) 0,99 -2,96 (**) 0,99 -2,95 (**) 
CMP_IPC4 1,02 8,07 (**) 1,02 3,86 (**) 1,01 2,55 (*) 
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE 1,02 2,32 (*) 1,01 0,39   1,02 1,26 
APP_CUMUL 1,00 16,75 (**) 1,00 8,40 (**) 1,00 8,06 (**) 
APP_OCCAS 1,11 21,10 (**) 1,11 9,50 (**) 1,35 12,08 (**) 
APP_OCCAS * ln(_t)     0,89 -8,52 (**) 
APP_CBOWN 0,97 -5,01 (**) 0,97 -1,98 (*) 0,96 -2,72 (**) 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 1,02 3,03 (**) 1,00 0,01   1,01 1,12 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,99 -0,90   1,01 0,40   0,98 -1,79 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 1,02 2,99 (**) 1,00 0,32   1,04 2,41 (*) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,93 -6,73 (**) 0,93 -2,89 (**) 0,93 -2,81 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,90 -12,44 (**) 0,89 -5,56 (**) 0,88 -5,75 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,99 -0,91   0,99 -0,97   0,99 -0,82 
JC-08 - Electricity 1,01 1,12   0,99 -0,54   1,01 1,07 
JC-09 - Computers 0,96 -3,87 (**) 0,95 -2,04 (*) 0,96 -1,88 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 1,00 -0,52   1,00 0,14   1,02 1,11 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 0,97 -5,83 (**) 0,97 -2,27 (*) 0,97 -2,10 (*) 
JC-12 - Vehicles 0,91 -15,25 (**) 0,92 -6,35 (**) 0,91 -6,69 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 0,94 -9,62 (**) 0,95 -3,65 (**) 0,97 -1,93 
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No TVC TVC Stratified 1 TVC Stratified 2 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT 1,06 3,52 (**) 1,06 1,63   1,04 1,07 
AU 1,17 6,19 (**) 1,16 2,55 (*) 1,09 1,54 
BE 1,04 2,08 (*) 0,96 -1,01   1,05 1,12 
CA 1,17 8,28 (**) 1,22 4,37 (**) 1,19 3,99 (**) 
CH 1,04 4,31 (**) 1,04 1,78   1,03 1,27 
DE 1,02 3,42 (**) 1,01 0,66   1,01 0,73 
DK 0,92 -3,14 (**) 0,83 -2,94 (**) 0,92 -1,48 
ES 1,24 6,86 (**) 1,20 2,58 (*) 1,17 2,16 (*) 
FI 0,91 -3,62 (**) 0,94 -1,14   0,87 -2,43 (*) 
GB 1,12 12,99 (**) 1,10 4,89 (**) 1,10 4,99 (**) 
IL 1,37 8,74 (**) 1,28 2,99 (**) 1,39 4,06 (**) 
IT 1,14 12,33 (**) 1,12 4,67 (**) 1,11 4,49 (**) 
JP 0,97 -4,30 (**) 0,96 -2,33 (*) 0,97 -2,09 (*) 
KR 1,01 0,28   0,91 -0,85   0,94 -0,62 
NL 1,17 16,63 (**) 1,21 8,78 (**) 1,18 7,72 (**) 
SE 1,28 16,96 (**) 1,29 7,86 (**) 1,24 6,60 (**) 
US 0,92 -6,16 (**) 0,92 -2,29 (*) 0,88 -3,90 (**) 
RoW 1,14 21,38 (**) 1,15 9,39 (**) 1,12 7,69 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990) 
1980 1,11 11,12 (**) 1,13 4,94 (**) 1,14 5,36 (**) 
1981 1,15 15,10 (**) 1,20 7,88 (**) 1,17 6,66 (**) 
1982 1,20 20,31 (**) 1,22 8,97 (**) 1,21 8,77 (**) 
1983 1,24 24,32 (**) 1,24 10,09 (**) 1,23 9,52 (**) 
1984 1,29 30,20 (**) 1,33 13,90 (**) 1,29 12,19 (**) 
1985 1,35 36,03 (**) 1,39 16,04 (**) 1,32 13,69 (**) 
1986 1,11 11,08 (**) 1,14 6,14 (**) 1,08 3,61 (**) 
1987 1,10 10,47 (**) 1,13 5,70 (**) 1,10 4,33 (**) 
1988 1,08 8,46 (**) 1,08 3,69 (**) 1,08 3,53 (**) 
1989 1,05 5,59 (**) 1,05 2,37 (*) 1,06 2,60 (**) 
1991 0,96 -4,85 (**) 0,97 -1,36   0,98 -0,98 
1992 0,93 -7,78 (**) 0,97 -1,56   0,96 -1,93 
1993 0,90 -10,73 (**) 0,91 -4,07 (**) 0,92 -3,75 (**) 
1994 0,86 -14,79 (**) 0,88 -5,43 (**) 0,87 -5,98 (**) 
1995 0,83 -17,50 (**) 0,89 -4,64 (**) 0,84 -7,13 (**) 
1996 0,80 -19,14 (**) 0,84 -6,50 (**) 0,77 -9,39 (**) 
1997 0,74 -22,77 (**) 0,76 -9,05 (**) 0,73 -10,33 (**) 
1998 0,69 -23,53 (**) 0,74 -8,64 (**) 0,69 -10,36 (**) 
1999 0,73 -17,67 (**) 0,74 -7,67 (**) 0,74 -7,85 (**) 
2000 0,80 -11,04 (**) 0,85 -3,61 (**) 0,84 -4,03 (**) 
Model 
# Subjects 647426 129460 129460 
# Failures 347552 69750 69750 
Log likelihood -4208305 -734114 -733208 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 20.615 (0,00) 3.857 (0,00) 4.016 (0,00) 
Cox Regression Model with Time-varying Covariates (TVC) - Breslow method for ties 




Table A6.20 – Survival Analysis of Patents Maintenance Periods (Robustness estimates) 
OLS Cens. Norm. Reg. Unstratified 1 Stratified 1 Stratified 2 Random Sample 1980-1987 Instrumental Var Log 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Filing routes                                                       
RTE_ACCSRC 0,25 7,46 (**) 0,26 4,49 (**) 0,93 -4,73 (**) 0,93 -4,58 (**) 0,95 -3,33 (**) 0,96 -1,24  1,01 0,17  0,92 -5,21 (**) 0,93 -4,50 (**) 
RTE_PCT -0,10 -8,95 (**) -0,14 -6,66 (**) 1,03 5,25 (**) 1,03 6,49 (**) 1,03 5,57 (**) 1,03 2,12 (*) 1,12 8,48 (**) 1,07 9,10 (**) 1,03 5,87 (**) 
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 0,00 -2,26 (*) 0,01 14,96 (**) 1,00 -13,07 (**) 1,00 -12,62 (**) 1,00 -15,10 (**) 1,00 -5,52 (**) 1,00 -0,26  0,99 -5,70 (**) 0,98 -9,13 (**) 
DRF_CLMLS      1,01 4,38 (**)    
DRF_PRIO 0,03 5,40 (**) 0,01 1,16  1,00 -0,65  1,00 -0,36  1,00 -0,49  1,00 0,50  1,00 -1,08  1,00 0,41  0,99 -1,61 
DRF_EQUIV -0,02 -2,38 (*) 0,05 3,07 (**) 0,99 -2,34 (*) 0,99 -2,48 (*) 0,98 -4,16 (**) 0,98 -1,98 (*) 1,01 2,08 (*) 0,99 -2,71 (**) 0,99 -1,94 
DRF_HASDIV -0,17 -7,00 (**) 0,91 20,03 (**) 0,80 -18,92 (**) 0,80 -21,04 (**) 0,74 -20,33 (**) 0,79 -8,61 (**) 0,91 -5,10 (**) 0,82 -12,83 (**) 0,79 -19,69 (**) 
DRF_ISDIV -1,82 -52,72 (**) -0,12 -1,76  0,92 -4,21 (**) 0,94 -3,83 (**) 0,87 -7,30 (**) 0,95 -1,28  1,23 5,76 (**) 0,94 -3,24 (**) 0,93 -3,63 (**) 
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 0,42 42,81 (**) 0,76 45,85 (**) 0,85 -41,41 (**) 0,85 -42,08 (**) 0,87 -26,64 (**) 0,85 -18,49 (**) 0,85 -27,78 (**) 0,74 -7,30 (**) 0,86 -39,18 (**) 
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,16 39,89 (**) 0,49 61,76 (**) 0,89 -54,30 (**) 0,89 -55,65 (**) 0,89 -46,11 (**) 0,89 -23,35 (**) 0,92 -26,08 (**) 0,90 -5,25 (**) 0,78 -55,45 (**) 
IMP_VSTATES      0,96 -52,78 (**)    
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC -0,02 -12,43 (**) 0,00 1,13  1,00 -2,77 (**) 1,00 -0,06  1,00 -1,74  1,00 -1,64  1,00 1,90  1,00 -0,45  0,99 -1,89 
CMP_NPC -0,04 -13,61 (**) -0,01 -2,01 (*) 1,00 1,23  1,00 3,06 (**) 1,00 0,19  1,00 1,05  1,00 2,01 (*) 1,00 1,03  1,02 5,70 (**) 
CMP_INV 0,00 1,01   0,04 7,34 (**) 0,99 -7,12 (**) 0,99 -7,23 (**) 0,99 -4,11 (**) 0,99 -2,96 (**) 0,99 -3,87 (**) 0,99 -7,34 (**) 0,97 -10,36 (**) 
CMP_IPC4 -0,05 -9,08 (**) -0,09 -9,58 (**) 1,02 8,14 (**) 1,02 8,07 (**) 1,03 8,79 (**) 1,02 3,86 (**) 1,01 2,26 (*) 1,01 4,40 (**) 1,04 8,25 (**) 
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE -0,01 -0,45   -0,09 -2,76 (**) 1,03 3,41 (**) 1,02 2,32 (*) 1,02 1,61  1,01 0,39  1,00 0,39  1,02 2,29 (*) 1,01 1,48 
APP_CUMUL 0,00 -26,12 (**) 0,00 -18,55 (**) 1,00 17,28 (**) 1,00 16,75 (**) 1,00 6,00 (**) 1,00 8,40 (**) 1,00 20,96 (**) 1,00 14,14 (**) 1,01 7,65 (**) 
APP_OCCAS -0,35 -27,13 (**) -0,54 -25,28 (**) 1,11 19,91 (**) 1,11 21,10 (**) 1,15 21,31 (**) 1,11 9,50 (**) 1,06 7,60 (**) 1,08 9,06 (**) 1,12 19,59 (**) 
APP_CBOWN 0,09 5,89 (**) 0,18 6,53 (**) 0,97 -5,15 (**) 0,97 -5,01 (**) 0,99 -1,25  0,97 -1,98 (*) 0,95 -4,78 (**) 0,96 -5,48 (**) 0,97 -4,99 (**) 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 0,05 3,38 (**) -0,07 -2,81 (**) 1,02 2,74 (**) 1,02 3,03 (**) 1,04 5,27 (**) 1,00 0,01  1,00 -0,24  1,03 4,51 (**) 1,02 2,74 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,05 3,11 (**) 0,09 3,55 (**) 0,99 -2,24 (*) 0,99 -0,90  1,01 1,01  1,01 0,40  0,97 -3,23 (**) 1,00 0,64  1,00 -0,15 
JC-04 - Biotechnology -0,28 -16,74 (**) -0,16 -5,72 (**) 1,03 3,94 (**) 1,02 2,99 (**) 1,07 8,07 (**) 1,00 0,32  1,03 3,41 (**) 1,02 2,41 (*) 1,01 1,91 
JC-05 - Telecommunications -0,25 -9,30 (**) 0,33 7,13 (**) 0,94 -5,43 (**) 0,93 -6,73 (**) 0,87 -9,76 (**) 0,93 -2,89 (**) 0,98 -1,20  0,94 -5,21 (**) 0,93 -5,83 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media -0,04 -1,60   0,47 12,03 (**) 0,90 -10,75 (**) 0,90 -12,44 (**) 0,81 -17,79 (**) 0,89 -5,56 (**) 0,99 -0,96  0,91 -8,97 (**) 0,90 -11,29 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics -0,04 -2,42 (*) 0,12 4,29 (**) 0,99 -0,75  0,99 -0,91  0,91 -11,09 (**) 0,99 -0,97  1,06 5,73 (**) 1,00 -0,22  1,00 -0,63 
JC-08 - Electricity 0,06 3,85 (**) 0,06 2,34 (*) 1,01 1,20  1,01 1,12  0,95 -6,74 (**) 0,99 -0,54  1,01 1,20  1,01 1,86  1,01 1,91 
JC-09 - Computers -0,16 -6,12 (**) 0,19 4,26 (**) 0,97 -3,03 (**) 0,96 -3,87 (**) 0,88 -10,05 (**) 0,95 -2,04 (*) 1,03 1,92  0,97 -2,78 (**) 0,97 -3,20 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics -0,02 -1,19   0,09 3,41 (**) 1,00 -0,59  1,00 -0,52  0,90 -12,70 (**) 1,00 0,14  1,05 5,77 (**) 1,01 0,91  1,00 -0,50 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 0,22 15,46 (**) 0,22 9,35 (**) 0,96 -7,20 (**) 0,97 -5,83 (**) 0,96 -6,06 (**) 0,97 -2,27 (*) 0,98 -2,36 (*) 0,96 -5,90 (**) 0,97 -5,92 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles 0,31 19,99 (**) 0,50 19,23 (**) 0,91 -15,50 (**) 0,91 -15,25 (**) 0,84 -20,63 (**) 0,92 -6,35 (**) 0,97 -2,71 (**) 0,90 -13,89 (**) 0,91 -15,26 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 0,23 14,20 (**) 0,36 13,10 (**) 0,93 -10,59 (**) 0,94 -9,62 (**) 0,91 -10,44 (**) 0,95 -3,65 (**) 0,95 -4,88 (**) 0,93 -8,50 (**) 0,94 -9,58 (**) 
JC-14 - Human Necessities 0,17 11,40 (**) 0,44 16,94 (**) 0,92 -13,78 (**) 0,92 -13,78 (**) 0,86 -18,46 (**) 0,92 -5,70 (**) 0,98 -2,09 (*) 0,92 -12,08 (**) 0,92 -12,83 (**) 
  
  
OLS Cens. Norm. Reg. Unstratified 1 Stratified 1 Stratified 2 Random Sample 1980-1987 Instrumental Var Log 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT -0,17 -4,04 (**) -0,18 -2,57 (*) 1,05 3,09 (**) 1,06 3,52 (**) 1,03 1,21 1,06 1,63 1,16 5,98 (**) 1,04 2,21 (*) 1,06 3,53 (**) 
AU -0,99 -14,89 (**) -0,78 -7,02 (**) 1,17 6,12 (**) 1,17 6,19 (**) 1,01 0,23 1,16 2,55 (*) 1,22 5,45 (**) 1,19 6,35 (**) 1,17 6,00 (**) 
BE -0,11 -2,50 (*) -0,13 -1,74 1,04 2,03 (*) 1,04 2,08 (*) 1,04 1,71 0,96 -1,01 1,01 0,29 1,05 2,46 (*) 1,04 2,00 (*) 
CA -0,45 -9,55 (**) -0,73 -9,17 (**) 1,18 8,67 (**) 1,17 8,28 (**) 1,07 2,64 (**) 1,22 4,37 (**) 1,23 6,86 (**) 1,21 9,26 (**) 1,17 8,12 (**) 
CH -0,20 -8,00 (**) -0,18 -4,30 (**) 1,04 3,96 (**) 1,04 4,31 (**) 1,04 2,60 (**) 1,04 1,78 1,07 4,60 (**) 1,06 5,44 (**) 1,04 4,19 (**) 
DE -0,01 -0,78   -0,04 -1,48 1,01 1,97 (*) 1,02 3,42 (**) 1,02 2,22 (*) 1,01 0,66 1,02 2,09 (*) 1,01 0,81 1,04 5,57 (**) 
DK 0,04 0,63   0,42 3,99 (**) 0,90 -3,94 (**) 0,92 -3,14 (**) 0,89 -3,48 (**) 0,83 -2,94 (**) 0,92 -1,66 0,93 -2,79 (**) 0,92 -3,08 (**) 
ES -0,45 -6,07 (**) -0,86 -6,81 (**) 1,24 6,77 (**) 1,24 6,86 (**) 1,25 6,21 (**) 1,20 2,58 (*) 1,18 2,73 (**) 1,17 4,99 (**) 1,25 7,10 (**) 
FI -0,23 -4,44 (**) 0,35 3,60 (**) 0,92 -3,44 (**) 0,91 -3,62 (**) 0,86 -5,14 (**) 0,94 -1,14 0,94 -0,97 0,91 -3,59 (**) 0,92 -3,41 (**) 
GB -0,41 -18,06 (**) -0,57 -15,28 (**) 1,13 13,51 (**) 1,12 12,99 (**) 1,08 6,92 (**) 1,10 4,89 (**) 1,11 8,56 (**) 1,12 12,37 (**) 1,12 12,76 (**) 
IL -0,83 -9,45 (**) -1,21 -8,04 (**) 1,37 8,49 (**) 1,37 8,74 (**) 1,30 6,17 (**) 1,28 2,99 (**) 1,33 4,20 (**) 1,40 8,93 (**) 1,38 8,63 (**) 
IT -0,33 -11,93 (**) -0,45 -9,81 (**) 1,13 11,63 (**) 1,14 12,33 (**) 1,11 7,49 (**) 1,12 4,67 (**) 1,19 9,96 (**) 1,11 8,57 (**) 1,14 11,96 (**) 
JP -0,10 -5,46 (**) 0,22 7,63 (**) 0,98 -3,27 (**) 0,97 -4,30 (**) 0,87 -15,16 (**) 0,96 -2,33 (*) 0,95 -5,31 (**) 1,03 1,94 0,97 -3,82 (**) 
KR -0,67 -8,30 (**) -0,29 -1,83 1,03 0,54 1,01 0,28 0,91 -2,01 (*) 0,91 -0,85 1,36 1,38 1,05 0,97 1,00 0,07 
NL -0,43 -16,55 (**) -0,71 -16,77 (**) 1,17 16,32 (**) 1,17 16,63 (**) 1,21 15,37 (**) 1,21 8,78 (**) 1,11 7,27 (**) 1,18 15,72 (**) 1,18 17,06 (**) 
SE -0,74 -20,69 (**) -1,06 -17,74 (**) 1,29 17,49 (**) 1,28 16,96 (**) 1,22 11,27 (**) 1,29 7,86 (**) 1,33 12,29 (**) 1,27 16,52 (**) 1,28 17,05 (**) 
US -0,21 -6,19 (**) 0,38 6,23 (**) 0,92 -5,72 (**) 0,92 -6,16 (**) 0,82 -10,08 (**) 0,92 -2,29 (*) 1,00 0,05 0,93 -4,00 (**) 0,92 -5,70 (**) 
RoW -0,62 -37,33 (**) -0,68 -24,26 (**) 1,16 21,95 (**) 1,14 21,38 (**) 1,05 5,29 (**) 1,15 9,39 (**) 1,15 14,08 (**) 1,22 14,32 (**) 1,14 19,95 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990)
1980 1,39 40,13 (**) 0,33 6,36 (**) 1,11 9,15 (**) 1,11 11,12 (**) 1,79 2,59 (*) 1,13 4,94 (**) 1,03 2,65 (**) 1,11 8,85 (**) 1,11 9,05 (**) 
1981 1,23 38,69 (**) 0,14 2,94 (**) 1,14 12,81 (**) 1,15 15,10 (**) 2,02 5,98 (**) 1,20 7,88 (**) 1,06 5,37 (**) 1,14 12,15 (**) 1,14 12,85 (**) 
1982 1,02 33,73 (**) -0,10 -2,13 (*) 1,19 17,52 (**) 1,20 20,31 (**) 1,87 8,01 (**) 1,22 8,97 (**) 1,10 9,47 (**) 1,19 16,70 (**) 1,19 17,83 (**) 
1983 0,84 28,63 (**) -0,30 -6,74 (**) 1,23 21,60 (**) 1,24 24,32 (**) 1,88 15,38 (**) 1,24 10,09 (**) 1,13 12,64 (**) 1,22 20,40 (**) 1,23 21,70 (**) 
1984 0,64 23,00 (**) -0,52 -12,33 (**) 1,28 26,87 (**) 1,29 30,20 (**) 1,77 25,24 (**) 1,33 13,90 (**) 1,18 17,42 (**) 1,29 26,80 (**) 1,29 27,50 (**) 
1985 0,52 18,90 (**) -0,69 -16,59 (**) 1,34 32,39 (**) 1,35 36,03 (**) 1,65 33,74 (**) 1,39 16,04 (**) 1,23 22,25 (**) 1,35 32,35 (**) 1,35 32,70 (**) 
1986 0,55 20,44 (**) -0,25 -5,98 (**) 1,11 10,71 (**) 1,11 11,08 (**) 1,23 16,83 (**) 1,14 6,14 (**) 1,01 0,87 1,11 11,07 (**) 1,11 10,99 (**) 
1987 0,36 13,52 (**) -0,30 -7,27 (**) 1,10 10,08 (**) 1,10 10,47 (**) 1,20 18,03 (**) 1,13 5,70 (**) 1,13 5,70 (**) 1,10 10,36 (**) 1,10 10,36 (**) 
1988 0,32 12,53 (**) -0,16 -4,07 (**) 1,08 8,13 (**) 1,08 8,46 (**) 1,12 11,97 (**) 1,08 3,69 (**) 1,08 3,69 (**) 1,08 8,63 (**) 1,08 8,26 (**) 
1989 0,14 5,70 (**) -0,12 -3,14 (**) 1,05 5,39 (**) 1,05 5,59 (**) 1,06 5,90 (**) 1,05 2,37 (*) 1,05 2,37 (*) 1,05 5,71 (**) 1,05 5,36 (**) 
1991 -0,27 -11,05 (**) 0,03 0,81 0,96 -4,56 (**) 0,96 -4,85 (**) 0,95 -5,66 (**) 0,97 -1,36 0,97 -1,36 0,96 -4,52 (**) 0,96 -4,69 (**) 
1992 -0,65 -27,10 (**) -0,01 -0,28 0,93 -7,56 (**) 0,93 -7,78 (**) 0,92 -9,01 (**) 0,97 -1,56 0,97 -1,56 0,94 -6,93 (**) 0,93 -7,43 (**) 
1993 -1,15 -47,64 (**) -0,07 -1,80 0,90 -10,54 (**) 0,90 -10,73 (**) 0,88 -12,47 (**) 0,91 -4,07 (**) 0,91 -4,07 (**) 0,91 -9,47 (**) 0,90 -10,27 (**) 
1994 -1,73 -71,71 (**) -0,08 -2,01 (*) 0,86 -14,68 (**) 0,86 -14,79 (**) 0,84 -17,23 (**) 0,88 -5,43 (**) 0,88 -5,43 (**) 0,87 -13,11 (**) 0,86 -14,48 (**) 
1995 -2,43 -100,23 (**) -0,11 -2,78 (**) 0,82 -17,48 (**) 0,83 -17,50 (**) 0,79 -20,97 (**) 0,89 -4,64 (**) 0,89 -4,64 (**) 0,84 -15,20 (**) 0,83 -17,21 (**) 
1996 -3,21 -132,79 (**) -0,12 -2,82 (**) 0,79 -19,48 (**) 0,80 -19,14 (**) 0,75 -23,95 (**) 0,84 -6,50 (**) 0,84 -6,50 (**) 0,81 -16,81 (**) 0,80 -18,83 (**) 
1997 -3,94 -161,37 (**) 0,01 0,22 0,73 -23,36 (**) 0,74 -22,77 (**) 0,66 -29,53 (**) 0,76 -9,05 (**) 0,76 -9,05 (**) 0,75 -20,44 (**) 0,73 -22,55 (**) 
1998 -4,49 -179,24 (**) 0,18 3,59 (**) 0,69 -24,23 (**) 0,69 -23,53 (**) 0,59 -31,81 (**) 0,74 -8,64 (**) 0,74 -8,64 (**) 0,71 -21,50 (**) 0,69 -23,32 (**) 
1999 -4,88 -185,58 (**) 0,09 1,73 0,72 -18,58 (**) 0,73 -17,67 (**) 0,52 -32,14 (**) 0,74 -7,67 (**) 0,74 -7,67 (**) 0,75 -15,63 (**) 0,74 -17,55 (**) 
2000 -5,25 -184,96 (**) 0,01 0,10 0,79 -11,82 (**) 0,80 -11,04 (**) 0,46 -28,85 (**) 0,85 -3,61 (**) 0,85 -3,61 (**) 0,80 -9,65 (**) 0,80 -10,97 (**) 
Model 
# Subjects / Observations 649910 649924 647426 647426 496530 129460 170881 647469 647437 
# Failures / R² 0,27 350034 347552 347552 216510 69750 160254 347565 347550 
Log likelihood -1212577 -4323903 -4208305 -2622046 -734114 -1730575 -4211079 -4208323 
F (P>F) / LR chi² (P>chi²) 3.609 (0,00) 14.713 (0,00) 19.983 (0,00) 20.615 (0,00) 20.354 (0,00) 3.857 (0,00) 4.618 (0,00) 14.012 (0,00) 19.154 (0,00) 
Cox Regression Model by group of variables - Breslow method for ties - Stratified by reason for lapse unless otherwise specified (EPO Grants filed 1980-2000) 
  
 
Table A6.21 – Estimates of the probability to survive an opposition 
OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Instrumental Vars Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Opposition track record 
OPP_MULTIPLE   -0,65 -34,45 (**)   
OPP_ORALPROC   0,35 23,21 (**)   
Filing routes 
RTE_ACCSRC 0,00 0,19   0,01 0,11 0,05 0,77 0,02 0,30 0,03 0,43   0,07 1,12
RTE_PCT 0,00 2,15 (*) 0,05 2,13 (*) 0,04 2,05 (*) 0,08 3,55 (**) 0,12 4,08 (**) 0,06 3,18 (**)
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 0,00 6,67 (**) 0,01 6,00 (**) 0,01 6,67 (**) 0,01 7,86 (**) 0,01 1,72   0,01 10,03 (**)
DRF_PRIO 0,00 2,47 (*) 0,03 2,45 (*) 0,03 3,01 (**) 0,04 4,00 (**) 0,05 2,74 (**) 0,05 4,89 (**)
DRF_EQUIV 0,00 -0,35   0,00 -0,31 0,00 0,11 0,00 0,30 0,00 0,35   0,00 0,19
DRF_HASDIV 0,00 0,55   0,01 0,32 0,06 1,45 0,03 0,85 0,02 0,37   0,08 2,07 (*)
DRF_ISDIV 0,00 -0,39   -0,03 -0,45 -0,02 -0,28 0,00 -0,05 0,01 0,13   0,03 0,42
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 0,00 17,54 (**) 0,28 17,26 (**) 0,26 15,75 (**) -0,37 -2,09 (*) 0,28 18,37 (**)
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,00 2,83 (**) 0,02 2,84 (**) 0,03 4,89 (**) -0,21 -3,17 (**) 0,03 5,75 (**)
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 0,00 10,37 (**) 0,03 10,49 (**) 0,03 10,38 (**) 0,03 10,74 (**) 0,03 11,85 (**) 0,03 12,33 (**)
CMP_NPC 0,00 7,76 (**) 0,04 8,36 (**) 0,04 9,01 (**) 0,04 8,56 (**) 0,05 9,38 (**) 0,05 9,46 (**)
CMP_INV 0,00 0,83   0,00 0,77 0,00 0,84 0,01 1,99 (*) 0,02 4,07 (**) 0,02 3,04 (**)
CMP_IPC4 0,00 -2,49 (*) -0,03 -2,68 (**) -0,03 -2,84 (**) -0,02 -1,94 0,01 0,68   -0,01 -0,71
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE 0,00 -2,22 (*) -0,07 -2,14 (*) -0,07 -2,03 (*) -0,08 -2,45 (*) -0,09 -2,58 (*) -0,07 -2,15 (*) 
APP_CUMUL 0,00 -4,53 (**) 0,00 -4,46 (**) 0,00 -4,90 (**) 0,00 -3,41 (**) 0,00 -1,41   0,00 -4,13 (**) 
APP_OCCAS 0,00 2,99 (**) 0,06 2,81 (**) 0,07 3,32 (**) 0,03 1,32 -0,03 -0,86   0,03 1,50 
APP_CBOWN 0,00 1,14   0,03 1,22 0,03 1,06 0,03 1,06 0,03 1,06   0,02 0,97 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 0,00 -5,09 (**) -0,11 -5,10 (**) -0,11 -4,95 (**) -0,10 -4,97 (**) -0,12 -5,37 (**) -0,09 -4,36 (**) -0,09 -4,69 (**) -0,09 -4,69 (**) -0,10 -4,95 (**) -0,09 -4,55 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,00 0,38   0,01 0,45 0,04 1,94 0,03 1,21 0,06 2,37 (*) 0,01 0,48 0,00 0,20 -0,02 -0,89 0,03 1,15 0,01 0,70 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,00 -3,12 (**) -0,10 -3,31 (**) -0,07 -2,16 (*) -0,07 -2,39 (*) -0,02 -0,44   0,00 -0,08 -0,04 -1,29 -0,05 -1,82 -0,04 -1,27 0,00 -0,03 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,00 -0,77   -0,05 -0,86 -0,05 -0,81 -0,07 -1,10 -0,06 -0,92   -0,09 -1,57 -0,09 -1,45 -0,09 -1,52 -0,08 -1,30 -0,08 -1,34 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,00 -3,17 (**) -0,16 -3,14 (**) -0,17 -3,31 (**) -0,14 -2,87 (**) -0,14 -2,80 (**) -0,13 -2,78 (**) -0,14 -2,89 (**) -0,15 -3,20 (**) -0,13 -2,75 (**) -0,13 -2,63 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,00 0,55   0,02 0,50 0,02 0,73 0,01 0,42 0,01 0,35   0,01 0,16 0,00 0,14 0,01 0,18 0,01 0,34 0,01 0,33 
JC-08 - Electricity 0,00 -1,81   -0,05 -1,76 -0,05 -1,78 -0,05 -2,01 (*) -0,07 -2,69 (**) -0,07 -2,64 (**) -0,07 -2,62 (**) -0,06 -2,43 (*) -0,06 -2,39 (*) -0,06 -2,41 (*) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,00 -2,25 (*) -0,12 -2,26 (*) -0,15 -2,68 (**) -0,14 -2,58 (*) -0,16 -2,87 (**) -0,14 -2,70 (**) -0,15 -2,85 (**) -0,13 -2,51 (*) -0,13 -2,51 (*) -0,14 -2,67 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,00 1,12   0,03 1,08 0,00 -0,12 0,04 1,17 0,01 0,28   0,03 1,09 0,03 1,12 0,03 1,08 0,03 1,03 0,03 1,15 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 0,00 4,35 (**) 0,10 4,31 (**) 0,13 5,76 (**) 0,09 4,08 (**) 0,04 1,54   0,09 4,47 (**) 0,09 4,33 (**) 0,11 5,04 (**) 0,10 4,51 (**) 0,08 3,91 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles 0,00 5,09 (**) 0,14 5,18 (**) 0,14 5,23 (**) 0,12 4,67 (**) 0,08 2,69 (**) 0,11 4,45 (**) 0,12 4,67 (**) 0,13 5,22 (**) 0,12 4,59 (**) 0,10 4,09 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 0,00 6,36 (**) 0,17 6,31 (**) 0,18 6,38 (**) 0,14 5,14 (**) 0,07 1,93   0,13 5,21 (**) 0,13 5,19 (**) 0,17 6,73 (**) 0,14 5,19 (**) 0,13 4,85 (**) 





OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Instrumental Vars Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variables Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT 0,00 -0,79   -0,04 -0,72 -0,02 -0,29 -0,08 -1,38 -0,13 -2,04 (*) -0,10 -1,72 -0,08 -1,43 -0,05 -0,91 -0,10 -1,65 -0,09 -1,54 
AU 0,00 -1,20   -0,15 -1,18 -0,14 -1,11 -0,12 -0,96 -0,13 -0,97   0,00 -0,01 -0,03 -0,26 -0,02 -0,16 -0,05 -0,39 0,03 0,22 
BE 0,00 1,15   0,09 1,23 0,08 0,98 0,08 1,07 0,08 1,07   0,10 1,39 0,09 1,24 0,12 1,58 0,08 1,13 0,11 1,50 
CA 0,00 -2,72 (**) -0,23 -2,65 (**) -0,22 -2,47 (*) -0,20 -2,28 (*) -0,15 -1,63   -0,15 -1,73 -0,18 -2,09 (*) -0,18 -2,14 (*) -0,15 -1,80 -0,13 -1,56 
CH 0,00 -0,52   -0,02 -0,49 -0,02 -0,40 0,00 -0,11 0,03 0,59   0,02 0,50 0,01 0,24 0,01 0,16 0,00 -0,01 0,02 0,61 
DE 0,00 1,41   0,04 1,51 0,06 2,10 (*) 0,01 0,54 -0,01 -0,31   -0,02 -0,60 -0,01 -0,30 0,01 0,24 -0,02 -0,60 0,02 0,59 
DK 0,00 1,24   0,11 1,36 0,12 1,49 0,10 1,26 0,11 1,34   0,04 0,50 0,05 0,67 0,06 0,82 0,14 1,70 0,07 0,89 
ES 0,00 1,12   0,17 1,12 0,19 1,24 0,13 0,84 0,09 0,57   0,03 0,24 0,06 0,42 0,10 0,68 0,11 0,73 0,04 0,24 
FI 0,00 -0,01   0,01 0,12 0,01 0,08 0,02 0,25 0,06 0,64   -0,04 -0,51 -0,03 -0,36 -0,04 -0,55 0,04 0,44 -0,02 -0,24 
GB 0,00 -5,49 (**) -0,19 -5,41 (**) -0,19 -5,36 (**) -0,17 -4,83 (**) -0,16 -4,26 (**) -0,16 -4,75 (**) -0,17 -5,30 (**) -0,18 -5,50 (**) -0,16 -4,79 (**) -0,13 -3,86 (**) 
IL 0,00 -0,02   -0,01 -0,03 0,00 -0,01 0,06 0,32 0,07 0,37   0,14 0,81 0,10 0,55 0,07 0,39 0,09 0,50 0,16 0,88 
IT 0,00 0,83   0,04 0,83 0,05 0,95 0,01 0,20 -0,02 -0,46   -0,01 -0,11 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,73 0,00 -0,09 0,00 -0,08 
JP 0,00 -0,96   -0,03 -0,94 -0,09 -2,61 (**) 0,05 1,57 0,18 2,67 (**) 0,08 2,83 (**) 0,06 2,01 (*) -0,02 -0,71 0,04 1,24 0,11 3,50 (**) 
KR 0,00 -0,72   -0,17 -0,74 -0,18 -0,81 -0,13 -0,59 -0,08 -0,36   -0,11 -0,51 -0,11 -0,47 -0,15 -0,68 -0,15 -0,66 -0,11 -0,50 
NL 0,00 -1,40   -0,06 -1,43 -0,06 -1,38 -0,06 -1,64 -0,01 -0,13   -0,08 -2,32 (*) -0,09 -2,40 (*) -0,08 -2,14 (*) -0,09 -2,49 (*) -0,06 -1,48 
SE 0,00 -1,81   -0,12 -1,77 -0,10 -1,41 -0,13 -1,88 -0,14 -1,99 (*) -0,09 -1,40 -0,09 -1,44 -0,08 -1,18 -0,10 -1,46 -0,09 -1,29 
US 0,00 -2,12 (*) -0,11 -2,03 (*) -0,12 -2,10 (*) -0,06 -1,13 0,01 0,14   -0,13 -2,55 (*) -0,09 -1,84 -0,16 -3,16 (**) -0,06 -1,15 -0,10 -2,02 (*) 
RoW 0,00 -8,61 (**) -0,25 -8,59 (**) -0,26 -8,65 (**) -0,19 -6,68 (**) -0,09 -1,56   -0,15 -5,50 (**) -0,19 -6,79 (**) -0,22 -8,17 (**) -0,16 -5,97 (**) -0,12 -4,47 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990)
1980 0,00 -4,99 (**) -0,23 -4,82 (**) -0,13 -2,72 (**) -0,23 -4,89 (**) -0,26 -5,19 (**) -0,25 -5,34 (**) -0,23 -5,03 (**) -0,24 -5,18 (**) -0,26 -5,44 (**) -0,26 -5,66 (**) 
1981 0,00 -4,87 (**) -0,20 -4,66 (**) -0,13 -2,95 (**) -0,20 -4,75 (**) -0,23 -5,10 (**) -0,22 -5,31 (**) -0,21 -5,04 (**) -0,21 -5,05 (**) -0,22 -5,24 (**) -0,24 -5,66 (**) 
1982 0,00 -3,88 (**) -0,15 -3,70 (**) -0,08 -1,83 -0,16 -3,98 (**) -0,18 -4,33 (**) -0,19 -4,80 (**) -0,18 -4,58 (**) -0,18 -4,45 (**) -0,18 -4,50 (**) -0,20 -5,08 (**) 
1983 0,00 -2,81 (**) -0,11 -2,71 (**) -0,05 -1,25 -0,11 -2,74 (**) -0,13 -3,13 (**) -0,14 -3,42 (**) -0,13 -3,25 (**) -0,13 -3,30 (**) -0,13 -3,27 (**) -0,15 -3,71 (**) 
1984 0,00 -0,59   -0,02 -0,54 0,03 0,83 -0,02 -0,51 -0,02 -0,55   -0,03 -0,85 -0,03 -0,77 -0,03 -0,83 -0,04 -0,97 -0,04 -1,07 
1985 0,00 -0,55   -0,02 -0,51 0,02 0,46 -0,02 -0,46 -0,01 -0,27   -0,05 -1,35 -0,05 -1,27 -0,05 -1,32 -0,03 -0,80 -0,06 -1,50 
1986 0,00 -0,51   -0,02 -0,50 0,01 0,12 -0,02 -0,58 -0,01 -0,30   -0,05 -1,24 -0,05 -1,25 -0,05 -1,17 -0,04 -0,90 -0,05 -1,41 
1987 0,00 -0,51   -0,02 -0,51 0,00 -0,05 -0,02 -0,47 -0,01 -0,22   -0,03 -0,67 -0,03 -0,73 -0,03 -0,75 -0,03 -0,66 -0,03 -0,85 
1988 0,00 -0,14   -0,01 -0,17 0,02 0,47 0,00 -0,09 0,01 0,17   -0,03 -0,88 -0,04 -0,96 -0,04 -1,00 -0,01 -0,24 -0,04 -0,94 
1989 0,00 -0,08   -0,01 -0,13 0,00 0,04 -0,01 -0,16 0,00 -0,06   -0,04 -0,94 -0,04 -0,98 -0,04 -0,94 -0,01 -0,36 -0,04 -0,97 
1991 0,00 -0,84   -0,03 -0,89 -0,04 -0,98 -0,04 -0,97 -0,04 -0,99   -0,02 -0,54 -0,02 -0,42 -0,02 -0,43 -0,03 -0,85 -0,02 -0,41 
1992 0,00 -1,05   -0,04 -1,08 -0,06 -1,46 -0,05 -1,35 -0,04 -1,12   -0,02 -0,57 -0,02 -0,58 -0,01 -0,33 -0,05 -1,16 -0,02 -0,45 
1993 0,00 -1,12   -0,05 -1,12 -0,06 -1,51 -0,06 -1,51 -0,05 -1,34   -0,01 -0,23 -0,01 -0,18 0,00 0,13 -0,05 -1,34 0,00 -0,03 
1994 0,00 -1,55   -0,06 -1,56 -0,09 -2,18 (*) -0,08 -1,95 -0,07 -1,67   -0,02 -0,44 -0,02 -0,45 0,00 -0,06 -0,07 -1,60 -0,01 -0,18 
1995 0,00 -2,00 (*) -0,09 -2,01 (*) -0,11 -2,40 (*) -0,10 -2,37 (*) -0,10 -2,21 (*) -0,02 -0,50 -0,01 -0,29 0,00 -0,10 -0,09 -2,08 (*) -0,01 -0,16 
1996 0,00 -1,93   -0,09 -1,96 -0,13 -2,85 (**) -0,10 -2,27 (*) -0,10 -2,22 (*) -0,03 -0,57 -0,02 -0,39 -0,01 -0,23 -0,09 -1,88 -0,01 -0,20 
1997 0,00 -3,15 (**) -0,17 -3,21 (**) -0,20 -3,77 (**) -0,18 -3,54 (**) -0,20 -3,66 (**) -0,13 -2,45 (*) -0,11 -2,26 (*) -0,10 -2,04 (*) -0,16 -3,12 (**) -0,10 -2,03 (*) 
1998 0,00 -2,71 (**) -0,17 -2,74 (**) -0,20 -3,14 (**) -0,20 -3,17 (**) -0,24 -3,65 (**) -0,14 -2,32 (*) -0,13 -2,09 (*) -0,11 -1,73 -0,18 -2,88 (**) -0,12 -2,02 (*) 
1999 0,00 -2,67 (**) -0,21 -2,72 (**) -0,23 -2,90 (**) -0,25 -3,18 (**) -0,32 -3,85 (**) -0,19 -2,43 (*) -0,18 -2,31 (*) -0,14 -1,84 -0,22 -2,79 (**) -0,16 -2,07 (*) 
2000 0,00 -4,58 (**) -0,49 -4,61 (**) -0,51 -4,67 (**) -0,54 -5,04 (**) -0,67 -5,85 (**) -0,48 -4,57 (**) -0,46 -4,42 (**) -0,41 -3,94 (**) -0,51 -4,86 (**) -0,45 -4,26 (**) 
Model 
# Observations 34512 34512 34512 34512 34514 35625 35622 35625 34514 35625 
Adjusted/Pseudo R² 0,03 0,03 0,06 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,01 
F (P>F) / LR chi² (P>chi²) 18 (0,00) 1.159 (0,00) 2.786 (0,00) 931 (0,00) 881 (0,00) 503 (0,00) 668 (0,00) 887 (0,00) 784 (0,00) 517 (0,00) 




Table A6.22 – Survival Analysis of Patent Applications Entire Life (competing risks) 
Stratified Withdrawn Refused Lapsed ab init. Validated unopp. Revoked in opp. Amended in opp. Maintained in opp. Opp. Pending 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Filing routes                                                       
RTE_ACCSRC 0,91 -9,99 (**) 0,88 -9,04 (**) 0,93 -1,92  0,91 -3,01 (**) 0,91 -5,76 (**) 1,05 0,59  1,11 0,68  1,02 0,13  1,15 0,89 
RTE_PCT 0,79 -72,92 (**) 0,66 -86,64 (**) 0,80 -15,31 (**) 1,03 2,71 (**) 0,96 -6,74 (**) 0,95 -1,91  1,02 0,43  0,85 -3,19 (**) 0,90 -1,70 
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 0,99 -43,76 (**) 0,99 -26,13 (**) 0,99 -11,73 (**) 1,00 -6,67 (**) 0,99 -26,54 (**) 0,99 -6,03 (**) 1,00 -1,68  1,00 -2,48 (*) 1,00 -0,44 
DRF_PRIO 1,00 -1,54  0,99 -2,24 (*) 1,02 2,07 (*) 0,99 -2,60 (**) 1,00 1,10  0,99 -0,37  1,01 0,58  0,98 -0,80  0,99 -0,40 
DRF_EQUIV 0,93 -21,52 (**) 0,91 -26,53 (**) 0,87 -12,99 (**) 0,97 -3,67 (**) 0,96 -9,99 (**) 0,91 -5,72 (**) 0,94 -2,06 (*) 1,01 0,46  1,02 0,84 
DRF_HASDIV 0,67 -44,13 (**) 0,53 -28,50 (**) 0,55 -15,80 (**) 0,84 -9,07 (**) 0,68 -29,78 (**) 0,61 -9,22 (**) 0,70 -4,43 (**) 0,63 -5,55 (**) 0,84 -1,74 
DRF_ISDIV 0,29 -124,38 (**) 0,22 -100,63 (**) 0,21 -32,03 (**) 0,41 -36,90 (**) 0,47 -39,81 (**) 0,37 -10,85 (**) 0,46 -5,69 (**) 0,58 -3,36 (**) 0,80 -1,48 
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 0,77 -97,34 (**) 0,66 -99,19 (**) 0,80 -18,09 (**) 0,89 -10,44 (**) 0,85 -40,72 (**) 0,79 -11,19 (**) 0,82 -6,34 (**) 0,79 -8,24 (**) 0,79 -4,59 (**) 
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,92 -61,36 (**) 0,95 -23,26 (**) 0,93 -12,52 (**) 0,97 -6,88 (**) 0,87 -59,62 (**) 0,94 -7,74 (**) 0,91 -8,30 (**) 0,90 -7,61 (**) 0,97 -1,96 
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 0,99 -17,04 (**) 0,99 -12,05 (**) 0,98 -10,27 (**) 0,99 -6,82 (**) 0,99 -10,09 (**) 0,99 -1,73  0,99 -2,81 (**) 0,99 -1,59  0,99 -1,67 
CMP_NPC 0,97 -33,77 (**) 0,97 -25,49 (**) 0,94 -16,30 (**) 0,98 -10,09 (**) 0,99 -8,06 (**) 0,96 -5,70 (**) 0,98 -2,69 (**) 0,99 -1,12  0,98 -1,75 
CMP_INV 0,99 -16,07 (**) 0,99 -10,54 (**) 0,98 -5,03 (**) 1,00 -1,82  0,99 -9,50 (**) 0,97 -3,74 (**) 0,98 -1,74  0,98 -1,99 (*) 1,00 -0,30 
CMP_IPC4 0,99 -6,20 (**) 0,97 -11,08 (**) 0,96 -5,57 (**) 0,98 -2,51 (*) 1,02 6,36 (**) 0,98 -1,36  0,99 -0,80  0,99 -0,29  0,97 -0,99 
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE 1,00 0,79  0,98 -3,02 (**) 1,05 1,82  1,09 4,01 (**) 1,03 4,25 (**) 1,05 1,03  0,96 -0,67  1,08 1,19  1,07 0,61 
APP_CUMUL 1,00 21,34 (**) 1,00 10,46 (**) 1,00 -1,36  1,00 2,79 (**) 1,00 18,22 (**) 1,00 3,17 (**) 1,00 2,04 (*) 1,00 1,86  1,00 0,49 
APP_OCCAS 1,01 4,04 (**) 0,97 -6,98 (**) 0,91 -6,04 (**) 1,05 3,42 (**) 1,08 14,22 (**) 0,83 -6,77 (**) 0,86 -4,01 (**) 0,98 -0,69  1,11 1,57 
APP_CBOWN 0,95 -12,20 (**) 0,93 -11,21 (**) 0,94 -3,26 (**) 0,99 -0,95  0,96 -5,87 (**) 0,92 -2,58 (*) 1,01 0,19  0,98 -0,40  0,88 -1,58 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 1,07 17,52 (**) 1,08 12,31 (**) 1,09 5,13 (**) 1,05 2,73 (**) 1,05 8,78 (**) 1,09 2,99 (**) 1,01 0,36  1,14 3,36 (**) 0,94 -0,84 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,96 -9,16 (**) 0,93 -10,96 (**) 0,89 -5,95 (**) 1,01 0,52  0,97 -5,49 (**) 1,00 0,01  0,94 -1,52  0,93 -1,76  1,00 0,01 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,86 -33,71 (**) 0,84 -26,43 (**) 0,80 -11,03 (**) 0,77 -14,65 (**) 0,95 -7,01 (**) 0,70 -8,92 (**) 0,84 -2,99 (**) 0,75 -4,72 (**) 0,96 -0,40 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,69 -58,91 (**) 0,63 -48,63 (**) 0,61 -14,92 (**) 0,75 -14,11 (**) 0,80 -18,39 (**) 0,68 -4,87 (**) 0,88 -0,96  1,01 0,06  1,62 2,72 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,83 -29,26 (**) 0,87 -14,35 (**) 0,78 -9,04 (**) 0,90 -4,53 (**) 0,80 -22,84 (**) 0,80 -3,55 (**) 0,76 -2,66 (**) 1,03 0,29  0,86 -0,92 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,90 -22,06 (**) 0,88 -17,11 (**) 0,86 -7,33 (**) 0,91 -4,99 (**) 0,90 -14,75 (**) 0,86 -3,34 (**) 1,19 2,84 (**) 1,02 0,31  1,00 0,04 
JC-08 - Electricity 0,93 -17,03 (**) 0,89 -17,24 (**) 0,91 -5,04 (**) 0,87 -8,03 (**) 0,96 -6,56 (**) 1,03 0,84  1,10 1,91  1,00 0,04  1,12 1,27 
JC-09 - Computers 0,75 -44,08 (**) 0,70 -36,95 (**) 0,62 -16,43 (**) 0,90 -4,09 (**) 0,81 -18,96 (**) 0,72 -4,79 (**) 0,87 -1,26  0,79 -2,27 (*) 0,80 -1,15 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,95 -11,80 (**) 0,91 -14,95 (**) 0,91 -4,63 (**) 1,01 0,58  0,97 -5,51 (**) 1,13 2,91 (**) 1,13 2,23 (*) 1,08 1,48  1,09 0,82 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 1,08 18,55 (**) 1,16 23,89 (**) 1,28 13,75 (**) 1,12 6,28 (**) 0,99 -1,61  1,15 4,77 (**) 1,02 0,38  0,99 -0,30  1,00 0,07 
JC-12 - Vehicles 1,05 10,34 (**) 1,17 21,97 (**) 1,33 13,82 (**) 1,03 1,70  0,95 -8,29 (**) 1,21 5,12 (**) 1,01 0,27  0,98 -0,51  1,15 1,68 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 1,04 7,45 (**) 1,07 9,26 (**) 1,27 11,07 (**) 1,10 5,16 (**) 0,97 -4,09 (**) 1,20 4,80 (**) 1,06 1,16  0,98 -0,46  1,04 0,43 
JC-14 - Human Necessities 0,99 -2,98 (**) 1,07 10,82 (**) 1,03 1,32  1,01 0,31  0,91 -14,77 (**) 0,91 -2,77 (**) 0,91 -1,78  0,96 -1,01  1,06 0,72 




Stratified Withdrawn Refused Lapsed ab initio Validated unopp. Revoked in opp. Amended in opp. Maintained in opp. Opp. Pending 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT 1,04 2,71 (**) 1,06 3,03 (**) 0,81 -3,50 (**) 0,79 -3,70 (**) 1,03 1,94  1,10 1,19  1,16 1,12  1,21 1,91  0,83 -0,80 
AU 0,83 -13,03 (**) 0,84 -8,80 (**) 0,57 -8,26 (**) 0,72 -5,52 (**) 0,93 -2,84 (**) 1,16 0,87  1,07 0,31  0,93 -0,34  0,66 -0,71 
BE 0,99 -0,47   1,04 2,12 (*) 0,75 -4,24 (**) 1,01 0,19  0,97 -1,35  0,67 -3,85 (**) 1,00 -0,02  0,74 -2,30 (*) 0,80 -0,92 
CA 1,02 1,52   1,01 0,39  0,81 -3,91 (**) 1,04 0,95  1,06 2,97 (**) 0,87 -1,22  0,92 -0,46  0,78 -1,51  1,99 2,88 (**) 
CH 1,03 3,38 (**) 1,10 7,90 (**) 0,87 -4,06 (**) 0,87 -4,05 (**) 0,99 -0,95  0,95 -0,88  1,30 3,40 (**) 0,86 -2,24 (*) 1,25 1,70 
DE 1,00 -0,07   1,02 2,02 (*) 0,85 -7,05 (**) 0,90 -5,04 (**) 1,00 -0,70  1,00 0,02  1,11 1,96  0,90 -2,23 (*) 1,05 0,57 
DK 0,89 -6,65 (**) 0,89 -4,44 (**) 0,79 -2,82 (**) 0,94 -1,15  0,84 -6,28 (**) 0,85 -1,44  1,04 0,23  0,78 -1,59  1,08 0,34 
ES 1,04 1,99 (*) 0,97 -1,22  0,69 -4,34 (**) 1,09 1,17  1,13 3,88 (**) 1,32 1,28  0,86 -0,48  1,02 0,07  1,76 1,54 
FI 0,79 -17,28 (**) 0,78 -11,12 (**) 0,60 -6,83 (**) 0,89 -2,67 (**) 0,76 -10,07 (**) 0,65 -3,52 (**) 1,03 0,15  0,76 -1,54  1,70 2,42 (*) 
GB 1,05 7,50 (**) 1,07 7,58 (**) 0,82 -7,18 (**) 1,04 1,49  1,03 3,23 (**) 0,80 -4,73 (**) 0,92 -1,23  0,91 -1,42  1,32 2,49 (*) 
IL 1,05 2,45 (*) 1,06 2,34 (*) 0,83 -2,02 (*) 0,95 -0,69  1,17 4,14 (**) 0,82 -0,77  1,22 0,70  1,40 0,99  2,83 3,15 (**) 
IT 1,04 4,64 (**) 1,02 2,20 (*) 0,74 -7,72 (**) 1,07 2,21 (*) 1,04 3,09 (**) 0,86 -2,22 (*) 1,06 0,58  0,90 -1,15  0,92 -0,52 
JP 0,82 -38,66 (**) 0,84 -19,79 (**) 0,60 -20,22 (**) 0,87 -6,60 (**) 0,80 -30,14 (**) 0,69 -8,49 (**) 0,89 -2,00 (*) 0,74 -5,26 (**) 1,06 0,57 
KR 0,93 -3,51 (**) 0,99 -0,26  0,62 -4,81 (**) 0,99 -0,11  0,84 -3,85 (**) 0,66 -1,44  1,38 0,55  1,58 0,91  1,68 1,02 
NL 1,06 7,36 (**) 1,01 0,76  0,78 -7,49 (**) 0,94 -1,97 (*) 1,15 13,46 (**) 0,83 -3,57 (**) 1,02 0,24  0,91 -1,40  1,13 0,91 
SE 1,04 4,55 (**) 0,99 -0,84  0,75 -6,58 (**) 0,96 -1,22  1,17 10,49 (**) 0,90 -1,14  0,92 -0,60  0,95 -0,40  1,77 2,92 (**) 
US 0,86 -15,07 (**) 0,93 -4,65 (**) 0,66 -8,80 (**) 0,99 -0,39  0,79 -14,59 (**) 0,81 -2,77 (**) 0,80 -1,95  0,69 -3,44 (**) 0,95 -0,26 
RoW 0,93 -14,09 (**) 0,95 -7,22 (**) 0,70 -16,59 (**) 0,87 -6,74 (**) 0,98 -3,10 (**) 0,77 -6,67 (**) 0,95 -0,82  0,81 -3,93 (**) 1,29 2,69 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990)
1980 1,24 22,60 (**) 1,49 22,44 (**) 1,53 10,88 (**) 3,19 4,38 (**) 1,21 16,79 (**) 1,46 6,14 (**) 1,35 3,13 (**) 1,41 4,55 (**) 3,47 5,22 (**) 
1981 1,19 19,45 (**) 1,26 14,54 (**) 1,37 8,64 (**) 1,04 0,12  1,21 17,50 (**) 1,46 6,73 (**) 1,30 3,08 (**) 1,38 4,48 (**) 3,43 5,16 (**) 
1982 1,16 17,29 (**) 1,14 8,68 (**) 1,16 4,09 (**) 39,80 14,34 (**) 1,21 18,37 (**) 1,35 5,44 (**) 1,31 3,38 (**) 1,36 4,32 (**) 4,15 5,90 (**) 
1983 1,10 11,91 (**) 0,96 -2,56 (*) 1,05 1,27  0,37 -4,17 (**) 1,20 18,57 (**) 1,15 2,56 (*) 1,32 3,53 (**) 1,30 3,71 (**) 3,62 5,03 (**) 
1984 1,08 9,69 (**) 0,87 -10,20 (**) 0,94 -1,81  1,60 2,47 (*) 1,22 20,94 (**) 1,14 2,37 (*) 1,37 4,20 (**) 1,20 2,63 (**) 2,82 3,54 (**) 
1985 1,04 5,26 (**) 0,79 -17,60 (**) 0,82 -5,25 (**) 1,03 0,19  1,22 20,81 (**) 1,00 -0,05  1,31 3,56 (**) 1,36 4,50 (**) 3,26 3,97 (**) 
1986 0,91 -11,90 (**) 0,81 -16,65 (**) 0,77 -7,64 (**) 1,40 2,75 (**) 1,00 0,31  0,99 -0,24  0,84 -2,17 (*) 0,94 -0,89  1,86 1,96 
1987 0,96 -4,86 (**) 0,81 -17,25 (**) 0,78 -7,51 (**) 1,41 3,54 (**) 1,10 9,76 (**) 1,03 0,59  1,01 0,06  1,07 0,95  1,10 0,26 
1988 0,96 -4,88 (**) 0,85 -14,19 (**) 0,87 -4,63 (**) 1,95 8,08 (**) 1,06 6,59 (**) 0,94 -1,22  1,05 0,60  1,11 1,41  1,06 0,18 
1989 0,98 -3,07 (**) 0,92 -7,10 (**) 0,89 -4,08 (**) 1,69 7,19 (**) 1,03 2,81 (**) 0,95 -1,00  0,93 -0,88  1,09 1,20  1,38 1,05 
1991 0,99 -1,71   1,02 1,53  0,95 -1,64  0,57 -8,12 (**) 0,98 -2,37 (*) 0,99 -0,21  1,04 0,44  1,04 0,47  0,71 -1,10 
1992 0,97 -4,07 (**) 0,99 -0,51  1,00 0,06  0,39 -13,63 (**) 0,96 -3,92 (**) 1,07 1,30  1,13 1,21  0,91 -1,14  0,37 -2,86 (**) 
1993 0,90 -12,88 (**) 0,89 -9,83 (**) 0,95 -1,58  0,28 -19,53 (**) 0,93 -7,03 (**) 1,15 2,54 (*) 1,09 0,82  1,05 0,53  0,84 -0,61 
1994 0,81 -25,96 (**) 0,78 -21,85 (**) 0,90 -3,64 (**) 0,24 -23,05 (**) 0,88 -11,68 (**) 1,26 4,11 (**) 1,08 0,64  0,82 -1,94  0,85 -0,59 
1995 0,72 -42,20 (**) 0,68 -35,27 (**) 0,80 -7,37 (**) 0,27 -22,53 (**) 0,83 -16,16 (**) 1,43 6,05 (**) 0,98 -0,15  0,87 -1,13  0,94 -0,23 
1996 0,66 -54,50 (**) 0,62 -43,81 (**) 0,83 -6,49 (**) 0,39 -16,41 (**) 0,78 -20,41 (**) 1,55 6,90 (**) 1,02 0,13  0,62 -2,91 (**) 1,45 1,47 
1997 0,67 -56,47 (**) 0,63 -43,82 (**) 0,92 -2,55 (*) 0,76 -4,75 (**) 0,72 -23,66 (**) 1,83 8,59 (**) 0,88 -0,43  0,51 -2,78 (**) 2,09 2,95 (**) 
1998 0,77 -37,16 (**) 0,72 -32,67 (**) 1,11 3,02 (**) 1,82 10,55 (**) 0,75 -18,19 (**) 2,53 11,08 (**) 0,64 -0,76  0,70 -1,09  4,44 6,07 (**) 
1999 1,07 9,39 (**) 0,91 -8,80 (**) 1,47 10,07 (**) 5,35 29,31 (**) 1,03 1,63  3,20 11,39 (**) 0,91 -0,10  0,74 -0,61  7,73 8,31 (**) 
2000 1,69 74,08 (**) 1,23 20,08 (**) 1,85 13,61 (**) 20,52 52,07 (**) 1,62 23,23 (**) 5,81 13,97 (**)  1,07 0,07  16,30 11,26 (**) 
Model 
# Subjects / Observations 1134860 307058 35437 45073 607708 11255 11237 12020 9910 
# Failures / R² 739924 307058 35437 45073 327155 11255 5485 6453 1857 
Log likelihood -8536509 -3528083 -330884 -414823 -4034502 -92362 -45007 -53735 -14198 
F (P>F) / LR chi² (P>chi²) 125.250 (0,00) 89.541 (0,00) 9.859 (0,00) 46.289 (0,00) 33.630 (0,00) 2.792 (0,00) 749 (0,00) 819 (0,00) 1.229 (0,00) 
   
Table A6.23 – Survival Analysis of Patent Applications Entire Life (by set of covariates) 
Routes Drafting Importance Complexity Applic. Profiles No IMP_ Variables 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z
Filing routes
RTE_ACCSRC 0,85 -16,59 (**) 0,90 -10,90 (**) 
RTE_PCT 0,85 -57,01 (**) 0,78 -75,34 (**) 
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 0,99 -67,60 (**) 0,99 -50,31 (**) 
DRF_CLAIMS fitted
DRF_PRIO 0,97 -19,63 (**) 0,98 -12,42 (**) 
DRF_EQUIV 0,93 -33,04 (**) 0,92 -33,20 (**) 
DRF_HASDIV 0,64 -52,06 (**) 0,65 -48,34 (**) 
DRF_ISDIV 0,31 -119,49 (**) 0,28 -124,10 (**) 
Importance
IMP_TRIADIC 0,74 -119,55 (**) 
IMP_TRIADIC fitted
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,91 -72,81 (**) 
IMP_FWDCIT5 fitted
Technical Complexity
CMP_BPC 0,99 -29,00 (**) 0,99 -18,05 (**) 
CMP_NPC 0,97 -42,07 (**) 0,97 -37,07 (**) 
CMP_INV 0,96 -45,42 (**) 0,98 -24,38 (**) 
CMP_IPC4 0,96 -27,47 (**) 0,98 -12,90 (**) 
Applicant Profiles
APP_MULTIPLE 1,00 -0,63 1,01 1,89
APP_CUMUL 1,00 24,44 (**) 1,00 14,58 (**) 
APP_OCCAS 1,06 18,21 (**) 1,05 15,34 (**) 
APP_CBOWN 0,96 -10,64 (**) 0,95 -11,85 (**) 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry)
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 1,06 15,30 (**) 1,06 14,76 (**) 1,05 14,11 (**) 1,09 21,65 (**) 1,06 15,29 (**) 1,08 19,54 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,94 -14,84 (**) 0,94 -16,04 (**) 0,97 -7,61 (**) 0,97 -7,80 (**) 0,94 -14,48 (**) 0,95 -13,16 (**) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,76 -66,85 (**) 0,76 -66,66 (**) 0,77 -62,05 (**) 0,79 -51,81 (**) 0,74 -71,72 (**) 0,83 -40,37 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,73 -50,08 (**) 0,71 -53,36 (**) 0,73 -48,41 (**) 0,72 -49,73 (**) 0,72 -50,82 (**) 0,69 -55,80 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,83 -30,45 (**) 0,85 -26,95 (**) 0,84 -28,10 (**) 0,82 -30,73 (**) 0,82 -31,15 (**) 0,83 -29,34 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,91 -19,93 (**) 0,91 -20,18 (**) 0,91 -19,81 (**) 0,91 -19,40 (**) 0,91 -20,53 (**) 0,90 -21,27 (**) 
JC-08 - Electricity 0,96 -11,60 (**) 0,95 -12,97 (**) 0,95 -12,08 (**) 0,96 -9,20 (**) 0,95 -11,70 (**) 0,94 -15,55 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,79 -37,84 (**) 0,78 -38,45 (**) 0,78 -39,00 (**) 0,79 -36,26 (**) 0,78 -38,96 (**) 0,76 -41,19 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,98 -4,42 (**) 0,98 -4,16 (**) 0,97 -6,45 (**) 0,97 -6,06 (**) 0,98 -3,89 (**) 0,96 -9,76 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 1,11 28,54 (**) 1,12 29,86 (**) 1,07 18,36 (**) 1,10 25,59 (**) 1,11 28,98 (**) 1,11 26,00 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles 1,10 23,08 (**) 1,09 21,36 (**) 1,06 13,66 (**) 1,10 21,09 (**) 1,11 24,74 (**) 1,08 17,54 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 1,10 22,71 (**) 1,10 22,13 (**) 1,04 8,25 (**) 1,10 21,62 (**) 1,10 22,58 (**) 1,09 18,23 (**) 




   
Routes Drafting Importance Complexity Applic. Profiles No IMP_ Variables
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France)
AT 1,07 5,50 (**) 1,06 5,20 (**) 1,02 2,06 (*) 1,05 3,98 (**) 1,07 5,72 (**) 1,06 5,15 (**)
AU 0,74 -20,78 (**) 0,71 -24,10 (**) 0,70 -24,29 (**) 0,68 -26,34 (**) 0,67 -27,75 (**) 0,81 -14,43 (**)
BE 0,96 -3,54 (**) 0,97 -2,39 (*) 0,96 -3,33 (**) 0,97 -2,14 (*) 0,97 -2,19 (*) 0,99 -0,81
CA 0,88 -10,72 (**) 0,93 -6,10 (**) 0,90 -9,27 (**) 0,87 -11,98 (**) 0,86 -12,43 (**) 0,98 -1,49
CH 0,97 -4,90 (**) 0,99 -1,72 1,00 0,34   0,96 -5,30 (**) 0,98 -2,41 (*) 1,00 -0,56
DE 1,02 4,89 (**) 1,02 3,92 (**) 1,01 3,21 (**) 1,03 6,29 (**) 1,01 2,85 (**) 1,02 3,53 (**)
DK 0,87 -9,15 (**) 0,84 -11,29 (**) 0,83 -12,28 (**) 0,79 -13,76 (**) 0,82 -12,85 (**) 0,88 -7,45 (**)
ES 1,12 6,71 (**) 1,06 3,64 (**) 1,08 4,44 (**) 1,10 5,63 (**) 1,11 6,27 (**) 1,05 2,86 (**)
FI 0,79 -16,30 (**) 0,75 -20,03 (**) 0,77 -18,90 (**) 0,72 -21,24 (**) 0,76 -19,68 (**) 0,78 -16,43 (**)
GB 0,97 -4,54 (**) 0,99 -1,39 0,98 -4,03 (**) 0,96 -7,77 (**) 0,96 -6,81 (**) 1,03 5,04 (**)
IL 0,94 -3,12 (**) 0,97 -1,64 0,95 -2,80 (**) 0,92 -4,46 (**) 0,91 -5,08 (**) 1,01 0,61
IT 1,08 11,26 (**) 1,07 10,03 (**) 1,07 9,36 (**) 1,09 11,38 (**) 1,10 13,28 (**) 1,05 6,88 (**)
JP 0,69 -78,19 (**) 0,73 -64,44 (**) 0,78 -51,52 (**) 0,72 -66,60 (**) 0,69 -75,21 (**) 0,75 -55,96 (**)
KR 0,88 -6,36 (**) 0,88 -6,61 (**) 0,93 -3,72 (**) 0,87 -6,60 (**) 0,88 -6,15 (**) 0,89 -5,87 (**)
NL 1,00 0,00 1,00 -0,04 1,04 5,68 (**) 1,00 0,16 1,00 -0,15 1,03 3,56 (**)
SE 1,00 -0,54 0,98 -2,75 (**) 0,97 -4,05 (**) 0,96 -4,09 (**) 0,97 -3,51 (**) 1,03 3,81 (**)
US 0,83 -20,18 (**) 0,78 -28,11 (**) 0,82 -21,32 (**) 0,74 -29,89 (**) 0,78 -26,85 (**) 0,81 -20,40 (**)
RoW 0,78 -57,52 (**) 0,83 -43,33 (**) 0,84 -39,76 (**) 0,76 -61,74 (**) 0,76 -62,53 (**) 0,86 -31,24 (**)
Time dummies (Reference = 1990) 
1980 1,33 33,10 (**) 1,29 29,64 (**) 1,32 32,06 (**) 1,33 32,22 (**) 1,37 35,99 (**) 1,25 25,20 (**)
1981 1,28 31,04 (**) 1,25 27,82 (**) 1,27 29,86 (**) 1,28 29,71 (**) 1,31 33,97 (**) 1,21 22,66 (**)
1982 1,25 29,41 (**) 1,22 26,05 (**) 1,24 28,57 (**) 1,24 27,46 (**) 1,28 32,42 (**) 1,17 20,17 (**)
1983 1,19 24,07 (**) 1,17 21,10 (**) 1,19 23,64 (**) 1,18 22,17 (**) 1,22 27,29 (**) 1,12 14,55 (**)
1984 1,16 20,62 (**) 1,13 17,70 (**) 1,17 22,02 (**) 1,15 18,67 (**) 1,18 23,80 (**) 1,08 10,48 (**)
1985 1,11 15,69 (**) 1,09 12,71 (**) 1,13 17,16 (**) 1,10 13,24 (**) 1,14 18,51 (**) 1,04 5,63 (**)
1986 0,97 -5,06 (**) 0,95 -7,85 (**) 0,98 -3,61 (**) 0,95 -6,34 (**) 0,98 -2,71 (**) 0,91 -13,25 (**)
1987 1,01 0,97 0,99 -1,34 1,02 2,57 (*) 1,00 0,17 1,02 2,93 (**) 0,96 -5,70 (**)
1988 1,00 -0,50 0,98 -3,00 (**) 1,00 0,39   0,99 -1,52 1,00 0,34 0,96 -5,70 (**)
1989 0,99 -1,38 0,99 -1,95 1,00 -0,30   0,99 -1,45 1,00 -0,48 0,97 -3,73 (**)
1991 0,96 -5,65 (**) 0,96 -5,46 (**) 0,96 -6,55 (**) 0,96 -5,92 (**) 0,95 -6,94 (**) 0,99 -1,86
1992 0,93 -11,49 (**) 0,93 -10,31 (**) 0,92 -12,14 (**) 0,93 -10,97 (**) 0,91 -13,24 (**) 0,97 -4,68 (**)
1993 0,85 -23,22 (**) 0,85 -22,83 (**) 0,84 -25,04 (**) 0,85 -22,20 (**) 0,84 -25,83 (**) 0,90 -14,15 (**)
1994 0,77 -37,17 (**) 0,76 -39,12 (**) 0,75 -39,65 (**) 0,77 -36,82 (**) 0,75 -40,60 (**) 0,81 -28,61 (**)
1995 0,68 -54,54 (**) 0,65 -58,92 (**) 0,66 -57,67 (**) 0,68 -53,03 (**) 0,66 -58,49 (**) 0,71 -45,36 (**)
1996 0,63 -63,21 (**) 0,60 -70,15 (**) 0,61 -67,83 (**) 0,62 -64,01 (**) 0,61 -68,29 (**) 0,66 -56,02 (**)
1997 0,65 -60,93 (**) 0,61 -69,16 (**) 0,62 -67,19 (**) 0,64 -62,01 (**) 0,63 -66,13 (**) 0,67 -54,78 (**)
1998 0,76 -38,74 (**) 0,72 -47,82 (**) 0,72 -47,02 (**) 0,75 -40,75 (**) 0,74 -44,46 (**) 0,79 -33,43 (**)
1999 1,06 7,77 (**) 1,00 -0,52 0,99 -1,89   1,03 3,83 (**) 1,01 1,76 1,09 12,28 (**)
2000 1,70 76,45 (**) 1,61 69,24 (**) 1,54 62,50 (**) 1,67 71,61 (**) 1,63 70,65 (**) 1,78 79,78 (**)
Model
# Subjects 1189058 1188907 1187863 1134986 1189049 1134868
# Failures 781474 781389 780316 739999 781465 739932
Log likelihood -9083235 -9068766 -9059352 -8561107 -9084400 -8543959
LR chi² (P>chi²) 92.946 (0,00) 119.790 (0,00) 111.417 (0,00) 93.242 (0,00) 90.385 (0,00) 125.898 (0,00)
Cox Regression Model by group of variables - Breslow method for ties - Stratified by reason for lapse unless otherwise specified (EPO Filings 1980-2000) 
  
   
 
Table A6.24 – Survival Analysis of Patent Applications Time to Decision (by set of covariates) 
Full Stratified Routes Drafting Importance Complexity Applic. Profiles Add. Variables No IMP_ Variables 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Filing routes                                                 
RTE_ACCSRC 0,94 -7,62 (**) 0,86 -19,24 (**)       0,94 -8,58 (**) 
RTE_PCT 0,82 -75,19 (**) 0,88 -56,12 (**)       0,81 -81,05 (**) 
RTE_LEGREP       1,00 -1,00    
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 0,99 -65,60 (**)  0,99 -98,90 (**)      0,99 -73,19 (**) 
DRF_PAGES_DESC        0,99 -87,66 (**)   
DRF_PAGES_DRAW        0,89 -38,82 (**)   
DRF_PRIO 1,00 0,11   0,98 -15,90 (**)      0,99 -7,34 (**) 
DRF_EQUIV 0,90 -33,33 (**)  0,91 -49,39 (**)      0,90 -51,77 (**) 
DRF_HASDIV 0,64 -68,58 (**)  0,61 -81,30 (**)      0,63 -76,41 (**) 
DRF_ISDIV 0,22 -212,41 (**)  0,23 -187,64 (**)      0,22 -194,49 (**) 
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 0,85 -63,78 (**)   0,82 -92,49 (**)      
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,96 -42,89 (**)   0,94 -61,91 (**)      
IMP_DSTATES       0,99 -28,21 (**)   
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 0,98 -49,46 (**)     0,97 -70,11 (**)   0,98 -53,24 (**) 
CMP_NPC 0,96 -61,22 (**)     0,96 -68,87 (**)   0,96 -66,92 (**) 
CMP_INV 0,99 -19,72 (**)     0,97 -52,75 (**)   0,98 -26,81 (**) 
CMP_IPC4 0,98 -15,18 (**)     0,95 -42,01 (**)   0,97 -21,79 (**) 
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE 1,04 7,43 (**)      1,02 5,88 (**)  1,04 8,98 (**) 
APP_CUMUL 1,00 7,10 (**)      1,00 15,34 (**)  1,00 2,50 (*) 
APP_OCCAS 0,89 -36,66 (**)      0,93 -25,97 (**)  0,91 -33,84 (**) 
APP_CBOWN 0,94 -16,33 (**)      0,94 -18,16 (**)  0,94 -18,33 (**) 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 1,12 29,70 (**) 1,09 27,81 (**) 1,09 26,91 (**) 1,09 26,23 (**) 1,14 39,18 (**) 1,09 27,80 (**) 1,07 22,78 (**) 1,12 35,59 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,91 -24,35 (**) 0,91 -27,71 (**) 0,90 -31,90 (**) 0,93 -21,72 (**) 0,94 -18,18 (**) 0,91 -28,26 (**) 0,89 -33,97 (**) 0,90 -29,51 (**) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,76 -67,39 (**) 0,68 -108,11 (**) 0,68 -108,53 (**) 0,69 -104,52 (**) 0,72 -86,50 (**) 0,67 -114,10 (**) 0,71 -92,96 (**) 0,75 -76,33 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,58 -98,91 (**) 0,63 -85,13 (**) 0,60 -92,07 (**) 0,63 -84,03 (**) 0,61 -87,00 (**) 0,62 -85,83 (**) 0,63 -82,79 (**) 0,58 -96,03 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,76 -52,53 (**) 0,76 -54,22 (**) 0,78 -48,27 (**) 0,77 -52,13 (**) 0,75 -54,87 (**) 0,76 -54,50 (**) 0,76 -52,13 (**) 0,76 -51,76 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,80 -54,41 (**) 0,81 -52,84 (**) 0,82 -52,47 (**) 0,82 -52,64 (**) 0,82 -51,19 (**) 0,81 -52,93 (**) 0,82 -51,30 (**) 0,81 -54,20 (**) 
JC-08 - Electricity 0,88 -33,81 (**) 0,90 -30,03 (**) 0,89 -34,18 (**) 0,90 -30,07 (**) 0,91 -26,91 (**) 0,90 -29,95 (**) 0,89 -31,78 (**) 0,88 -36,40 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,65 -76,39 (**) 0,70 -66,80 (**) 0,68 -71,08 (**) 0,69 -67,23 (**) 0,69 -67,10 (**) 0,70 -66,53 (**) 0,71 -61,91 (**) 0,65 -75,05 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,91 -23,84 (**) 0,94 -17,93 (**) 0,94 -17,74 (**) 0,93 -19,66 (**) 0,93 -19,06 (**) 0,94 -16,49 (**) 0,93 -18,90 (**) 0,92 -23,13 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 1,19 46,71 (**) 1,18 54,25 (**) 1,20 59,32 (**) 1,15 45,98 (**) 1,19 53,44 (**) 1,20 57,33 (**) 1,19 53,23 (**) 1,21 58,92 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles 1,21 46,31 (**) 1,24 60,66 (**) 1,23 60,52 (**) 1,21 54,01 (**) 1,24 59,53 (**) 1,25 63,58 (**) 1,23 56,84 (**) 1,23 56,94 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 1,11 22,98 (**) 1,13 33,95 (**) 1,13 34,76 (**) 1,09 22,70 (**) 1,14 34,62 (**) 1,15 37,20 (**) 1,13 32,80 (**) 1,14 34,07 (**) 
JC-14 - Human Necessities 1,03 6,55 (**) 0,99 -3,74 (**) 1,03 7,45 (**) 0,96 -10,95 (**) 0,98 -6,94 (**) 0,99 -1,59  0,99 -2,22 (*) 1,04 10,08 (**) 
  
   
Full Stratified Routes Drafting Importance Complexity Applic. Profiles Add. Variables No IMP_ Variables
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France)
AT 0,99 -0,86  1,00 0,02  1,01 1,39  0,98 -2,37 (*) 0,98 -2,25 (*) 1,01 0,67  1,00 -0,10  1,00 0,36  
AU 0,54 -50,35 (**) 0,46 -59,33 (**) 0,45 -61,94 (**) 0,44 -63,17 (**) 0,45 -61,16 (**) 0,43 -64,27 (**) 0,45 -61,37 (**) 0,53 -47,44 (**)
BE 0,84 -14,02 (**) 0,80 -21,14 (**) 0,83 -18,41 (**) 0,81 -20,62 (**) 0,81 -19,74 (**) 0,82 -19,81 (**) 0,81 -20,98 (**) 0,84 -17,00 (**)
CA 0,80 -20,58 (**) 0,68 -38,74 (**) 0,73 -31,40 (**) 0,68 -38,30 (**) 0,67 -39,51 (**) 0,67 -39,44 (**) 0,69 -36,51 (**) 0,78 -23,83 (**)
CH 0,90 -14,43 (**) 0,86 -26,50 (**) 0,89 -20,99 (**) 0,88 -21,86 (**) 0,85 -27,16 (**) 0,87 -23,03 (**) 0,86 -24,87 (**) 0,88 -20,44 (**)
DE 0,93 -14,67 (**) 0,95 -12,49 (**) 0,95 -12,59 (**) 0,95 -13,53 (**) 0,95 -11,88 (**) 0,94 -15,00 (**) 0,95 -13,27 (**) 0,94 -15,00 (**)
DK 0,76 -17,66 (**) 0,74 -23,62 (**) 0,73 -24,71 (**) 0,71 -26,79 (**) 0,67 -29,18 (**) 0,72 -26,69 (**) 0,74 -23,50 (**) 0,76 -20,27 (**)
ES 0,80 -14,02 (**) 0,84 -12,22 (**) 0,78 -16,56 (**) 0,81 -14,60 (**) 0,82 -13,12 (**) 0,85 -10,89 (**) 0,82 -13,39 (**) 0,81 -14,18 (**)
FI 0,64 -41,99 (**) 0,64 -38,85 (**) 0,62 -43,11 (**) 0,63 -41,54 (**) 0,59 -44,34 (**) 0,62 -42,23 (**) 0,63 -41,29 (**) 0,63 -37,97 (**)
GB 0,83 -30,84 (**) 0,77 -52,44 (**) 0,79 -46,63 (**) 0,77 -53,03 (**) 0,75 -56,07 (**) 0,76 -54,60 (**) 0,77 -52,87 (**) 0,82 -38,87 (**)
IL 0,74 -16,89 (**) 0,66 -25,14 (**) 0,69 -22,85 (**) 0,66 -25,27 (**) 0,65 -25,71 (**) 0,66 -25,72 (**) 0,68 -23,99 (**) 0,73 -19,03 (**)
IT 0,81 -30,15 (**) 0,85 -27,09 (**) 0,83 -29,85 (**) 0,84 -28,54 (**) 0,84 -28,38 (**) 0,86 -23,82 (**) 0,85 -26,84 (**) 0,81 -32,94 (**)
JP 0,60 -103,37 (**) 0,53 -157,73 (**) 0,57 -137,45 (**) 0,57 -134,84 (**) 0,55 -141,29 (**) 0,52 -158,41 (**) 0,53 -149,77 (**) 0,57 -130,27 (**)
KR 0,68 -25,21 (**) 0,66 -25,45 (**) 0,66 -25,70 (**) 0,69 -23,19 (**) 0,65 -25,74 (**) 0,66 -25,19 (**) 0,66 -25,75 (**) 0,66 -24,90 (**)
NL 0,85 -22,75 (**) 0,82 -34,98 (**) 0,82 -34,87 (**) 0,84 -30,63 (**) 0,81 -35,16 (**) 0,81 -34,09 (**) 0,81 -37,26 (**) 0,84 -29,22 (**)
SE 0,75 -33,22 (**) 0,70 -47,57 (**) 0,69 -49,82 (**) 0,68 -51,53 (**) 0,68 -50,45 (**) 0,71 -46,40 (**) 0,69 -49,60 (**) 0,75 -36,75 (**)
US 0,69 -44,57 (**) 0,69 -49,99 (**) 0,64 -59,42 (**) 0,67 -52,42 (**) 0,61 -62,01 (**) 0,66 -56,16 (**) 0,66 -55,21 (**) 0,66 -50,08 (**)
RoW 0,66 -89,86 (**) 0,56 -154,46 (**) 0,61 -130,99 (**) 0,58 -142,23 (**) 0,55 -156,48 (**) 0,54 -161,65 (**) 0,57 -148,46 (**) 0,63 -117,55 (**)
Time dummies (Reference = 1990) 
1980 1,82 44,85 (**) 1,93 79,47 (**) 1,83 72,66 (**) 1,91 78,32 (**) 1,98 80,04 (**) 1,98 82,10 (**) 2,03 85,32 (**) 1,84 71,20 (**)
1981 1,56 39,61 (**) 1,67 67,52 (**) 1,59 61,41 (**) 1,65 66,33 (**) 1,68 66,68 (**) 1,70 70,26 (**) 1,77 74,91 (**) 1,57 58,03 (**)
1982 1,34 30,47 (**) 1,45 51,37 (**) 1,38 44,57 (**) 1,44 50,90 (**) 1,45 50,09 (**) 1,48 54,16 (**) 1,53 59,09 (**) 1,35 40,30 (**)
1983 1,12 12,94 (**) 1,23 29,41 (**) 1,18 23,20 (**) 1,23 29,42 (**) 1,22 27,81 (**) 1,25 32,49 (**) 1,30 37,36 (**) 1,13 17,26 (**)
1984 0,99 -0,84  1,08 11,89 (**) 1,04 5,82 (**) 1,09 13,36 (**) 1,07 10,35 (**) 1,11 15,18 (**) 1,14 20,22 (**) 1,00 -0,70  
1985 0,90 -14,74 (**) 0,98 -3,71 (**) 0,94 -9,19 (**) 0,99 -2,25 (*) 0,96 -6,00 (**) 0,99 -0,93  1,03 4,05 (**) 0,90 -16,11 (**)
1986 0,90 -14,21 (**) 0,97 -4,33 (**) 0,94 -9,54 (**) 0,98 -2,88 (**) 0,96 -5,91 (**) 0,99 -1,87  1,00 0,46  0,90 -15,29 (**)
1987 0,87 -20,14 (**) 0,92 -13,76 (**) 0,90 -18,03 (**) 0,92 -12,79 (**) 0,92 -13,63 (**) 0,93 -11,99 (**) 0,93 -11,95 (**) 0,87 -21,31 (**)
1988 0,89 -18,40 (**) 0,92 -13,45 (**) 0,90 -17,32 (**) 0,93 -13,08 (**) 0,92 -14,16 (**) 0,93 -12,79 (**) 0,92 -13,94 (**) 0,89 -19,42 (**)
1989 0,91 -14,72 (**) 0,93 -13,31 (**) 0,92 -14,25 (**) 0,93 -12,52 (**) 0,92 -13,20 (**) 0,93 -12,53 (**) 0,93 -13,14 (**) 0,91 -15,76 (**)
1991 1,03 4,14 (**) 0,99 -2,51 (*) 0,99 -1,87  0,98 -3,35 (**) 1,00 0,30  0,98 -3,78 (**) 0,99 -2,57 (*) 1,03 4,51 (**)
1992 1,03 4,27 (**) 0,96 -7,17 (**) 0,97 -5,33 (**) 0,96 -7,76 (**) 0,99 -2,22 (*) 0,95 -8,99 (**) 0,96 -7,13 (**) 1,03 4,49 (**)
1993 0,96 -6,63 (**) 0,89 -21,21 (**) 0,89 -20,76 (**) 0,88 -22,97 (**) 0,92 -15,10 (**) 0,87 -23,67 (**) 0,88 -21,41 (**) 0,96 -7,74 (**)
1994 0,86 -22,76 (**) 0,80 -38,10 (**) 0,80 -40,05 (**) 0,79 -40,66 (**) 0,83 -32,52 (**) 0,79 -41,08 (**) 0,80 -38,79 (**) 0,86 -25,86 (**)
1995 0,75 -44,33 (**) 0,71 -61,02 (**) 0,68 -66,85 (**) 0,69 -64,41 (**) 0,74 -52,94 (**) 0,69 -64,89 (**) 0,70 -62,62 (**) 0,75 -48,44 (**)
1996 0,68 -64,29 (**) 0,65 -75,73 (**) 0,62 -84,27 (**) 0,64 -80,58 (**) 0,67 -71,14 (**) 0,64 -80,74 (**) 0,65 -78,04 (**) 0,68 -66,67 (**)
1997 0,66 -71,39 (**) 0,65 -78,57 (**) 0,62 -88,33 (**) 0,63 -85,00 (**) 0,66 -74,92 (**) 0,63 -83,99 (**) 0,64 -81,28 (**) 0,67 -70,99 (**)
1998 0,74 -54,13 (**) 0,72 -58,89 (**) 0,69 -68,68 (**) 0,69 -67,08 (**) 0,73 -56,36 (**) 0,70 -64,98 (**) 0,71 -61,87 (**) 0,75 -51,64 (**)
1999 0,94 -11,12 (**) 0,92 -15,01 (**) 0,88 -23,56 (**) 0,87 -24,38 (**) 0,92 -14,50 (**) 0,89 -21,41 (**) 0,91 -16,89 (**) 0,95 -8,22 (**)
2000 1,29 44,29 (**) 1,27 42,84 (**) 1,22 35,63 (**) 1,18 29,99 (**) 1,27 42,06 (**) 1,23 36,20 (**) 1,27 42,45 (**) 1,33 49,36 (**)
Model 
# Subjects 1134856 1189054 1188903 1187859 1134982 1189045 1181836 1134864 
# Failures 1039618 1086170 1086045 1085013 1039723 1086161 1084574 1039626 
Log likelihood -12279390 -12911812 -12875160 -12892886 -12321654 -12912784 -12887200 -12283190 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 206.417 (0,00) 208.253 (0,00) 278.340 (0,00) 218.887 (0,00) 216.248 (0,00) 206.077 (0,00) 216.188 (0,00) 290.680 (0,00) 
   
 
Table A6.25 – Survival Analysis of Patents Maintenance Periods (by set of covariates) 
Routes Drafting Importance Complexity Applic. Profiles Add. Variables No IMP_ variables 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Filing routes                                           
RTE_ACCSRC 0,92 -5,43 (**)           0,93 -4,83 (**) 
RTE_PCT 1,02 4,09 (**)           1,01 2,69 (**) 
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS   1,00 -18,19 (**)         1,00 -18,11 (**) 
DRF_CLMLS           1,00 -1,94   
DRF_PRIO   0,98 -7,61 (**)         0,99 -5,58 (**) 
DRF_EQUIV   0,98 -4,06 (**)         0,99 -3,65 (**) 
DRF_HASDIV   0,76 -22,58 (**)         0,78 -20,81 (**) 
DRF_ISDIV   0,92 -4,46 (**)         0,94 -3,37 (**) 
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC     0,84 -45,53 (**)       
IMP_FWDCIT5     0,89 -56,51 (**)       
IMP_VSTATES           0,95 -61,37 (**) 
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC       1,00 -4,24 (**)     1,00 -1,31 
CMP_NPC       1,00 -1,42       1,00 0,14 
CMP_INV       0,98 -18,13 (**)     0,99 -11,94 (**) 
CMP_IPC4       1,00 -0,18       1,01 2,56 (*) 
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE         1,02 2,42 (*)   1,02 2,5 (*) 
APP_CUMUL         1,00 13,84 (**)   1,00 12,67 (**) 
APP_OCCAS         1,16 30,35 (**)   1,14 26,38 (**) 
APP_CBOWN         0,97 -4,31 (**)   0,97 -4,38 (**) 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 1,02 3,89 (**) 1,02 4,19 (**) 1,02 4,32 (**) 1,02 4,51 (**) 1,02 4,25 (**) 1,05 7,67 (**) 1,02 3,88 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,97 -5,68 (**) 0,97 -5,47 (**) 1,00 -0,55   0,98 -3,81 (**) 0,97 -5,20 (**) 0,98 -2,16 (*) 0,98 -3,87 (**) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,95 -8,07 (**) 0,96 -5,65 (**) 1,01 1,89   0,96 -5,30 (**) 0,95 -7,41 (**) 1,01 1,37   0,97 -3,96 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,93 -6,65 (**) 0,93 -6,95 (**) 0,94 -5,49 (**) 0,93 -5,84 (**) 0,92 -7,03 (**) 0,86 -11,01 (**) 0,93 -6,51 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,90 -11,41 (**) 0,90 -10,81 (**) 0,91 -10,38 (**) 0,89 -12,28 (**) 0,89 -11,95 (**) 0,80 -19,37 (**) 0,89 -11,73 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics 1,01 1,32   1,01 1,20   1,01 1,08   1,00 0,28   1,01 0,76   0,91 -10,53 (**) 1,00 -0,23 
JC-08 - Electricity 1,03 5,38 (**) 1,03 4,84 (**) 1,02 3,22 (**) 1,03 4,79 (**) 1,02 4,31 (**) 0,97 -4,47 (**) 1,02 3,40 (**) 
JC-09 - Computers 0,98 -1,97 (*) 0,98 -2,07 (*) 0,98 -2,19 (*) 0,98 -2,19 (*) 0,97 -3,04 (**) 0,88 -9,66 (**) 0,97 -2,95 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 1,02 3,88 (**) 1,02 3,93 (**) 1,01 0,98   1,02 2,48 (*) 1,02 3,26 (**) 0,92 -10,48 (**) 1,01 2,15 (*) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 1,01 1,09   1,01 1,21   0,98 -4,45 (**) 1,00 -0,70   1,00 -0,16   1,00 -0,11   0,99 -1,45 
JC-12 - Vehicles 0,95 -8,90 (**) 0,94 -9,54 (**) 0,92 -14,45 (**) 0,94 -10,15 (**) 0,95 -8,60 (**) 0,88 -16,73 (**) 0,94 -10,29 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 1,00 -0,53   1,00 -0,69   0,95 -7,85 (**) 0,99 -1,65   0,99 -2,21 (*) 0,97 -3,22 (**) 0,98 -3,35 (**) 




   
Routes Drafting Importance Complexity Applic. Profiles Add. Variables No IMP_ variables 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT 1,09 5,52 (**) 1,09 5,47 (**) 1,07 4,01 (**) 1,09 5,05 (**) 1,09 5,40 (**) 1,07 3,13 (**) 1,08 4,69 (**) 
AU 1,14 5,03 (**) 1,18 6,57 (**) 1,20 7,26 (**) 1,15 5,26 (**) 1,11 3,91 (**) 0,98 -0,57   1,13 4,70 (**) 
BE 1,02 1,03   1,02 1,38   1,02 1,37   1,02 1,15   1,02 1,28   1,02 0,83   1,03 1,70 
CA 1,12 6,02 (**) 1,15 7,39 (**) 1,17 8,15 (**) 1,12 6,02 (**) 1,11 5,42 (**) 1,02 1,06   1,13 6,50 (**) 
CH 1,00 0,34   1,01 1,07   1,03 3,13 (**) 1,00 0,08   1,01 1,25   1,00 0,09   1,02 1,81 
DE 1,03 5,10 (**) 1,03 4,57 (**) 1,03 4,34 (**) 1,04 7,00 (**) 1,03 4,14 (**) 1,02 2,50 (*) 1,03 5,01 (**) 
DK 0,93 -2,95 (**) 0,94 -2,50 (*) 0,95 -2,09 (*) 0,91 -3,47 (**) 0,93 -3,25 (**) 0,92 -2,92 (**) 0,91 -3,63 (**) 
ES 1,32 8,98 (**) 1,30 8,60 (**) 1,28 8,08 (**) 1,31 8,72 (**) 1,27 7,79 (**) 1,36 8,67 (**) 1,26 7,33 (**) 
FI 0,94 -2,48 (*) 0,95 -2,30 (*) 0,96 -1,64   0,91 -3,80 (**) 0,94 -2,51 (*) 0,87 -5,18 (**) 0,90 -4,05 (**) 
GB 1,08 9,07 (**) 1,10 11,15 (**) 1,11 12,62 (**) 1,08 8,79 (**) 1,08 9,37 (**) 1,05 4,07 (**) 1,09 10,34 (**) 
IL 1,33 7,80 (**) 1,35 8,26 (**) 1,38 8,89 (**) 1,33 7,66 (**) 1,29 6,97 (**) 1,26 5,61 (**) 1,32 7,44 (**) 
IT 1,16 14,06 (**) 1,15 13,28 (**) 1,14 12,37 (**) 1,16 13,70 (**) 1,15 13,06 (**) 1,14 9,68 (**) 1,15 12,55 (**) 
JP 0,88 -19,45 (**) 0,90 -16,59 (**) 0,95 -7,37 (**) 0,90 -15,62 (**) 0,89 -17,51 (**) 0,77 -30,17 (**) 0,92 -12,13 (**) 
KR 0,97 -0,60   0,98 -0,48   1,00 0,03   0,98 -0,52   0,98 -0,45   0,87 -2,85 (**) 0,99 -0,31 
NL 1,15 15,07 (**) 1,15 15,04 (**) 1,17 17,52 (**) 1,15 15,29 (**) 1,14 14,05 (**) 1,19 14,71 (**) 1,15 14,18 (**) 
SE 1,27 17,55 (**) 1,28 18,16 (**) 1,28 18,36 (**) 1,28 17,25 (**) 1,25 16,16 (**) 1,23 12,35 (**) 1,27 16,23 (**) 
US 0,92 -5,90 (**) 0,93 -5,86 (**) 0,96 -3,11 (**) 0,89 -7,46 (**) 0,92 -6,05 (**) 0,83 -10,22 (**) 0,89 -7,98 (**) 
RoW 1,04 6,82 (**) 1,07 11,29 (**) 1,12 18,78 (**) 1,05 7,95 (**) 1,05 8,56 (**) 0,94 -7,43 (**) 1,09 12,38 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990) 
1980 1,16 13,84 (**) 1,15 12,74 (**) 1,13 11,02 (**) 1,14 11,94 (**) 1,16 14,02 (**) 1,70 2,38 (*) 1,13 11,43 (**) 
1981 1,19 17,22 (**) 1,18 16,20 (**) 1,16 14,56 (**) 1,17 15,41 (**) 1,19 17,30 (**) 1,94 5,74 (**) 1,17 14,96 (**) 
1982 1,24 22,30 (**) 1,23 21,34 (**) 1,21 19,73 (**) 1,22 20,32 (**) 1,24 22,36 (**) 1,79 7,67 (**) 1,22 19,83 (**) 
1983 1,27 25,70 (**) 1,26 24,78 (**) 1,24 23,41 (**) 1,26 23,80 (**) 1,27 25,72 (**) 1,81 14,60 (**) 1,25 23,32 (**) 
1984 1,32 30,86 (**) 1,31 29,97 (**) 1,30 29,32 (**) 1,31 28,94 (**) 1,32 30,71 (**) 1,76 25,29 (**) 1,30 28,34 (**) 
1985 1,36 35,11 (**) 1,36 34,60 (**) 1,35 34,22 (**) 1,36 33,50 (**) 1,36 35,14 (**) 1,64 34,16 (**) 1,35 33,19 (**) 
1986 1,12 12,90 (**) 1,12 12,40 (**) 1,12 12,28 (**) 1,11 11,43 (**) 1,12 12,95 (**) 1,24 17,97 (**) 1,11 11,26 (**) 
1987 1,11 11,78 (**) 1,11 11,44 (**) 1,11 11,60 (**) 1,10 10,12 (**) 1,11 11,68 (**) 1,21 19,30 (**) 1,10 10,25 (**) 
1988 1,09 9,31 (**) 1,08 8,89 (**) 1,08 9,05 (**) 1,08 7,85 (**) 1,08 9,10 (**) 1,12 12,67 (**) 1,08 8,17 (**) 
1989 1,06 6,29 (**) 1,06 6,07 (**) 1,05 5,95 (**) 1,05 5,22 (**) 1,06 6,10 (**) 1,06 6,44 (**) 1,05 5,46 (**) 
1991 0,96 -4,52 (**) 0,96 -4,28 (**) 0,96 -4,28 (**) 0,96 -4,57 (**) 0,96 -4,39 (**) 0,95 -5,58 (**) 0,96 -4,63 (**) 
1992 0,93 -7,74 (**) 0,93 -7,39 (**) 0,93 -7,21 (**) 0,93 -7,62 (**) 0,93 -7,58 (**) 0,92 -9,27 (**) 0,93 -7,64 (**) 
1993 0,90 -11,10 (**) 0,90 -10,44 (**) 0,90 -10,27 (**) 0,90 -10,66 (**) 0,90 -10,86 (**) 0,88 -13,15 (**) 0,90 -10,57 (**) 
1994 0,85 -15,77 (**) 0,86 -14,96 (**) 0,86 -14,61 (**) 0,86 -15,13 (**) 0,86 -15,30 (**) 0,83 -18,47 (**) 0,86 -14,77 (**) 
1995 0,82 -18,64 (**) 0,82 -17,84 (**) 0,83 -17,38 (**) 0,82 -17,79 (**) 0,82 -17,98 (**) 0,78 -22,55 (**) 0,82 -17,42 (**) 
1996 0,78 -20,53 (**) 0,79 -19,66 (**) 0,80 -19,30 (**) 0,79 -19,62 (**) 0,79 -19,86 (**) 0,73 -25,84 (**) 0,80 -19,03 (**) 
1997 0,72 -23,92 (**) 0,73 -23,12 (**) 0,73 -23,13 (**) 0,73 -23,00 (**) 0,73 -23,28 (**) 0,65 -31,21 (**) 0,74 -22,38 (**) 
1998 0,69 -24,08 (**) 0,70 -23,39 (**) 0,69 -23,84 (**) 0,70 -23,40 (**) 0,70 -23,50 (**) 0,59 -32,88 (**) 0,70 -22,80 (**) 
1999 0,74 -17,48 (**) 0,75 -16,74 (**) 0,74 -17,82 (**) 0,74 -17,02 (**) 0,75 -16,97 (**) 0,52 -32,50 (**) 0,75 -16,48 (**) 
2000 0,82 -9,79 (**) 0,83 -9,05 (**) 0,80 -11,10 (**) 0,83 -9,49 (**) 0,83 -9,26 (**) 0,47 -28,46 (**) 0,83 -8,99 (**) 
Model 
# Subjects 668744 668688 668744 647471 668740 508700 647426 
# Failures 363762 363746 363762 347567 363758 224157 347552 
Log likelihood -4421369 -4420535 -4418328 -4211991 -4420822 -2723035 -4210808 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 12.492 (0,00) 13.740 (0,00) 18.573 (0,00) 12.241 (0,00) 13.482 (0,00) 15.412 (0,00) 14.218 (0,00) 
APPENDICES 
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Table A6.26 – Survival Analysis of Patent Applications Entire Life by Type of Applicant 
Occasional Others Academic 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Filing routes                   
RTE_ACCSRC 0,85 -7,82 (**) 0,92 -7,42 (**) 0,95 -0,90 
RTE_PCT 0,72 -42,86 (**) 0,81 -54,63 (**) 0,71 -14,89 (**) 
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 0,99 -19,10 (**) 0,99 -35,73 (**) 1,00 -6,33 (**) 
DRF_CLAIMS fitted     
DRF_PRIO 1,02 3,53 (**) 0,99 -3,97 (**) 0,97 -1,94 
DRF_EQUIV 0,95 -6,31 (**) 0,93 -27,85 (**) 0,89 -8,18 (**) 
DRF_HASDIV 0,63 -12,17 (**) 0,67 -42,52 (**) 0,65 -9,33 (**) 
DRF_ISDIV 0,23 -41,35 (**) 0,30 -112,12 (**) 0,20 -25,61 (**) 
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 0,77 -38,91 (**) 0,77 -89,86 (**) 0,74 -16,57 (**) 
IMP_TRIADIC fitted     
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,93 -20,60 (**) 0,92 -55,95 (**) 0,93 -11,10 (**) 
IMP_FWDCIT5 fitted     
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 0,99 -8,28 (**) 0,99 -16,16 (**) 0,99 -1,79 
CMP_NPC 0,97 -12,21 (**) 0,98 -28,14 (**) 0,98 -7,55 (**) 
CMP_INV 0,97 -11,12 (**) 0,99 -13,74 (**) 1,00 -0,36 
CMP_IPC4 0,97 -6,80 (**) 0,99 -3,04 (**) 0,96 -4,42 (**) 
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE 1,05 4,74 (**) 0,99 -1,64   0,96 -1,83 
APP_CUMUL   1,00 20,95 (**) 1,00 -2,03 (*) 
APP_OCCAS     0,97 -1,33 
APP_CBOWN 0,93 -6,00 (**) 0,95 -10,64 (**) 0,98 -0,50 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 1,03 2,86 (**) 1,08 18,84 (**) 1,11 3,82 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,89 -9,46 (**) 0,96 -8,01 (**) 1,06 1,53 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,85 -14,59 (**) 0,86 -28,77 (**) 0,84 -7,51 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,81 -10,22 (**) 0,67 -55,64 (**) 0,83 -2,11 (*) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,95 -2,86 (**) 0,82 -28,87 (**) 0,91 -1,62 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,94 -4,37 (**) 0,90 -21,25 (**) 1,15 2,61 (**) 
JC-08 - Electricity 0,96 -3,47 (**) 0,92 -17,75 (**) 1,03 0,78 
JC-09 - Computers 0,89 -7,46 (**) 0,72 -43,62 (**) 0,82 -3,09 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,95 -4,20 (**) 0,95 -10,95 (**) 1,06 2,49 (*) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 1,13 14,72 (**) 1,07 14,43 (**) 1,17 3,86 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles 1,12 11,60 (**) 1,04 6,95 (**) 1,21 3,65 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 1,06 6,32 (**) 1,04 6,49 (**) 1,18 3,95 (**) 
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Occasional Others Academic 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT 1,00 0,01   1,04 3,00 (**) 0,78 -1,52 
AU 0,85 -7,58 (**) 0,83 -7,98 (**) 0,82 -3,41 (**) 
BE 1,02 0,64   0,97 -1,80   1,38 4,79 (**) 
CA 1,01 0,58   1,02 1,04   1,16 3,00 (**) 
CH 0,97 -2,00 (*) 1,04 4,68 (**) 1,44 5,46 (**) 
DE 0,95 -4,51 (**) 1,01 2,60 (**) 1,12 2,52 (*) 
DK 0,94 -2,16 (*) 0,86 -7,25 (**) 0,98 -0,17 
ES 1,02 0,95   0,98 -0,76   1,07 0,67 
FI 0,78 -8,08 (**) 0,79 -13,10 (**) 1,69 2,50 (*) 
GB 0,99 -0,49   1,06 8,92 (**) 1,10 2,42 (*) 
IL 1,03 1,14   1,05 1,90   1,01 0,07 
IT 1,05 3,90 (**) 1,01 0,64   1,11 1,39 
JP 0,89 -8,22 (**) 0,82 -33,97 (**) 0,87 -3,37 (**) 
KR 1,02 0,45   0,90 -4,23 (**) 1,15 1,80 
NL 0,96 -2,40 (*) 1,08 9,44 (**) 1,31 4,76 (**) 
SE 1,02 1,64   1,03 2,70 (**) 1,36 6,64 (**) 
US 0,86 -8,01 (**) 0,86 -12,22 (**) 1,07 0,50 
RoW 0,86 -13,95 (**) 0,96 -8,34 (**) 0,99 -0,43 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990) 
1980 1,18 8,15 (**) 1,25 21,84 (**) 0,97 -0,38 
1981 1,13 6,63 (**) 1,20 19,63 (**) 0,95 -0,67 
1982 1,09 4,47 (**) 1,17 17,90 (**) 1,05 0,67 
1983 1,05 2,92 (**) 1,11 12,76 (**) 0,93 -1,09 
1984 1,01 0,74   1,09 10,71 (**) 0,95 -0,84 
1985 0,98 -0,87   1,05 6,28 (**) 0,99 -0,18 
1986 0,89 -6,53 (**) 0,91 -11,57 (**) 0,94 -1,23 
1987 0,94 -3,70 (**) 0,97 -4,11 (**) 0,95 -0,95 
1988 0,94 -3,63 (**) 0,97 -4,35 (**) 1,02 0,46 
1989 0,97 -1,58   0,98 -3,06 (**) 1,04 0,76 
1991 1,01 0,63   0,99 -1,94   0,91 -1,84 
1992 0,95 -2,98 (**) 0,98 -3,07 (**) 0,82 -3,71 (**) 
1993 0,89 -6,68 (**) 0,91 -11,77 (**) 0,78 -4,67 (**) 
1994 0,81 -12,18 (**) 0,82 -24,48 (**) 0,70 -6,85 (**) 
1995 0,73 -17,83 (**) 0,71 -40,88 (**) 0,69 -7,17 (**) 
1996 0,67 -22,84 (**) 0,66 -50,74 (**) 0,72 -6,36 (**) 
1997 0,68 -22,45 (**) 0,65 -51,43 (**) 0,88 -2,58 (*) 
1998 0,79 -14,38 (**) 0,76 -34,07 (**) 1,18 3,44 (**) 
1999 1,01 0,76   1,06 7,73 (**) 1,63 9,87 (**) 
2000 1,45 21,86 (**) 1,73 67,38 (**) 2,86 20,57 (**) 
Model 
# Subjects 186639 926567 25293 
# Failures 135493 591303 15497 
Log likelihood -1329447 -6698188 -117129 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 25.912 (0,00) 108.632 (0,00) 5.402 (0,00) 
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Table A6.27 – Survival Analysis of Patent Applications Time to Decision by Type of Applicant 
Occasional Others Academic 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z   
Filing routes                   
RTE_ACCSRC 0,87 -7,83 (**) 0,96 -4,80 (**) 0,94 -1,23 
RTE_PCT 0,75 -45,49 (**) 0,84 -59,53 (**) 0,72 -17,61 (**) 
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 0,99 -27,64 (**) 0,99 -57,54 (**) 0,99 -8,44 (**) 
DRF_CLAIMS fitted     
DRF_PRIO 1,03 8,38 (**) 0,99 -4,94 (**) 0,98 -2,17 (*) 
DRF_EQUIV 0,91 -12,90 (**) 0,91 -44,21 (**) 0,86 -11,64 (**) 
DRF_HASDIV 0,62 -17,80 (**) 0,65 -66,80 (**) 0,64 -13,43 (**) 
DRF_ISDIV 0,19 -60,47 (**) 0,23 -174,37 (**) 0,17 -33,79 (**) 
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 0,84 -30,61 (**) 0,85 -62,73 (**) 0,81 -13,45 (**) 
IMP_TRIADIC fitted     
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,96 -15,32 (**) 0,95 -41,49 (**) 0,95 -8,99 (**) 
IMP_FWDCIT5 fitted     
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 0,98 -23,80 (**) 0,98 -46,19 (**) 0,99 -3,89 (**) 
CMP_NPC 0,96 -21,69 (**) 0,96 -55,54 (**) 0,97 -11,98 (**) 
CMP_INV 0,97 -13,70 (**) 0,99 -15,87 (**) 0,99 -2,26 (*) 
CMP_IPC4 0,96 -12,12 (**) 0,98 -11,47 (**) 0,94 -7,44 (**) 
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE 1,04 4,28 (**) 1,05 9,19 (**) 1,00 0,14 
APP_CUMUL   1,00 11,91 (**) 1,00 1,32 
APP_OCCAS     0,92 -3,96 (**) 
APP_CBOWN 0,90 -10,28 (**) 0,94 -14,99 (**) 0,99 -0,21 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 1,06 7,53 (**) 1,13 33,01 (**) 1,20 7,86 (**) 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,85 -15,28 (**) 0,91 -23,30 (**) 1,01 0,31 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,80 -23,09 (**) 0,77 -60,47 (**) 0,75 -13,75 (**) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 0,72 -17,42 (**) 0,58 -89,94 (**) 0,76 -3,62 (**) 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 0,89 -7,10 (**) 0,75 -51,09 (**) 0,86 -3,15 (**) 
JC-07 - Electronics 0,86 -12,91 (**) 0,80 -52,99 (**) 0,98 -0,49 
JC-08 - Electricity 0,92 -8,23 (**) 0,88 -35,18 (**) 0,97 -1,07 
JC-09 - Computers 0,84 -11,56 (**) 0,62 -77,98 (**) 0,81 -3,73 (**) 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 0,91 -9,49 (**) 0,92 -21,88 (**) 1,01 0,67 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 1,21 26,66 (**) 1,17 42,26 (**) 1,22 5,61 (**) 
JC-12 - Vehicles 1,21 22,81 (**) 1,22 48,38 (**) 1,34 6,54 (**) 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 1,09 11,10 (**) 1,12 25,31 (**) 1,18 4,50 (**) 
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Occasional Others Academic 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT 0,97 -1,39   0,97 -2,86 (**) 0,98 -0,19 
AU 0,59 -26,18 (**) 0,54 -31,04 (**) 0,58 -10,85 (**) 
BE 0,96 -1,94   0,79 -19,67 (**) 1,12 1,96 
CA 0,84 -9,55 (**) 0,78 -18,42 (**) 0,91 -2,20 (*) 
CH 0,93 -5,56 (**) 0,88 -18,61 (**) 1,31 4,43 (**) 
DE 0,93 -7,98 (**) 0,93 -16,63 (**) 1,02 0,59 
DK 0,78 -9,59 (**) 0,75 -17,70 (**) 1,01 0,06 
ES 0,82 -9,25 (**) 0,75 -12,63 (**) 0,82 -2,26 (*) 
FI 0,66 -16,60 (**) 0,63 -33,43 (**) 1,40 1,72 
GB 0,82 -17,69 (**) 0,82 -32,57 (**) 0,91 -2,73 (**) 
IL 0,78 -10,08 (**) 0,71 -13,69 (**) 0,81 -3,55 (**) 
IT 0,87 -12,37 (**) 0,78 -32,93 (**) 0,91 -1,60 
JP 0,68 -30,36 (**) 0,60 -107,01 (**) 0,74 -8,51 (**) 
KR 0,74 -8,83 (**) 0,68 -19,33 (**) 0,89 -1,80 
NL 0,93 -4,69 (**) 0,83 -26,75 (**) 1,06 1,23 
SE 0,79 -18,20 (**) 0,74 -28,19 (**) 0,89 -2,70 (**) 
US 0,68 -22,83 (**) 0,69 -38,73 (**) 1,05 0,41 
RoW 0,63 -47,56 (**) 0,67 -89,31 (**) 0,70 -14,84 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990) 
1980 1,45 19,04 (**) 1,94 69,09 (**) 1,60 5,65 (**) 
1981 1,33 15,71 (**) 1,60 53,76 (**) 1,28 3,12 (**) 
1982 1,17 8,71 (**) 1,36 37,15 (**) 1,33 4,21 (**) 
1983 1,02 1,35   1,13 15,58 (**) 0,93 -1,20 
1984 0,92 -4,84 (**) 0,99 -0,89   0,90 -1,71 
1985 0,86 -9,13 (**) 0,89 -15,28 (**) 0,90 -2,04 (*) 
1986 0,87 -8,34 (**) 0,90 -13,96 (**) 0,89 -2,24 (*) 
1987 0,85 -10,35 (**) 0,88 -18,53 (**) 0,85 -3,23 (**) 
1988 0,89 -7,89 (**) 0,89 -17,55 (**) 0,97 -0,56 
1989 0,92 -5,83 (**) 0,91 -14,52 (**) 1,04 0,81 
1991 1,02 1,49   1,03 4,25 (**) 0,90 -2,44 (*) 
1992 0,97 -2,15 (*) 1,04 6,81 (**) 0,77 -5,88 (**) 
1993 0,91 -6,28 (**) 0,97 -4,78 (**) 0,75 -6,65 (**) 
1994 0,82 -13,80 (**) 0,88 -20,05 (**) 0,69 -8,60 (**) 
1995 0,76 -18,92 (**) 0,77 -41,50 (**) 0,71 -8,06 (**) 
1996 0,69 -26,08 (**) 0,70 -55,50 (**) 0,72 -7,88 (**) 
1997 0,70 -25,13 (**) 0,71 -54,88 (**) 0,90 -2,65 (**) 
1998 0,83 -13,43 (**) 0,84 -28,20 (**) 1,20 4,51 (**) 
1999 1,11 7,06 (**) 1,19 27,02 (**) 1,73 13,12 (**) 
2000 1,60 32,07 (**) 1,93 99,87 (**) 2,96 24,93 (**) 
Model 
# Subjects 186638 926564 25293 
# Failures 174873 847182 20651 
Log likelihood -1709739 -9661152 -155671 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 48.570 (0,00) 243.296 (0,00) 9.222 (0,00) 
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Table A6.28 – Survival Analysis of Patents Maintenance Periods by Type of Applicant 
Occasional Others Academic 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Filing routes                   
RTE_ACCSRC 0,92 -2,12 (*) 0,93 -3,96 (**) 1,02 0,16 
RTE_PCT 1,05 4,23 (**) 1,02 3,11 (**) 1,02 0,44 
Drafting 
DRF_CLAIMS 1,00 -2,95 (**) 1,00 -10,74 (**) 0,99 -3,72 (**) 
DRF_CLAIMS fitted     
DRF_PRIO 1,00 -0,23   1,00 -0,57   0,98 -0,64 
DRF_EQUIV 1,00 0,34   0,99 -2,30 (*) 1,01 0,23 
DRF_HASDIV 0,71 -6,33 (**) 0,81 -16,79 (**) 0,76 -3,69 (**) 
DRF_ISDIV 0,89 -1,99 (*) 0,95 -2,63 (**) 0,94 -0,48 
Importance 
IMP_TRIADIC 0,84 -17,88 (**) 0,85 -36,19 (**) 0,79 -7,17 (**) 
IMP_TRIADIC fitted     
IMP_FWDCIT5 0,90 -17,51 (**) 0,89 -49,13 (**) 0,91 -7,91 (**) 
IMP_FWDCIT5 fitted     
Technical Complexity 
CMP_BPC 1,00 0,56   1,00 -0,38   0,99 -0,95 
CMP_NPC 1,00 -1,10   1,01 4,22 (**) 1,00 -0,60 
CMP_INV 0,98 -5,20 (**) 0,99 -5,39 (**) 1,00 0,08 
CMP_IPC4 1,01 1,43   1,02 7,24 (**) 1,02 1,10 
Applicant Profiles 
APP_MULTIPLE 1,11 6,38 (**) 0,98 -2,48 (*) 0,94 -1,68 
APP_CUMUL   1,00 15,12 (**) 1,00 -2,63 (**) 
APP_OCCAS     1,03 0,77 
APP_CBOWN 0,96 -2,43 (*) 0,98 -3,04 (**) 1,00 -0,07 
EPO Joint Clusters (Reference = Organic Chemistry) 
JC-01 - Industrial Chemistry 0,98 -1,26   1,02 3,94 (**) 0,99 -0,21 
JC-03 - Polymers 0,95 -2,81 (**) 1,00 -0,72   1,16 2,71 (**) 
JC-04 - Biotechnology 0,92 -4,45 (**) 1,04 5,69 (**) 0,91 -2,29 (*) 
JC-05 - Telecommunications 1,07 1,59   0,92 -6,50 (**) 0,76 -1,56 
JC-06 - Audio/Video/Media 1,02 0,67   0,89 -11,76 (**) 0,87 -1,21 
JC-07 - Electronics 1,08 3,29 (**) 0,99 -1,74   1,24 2,43 (*) 
JC-08 - Electricity 1,00 0,10   1,01 0,89   1,04 0,67 
JC-09 - Computers 1,07 2,13 (*) 0,95 -4,26 (**) 0,88 -1,01 
JC-10 - Measuring Optics 1,03 1,81   0,99 -1,54   1,15 3,41 (**) 
JC-11 - Handling & Processing 1,01 0,44   0,97 -5,25 (**) 1,05 0,88 
JC-12 - Vehicles 0,99 -0,86   0,90 -14,76 (**) 1,01 0,17 
JC-13 - Civil Engineering 0,98 -1,47   0,94 -8,74 (**) 1,19 2,88 (**) 
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Occasional Others Academic 
Variables H.R. z H.R. z H.R. z 
Country of residence of applicants (Reference = France) 
AT 1,01 0,21   1,08 3,99 (**) 0,68 -1,61 
AU 1,17 4,24 (**) 1,17 3,87 (**) 1,02 0,24 
BE 0,99 -0,17   1,06 2,97 (**) 0,76 -1,77 
CA 1,09 2,49 (*) 1,20 7,62 (**) 1,26 2,48 (*) 
CH 0,98 -0,79   1,06 4,92 (**) 1,19 1,75 
DE 0,99 -0,75   1,03 4,40 (**) 1,01 0,17 
DK 0,98 -0,54   0,89 -3,50 (**) 0,96 -0,16 
ES 1,18 3,66 (**) 1,27 5,39 (**) 1,45 1,84 
FI 0,89 -2,41 (*) 0,93 -2,49 (*) 4,13 2,44 (*) 
GB 1,05 2,66 (**) 1,13 12,29 (**) 1,15 2,04 (*) 
IL 1,43 6,55 (**) 1,32 4,96 (**) 1,04 0,32 
IT 1,14 6,39 (**) 1,13 9,26 (**) 1,30 2,42 (*) 
JP 1,06 2,75 (**) 0,97 -3,57 (**) 0,92 -1,40 
KR 1,46 4,51 (**) 0,85 -2,68 (**) 1,28 1,72 
NL 0,97 -1,20   1,22 18,25 (**) 0,93 -0,67 
SE 1,30 11,05 (**) 1,21 9,92 (**) 1,61 5,91 (**) 
US 1,00 -0,07   0,89 -6,56 (**) 0,95 -0,22 
RoW 1,14 7,69 (**) 1,15 18,87 (**) 1,21 4,22 (**) 
Time dummies (Reference = 1990) 
1980 1,17 5,71 (**) 1,10 7,74 (**) 1,02 0,23 
1981 1,16 5,77 (**) 1,14 11,96 (**) 1,16 1,48 
1982 1,20 7,18 (**) 1,20 16,68 (**) 1,14 1,39 
1983 1,24 8,44 (**) 1,23 20,02 (**) 1,33 3,45 (**) 
1984 1,29 10,37 (**) 1,29 25,41 (**) 1,32 3,28 (**) 
1985 1,32 11,48 (**) 1,35 30,48 (**) 1,44 4,77 (**) 
1986 1,09 3,60 (**) 1,11 10,18 (**) 1,24 2,81 (**) 
1987 1,09 3,56 (**) 1,11 9,82 (**) 1,12 1,41 
1988 1,08 3,24 (**) 1,08 7,44 (**) 1,08 1,05 
1989 1,02 0,99   1,06 5,51 (**) 1,02 0,27 
1991 0,99 -0,22   0,95 -4,95 (**) 1,02 0,31 
1992 0,94 -2,42 (*) 0,93 -7,16 (**) 0,95 -0,65 
1993 0,94 -2,46 (*) 0,90 -10,15 (**) 0,95 -0,65 
1994 0,91 -3,83 (**) 0,85 -13,96 (**) 0,93 -0,89 
1995 0,88 -4,64 (**) 0,82 -16,51 (**) 0,94 -0,71 
1996 0,88 -4,42 (**) 0,78 -18,50 (**) 0,99 -0,11 
1997 0,78 -7,47 (**) 0,73 -21,02 (**) 0,86 -1,39 
1998 0,78 -6,88 (**) 0,68 -22,22 (**) 0,82 -1,69 
1999 0,83 -4,58 (**) 0,72 -16,99 (**) 0,76 -2,05 (*) 
2000 0,97 -0,67   0,77 -11,59 (**) 0,94 -0,41 
Model 
# Subjects 93050 545749 10198 
# Failures 53637 289711 5041 
Log likelihood -545294 -3458594 -40195193 
LR chi² (P>chi²) 2.340 (0,00) 16.306 (0,00) 501 (0,00) 
 
